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ABSTRACT 
How CAN organisations make ‘good’ people do ‘bad’ things? This question has become 
more pertinent with rising cases of corporate scandals emphasising the importance of 
understanding the role of organisational context in behavioural ethics involving individuals 
and groups in organisational sociology. Few empirical studies exist in the literature that 
examines the role of context in workplace morality of employees and managers. This 
dissertation aims to develop this research on the role of context in morality, by offering an 
exploration of bureaucracy and its effects on employee morality drawing on two theories: 
Moral Identity Theory (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and Kohlberg’s (1961) Cognitive Moral 
Development (CMD). 
My key findings suggest that a bureaucracy is not merely a cluster of related characteristics 
or general typology as it is often abstracted in the literature and relevant theory (e.g Weber, 
1978). Instead, even within the characteristics of a common type, there are subtle 
differences. Six multinational pharmaceuticals paired into three matched case groups were 
investigated along two Weberian dimensions - Rules and Managerial Control from which four 
different hybrids of bureaucracies were discovered namely: Traditional Bureaucracy (a 
context of strict rule-based compliance and personalised managerial control); Caste 
Bureaucracy (a culturally charged rule-based bureaucracy that fosters a caste controlled 
structure); Charismatic Bureaucracy (a system of unwritten rules and personalised 
managerial control underpinned by the charisma of leaders) and Entrepreneurial 
Bureaucracy (a hierarchical structure without rules and managerial control supporting 
opportunism). 
The effects of these hybrids on employee morality were found to be generally negative 
except the charismatic bureaucracy, which encouraged moral awareness in employees 
through the visible charisma of its leaders. Other hybrids typically encouraged a general 
pattern of inflated moral identity through rule compliance for instance that inspired an inflated 
sense of moral and professional competence in employees. By this, the bureaucracies were 
discovered to encourage conventional reasoning level (Kohlberg Stage 3) in individual 
employees such that conformity is the norm, to the detriment of individual critical moral 
inquiry - the vital component of ethics. Finally, all these helped the bureaucracies 
influence an overwhelming number of persons within them to become socialised in 
displaying loyalty to their organisations rather than to their professions, implying that the 
bureaucracies encouraged ‘expertise’ over ‘professionalism’ (Koehn, 2006). It was therefore 
concluded that for bureaucracies to empower employee morality, tacit means rather than 
explicit rule compliance methods must be employed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background 
Increasing interests in ethical decision making in organisations have been linked to 
repeated incidents of corporate scandals in recent history. The Enron saga tops the 
list, with others such as the Tyco scandal, HealthSouth’s mismanagement and 
Parmalat’s corruption shame also drawing considerable attention (Healy and Krishna, 
2003; Chaubey, 2006). More recently, the Petrobras oil scandal in Brazil (Leahy, 
2016), Volkswagen carbon emission scandal (Gates, Ewing, Russell and Watkins, 
2016), Tesco’s overstated profit (Ruddick, 2016) and the drug trials in France (BBC, 
2016) have further highlighted the critical importance of understanding morality in the 
work place. The kind of people, usually senior executives, involved in these scandals 
raises further curiosity. For example, Anand, Ashforth & Joshi, (2004) in their study 
observed that most corporate acts of wrongdoing reported in corporations are 
perpetrated by individuals via senior and through middle management who are 
upstanding members of society, giving to charities, are caring parents and don’t 
share the image of typical criminals.  
More puzzling also is the finding of Elm and Nichols, (1993) that older individuals in 
management roles have been found to display lower moral judgement than younger, 
less experienced employees. This has since been confirmed by other studies like 
that of Trevino and Weaver, (2003). These findings are troublesome, since they 
demonstrate that management role holders may not be ethical role models in 
business organisations, which may also help raise concern with the kind of broader 
moral context in organisations and its effects for employee morality. Hence we can 
reasonably infer there are more forces at work beyond the individual, which has 
been supported by behavioural ethics theories (Weaver, 2006; Crane and Matten, 
2010). This is further buttressed by empirical findings that confirm individual moral 
reasoning to be lower in work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas 
(Weber, 1990; Elm & Nichols, 1993; Adewale, 2011).  
All these findings emphasize the role of contextual elements in shaping the morality 
of workers and have led to the emergence of a growing literature on psychological 
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mechanisms that enable ethical behaviour in business roles (Harman, 2003; Doris, 
1998). As such Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, (2006) in a comprehensive literature 
review of behavioural ethics in organisations suggested that subsequent research in 
this field should focus on the role contexts play in shaping the ethics of workers and 
the key contextual factors and variables which interact with moral identity. This study 
aims to contribute to knowledge in this regard. 
1.1 Introduction  
We understand from existing literature that the complex nature of ethical decision 
making in organisations is a function of the interaction between actors (individuals) 
and the organisation’s environment (contextual factors) (Ford and Richardson, 1994; 
O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005; Weaver, 2006; Trevino et al 2006; Verbeke, 
Ouwerkerk & Peelen, 1996). This interaction could evolve into a highly complex 
series of interdependent relationships depending on the nature of the contextual 
factors and dimensions of individuality studied in the process.  
1.1.1 Bureaucratic Context 
One very important contextual variable is an organisation’s structure which Stephens 
and Lewin, (1992) identified could manifest in different forms particularly 
bureaucracies (Weber, 1948). Bureaucratic context has been specifically identified to 
causally impact ethics and morality in the workplace (Bauman, 1983, 1993, Verbeke 
et al, 1996; Ten Bos, 1997; Schein, 2004 Trevino et al, 2006; Weaver, 2006, Martin 
and Cullen, 2006; Parboteeah and Kapp, 2008; Chen et al, 2010).  Despite well-
documented evidence of this impact, bureaucracy has actually been exposed to 
limited empirical research in this regard, hence, its specific consequences for ethical 
decision making remains unclear (Weaver at al, 2006; Crane and Matten, 2010). 
This research will be attempting to make a contribution towards this gap in 
knowledge. Also, given the large expanse of work in the literature on bureaucracy 
and its many facets, this study gives careful consideration to one of its core 
foundational tenets – the legal-rational decision making concept believed to be at the 
epicentre of bureaucratic morality discourse (Adler & Borys, 1996). As Clegg and 
Baumeler (2010) explained, the highly technical rationality which bureaucracy 
encourages is the essential fabric of its metaphoric ‘iron cage’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) description. It has also been claimed by some scholars to represent a high 
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form of irrationality (Humell, 1998) despite its overly rational façade (Abrahamson 
and Baumard, 2008). With irrationality, ethical issues become noticeable, and this 
provides useful grounds to critically evaluate bureaucratic morality. 
1.1.2 The role of individuals in the organisational decision making processes 
On the other hand, studies on morality at the individual level in the literature have 
been dominated by Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development (CMD) theoretical 
approach (Kohlberg, 1969; Treviño, 1986; Trevino, 1990) further developed by Rest 
and his colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). They came up with a 
widely accepted four-stage process involved in ethical decision-making as shown in 
figure 1 below:  
Figure 1.1: Rest’s Ethical Decision making process framework 
 
Source: Adapted from Rest, (1994) 
Associated with the above, two research lines are most prominent.  On one hand 
research that closely relates to the assumptions associated with the above process 
framework and the work of Rest (1994) and Kohlberg (1961). These emphasize the 
role of personal cognitive maturity for each of the above stages  (Sparks and Hunt, 
1998; Jones, 1991; Hare, 1991; Reynolds, 2006; Loe, Ferrell & Mansfield, 2000; 
Frey, 2000; Khatri and Ng, 2000; Haidt, 2001; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Salvador and 
Folger 2009). Kohlberg’s (1961) CMD is a strong predictor of ethical behaviour 
(Weaver, 2006) when it comes to individual moral reasoning capacity. Thus, a 
qualitative approximation of Kohlberg’s CMD assumptions will be one of the 
theoretical lenses to be employed in this study.  
In a second competing line of research, the concept of moral identity (Blasi, 1983, 
1984, 2005; Aquino and Reed, 2002) surfaced and has become increasingly popular 
as another explanatory theory in the behavioural ethics especially amid research 
lines that focus on the importance of the sociology of organisations and social 
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aspects of individual identity for organisational ethics. (Blasi, 1983; Bergman, 2004; 
Hoffman, 2000; Walker, 2004; Shao, Aquino and Freeman, 2008). These 
researchers have attempted to show that the strength of the relationship between 
moral reasoning and moral action maybe at best moderate in all tested scenarios. 
Besides moral capacities, it has been proposed that individual moral (social) identity 
is thus strongly influencing in the ethical decision making process (Aquino and Reed, 
2002; Trevino, 1990; Rest, 1991; Weaver, 2006). At the identity level of studying 
individuals, the question to be answered is “Who am I?”  This is the whole concept of 
self which according to Markus & Wurf, (1987) is the interpretive structure that 
mediates most significant intrapersonal processes (including information processing, 
affect and motivation) and a wide variety of interpersonal processes (including social 
perception, choice of situation among others). It is also essentially regarded as a 
self-regulation mechanism of how individuals control and direct their own actions. 
Many recent studies (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 2005) have begun looking actively 
into identity based moral motivation for greater insight into the complex human 
ethical decision making process, from which the construct of moral identity emerged. 
Hence inasmuch as morality is central to a person, the chances of acting morally 
become higher (Blasi, 1999). If however he falters, it is simply a betrayal of self. As a 
second lens, the moral identity theory will also be employed in understanding 
individual morality within the bureaucratic contexts. 
Thus, building on these increasingly popular bodies of work, this study will be 
examining the role of bureaucratic context in affecting employee (and to some extent) 
managerial morality in the workplace.  Overall however it has been noted that the 
relationship between contextual factors and individual capacities is a delicate and 
intertwined phenomenon, which may also be explaining why this dissertation has 
relied on qualitative research methods for the exploration of the phenomenon.  
1.2 Aim of the Study 
As established, contexts are known to influence moral behaviour and actions 
(Weaver, 2006), especially with findings in the ethical decision making literature that 
have established employees adopt lower levels of morality at work than they do at 
home (Elms and Nichol, 1993; Adewale, 2011). As such, bureaucracy being a major 
contextual fabric in our organisations by which work is organised has been widely 
reported to have negative impacts on the moral capacities of employees working in 
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them (Merton, 1968; Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 1998). However, there is little empirical 
evidence for this (Jackall, 1988). This study therefore aims to investigate the 
interaction between bureaucratic contexts and employees’ moral identity in affecting 
moral behaviour. This study aims to clarify existing claims about the negative effects 
of bureaucratic environments on employee morality but also intends to uncover the 
specific mechanisms by which the bureaucracies do this.  
1.3 Research Questions 
Broad Research Question: How do contextual variables and in particular 
bureaucracy shape employee morality?  
1. How does bureaucracy’s emphasis on bureaucratic rationality influence 
(enhance or supress) moral action as manifested in various types and 
contexts of real world bureaucracy?  
2. How do bureaucratic context’s key features influence individuals’ moral 
identity, and how may such effects differ vis-à-vis individuals with salient 
moral identity, versus individuals with weaker moral identity? 
3. How do bureaucratic context’s key features affect individual moral reasoning 
dynamics in the workplace? 
4. How does bureaucratic context influence the quality of the professional 
workplace ethics? 
1.4 Propositions 
Three propositions will be explored in this study as follows: 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of 
moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and 
rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and 
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values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak 
moral identity 
1.5 Study Design  
This study will be adopting a case study design that allows a combination of some 
correlational design within a qualitative descriptive design method. It will be thus a 
mixed method study with a salient qualitative method focus. The correlational nature 
of this study will aim at exploring the strength of employees’ moral identities and 
nature of their bureaucratic environments using a carefully devised survey tool. On 
the other hand, the descriptive aspect of the study, will aim at using semi-structured 
interviews to explore the interactions going on between the employees and their 
work environments with a view to understanding the likely impacts of the former on 
their moral behaviours. This provides deeper insights into contextual issues not 
discovered from the survey instrument. Thus, this study will be drawing on some 
quantitative data but predominantly qualitative data, allowing for a triangulation of 
methods. Hitherto, studies in the organisational ethics literature have adopted purely 
quantitative data in correlational designs. This study intends going further by 
including a descriptive design that would require qualitative data set to enrich our 
understanding of the relationships not captured at the correlational stage. In this 
regard, the case study design allows for this multiplicity of methods and data and will 
be the chosen design framework for this study. As Yin, (2003) posited, case study 
design ‘allows the researcher to explore individuals or organisations, simple through 
complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs’ using a variety of 
data sources. It thus helps in the holistic understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied, with each data source being one piece of a ‘puzzle’ that will be converged at 
the analysis stage (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
1.6 Assumptions, Limitations and Scope  
In a qualitative study of this nature, it may be assumed that participants will answer 
all questions honestly and accurately without holding back useful information. 
Despite the limited use of objective quantitative measures the qualitative study has 
to rely on the subjects’ and the researchers’ integrity in sharing and reporting key 
patterns. It will also be assumed that the subjects’ opinions are reliable based on 
their true personal experiences within the bureaucracies and this to the best of their 
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abilities. The main potential limitation in this study is researcher’s bias due to 
personal links to the wider local context in which the study is taking place. The 
specific nature of this researcher bias will be further discussed in the methodology 
chapter (Chapter 4) including how it was controlled throughout the study. Perceptual 
misrepresentations are also a possibility in qualitative studies. Also, this study takes 
place in a context that could be particularly difficult to navigate and thus the 
projected number of participants could be restricted. The generalizability of the study 
could also be a potential limitation, even though the robust case study design 
employed in this study considered this. 
1.7 Breakdown of Dissertation Chapters  
Chapter one presents a broad overview of this entire dissertation. It begins with a 
background to this study, which explores the gaps the research intends to fill. It then 
presents the aim of the study, research questions as well as the assumptions, 
limitations and scope of the study.  
Chapter two is the first of two literature review chapters. This chapter critically 
discusses the literature on bureaucracy and bureaucratic morality. It begins by 
presenting a history of bureaucracy and its evolution in the 20th century business 
landscape. Then the specific conceptualisation of bureaucracy to be adopted in this 
study was discussed amongst the possible concepts available in literature. Weber’s 
ideal type is unveiled and discussed in great detail as the adopted perspective in this 
study. The morality of bureaucracy is then explored with all previous empirical 
studies also presented in the process. It concludes with the moral impact of Weber’s 
bureaucracy and more specifically the likely impact of two key Weberian features on 
employee morality.  
Chapter three is a succinct literature review on ethical decision-making. The various 
theoretical approaches in descriptive ethics were first discussed with a clear focus on 
Kohlberg’s CMD and the moral identity theory. Then both are discussed in the 
context of bureaucracies from which the contributions of both CMD and Moral 
Identity theories are offered. Finally the three propositions to be explored in this 
study are also presented.  
Chapter four introduces and critically discusses how this research was designed and 
executed. It begins by reiterating the overall aim of this research and the research 
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paradigm employed in this study. Subsequent sections provide discussions on the 
choice of a qualitative research approach; the case study design employed in the 
study as well as all data collection tools including interviews, questionnaire, and field 
notes. Further, details of participants in this study, sampling methods employed, and 
a comprehensive description of interview settings, are also discussed. Beyond these, 
the final sections of this chapter present thematic analysis as the data analysis 
method and how themes were generated in this study. Other issues discussed 
include the ethical considerations for this study, researcher’s bias and limitations in 
the process of executing the study. It concludes with a reflexive piece by the 
researcher. 
Chapter five offers a critical description of the research context. It begins by profiling 
the economic, social and institutional environment of the country, Nigeria. Next, a 
history of scandals within the Nigerian industry is discussed to present a context 
relevant canvas of immoral practices by MNCs in the pharmaceutical industry in 
Africa/Nigeria. Beyond these, a detailed description of the specific firm contexts in 
each of the three case groups is presented. 
Chapter six presents the analysis and findings on the first paired cases - the two 
American pharmaceuticals. It begins by discussing the nature of formalised rules 
through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and managerial control within the 
context. Both of these features were discovered to function together to create a 
“Traditional Bureaucracy” context. Evidences that showed this were presented 
alongside a critical discussion of the impact of this traditional bureaucracy on the 
moral capacities of employees. 
Chapter seven presents the analysis and findings on two Indian pharmaceuticals, the 
second case group in this study. Unlike the American case group, this case presents 
a different scenario in which both rules and managerial control had an intertwined 
influence that creates a ‘Caste Bureaucracy’. Evidence from interview data and 
secondary sources such as organisations’ websites were then used to critically 
present salient findings.  
Chapter eight presents the analysis and findings in a sample of two Nigerian 
pharmaceuticals. This is the third case group in this study. Unlike the two previous 
case groups however, this case group presented a pair of dissimilar firms. The first 
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(N1) is a quasi-bureaucracy with charismatic authority underpinning its bureaucratic 
features hence is regarded as a ‘Charismatic Bureaucracy’. The second (N2) is an 
‘Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy’ characterised by a laissez-faire opportunity seeking 
culture. Evidences of these two different bureaucracies were presented in the 
sections that follow. Finally, relevant findings along the three key propositions 
explored in this study were presented using evidence from interview data and 
secondary sources.  
Chapter nine presents a critical discussion of the prevalent themes across the three 
case groups explored in this study. It starts by giving a general overview of the 
different hybrids of bureaucracies that typified each of the case groups and their 
effects on morality. It followed on with the discussion of three key themes common 
across the case groups explored in this study namely: General pattern of “inflated” 
moral identities; The CMR is a better predictor of morality; Bureaucracies encourage 
expertise over professionalism. By comparing and contrasting these with relevant 
literature new contributions to both theory and practice were drawn. 
Chapter ten is the final chapter of this dissertation. It begins by discussing the 
observed limitations in the cause of this study. It then follows with key practical 
implications for different fields of study such as organisational design, national health 
systems and so on following from the key findings in this study. Finally, for each of 
these implications, directions for future research are also presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIC MORALITY 
2.0 Introduction 
A bureaucracy according to Weber, (1948) signifies a distinct organisational setting 
also known as “the bureau” (French word for “office” and “official”), ideally 
characterized by formalized rules, hierarchies, specialized duties, demarcation of 
jurisdiction, standardized processes and impersonality, all aimed at governing 
relationships and organisational performance with a focus on efficiency and long 
term effectiveness (Akrivou & Bradbury-Huang, 2011; Weber, Gerth & Mills, 1946; 
Adler & Borys, 1996; Hales, 2002, duGay, 2000, Mintzberg, 1979; Croizer, 1964; 
Farazmand, 2009). The anticipated effect of this structure is a technically superior 
and procedurally rational system that works with precision, speed, knowledge, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction as well as 
material and personal costs (Udy, 1959, Weber, 1978; Fry, 1980; Olowu, 1988; 
Jaffee, 2001; Al-Habil, 2011). Implicit in Weber’s definition are: its use as a control 
tool through the exercising of power, the possibility of ordering the actions of a large 
group of people and also its concept of rationalism, which streamlines social actions 
into logical structures to achieve efficient ends.  
Amidst a huge existing body of literature on bureaucracy, this review will focus on 
the sociological and business streams, offering rich insights into the workings of 
bureaucracy in modern business organisations. First, a brief historical review of 
bureaucracies and its evolution over time is presented spanning the earliest human 
civilisations to the industrial revolution era. Second, drawing from the works of du 
Gay, (2000) a critical discussion of Weber’s ideal type follows alongside its criticisms 
and the emergence of post bureaucratic organisations. Finally, emerging moral 
issues from the practical adoption of bureaucracies in organizations will be 
highlighted, focusing on specific attributes of bureaucracy and their impacts on 
employee morality. 
2.1 History of Bureaucracy: Applied 20th Century Evolution of 
Bureaucracy in Business 
Bureaucracy has been around us since the earliest human societies. History 
documents its adoption by the earliest empires as an administrative and power tool 
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in the form of institutions, for organising resources towards achieving pre-determined 
ends, often the development of infrastructure and inventions (Farazmand, 2009). 
Long before Weber’s conceptualisation of bureaucracy, bureaucracy has been 
recorded throughout human history since early civilisations as an institution of 
government and administration. Great empires, including the Chinese, Babylonian, 
Persian and Roman empires, adopted bureaucracy in their administration to which 
crucial developments and advancements in human history have been credited (Fyre, 
1975). Particularly, the Persian bureaucracy celebrated for its complexity, structure 
and effective performance became the model bureaucracy to follow (Cook, 1983). In 
addition to the several inventions, innovations and landmark developments, the 
Persian bureaucracy was also credited to have fed the world with ideas of 
administrative ethics, modern governance, organisation theory, and management 
amongst others (Farazmand, 2004). To these ends, bureaucracy was used as a 
public administrative tool, driven by authoritarian leadership, to create working 
systems for societies.  
Beyond these empires, into modern times, bureaucracy continues to thrive in almost 
every sphere of life (Gajduschek, 2003). In the 19th Century Europe, the Germans 
perfected a factory system based bureaucratic organisational model (Thompson, 
1969; Siddall, 1979). Their innovations included the creation of formalised and 
centralised control systems; these were implemented via standard operating 
procedures, centralised materials requirements, meritocracy, control by rules, 
logistics, division of labour, narrow job descriptions and sequential processing 
(Weinstein, 1968). Following this, Americans introduced improvements to the system 
through activity and cost measurements as well as workflow reconfiguration using 
electric motors. Taylor’s scientific management (or Taylorism) surfaced and another, 
Ford’s car assembly model called Fordism. Both were rooted in the principles of 
compartmentalisation and division of labour in order to make the organisations as 
efficient as possible resulting in price cuts and improved productivity. Employees 
performed single repetitive tasks, products became more standardized with better 
quality which also saw a growth in the middle management as planning was 
separated from execution (Thompson, 1988; Kimble, 2014). However, Taylorism for 
instance, was criticised as reducing human beings to commodities and regarded as 
mere machine components thereby eliminating the human element of organisations. 
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Its exploitative tendencies were also a downside amongst other shortcomings 
(Hartwell, 1971). Nonetheless, Ford’s assembly model became so significant; it 
spread to other parts of the world (Merkle, 1980).  
Weber by observing these changes during the industrial revolution alongside 
features of Western civilisation was convinced that society was driven by the 
passage of rational ideas into culture, which in turn transformed the society into a 
bureaucratic entity (Clegg & Baumeler, 2010). Weber saw capitalism as the rational 
way of organising economic life, towards the ends of calculability of likely returns 
(Reed, 1999). He therefore predicted excessive rationalisation would increase until 
its establishment as the most prevalent form of organizing due to its incomparable 
stability and efficiency (Weber, 1978). Today, as Wilmot (1987) observed that 
‘bureaucracy starts from birth (health bureaucracy) to family upbringing (social 
welfare), to school (educational) to work (civil service, military, commercial, industrial) 
to worship and death (religion): bureaucracy increasingly dominates man’ (Eme and 
Emeh, 2012: 20).  
Accordingly, bureaucracy has made large complex organisations efficient and also 
inevitable (Womack, James and Roos, 1990) by championing crucial achievements 
in the management of the economy and society (Farazmand, 2004). As such they 
advanced with sophistication and were simply better off, providing security, jobs, 
economic growth, stability and also the much-needed services of the time (Evans 
and Wurster, 1997). Thus, bureaucracy grew in impact and size, reaching its peak in 
the twentieth century (Farazmand, 2004). As Farazmand, (2014) further opined, 
bureaucracy during the twentieth century played a formidable role in public 
governance and administration and in business administration, leading to the rise of 
large-scale corporate organizations and multinational corporations everywhere.  
In summary, throughout history, bureaucracy has often been adopted in two different 
ways each with different outcomes and effects: as an instrument or an institution, 
what Gajduschek, (2003) in his view called bureaucracy as a mechanistic tool and 
bureaucracy as organisational phenomenon. In the first case, it is seen as a rational 
tool for executing the commands of elected leaders. That is, it is the tool for 
achieving pre-determined purposes efficiently and effectively. The implication of this 
is that in the former, rationality and justice are the outcome of the system. In the 
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second case, bureaucracy is conceptualized as an institution, as such, bureaucracy 
functions with organisational and normative principles of its own based on rule of law, 
due process, codes of behaviour among others. In this light, it is more of an 
expression of cultural values and a system of governance than a mere means to an 
end. The implication of this second conceptualisation of bureaucracy is that 
rationality and justice are characteristics of procedures to follow in order to reach an 
outcome. Crozier, (1964) also distinguished three different conceptualisations of 
bureaucracies as follows: 1. Weber’s ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1947); 2. 
Government agencies staffed by appointed officials in hierarchies, governed by a 
sovereign authority and top-down implementation of strategy and rules (Waldo, 1992) 
and 3. The ‘red tape’ effects of a bureaucratic structure are ascribed to slowness, 
long procedures and routine (Olsen, 2004). Of these three, the Weberian model is 
the most relevant in business literature, as it typifies business organisations in the 
modern society (Farazmand, 2009).  
 
2.2 Weber’s Ideal Type and Post Bureaucratic Organisations 
Coser and Rosenberg, (1976) defined Weber’s ideal type as ‘that type of hierarchical 
organization which is designed rationally to coordinate the work of many individuals 
in the pursuit of large-scale administrative tasks’ (Page15). Weber identified the core 
elements of an ideal bureaucracy to include impersonality, efficiency and rationality 
aimed at achieving precision, speed, clarity in communication and reduction of costs 
of human resources in organisations (Miller, 2014). Weber further opined that these 
are the technical advantages of bureaucracy, made possible by published formal 
(impersonal) rules and codes of conduct, hierarchical authority with one level subject 
to the control of the other, with responsibilities at each level clearly delineated. Whilst 
Weber’s ideal type was not a representation for every type of bureaucracy; it was 
simply hypothetical and served as a mental model to capture the phenomenon 
wherever it is observed (Weber, 1978). Furthermore, Olsen, (2008) opined that as an 
ideal type, bureaucracy has clear characteristics, preconditions, and effects, while 
practice at best approximates the ideal type. 
The dominance of bureaucracy as the rational way of efficiently organising resources 
as well as its many perceived contributions to our societies is keenly debated in 
many circles especially since the last few decades. Arguments range along the 
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continuum of those in praise of its many abilities, especially its administrative 
capacities (Hunter, 1994; du Gay, 2000; Alvesson and Thompson, 2005; Reed, 2005) 
to those who claim it is undemocratic, unresponsive to people and normalises 
corruption and amorality in our economic life (Hummell, 2007, Jackal, 1983, Drucker, 
1988), to the extent that its demise is often predicted in favour of newer, post 
bureaucratic organisation forms able to meet the needs of our changing world 
(Dopson and Stewart, 1990). But, bureaucracy has long been seen as a cornerstone 
of advanced industrial society that typifies the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
(Clegg, Harris, Hopfl, 2011). Campbell, (2013) further opined that large bureaucratic 
organizations have become a key fact of life in modern polities. And as Farazmand, 
(2001) & Gajduschek, (2003) further argue, bureaucracy has never had a true 
alternative; therefore, no organisation will ever totally replace it. Its survival through 
the ages, they claim, is an indication of its resilience and relevance (Farazmand, 
2007).  
In Weber’s own words, bureaucracy is ‘from a technical point of view, capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally that most 
rationally known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings’ 
(Weber, 1946). It is the rational-legal type of authority that characterises Weber’s 
concept of bureaucracy, as it is premised on a legitimacy of patterns of normative 
rules and the rights of those elevated to positions of authority (Stillman, 2000). The 
resultant system is meant to be one that detaches any form of personal attachments, 
leaving little or no room for personal favouritisms, bias or arbitrariness and relying 
solely on a professional decision-maker (du Gay, 2000; Stillman, 2000). Morally, this 
can be advantageous as strict rule-based compliance with an adherence to rules can 
be a measure of objectivity to get tasks done. As du Gay, (2000) further opined, 
rules and procedures that are in place are intended to bring about equality and 
fairness in how workers are treated as much as it brings about control for 
management. As such, Du Gay, (2000) is of the opinion that bureaucracy allows for 
impersonal fairness within the organisation, for example with equal opportunities and 
that this in itself provides an important political and ethical resource in liberal 
democratic regimes because it separates the administration of public life from 
‘private moral absolutisms’ (Watson, 2003 pp. 91). Bureaucracy’s indifference to 
certain moral ends, according to du Gay is therefore its strengths and not its 
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weakness. In the absence of this, office-holders could do their work in ways, which 
prioritise their private advantage, to the detriment of organisational objectives (du 
Gay, 2000). Besides, the clear demarcation of roles and hierarchies is known to to 
help solve the problem of maintaining order over an organisation as it grows in scale. 
King and Lawley, (2013) further explained that bureaucracies do this by creating 
clear roles and responsibilities, outlining clear lines of authority and the limits of the 
authority.  
In spite of these positives, Weber however also shared his concerns about a 
disenchanted world characterised by the decline of substantive rationality and 
shared values based mostly on commonly held religious and societal beliefs. Instead, 
as Miller, (2014) opined, bureaucracy advances instrumental rationality and therefore 
the focus is on ends and not the means. Also Spicer, (2013:10) asserted that 
‘although Weber was pessimistic regarding the effects of rationalisation and 
bureaucracy on human life and freedom, he saw the disenchantment of the world 
that results from the ascent of science and rationalism and the decline of religious 
and mystical interpretations of human experience as expanding the capacity for 
human freedom and moral responsibility’, resulting in the loss of meaning (Gronow, 
1988). Implicit in Weber’s opinion is the allowance of value pluralism that blurs the 
boundaries of shared values and has the capacity to degenerate into fragmentation 
of values since shared values are replaced by myriad of individual/subjective belief 
systems and opinions (Latsis, 2013; Weber, 1974). As a result, modern men /women 
in business roles may find it ok to be cynical, trapped in procedures, or less 
motivated by the pursuits of moral principles (Latsis, 2013). Therefore, under 
capitalism for example, its adoption in private for-profit businesses operating in free 
markets produces totally different ramifications from shared value-based societal 
development objectives.  
The above implies that this Weberian model could also result in a system 
metaphorically termed the ‘Iron Cage’ (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980). The term ‘iron 
cage’ describes a system based purely on teleological efficiency, rational calculation 
and control in which one set of rules and laws that must be adhered to without room 
for flexibility. This kind of system is able to limit human freedom and capacity to think 
independently since all rules have been clearly demarcated hence Weber’s own 
assertion that it could be a control/power tool of the first order (Jackall, 1988). 
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Therefore, without considerations for the ends for which Weber’s model is being 
used, the fact that human freedom is curtailed in the system often draws a lot of 
criticisms in literature and can be argued to have moral implications. Bauman, (2001) 
in his view argued that the iron cage as it is designed aims to ‘leave erratic passions 
out of bounds, giving no room for any irrationality, human wishes included’ to the 
extent that any passion is seen as dangerous and destabilising to bureaucratic 
organisation, i.e. its emphasis of hyper, unmoderated rationality. This according to 
Derlien, (1999), is ‘the most formal, rational mode of exercising domination’, which 
Hummel, (2007) argued has dehumanising effects, in that organisations totally 
control the thinking of their employees towards desired ends, giving them no room or 
control over their personal decisions. 
Thus, there are two distinct views on the rationality of bureaucracy: that of a ‘super’ 
rationality which allows no irrationality and another rationality that leads to a form of 
irrationality. Critiques such as Jackal, (1988), Merton, (1968) and Hummel, (2007) 
often build their arguments around the latter view, arguing that the rationality 
espoused by Weber’s bureaucracy has the capacity to imprison and control ‘cage’ 
employee’s ability to recognise moral issues and to make free ethical decisions. This 
can result in what Merton, (1949) referred to this as ‘occupational psychosis’ or 
‘deformed professionalism’ in which bureaucracies make employees become so 
biased they normalise ideas or behaviours that are supposed to be considered 
abnormal. Although Gajduschek, (2003) argued that Weber’s concept of rationality is 
often subject to misrepresentations, he believed that Weber’s position on rationality 
was that of ‘uncertainty reduction’ instead of ‘efficiency’ although he argued 
uncertainty reduction could imply efficiency in some ways. Nonetheless, Merton, 
(1968) in his study on bureaucracies discovered what he called ‘unintended 
consequences’ associated with bureaucracies. For instance, ‘ignorance’, where it is 
impossible to anticipate everything, and ‘error’, which lends employees to incomplete 
analysis of problems following from a monotonous approach to problem solving even 
in different scenarios, amongst others (Merton, 1968). These, Merton believed could 
significantly reduce the capacity of employees to recognise moral issues or respond 
appropriately to them.  
Based on these flaws, the demise of bureaucracy has been anticipated and 
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demanded throughout the history of management thought as well as in modern 
social and political theory (du Gay, 2000) in favour of post bureaucratic organisations 
(Heckscher, 1994). According to Heckscher, (1994), ideals to be espoused in post 
bureaucratic organisations, as different from Weber’s bureaucratic organisation 
include rules being replaced by consensus and shared values; responsibilities being 
assigned on the basis of competence rather than hierarchy and treated as 
individuals rather than impersonally; the organisation has an open bureaucracy, 
flexible in the way work is done such that work is no longer done in fixed hours or at 
a designated place. This newer form of organisation tends to favour flat structures 
and not hierarchical ones for instance and a more cordial organisation culture that 
thrives on social accountability. However, this organisational type also comes with its 
shortfalls including the problem of control. With shared values, Knights and Wilmott, 
(2007) argue that this offers a fragile form of control, resting on self-control rather 
than external monitoring. Also they argue that trust may be difficult to sustain and 
can be easily betrayed. Furthermore since post bureaucracies advocate for free 
movement of labour in and out of organisations, they have the tendency to 
degenerate into anarchies. All of these are precisely the problems Weber’s ideal type 
seems to solve with its characteristics. Thus, in spite of the heavy criticisms of 
bureaucracy, indications are that it is far from dead in contemporary management 
circles. Despite claims by key management authorities (Castells 2000; Giddens, 
1998; Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994; Leadbeater 1999; Peters 1989) there is a 
need to be cautious in claiming a substitute for bureaucracy has been found because 
as Farazmand, (2004) argues, the survival of bureaucracy through the ages 
indicates we cannot do without it.  
2.3 The Morality of Bureaucracy 
“The greatest threat to the bureaucratic system—as Weber sees it in a historical 
context—is that personal emotion and moral judgment may distort the system. The 
ability to work without affections, thus, is the personal precondition of the existence 
of bureaucracy” Gajduschek, (2003) 
 
According to Gajduschek (2003), personal emotional experience and emotional 
sharing and moral judgement alike are all feared to distort bureaucratic systems’ 
functioning, because they are incompatible with the “rule” of hyper rationalism’s 
façade (cite) which sustains the whole edifice of bureaucracy. But often, strong 
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personal emotion can produce virtues such as courage, integrity, generosity, 
collegiality, temperance which threaten the fragmentation and control (from the top) 
of the administrative core in a bureaucratic organisation. Thus, discussions on 
bureaucratic morality can start from some of the consequences of rationality Weber 
may not have actually envisaged. His original concept of bureaucracy is seen as a 
rational means of exercising control to get jobs done efficiently (Weber, 1948). 
Implicit in this statement is the fact that workers are expected to think and act in 
certain pre-determined ways, working without affection, amounting to a desired end. 
This reduces humans to some form of machine or robots. Gouldner, (1954) 
described this as the conceptualising of humans as objects and subjects, which is 
often captured by their aggregation in the general category of “human resources” in 
addition to other technological and financial resources that make up assets of 
organisations. In the purely formal aspects of Weber’s bureaucracy, people recruited 
in positions are guided by predefined tasks, rules and assignments. Also, with clear 
division of labour, humans are treated as objects, as they are “resources” that 
contribute to the higher or lower organisational efficiency. However, in exercising 
authority based on technical competence and skill, humans are treated as subjects 
with evaluative capacities. 
Thus, workers in a subjective position of authority may be unable to identify moral 
issues involved in their work roles and even if they do, the capacity to act morally is 
often restricted by set rules. Studies by (Bauman, 1983, 1993) and Ten Bos (1997) 
have indicated the likely negative impact of bureaucratic structures on ethical 
decision making; they put forward four ways they could do this:  
(1) Suppression of moral autonomy, in which written rules guide every action taken 
and no decision can be made outside of those rules, thereby limiting ability to act in 
ways deemed morally appropriate by actor in the circumstance, and they limit the 
moral questioning of any rules as rules must be taken for granted and obeyed 
(2) Instrumental end-oriented-morality (an act is right in so far as it satisfies a need) 
which de-emphasizes normative inquiry on the means by which ends are being 
reached,  
(3) Moral distancing, in which as long as rules are followed, responsibility is not 
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taken for any unanticipated consequences since actors have functioned within 
required boundaries, and 
 (4) The denial of moral status, which is the inability to realise, reflect upon, and take 
accountability of, or accept the moral undertone and the significance of actions and 
of decisions taken. An implication of this is that individuals at the lower levels are not 
sufficiently able, nor are they empowered, to make informed decisions as most of the 
details needed to make such decisions do not trickle down. So, when moral issues 
are involved in the decisions to be made, there is an obvious handicap in either 
recognizing them or even raising any alarm in cases where they are detected. This 
phenomenon of isolation is heightened by the tendency of some organizations to 
structure work relationships so that group members have little contact with members 
of other work groups. Hence, such activities as comparing of notes is not allowed, 
thereby impeding moral responsibility in the process. 
Hummel, (2007) in his book, ‘Understanding Bureaucracies’ offered several 
examples of how bureaucracy limits peoples’ capacity to adhere to their broader 
professional identity or abilities to make the right decisions based on the contexts 
and situations they face. For instance, in a hospital setting, a doctor was forced by a 
Medicare program to discharge a very sick patient prematurely to save bed space, 
resulting in the death of the patient. (Pg.10). Another study by Epstein and 
O’Halloran, (1999) revealed how lawmakers used bureaucracy to reduce the 
discretion provided to agencies thereby limiting their abilities to make policy 
decisions (Huber and Shipan, 2002; Lewis, 2003; Wood and Bohte, 2004). These 
effects of bureaucracy limits the capacity of people to reflect and decide how they 
ought to act as virtuous moral agents (Koehn, 2001)  
Therefore, as Jackall, (1988) in his study of bureaucratic work environments queried, 
‘how is morality defined in corporations?’ it was simply answered as follows: “What is 
right in the corporation is not what is right in a man’s home or in his church. What is 
right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you. That’s what 
morality is in the corporation.” (pg.36). This answer has been further proven and 
supported by other empirical and conceptual studies (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 
2004; Trevino et al, 2006, Schein, 2004).  
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Hence, understanding the kind of moral climate bureaucracies create and the 
subsequent impact on individual actors begins with the appreciation of the fact that 
bureaucracy is/becomes a ‘world apart’ separate from the broader society (Hummel 
2007). In Hummel’s view, there is a social atmosphere created by bureaucracies that 
breed unique sets of pressures - social, cultural, psychological and cognitive 
(linguistic) types that shape bureaucrats and determine their behaviours. These 
pressures play huge roles in determining how individuals think, construct their sense 
of identity and behave at all times.  
Hence, organisations are more than places of work but environments that make 
“…the men and women in them come to fashion an entire social ambience that 
overlays the antagonisms created by company politics...” through rationalism 
(Jackall, 1983 p.37). In this sort of setting, managers and employees are inclined to 
treat one another and themselves instrumentally, as objects, analysing mutual 
strengths and weaknesses and deciding based on the instrumental calculation of 
what needs to be done in order to survive and ascend in the organisational order 
(Goodpaster 1978). The outcome is a systematic reconstruction of the workers’ 
images into the person the system demands, a process that can be argued to have 
identity and moral implications. 
In describing this process, this reconstruction process is often regarded as a form of 
‘dehumanisation’ (Mintzberg, 1979) whilst the likely actions of the ‘reconstructed’ 
workers would thus be questionable (Clawson, 1980). Given this, it is hard to see a 
place for ‘personal’ ethics as opposed to impersonal ethics.  Besides, in such 
contexts, there is no use for universal higher abstract ethical principles but 
conformity to the requirements of bureaucratic functionality. Furthermore, Merton, 
(1957) made a bold assertion that ‘Bureaucracy may actually contain the seed of its 
own destruction’. First, on social grounds, Weber posited that “Bureaucracy is the 
way of transforming social action into rationally organised action” (Weber, 1968), 
thereby creating a ‘new world’ that seems distant from the real world lacking strong 
normative foundations (Habermas, 1971). This claim of bureaucracy being a new 
world is buttressed by the established fact in literature that people generally make 
ethical decisions at a lower level of cognitive reasoning at work than they do outside 
of work (Hummel, 2007). The transition between both worlds may come with wider 
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implications including having to learn not just a new set of behaviours but also a new 
mode of life (Jackall, 1983). In this regard, bureaucracy could give birth to a new 
species of dehumanised beings whose norms and beliefs are replaced with technical 
rationality and related means. This process which Hummel, (2007) described as a 
conversion from social relations to relations of control is exemplified in the way 
corporations expect their employees to learn to talk, act or think in particular ways. 
Thus, employees or bureaucrats are locked up in particular patterns of behaviours.  
Gouldner’s (1954) opinion leads to the next criticism of Weber’s bureaucracy on 
psychological and cognitive grounds as having the ability to dehumanise its workers 
in what Weber himself called ‘crippled personality of the specialities’ (Weber, 1946). 
Although as Minztberg, (1979) argued, Weber did not intend his description to imply 
rationality devoid of morality, but merely implying a tough stand in getting things 
done in predetermined ways. Hummell (2007) disagrees, picking on Weber’s own 
very prediction that the future could be populated by “specialists without spirit, 
sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of 
civilization never before achieved.” Further, Weber in Gronow, (1988) admitted that 
values have gone from public life through parallel processes of rationalisation an 
intellectualisation thereby resulting in loss of individual freedom and meaning. 
Therefore it is often agreed that the mechanistic tendencies of bureaucracy detach a 
bureaucrat from his or her humanity/emotions, society and even individual thinking. 
In addition, human identity and character is replaced with organisational identity, 
substituting his/her sense of right or wrong whilst performing his daily duties (Lefort, 
1974). This degeneration from a human to more of an organisation’s robot is 
regarded as horrific at least. Finally, the cultural provision of rules to strictly follow 
without discretion leaves out any opportunity to have an input or lend a voice to the 
direction of the organisation thereby hindering the freedom democracy brings. The 
tension that arises in this case leads to discussions about the legitimacy of 
bureaucracy, power, discretion and judgement especially since workers norms and 
beliefs are torn away from them as, Goodpaster, (1991) concluded in his study on 
ethical imperatives and corporate leadership. 
In summary, at the very core of these critiques are two basic issues: First that 
bureaucratic rationalization is a dominant organizational logic, producing different 
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degrees of inefficiency, dehumanization, and ritualism (Ackroyd, Batt, Thompson and 
Tolbert, 2005) and could stifle creativity, foster dissatisfaction and demotivate 
employees (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990; Adler & Cole, 1995; Adler & Borys, 
1996). So, bureaucracy may ultimately create its own inefficiency and this may 
suggest in the long term it is not as efficient as its supporters want to present it. This 
is also supported by the significant theoretical and empirical research in the 
principal-agent problems linked to management’s opportunistic use of power 
asymmetries for self-interested gains (Hill and Jones, 1992). Second, that perhaps 
the recorded positive and negative impact of bureaucracies could also be 
contextually dictated. For example, du Gay (2000) argues that particular industries 
can only thrive when strict rules are enforced and that before critiquing any 
bureaucracy, it is useful to look into the context in which it is thriving. Thus, with the 
several interpretations and adoptions of the bureaucratic concept in literature and 
reality comes a lot of ambiguity such that in critiquing or accepting any arguments, 
bureaucracy has to be clearly understood in the light of Weber’s original thoughts 
and in the context in which it is being practiced.  
2.4 Summary of Studies on Bureaucratic Morality 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below summarise the different theoretical and empirical studies 
on bureaucratic morality. Beginning with the theoretical and conceptual studies, a 
larger proportion of these studies were published based on author’s experiential 
knowledge of the workings of the bureaucracies to which they had been exposed. 
Also, these bureaucracies were not all in business organisations, but cut across 
public offices, state agencies amongst others and yet reported consistent findings. 
2.4.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Studies 
 
Table 2.1: Theoretical and Conceptual Studies on Bureaucratic Morality 
Author Findings/Conclusion 
Merton, 1949 Bureaucracy and its overtly legal rationality leads to ‘unintended 
consequences’ such as trained incapacity in which employees are 
made to approach every issue the same way even when those 
issues require different responses; occupational psychosis, in 
which rules and values of the system produce a pronounced 
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character of the mind in the employees in conformity with the 
bureaucracy and professional deformation in which the 
bureaucracy hinders the professional duties of employees. 
Milgram 1963, 
1964 
Established the uneasy relationship between bureaucracy and the 
ethics of personal responsibility easily leads to institutionalized 
immorality. Using the Nazi and holocaust example, he indicated 
that the atrocities were perpetrated by ordinary people who 
believed they were working within the lawful limits. Only after the 
world war were the huge moral ramifications uncovered. 
Thompson 1985 He defined the ethics of bureaucracy into two: ethics of neutrality 
in which bureaucrats act on behalf of the organization in order to 
serve the needs of society; and the Ethic of Structure, in which the 
organization itself is responsible for ethical decision-making, and 
that individuals can only be responsible for the direct results of 
specific actions. He criticised both and concluded that: the 
contention that policies are right because the organisation says so 
is a violation of liberal democracy; decision and policy making in 
bureaucracies are so ethereal that it is difficult to know when an 
ethical Rubicon is crossed. Also, that in bureaucracies, individuals 
are immune to shared moral liability action simply because of their 
membership in the organization. 
Gronow, 1988 Bureaucracy comes with parallel processes of intellectualisation 
and rationalisation leading to loss of individual freedom and 
values. Result is value pluralism in which legitimacy is not on 
shared norms but on procedural and formal rules.  
Dwivedi, 1988  Admits to the failure of bureaucracies in upholding moral 
standards. Recommended that the moral resolve of employees be 
assisted through the use of a strong code of ethics as a guide to 
‘proper behaviour in the face of ethical dilemmas’ 
Olowu, 1988; Pointed out the abuse of power and position of office as the key 
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Dunsire, 1988; 
Rohr, 1988 
driver of bureaucratic morality. 
Sherrer, 2000 Reviewed behaviourism in bureaucracies and identified individuals 
often end up with sadistic behaviours, mindless obedience to 
authority, conditioned, robotic behaviours, conformity and the 
categorisation of people based on their conformity. “…the explicit 
rejection of human autonomy and the role of consciousness in 
human behaviour is ingrained in bureaucratic systems and in the 
thinking of those who administer them” (P. 253) 
Hummel, 2007 Bureaucracy is a separate world from the ‘real’ world. Socially, it 
brings people together only to cause separation by replacing 
mutually oriented social action governed by shared human 
concerns and moral norms with rationally organised action. 
Psychologically, it takes over the conscience and imposes 
organisational identity on employees. Culturally, it replaces 
ordinary human values with values of its own, compatible with the 
objective of the bureaucracy. Cognitively, it defines what things 
are. Politically, it is a power tool for controlling people towards the 
objective of the bureaucracy via increasing amorality. 
Macalagan, 2007 Reviewed the conflict of hierarchical control and moral autonomy. 
He concluded that control over ethics stifles individual potential for 
moral imagination, moral responsibility and capacity for moral 
judgement. 
 
From these theoretical and conceptual studies, there is a consensus about the 
adverse effect of bureaucracies on the moral capacity of those working in them. 
While the majority seem to establish this negative relationship, only one study 
(Dwivedi, 1988) proffered the solution of improved code of ethics, which has also 
been subject to varying findings in both theoretical and empirical studies. The studies 
in Table 1 may not be an exhaustive list of all theoretical studies on bureaucratic 
morality; they however accurately reflect the findings of most studies on bureaucratic 
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morality. Table 2 below summarises key empirical studies on bureaucratic morality. 
2.4.2 Empirical Studies 
 
Table 2.2: Empirical Studies on Bureaucratic Morality 
Author Objective/Methodology Findings and Conclusion 
Jackall, 1988 How bureaucracy shapes moral 
consciousness. Study was 
carried out across 4 organisations 
with over 100 semi structured 
interviews 
‘Bureaucracy breaks apart 
substance from appearances, 
action from responsibility, and 
language from meaning’(p. 
130). It erodes internal and 
external standards of morality 
and rationally justifies amorality 
and even a conscious neglect 
of ethics, especially amid 
managers. Success is 
capricious, the original 
protestant ethic is lost to sheer 
individualism, and a quest of 
success through markets and 
superiors. ‘Bureaucracy makes 
its own internal rules and social 
context the principal moral 
gauges for action’ (p.130) 
Ferrell and 
Skinner, 1988 
Investigate the relationship 
between ethical structure and 
ethical behaviour in marketing 
research organisations. Self-
administered questionnaires were 
sent by post out of which 600 
were returned. 
The presence of an ethical 
code explained the most 
variance there was in ethical 
behaviours in all firms.  
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Empirical studies on bureaucracy have been predominantly focused on its form, type 
conceptualisation, specific dimensions e.g. hierarchy, formalisation, centrality etc, 
(Hall, 1963; Goulder, 1959 etc).  Very few studies are known to have empirically 
studied the theorised impact of bureaucracy on morality. As at the time Ferrell and 
Skinner, (1988) published their study, they claimed there were no empirical studies 
on the impact of bureaucracy on ethical behaviour until Jackal (1988) adopted a 
purely qualitative method published his work in the same year. Since then, there 
have been huge advancements in the evolution of organisations and in the 
development of descriptive ethical theories. Therefore, the need for empirical studies 
on bureaucratic morality becomes more pronounced as both the subject of 
bureaucracy and ethics continues to generate a lot of debates. As Merton, (1949) 
concluded in his work, there is a need to study empirically the real impact of 
bureaucracy on employee morality. To this end, he proposed the following possible 
study focuses: ‘To what extent are particular personality types selected and modified 
by the various bureaucracies (private enterprise, public service, the quasi-legal 
political machine, religious orders)? Inasmuch as ascendancy and submission are 
held to be traits of personality, despite their variability in different stimulus-situations, 
do bureaucracies select personalities of particularly submissive or ascendant 
tendencies? And since various studies have shown that these traits can be modified, 
does participation in bureaucratic office tend to increase ascendant tendencies?’ 
Thus the dearth of empirical studies on bureaucratic morality leaves a huge gap, 
which this study aims to fill. 
2.5 Moral Impact of Weber’s Ideal Bureaucratic type 
In an age characterised by top level scandals and ethical issues in high and low 
places, understanding the role of the most dominant organisational arrangement in 
enhancing or impeding moral agency becomes necessary. One of the very few 
studies that have empirically tested the direct impact of bureaucracy on moral 
agency is the work of Jackall, (1988), a summary of which was offered in the 
previous table 2.2. More specifically by interviewing 100 managers, Jackall 
discovered that the world of bureaucracy is not as straightforward as it appears. In 
fact he called it a ‘moral maze’ and concluded that bureaucracies are not helpful to 
individual moral agency. But, generalising all bureaucracies, as impeding moral 
agency is a bold claim that must be empirically verified. Besides, perhaps not all 
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‘types of bureaucracies’ are stifling to moral autonomy. And if they are, could there 
be any good in them? As Hummel (2007) argued, if the moral ramification of 
bureaucracy is found to be true, it therefore transcends a mere psychological 
challenge into an ontological one in which our very being is questioned.  
 
Therefore, building from the arguments of early scholars such as Hall, (1963) and 
Gouldner, (1959) on how bureaucracy ought to be conceptualised, a 
multidimensional approach which measures bureaucracy as an entity with multiple 
characteristics to determine the extent to which each one exists in the studied 
organisation will be adopted in evaluating moral issues in bureaucracy. As such, the 
documented impact of Weber’s ideal attributes on employees will be explored. The 
focus of this section will be based on two attributes of Weber’s ideal bureaucracy, at 
the heart of legal-rationality and also documented to have significant influence on 
employee morality Gajduschek, (2003):  Rules (Structures, procedures and 
responsibilities) and Managerial Control. These also are critical within the industry 
context within which this research was conducted. 
 
2.5.1 Rules 
Formalisation is the extent of rules, procedures and instructions in place in 
organisations (Adler and Borys, 1996). It is also the standardisation of procedures, 
streamlined into statements of procedures and operations (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, 
& Turner, 1969). Formalisation is a central feature of Weber’s bureaucratic ideal type 
(Jaffee, 2001) and one that has been extensively researched (Pugh and Hickson, 
1976; Mintzberg, 1979) especially in line with efficiency, employee satisfaction 
(Arches, 1991), innovation and improved ethical conduct (Ferrell and Skinner, 1988). 
Organisational rules including codes of ethics are a part of the formal structure in 
organisations. They define relationships and guide activities thereby creating sets of 
mutual expectations as well as reducing uncertainties (Zhou, 1993).  
 
In practice, formalised rules have been reported to activate role conflict among 
professionals because of the discrepancy that exists between the norms of a 
profession that ought to be espoused by its community of members across different 
organisations and economies and each single organisation’s norms and rule (Organ 
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and Greene, 1981; See also discussions on Professional Codes from Chapter 6 
onwards later on). This is also known to create a moral tension between employees 
and their organisation. Merton, (1968) further explained that often the presence of 
formalised rules implies the need to strictly adhere to those rules, a behaviour called 
compliance. He then argued that the impact of compliance on employees is that 
following the rules becomes an end in itself and could cause them to lose focus on 
the bigger goals of the organisation. Therefore, Gouldner, (1954) in his work 
recognised two types of compliance: compliance based on the desire to achieve 
goals efficiently and compliance based on an obligation to obey the command of 
superiors unquestioningly. He then further argued that in the latter case, authority 
based on formal positions may not be sufficient to enforce the compliance of 
subordinates especially in cases where the subordinates are more skilful than their 
superiors.  
 
Also, Thompson, (1967) and Lawrence and Lorsch, (1967) found that employees will 
react positively both when high levels of formalization are associated with routine 
tasks and when low levels of formalization are associated with non-routine tasks. 
This is because employees and average human beings like to be told what to do to 
succeed and be rewarded which makes life less hard and more conformist. This 
finding is in line with the prevalent presuppositions that standardising routine work in 
organisations should boost efficiency thereby guaranteeing employee satisfaction. 
However, critics still disagree with this argument because it assumes a high level 
correlation of goal congruence between employees and employers, a situation many 
have argued is rarely obtained (Pfeffer, 1981). Hence, these buttress the need to see 
each organisation as a unique entity with at best shared features with other 
organisations, therefore, care must be taken in making generalisations. 
 
From an ethics perspective, rules have also been subject to mixed findings. For 
instance, rules have often been argued to grant organisations more control over the 
ethical behaviours of their employees (Ferrell and Skinner, 1988). In their finding, 
they concluded that formalisation explained the most variance in ethical behaviour 
with the existence of an ethical code as the major factor explaining the variation. In 
affirmation, corporate policies, usually codes of ethical conduct have also been 
linked to increased ethical conduct (Ferrell, Weaver, Taylor and Jones 1978; 
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Fritzsche and Becker, 1983; Hunt, Chonko, and Wilcox 1984). Tsalikis and Fritzche, 
(1989), Murphy, Smith and Daley, (1992) concluded in their studies that corporate 
ethics inhibits unethical behaviour and that employees in these organisations were 
less aware of unethical or illegal activity in their organisations. Whilst this could be a 
positive, the fact that moral awareness is reduced is a major point of criticism, 
whereby employees’ individual moral agency is replaced by rules thereby limiting 
their capacity to recognise moral issues and make sound judgements. Therefore, 
this has often raised concerns about the presence of code of ethics being a mere 
façade to mask the real ethical issues and struggles in organisations.   
 
A link here may be established with the theory in the previous chapter of my 
literature review with a focus on cognitive moral development theory (Kohlberg, 
1969). Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory offers key insights into the 
moral ramifications of the rule based morality bureaucracies espouse. According to 
Kohlberg’s, (1969) typology of cognitive moral development, rule based morality 
places individuals at the pre conventional level of moral reasoning. At this basic level 
of moral reasoning, morality is defined in terms of avoiding to break the rules and a 
propensity for excessive rule conformity by the majority of (conventional) employees 
and managers in organisations (Kohlberg, 1969; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987), beyond 
which every other concern is obliterated. This behaviour may produce indeed both 
amoral and immoral behaviours. Employee orientation would be on reward, 
punishments and obedience only. However, Kohlberg’s categorisations suggest 
higher levels of moral development, that is the conventional and post conventional 
stages are more adequate in resolving significant moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1981). 
Therefore, Kohlberg’s theory argues that at the pre conventional level bureaucracies 
expect employees to function, orientation would be towards keeping the rules, a 
reasoning level that renders them incapable of making critical moral judgements. 
Whereas, anyone reasoning at the higher stages could for example recognise a 
moral issue and make a decision to leave the job based on the violation of some 
higher moral principle they hold in high regard. As such Kohlberg’s theory would 
presume from a moral standpoint that strict rule compliance in bureaucracies creates 
a false conscience and a rule based moral code that keeps employees bound at a 
lower level of cognitive moral maturity (Kohlberg, 1969; 1987). Hence, moral 
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capacity to see moral issues and make autonomous moral judgement is significantly 
curtailed. 
 
This position has been substantiated by some empirical studies. For instance, 
Weber, (1990) in his study of moral reasoning among managers (which was in 
response to three distinct moral dilemmas given) discovered that managers typically 
reasoned at the conventional level, implying their thinking is done at the level of 
conformity. Weber, (1990) also discovered in his study that managers that worked in 
large organisations reasoned as a considerably low(er) level than those working in 
small self-employed firms thereby validating the role rules play in limiting moral 
capacity of employees (Jackall, 1988). Also in a review of literature by Loe, Ferrell 
and Mansfield, (2000), seventeen studies were found to have studied the role of 
code of ethics in decision-making. Results varied from those who found code of 
ethics as useful to the improvement of ethical behaviour (Weaver and Ferrell, 1977) 
to those who discovered it increased a sense of awareness and subsequent 
reporting of unethical incidents (Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; Barnett, 1992; Kaye, 
1992) and to those who concluded it was less effective in helping ethical behaviours 
(Bruce, 1994; Glenn and Van Loo, 1993). However, Beneish, and Chatov, (1993) 
opined the contents of code vary according to industries and this could explain the 
variations in the findings. 
 
2.5.2 Managerial Control and Hierarchy  
Hierarchy is defined as ‘a rank ordering of individuals along one or more socially 
important dimensions’ (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; 
Parsons, 1940). Ranks are a system in which each level controls a lower level and 
itself controlled by higher levels. From this, the concept of managerial control arises 
which is the legitimate control managers can exert on their subordinates towards 
certain ends based on their position in the firm. Therefore, there can be different 
forms of hierarchy, based on the dimensions upon which the hierarchy is defined. 
For instance, hierarchy could be power or ability to influence others (French & 
Raven, 1959), knowledge structure (Downs, 1969), or leadership and ability to drive 
shared goals (Bass, 2008; Van Vugt, 2006). Hierarchies can also emerge formally in 
the case of power and authority being vested in some positions more than others 
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(Mills, 1956; Mintzberg, 1979; Tannenbaum, 1962; Anderson and Brown, 2010) or 
informally when differences in status, experience age and influence develop among 
peers working together (Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; Blau, 1955).  
A formal hierarchy or vertical structure is thus the basis of central planning and 
centralised decision making. 
 
Most scholars agree that the existence of hierarchies in organisation tends towards 
some form of control (Maclagan, 2007). For instance, Downs, (1969) opined that 
hierarchical structures exist to settle conflicts via automatic rules of hierarchical 
status and power, which are inevitable in any large organisation, and also to promote 
efficient communication and the minimization of losses of time and resources that 
increase uncertainty and reduce productivity and thus short term efficiency. These 
conflicts could arise from differences in goals of employees even if all parties 
perceive reality identically and could also arise from their mode of perceiving realities 
even when they share the same basic goals. For instance the latter conflict could 
arise from differences in technical expertise as most bureaucracies tend to have 
mixed expertise on board. In order to settle these problems, power must be 
delegated to a few members of the organisation. These members are thereby given 
‘superior’ authority, which is the concept of hierarchy. There could also be a 
communications hierarchy in which there are different knowledge levels or privileged 
information at each stage of the hierarchy. This is often aimed at controlling data flow 
or protecting sensitive data. 
 
Studies on managerial control through hierarchies like any other bureaucratic feature 
have been studied in line with varying outcomes such as work satisfaction, work 
coordination, group performance and often with varying results (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008). For instance, some studies on hierarchy have shown managerial control 
facilitates better group performance and coordination, yet a larger number of studies 
have proven hierarchies and ensuing control lead to poor group performance 
(Anderson and Brown, 2010) in the case of slowing down transaction or process 
speed (Ackroyd, Batt, Thompson and Tolbert, 2004). Also, the phenomenon of 
groupthink by (Janis, 1982) suggests that in groups, ‘loyalty requires each member 
to avoid raising controversial issues’ (p.12) which advances the need for conformity 
among members even if the decision made is dysfunctional, weak in even 
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conventional aspects and irrational. This limits individual moral autonomy and 
capacity, particularly when such groups have hierarchies and superiors exercise 
control, the tendencies for the group think effect is often more pronounced as group 
members may not want to openly oppose their leaders, thereby producing morality of 
the herd to the detriment of individual morality (Janis, 1982). These have often led to 
the conclusions in literature that managerial control is not universally good or bad for 
organisations but that its effects could depend on a variety factors including 
personalities, organisational objectives, culture, and industry among others. (Argyris, 
1973; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973; Hage, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Pugh, et al, 1969). 
 
Likewise, the role of managerial control in the ethical behaviour of employees has 
been variously studied in different dimensions. It is often discussed under what 
Maclagan, (2007) referred to as a control oriented position implied in most of 
business ethics. Thus, it is a correlate of ethical behaviour and can give managers 
leverage over individual behaviours. It therefore logically follows that hierarchy, like 
training programs, codes, leadership style influences employee decisions and 
conducts (Weber 1993, Trevino & Nelson 1995, Ferrell and Fraedrich, 2014). 
Brenner and Molander, (1977) in their study concluded that the behaviour of senior 
managers served as a signpost for the ethical choices of junior managers. Likewise, 
Harris, (1990) McDonald and Zepp, (1989) and Trevino, (1986) submit that top 
management in emphasising and clarifying appropriate behaviour can overtly 
influence subordinates’ behaviour. Harris, (1990) studied businesspersons using 
their years of business experience as a surrogate for managerial position within 
organisational hierarchy. He found significant differences in the ethical values of 
managers by years of experience for all five construct he measured. Respondents 
with over 21 years of experience were found to be less tolerant to questionable 
business practices than the junior level ones. However more recent studies (e.g 
Anand, Ashfort, and Joshi 2004) have discovered trends to the contrary. As Posner 
and Schmidt, (1984) submitted, the longer individuals stay in a firm and rise through 
the ranks, the more blurred the distinction between personal and organisational 
values get. The moral ramifications of this transformation are huge especially 
regarding moral awareness and capacity to make objective moral judgements at 
such levels of management. 
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In a study of fortune 500 executives, Lincoln, Pressley and Little, (1982) reported 
that a majority of organisational employees admitted compromise in personal values 
to achieve other organisational goals relevant to efficiency linked with individual 
performance objectives. In a study of organisational pressures at different 
hierarchical levels, Posner and Schmidt, (1984) submitted that first level managers, 
that is supervisors felt more pressure than middle level managers and the senior 
managers. This finding collaborates that of Jackall, (1988) who posited that in the 
bureaucracies he studied, senior managers often pushed down the work load and 
pressure whilst the accolades rise up to them. The logic as Jackall explained is to 
get the subordinates (including lower /middle level management) to do any dirty work 
and there can be then some ‘fall guy’ when things don’t go as planned (Jackall, 
1988). Furthermore, Anand, Ashforth & Joshi, (2004) in their study observed that 
most immoral acts reported in corporations are perpetrated by individuals (usually 
top executives) who are upstanding members of society, giving to charities, are 
caring parents and don’t share the image of typical criminals. More puzzling also is 
the finding of Elm and Nichols, (1993) that older managers have lower moral 
judgement scores than younger, less experienced employees, a position that has 
since been confirmed by other studies like that of Trevino and Weaver, (2003). 
According to Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory, the reverse of these 
findings is meant to be the case, as older, more experienced employees are 
expected in principle to hold themselves accountable to higher moral standards. This 
is further buttressed by empirical findings that confirm moral reasoning to be lower in 
work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas (Weber, 1990; Elm & 
Nichols, 1993). 
 
Thus, managerial control through hierarchies undermines the genuineness and 
quality/frequency of moral discourse in organisations (Jackall, 1988). Besides the 
documented impacts senior management have on their subordinates, varying 
demands and pressures at different levels of hierarchy could also have varying moral 
implications. At lower levels, for instance, full integration into the system and its ways 
may not have fully occurred hence some measure of individual morality can still 
govern action. Whereas, as employees rise through the ranks, the demands of their 
roles could cause a blur between individual ethical reasoning and moral values in the 
moral code the organisation. As Jackall (1988) claimed that ‘organisational life 
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makes managers unable to see most issues that confront them as moral, even when 
the problems they face are presented in moral terms’ Tsahuridu, (2006). At that 
height, the dilution of values creates complex individuals whose capacity to make 
objective moral judgements could be significantly hindered. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This review has explored the evolution of bureaucracy in business organisations 
through history. Arguing that the demands of technological advancements and 
access to resources during and after industrial revolution era necessitated change in 
organisation arrangements, bureaucracy rose up as the rational, most efficient 
means of ordering resources in a largely capitalist Western world.  With its rise also 
came a decline in substantive rationality and the ascent of instrumental rationality, a 
trend that implied absolute values gave way to pluralism. This opened a pathway for 
moral discourse. Also bureaucracy in action revealed the wrong side of rationality or 
efficient systems that seemed to have every rule and procedures set in place, in the 
iron cage phenomenon. The fact that rules could supress moral autonomy and limit 
the capacity of employees to at times see moral issues involved in their decisions, 
thereby rendering them incapable to respond appropriately also opened another 
channel for the discourse of bureaucratic morality.  
 
Also, Weber’s ideal type, which is the most popular conceptualisation of 
bureaucracies amidst a few possible ones, was further scrutinised and was found to 
have its several merits and demerits. In line with the discourse on employee morality 
and the role of bureaucracy, very few empirical studies for instance, Ferrell and 
Skinner, (1988) and Jackall, (1988) have explicitly studied the link between 
bureaucracy and morality. Both discovered that bureaucracies indeed have a way of 
limiting the moral capacities of their employees and could even go as far as 
replacing their identity. Yet, none of both studies employed any ethical theories in 
making sense of their findings. But with advancements in the field of descriptive 
ethics there is a better opportunity for richer empirical insight into how bureaucracies 
actually interact with individuals to affect their morality. Finally, in investigating how 
bureaucracies do this, two of its components, rules and hierarchies were further 
investigated and found to affect morality in different ways.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents and critically discusses descriptive ethical theories with a 
focus on individual factors. They aim to be used as lenses in understanding 
processes that drive morality at the individual and group levels within bureaucratic 
contexts. Of particular importance is the understanding of ethical, unethical or amoral 
behavioural responses of actors in bureaucratic contexts based on my choice of 
moral identity and cognitive moral development works. Both streams of literature are 
situated within a broader literature looking at moral agency based on situationally 
defined identities (Ashforth, 2001) and social frameworks stifling individual moral 
agency (Bandura, 2001). Randall and Gibson, (1990) in a critique of business ethics 
research commented that only about 35% of studies they reviewed offered any kind 
of theoretical development, whilst 75% lacked hypotheses or propositions to be 
tested (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Whilst theoretical improvements in ethics 
may have increased the number of studies focusing on theory development as 
reported in a more recent review effort by Jennings, Mitchel and Hannah, (2014), the 
study of bureaucratic morality still lacks studies with strong theoretical grounding and 
empirically tested hypotheses or propositions. This presents a gap in literature for 
this study to make a contribution. The first part will offer a critical justification of the 
descriptive ethical theories: Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory (CMD) 
and the socio-cognitive moral identity theory chosen for this study. Then each theory 
will be separately reviewed in the second part. Focus will be on the strengths and 
shortcomings of each, empirical applications and potential contributions to the 
discourse of bureaucratic morality from which propositions to be tested will be drawn. 
3.1 Theoretical Approaches in Descriptive Ethics 
The study of business ethics is usually divided into two realms: normative and 
descriptive ethics (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Normative ethics offers guides on 
how to behave (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994) while descriptive or empirical ethics 
attempts to predict and explain the actual behaviour of individuals (Trevino and 
Weaver, 1994; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). The latter has been the focus of 
ethical decision making in the social sciences and business literature (Trevino, 
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Weaver and Reynolds, 2006) with studies relying heavily on an ethical decision-
making framework by Rest, (1986). Rest’s, (1986) framework posits that in 
descriptive ethics, the focus is on an entire decision making process involving first 
being morally aware of an ethical issue, before moral judgement can be made, 
followed by moral motivation and moral behaviour (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and 
Thoma, 1999). This framework (that appears in figure 1.1 in the intro chapter) was a 
revolutionary understanding on processes that guide moral agents to actually act 
ethically, as it is much broader from a focus on moral judgement alone which 
normative ethics espouses and has been argued cannot fully predict moral 
behaviour (Trevino and Weaver, 2003).  
Other individual factors such as age, gender, education, nationality, locus of control 
amongst others as well as contextual variables such as opportunities, code of ethics, 
rewards and sanction, hierarchy, leadership etc. have often been tested (Ford and 
Richardson, 1994; Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; Cottone and Claus, 2000; 
O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Interestingly, the most tested individual variables; 
age (Jones and Gautschi, 1988; Barnet and Carson, 1989; Muncy and Vitell, 1992; 
Razzaque and Hwee, 2002 etc.) and gender (Chonko and Hunt, 1985; Ferrell and 
Skinner, 1988; Brady and Wheeler, 1996 etc.) have often reported no significant 
impact on ethical decision-making. Studies that have reported significant impacts 
often found women to be more ethical than men (Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; 
Weber and Wabieleski, 2001). Other individual factors studied in this regard have 
also returned varied findings (Cottone and Claus, 2000) often with no clear 
consensus on how they affect ethical decision-making. 
Advancements in theories spanning the last four decades, focusing on the individual 
have enhanced our understanding of the dynamics that enable a higher or lower 
quality of individual moral reasoning and action patterns in organisations. For 
instance, theories and frameworks such as cognitive moral development (CMD) 
(Kohlberg, 1969); human integrity theories (Akrivou & Oron, 2016 in press), 
individual-context interaction (Trevino, 1986); moral intensity (Jones, 1991); and 
socio-cognitive moral identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984; Aquino and Reed, 2002; Hardy and 
Carlo, 2005) have all contributed immensely to the discourse on conscious level 
moral reasoning. However, some other studies have also highlighted the role of 
unconscious reasoning and bias in ethical decision making such as the works of 
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Guadin & Thorne, (2001) on emotions, and cognitive affect models in ethical 
decision making as well as Woiceshyn’s, (2011) Intuition approach (see figure 3.1 
below). Intuition for instance was found in a study of 19 CEOs by Woicheshyn (2009) 
to be actively deployed in business decision-making and it played a salient role in the 
quality of decisions. The majority of these advancements stem from the cognitive 
approach to ethical decision making with early research focusing primarily on the 
individual and their ability to reason through dilemmas. I choose to focus on two 
theories that both emphasize the cognitive understanding of moral behaviour. 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Approaches to Ethical Decision-making. 
 
Hence, Kohlberg’s (1969) CMD was heavily relied upon as this cognitive approach to 
ethical decision-making ‘emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain 
moral behaviour’ (Jennings, Mitchel and Hannah, 2014) where moral reasoning is 
seen as a function of a person’s overall cognitive maturation (Akrivou, 2013; 
Kohlberg, 1969). In other words, this approach aims at understanding the underlying 
thought patterns, or cognitive equilibria which can help decipher the structure of the 
reasoning processes of individuals while undertaking ethical action, or when making 
ethical decisions. To date, Kohlberg’s, (1969) CMD theory is often argued to be the 
most influential cognitive-based theory (Aquino & Reed, 2002). O’Fallon and 
Butterfield, (2005) reported that from 23 CMD based studies covered in their review, 
19 reported very significant findings on the impact of CMD on moral behaviour. Prior 
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to their report, two other review articles by Ford and Richardson (1994) and Loe et al. 
(2000) did not report any CMD studies, suggesting increasing interests in the 
application of the CMD in modern business ethics studies, particularly individual 
ethical decision making. Therefore, Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, (2006) concluded 
in their review that it is indeed proven that the CMD theory proposes moral reasoning 
as the strongest predictor of ethical behaviour and has paved the way forward for 
studies in this field (Ford and Richardson, 1994; O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2005).  
A second strand of the literature is the (more recent) concept of moral identity (Blasi, 
1983, 1984, 2005; Aquino and Reed, 2002). Since it surfaced it has become 
increasingly popular as another explanatory variable in the behavioural ethics 
literature. At the identity level of studying individuals, the question to be answered is 
“Who am I?”  This is the whole concept of self which according to Markus & Wurf, 
(1987) is the interpretive structure that mediates most significant intrapersonal 
processes (including information processing, affect and motivation) and a wide 
variety of interpersonal processes (including social perception, choice of situation 
among others). It is also essentially regarded as a self-regulation mechanism of how 
individuals control and direct their own actions. Many recent studies (Aquino & Reed, 
2002; Carlo and Hardy, 2005; Blasi, 2005) have begun looking actively into identity 
based moral motivation for greater insight into the complex human ethical action and 
decision-making processes from which the construct of moral identity emerged.  
This approach proposes that when moral traits are central to self-definition, it 
increases the chances of acting morally (Blasi, 1999). If however he falters, it 
translates as a betrayal of self. Thus as Erikson, (1964) posited that as identity is 
rooted in one’s being, moral actions result only when morality is integrated into one’s 
self (Blasi, 1984). Therefore, a person has moral actions to the extent to which moral 
values, ideals and concerns are central to self-understanding and self-definition 
(Blasi, 1993, Carlo and Hardy 2005). This in turn motivates a sense of responsibility 
to behave consistently with those notions. Aquino and Reed, (2002) developed this 
work further by creating a tool to measure moral identity in individuals along two 
dimensions internalisation (the degree to which moral values are considered central 
to self) and symbolisation (the degree to which these traits are expressed publicly 
through the person’s actions) (Reynolds and Creanic, 2007). Empirical studies that 
have used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) tool have reported significantly positive 
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correlations between moral identity and ethical decision-making (Aquino et al, 2009; 
2011; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). In addition, moral identity has been found to be 
critical to moral processing and behaviour (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Weaver, 2006) 
and has also been found to be an important construct in explaining the link between 
moral judgement and moral behaviour (Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007).  
Thus this study will be employing both Kohlberg’s CMD and moral identity theory 
together to provide a rich theoretical underpinning for understanding how morality in 
individuals interacts with bureaucratic contexts.  Both theories, as discussed above 
will potentially bring unique contributions into this study. This approach has the 
potential to make contributions to existing knowledge. The next sections critically 
explore both the CMD and moral identity in greater depth. The unique contributions 
each can bring to the discourse of bureaucratic morality will be underlined from 
which propositions to be tested will be drawn. 
3.2 Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development Theory 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development took it roots from the assumptions 
on the moral development in children by Piaget, (1932). Piaget’s research viewed 
and established morality as cognitive and developmental, implying that the 
development of children in making moral judgements is based on interactions with 
the social environment and how it affects the cognitive moral development patterns 
of children1. Kohlberg, (1969) building on Piaget’s theory assumptions developed a 
theory of moral development in adulthood, with a longitudinal research on fifty-eight 
American boys (Kohlberg, 1981). Although his choice of an all-male sample has 
often been criticised (Murphy and Gilligan, 1980) and argued may have returned 
varied results had female samples been included (Gilligan, 1982), further studies 
(Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; Weber and Wabieleski, 2001) on CMD in both 
                                                          
1 From this, he identified development spanning through two separate moralities that 
characterised children from age six through twelve (Trevino, 1992). The first, he called 
morality of constraint in which the children are subject to another’s law and where rights are 
defined by obedience to authority in their earlier development and the second, he described as 
morality of cooperation or autonomy, where children in their later development understand 
and internalise rules independent of adult authority (Fleming, 2005). The transition from 
constraint to autonomy is aided by peer interactions and cognitive development and thus, they 
begin to see rules as mutually beneficial to maintain order in a social construct (Fleming, 
2006). 
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male and female have reported insignificant differences between both sexes (Bussey 
and Maughan, 1982).  
Nonetheless, Kohlberg’s aim to study changes in moral reasoning as growth and 
development occurs over the course of a lifetime resulted in the following key 
assumptions: 
1. The theory is universal and non-culturally specific (Fraedrich et al 1994) 
2. CMD is based on how moral maturity capacity progresses in a staged and 
unidirectional process in the context of the surrounding, culturally conditioned 
rules and conventions towards more principled and universal ethics (Akrivou, 
2013). Kohlberg’s arguments lie within the construct of moral relativism in 
view of how individuals are able to use their cognitive moral faculties to 
respond to the surrounding morality in a given context. 
3. Higher stages of moral development are psychologically more adequate than 
lower stages. (Levine, 2007) 
4. Higher stages of moral development involve higher maturity in cognitive terms, 
i.e. they involve more nuanced and rigorous reasoning capacities upon which 
moral reasoning may identify increasingly more universal and complicated 
ethical dimensions and solutions. 
5. Formal qualities of moral judgements can be defined or agreed upon 
regardless of agreement on substantive matters (Fraedrich et al 1994)  
These assumptions provide a foundation for his study in which he followed his 
sample aged between 10 and 16 years, for a twelve-year period, interviewing them 
every three years (Trevino, 1986). He tested the response of his sample with 
hypothetical moral dilemmas from which he delineated a structure for moral 
reasoning and observed how changes occurred as the boys grew older. He 
discovered that changes in moral reasoning result from the cognitive disequilibrium 
that occurs when an individual perceives a contradiction between a current pattern in 
his or her moral reasoning level and the next higher one (Turiel, 1969).  
In Kohlberg’s view, the essential ingredient of moral development is not social 
pressure, the superego or habit, but rather a certain mode of reasoning and 
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judgement that are neither innate nor environmental, but arise through the interaction 
of the child with his social environment (Aron, 1970) resulting in personal choices 
and cognitive responses. In his widely read publication, Kohlberg (1969, p.352) 
further explained that the cognitive development assumption is that basic mental 
structure is the result of ‘an interaction between organismic structuring tendencies 
and the structure of the outside world’, rather than reflecting one directly. This 
interaction leads to cognitive stages, which represent continuous transformations 
through exposure to the external environment. Kohlberg’s arguments lie within the 
construct of moral relativism in which the morality of an action is relative to context 
and in which no action is moral or immoral but are justified by the reasoning behind 
such actions. However, reasoning is not stagnant, but changes from childhood to 
adulthood.  
Kohlberg’s CMD model identified six stages of cognitive moral development as 
follows (See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the CMD stages and a 
breakdown of the Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) profiles of all participants. See 
also Chapter 4, Page 79 for a detailed description of how Kohlberg’s CMD stages 
were adapted empirically to determine the CMR levels of participants): 
Figure 3.1: Kohlberg’s CMD Stages and Social Perspectives 
Stage What is considered right  Social 
Perspective 
1. PRECONVENTIONAL 
LEVEL 
Stage One – Obedience and 
punishment orientation 
 
Stage Two – Instrumental 
purpose and exchange 
 
Sticking to rules to avoid 
physical punishment. 
Obedience for its own sake 
 
Following rules only when it is in 
one’s immediate interest. Right 
is an equal exchange, a fair trial 
EGOISM 
Blind Egoism 
 
 
Instrumental 
Egoism 
2. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL 
Stage Three – Interpersonal 
accord, conformity, mutual 
expectations 
 
Stereotypical ‘good’ behaviour. 
Living up to what is expected by 
people close to you.  
BENEVOLENCE 
Instrumental social 
relationship 
perspective 
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Stage Four – Social accord 
and system maintenance 
 
 
Fulfilling duties and obligations 
to which you have agreed. 
Upholding laws except in 
extreme cases where they 
conflict with social duties. 
Contributing to society, group. 
 
 
 
Instrumental Social 
systems 
perspectives 
3. PRINCIPLED LEVEL 
Stage Five – Social contract 
and Individual rights 
 
 
 
 
Stage Six – Universal ethical 
principles 
 
Being aware that people hold a 
variety of values; that rules are 
relative to the group. Upholding 
rules because they are social 
contract. Upholding non-relative 
values and rights regardless of 
majority opinion. 
 
Following self-chosen ethical 
principles. When laws violate 
these principles, act in accord 
with principle. 
PRINCIPLE 
Contractual / 
Principled 
Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual respect as 
a universal 
principle 
Source: Adapted from Kohlberg, (1969, 1971) Victor and Cullen, (1988) and Trevino, (1986) 
Based on these stages, Kohlberg, (1977) argued that the higher stages were 
objectively better in terms of the rigour and relevance to important ethical standards 
and therefore more desirable than the lower stages. Thus, a higher level of moral 
cognitive maturity implied more nuanced and more integrated ethical decision-
making which embraces broader humanistic and ecological ethical responses via 
dialogue internally in the self and externally, while it abandons ego-driven moral 
choices (Kohlberg, 1981; Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2013; 2015). This is a major 
contribution of the Kohlberg theory, which makes it relevant today. By operating on a 
higher level, one’s overall moral reasoning becomes more complicated and nuanced 
in that it balances harmonically yet ethically various social-citizenship and 
professional ethical identities principles (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977; Akrivou, 2008) 
while the opposite is true for pre-conventional and early conventional stages in 
particular, hence, his theory allows a unidirectional flow upwards. Therefore, 
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individuals reasoning at stages five and six for instance are expected to be morally 
sound and able to make decisions consistent with their beliefs, even in difficult 
situations (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006) as different from those operating at 
the lower stages who are more inclined to the ‘obedience and punishment’, 
‘conformity’ or ‘law and order’ orientations, all of which restrict moral reasoning and 
behavioural capacity.  
Kohlberg’s theorised unidirectional flow of cognitive maturity has however drawn 
criticisms from other scholars. For instance, Bussey and Maughan, (1982) observed 
that from Kohlberg’s initial longitudinal studies (Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg and 
Krammer, 1969) some of the adults did regress to lower stages of moral 
development, which contradicts Kohlberg’s unidirectional position. Also, as 
understood by Kohlbergian scholars, ‘an individual may be cognitively capable of 
reasoning at the highest stages of the moral development scale but does not always 
operate at the highest stages given various individual, organizational, and context 
factors’ (Malinowski and Smith, 1985; Weber and Gillespie, 1998; Weber and 
Wasieleski, 2001). For example in bureaucracies where strict adherence to set rules 
is compulsory, the likelihood of a regression to lower CMD stages is a possibility 
since the pressure from such contexts could force individuals to operate at lower 
CMD levels than they would for instance in non-work scenarios. 
In a study by Elms and Nichols, (1993), older managers were discovered to have 
lower moral judgement scores than younger, less experienced employees, a position 
that has since been confirmed by other studies like that of Trevino and Weaver, 
(2003). According to Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory, the reverse of 
these findings is meant to be the case and the power of socialisation of individuals 
within organisational cultures that are weak in ethical reflection terms is salient, 
which may indicate the progression in moral development can also take both 
directions (an ascending and a descending one). This is further buttressed by 
empirical findings that confirm moral reasoning to be lower in work-related dilemmas 
compared to non-work dilemmas (Weber, 1990; Elm & Nichols, 1993; Adewale, 
2011). Thus, some of Kohlberg’s unidirectional claims remains contestable, 
especially if the individuals have not reached the principled level at which it could be 
truly difficult to regress to lower stages (Kohlberg, 1981). Yet from literature, it has 
been widely reported that the highest level managers often operate at is stage four 
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(Weber, 1990), which would imply the likelihood of fluctuations in their CMD levels. 
Therefore, Aron, (1970) argued that moral reasoning alone cannot predict moral 
behaviour, especially within organisations. 
Hannah, Avolio & May, (2011) for instance also criticised Kohlberg’s CMD as 
addressing one aspect of cognitive abilities, that is the capacity to recognise and 
judge moral issues, whereas it fails in helping us understand self-regulatory 
capacities that ‘promote how an individual engages his or her full cognitive capacities 
in a given moral dilemma’ (p. 666). Neither does the CMD help our understanding of 
why an individual will stand up and act in the face of adversity whilst another with 
equal cognitive capacity would not (Bandura, 1999). Furthermore, some other key 
empirical studies (Blasi, 1983; Bergman, 2004; Hoffman, 2000; Walker, 2004; Shao, 
Aquino and Freeman, 2008) have also claimed that the strength of the relationship 
between moral reasoning and moral action is small or at best moderate in all tested 
scenarios. Therefore, other mechanisms besides moral reasoning also affect the 
ethical decision making process (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Trevino, 1990; Rest, 1991; 
Weaver, 2006). 
Further, Bandura, (1999) identified forms of ethical reasoning failure associated with 
human cognition, for instance, moral disengagement which he explained is the 
process of people deliberately disengaging or freeing themselves from self-sanctions 
and guilt that would normally come from unethical conducts (Moore and Gino, 2013). 
Indeed, there are times human decision makers would fail to follow rational principles, 
alternatives or give importance to what really matters (Guzak, 2015). Finally, 
Kohlberg’s CMD is based on the philosophy of justice, whereas other philosophical 
principles such as virtue (McIntyre, 1981) and equality (Pojman, 1995), amongst 
others are totally ignored. Therefore, there is more to ethical decision-making than 
moral reasoning (Blasi, 1984; Higgins et al 1984). Blasi, (1983) in his study of ethical 
decision making introduced the concept of identity in explaining the failures of 
cognition in the ethical decision making process and thereby claims to expound on 
Rest’s (1986) last two stages – moral motivation and moral behaviour. In addition 
Kohlberg’s theory is initially tested entirely within western assumptions and may not 
have salience for other cultures. However, an exploratory CMD study on Nigerian 
managers (Adewale, 2011) revealed the salience of the CMD within that African 
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context and also found consistent with literature that indeed several managers 
reason at the conventional level. 
Based on these contributions as well as criticisms, Kohlberg’s CMD has been 
severally tested in empirical studies and is strongly linked to moral behaviour. 
Studies like those of Green and Weber, (1997) and Bass, Barnett and Brown (1999) 
found very strong positive relationships between CMD and ethical judgement or that 
CMD positively influenced the decision making process. Trevino, (1986) in a study 
empirically tested the interaction between cognitive moral development in individuals 
and contextual elements (work roles and immediate work context) in affecting ethical 
decision-making. She discovered varied moral reasoning capacities in her 
respondents based on their CMD level according to Kohlberg’s theory. This position 
has been confirmed in other studies for instance Weber, (1990) and Trevino, (1992) 
who also found very positive relationships between levels of CMD in managers and 
varied responses to ethical dilemmas in a business context thereby affirming the 
applicability and credibility of the CMD in business oriented moral dilemmas.  
3.3 Moral Identity Theory 
More recent theorising in the study of moral development focuses on identity based 
morality, or moral identity (Bergman, 2004). Increasingly, this line of study is 
influencing studies in the broader ethical decision making literature (e.g., Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2005; Weaver, 2006). The express claim behind 
this growing line of work is to bridge the gap between moral judgement and moral 
behaviour (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), as some critiques of Kohlberg’s theory noted 
it may be weak in this respect, as noted earlier. As Damon, (1984:110) argued, “we 
must know about not only the person’s moral beliefs but also the person’s 
understanding of self in relation to those moral beliefs”. Therefore, as far as morality 
is central to self-understanding, failure to act in accordance with one’s moral traits 
creates a moral dissonance and emotional discomfort (Blasi, 1999). It is in effect a 
betrayal of self and as Bergman, (2004) argued, ‘the motivating power of morality 
resides in its degree of integration with the self’. This implies that regardless of 
situational variations, decisions emanating from the root of one’s being (Erikson, 
1964) will likely hardly ever vary in different contexts.  
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Thus, self-identity has been closely linked with cognition, affect and behaviour. For 
instance, Weaver and Agle, (2002) theorised while Bolton and Reed, (2004) have 
empirically verified that judgements that harmonise well with one’s identity are more 
stable than those not in harmony with one’s identity yet how individuals value their 
options is not explained by this approach hence it is weak in this respect.  
3.3.1 Conceptualising Moral Identity 
There are two broad perspectives to the conceptualising of moral identity (Shao, 
Aquino and Freeman, 2008) namely: the character perspective and the socio-
cognitive perspective. The character perspective took its root from the ‘self-model’ of 
Blasi, (1983; 1984) and has been described as befitting in understanding the 
disposition of moral exemplars (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps, 2008). The 
socio-cognitive approach however relates with the complex structures of moral 
functioning as well as the social dimensions of morality and identity (Rai and Fiske, 
2011; Moore and Gino, 2013) more relevant to everyday morality within 
organisational contexts.   
The socio-cognitive approach conceptualises moral identity as a schema of moral 
values and traits often leading to the building of cognitive representations and 
behavioural scripts (Aquino and Reed, 2002). In this approach, identity is formed 
through social cognition processes and therefore draws on theoretical contributions 
from social cognition, memory, identity and information processing to explain moral 
functioning (Bandura, 2001; Shao, et al, 2008). The socio-cognitive perspective 
assumes that individuals are an embodiment of multiple identities (Shao et al, 2008), 
often defined through association with different social structures (Bandura, 2001). 
Hence, moral identity is one of several possible identities individuals possess and 
has to be ‘triggered’ by situational cues to play a part in affecting behaviour (Aquino 
and Reed, 2002; Reynolds and Ceracic, 2007). 
This approach however has its roots in postmodern tradition which promotes the 
idea of identity as non-unitary and self-concept as fragmented and plural e.g. Markus 
and Nurius’s, (1986) the plural selves. This tradition presupposes various self-
definitions are not held together or integrated by an overarching synthesis (Schwitzer, 
2004) and explains why moral identity can be construed as a standalone identity 
whereas, having moral values as central to one’s self, which Aquino’s (2002) 
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advocates, could also be a part of other identities. For instance, being kind is not an 
isolated moral value we simply acquire but could stem from other identities such as 
being a mother, father or Christian. As Schwitzer, (2004) further argues that what 
follows with reference to the concept of plural selves is an openly different way of 
interpreting and of valuing the self. Morally, this will ‘liberate the person from 
oppressive expectations of cultural and personal integration’ (p.50), normally central 
to the position of the unitary self and stable identity. This approach thus limits the 
concept of individual integrity and could facilitate multiplied reasons for any moral or 
immoral actions to be justifiable based on a particular identity since the individuals 
are fragmented and believe they are different persons in different circumstances and 
contexts. Whereas the concept of unitary and consistent identity proposes a holistic 
approach to personality, which makes individuals more accountable to themselves 
under different circumstances. 
However, moral identity exists alongside a host of other possible identities that can 
guide ethical behaviour, hence not every moral outcome may be attributable to an 
‘independent’ moral identity. For instance, an act of ‘kindness’ may have its root in 
the actor being a father, mother or a member of a group as different from assuming 
kindness is a stand-alone moral virtue that can be integrated into oneself 
independent of other identities. Also, this approach does not explain moral 
development and seems to assume internalising a virtue translates into full moral 
maturity, a position that tends to ignore elements of an individual’s growth and 
development within a polity. Nonetheless, some propositions of the moral identity 
theory will potentially enrich our understanding on the discourse of individual ethical 
decision-making within bureaucratic contexts.  
Also, a critical mechanism in the socio-cognitive moral identity approach is 
knowledge accessibility, which presupposes that the more accessible (readiness for 
activation), a given schema or cognitive representation is, the stronger its influence 
in affecting subsequent behaviour (Higgins, 1996). Therefore, a person’s moral 
identity is considered a central part of their self-definition if their moral knowledge 
structure is easily accessible in given situations and can therefore impact information 
processing and subsequent behaviour (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Lapsley and Lasky, 
2001; Lapsley and Narvaez, 2004). This process underpins the concept of self-
importance (Damon, 1984) that is the centrality of an identity to self-definition.  It 
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then also follows on the other hand that where a person’s moral identity is not readily 
accessible, its ‘activation potential’ is limited and would therefore play a minor role in 
regulating moral behaviour (Aquino et al, 2009).  
However it is also possible to have a salient moral identity, which is at the same time 
incongruent with for instance, a professional identity, as in the case for managers in 
their organisations. This kind of conflict exposes another potential flaw in the socio-
cognitive approach, as it does not explain how such individuals would make a moral 
decision in the circumstance. One way such managers resolve the conflict therefore 
would be to find some means of rationalising their actions. Thus for a person to 
maintain self-consistency according to the Higgins’ (1996) model they would try to 
convince themselves they are a moral manager if they are following the rules their 
superiors and a bureaucracy sets for them. This is indeed what Jackall, (1988) found 
and no coincidence managers in Jackal’s sample exhibited early level conventional 
moral development stages. They had no moral discomfort nor were even fully aware 
how they manipulated their self-system to behave conformably while re-labelling 
them “ethical” to get away from the guilt originating in their moral identity that they 
have failed morally while at work. 
Nonetheless, Aquino and Reed, (2002) defined moral identity as ‘self-schema 
organised around a set of moral trait associations’ for instance, being honest, caring, 
compassionate etc or as simply the ‘embeddedness’ of certain characteristically 
moral traits in ones’ self-concept and behaviour’ (Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007). They 
defined these associations as relating to distinct mental image of what a moral 
person is likely to think, feel and do in any given situation. Aquino and Reed, (2002) 
further developed a construct to measure moral identity following from Erikson’s 
(1964) definition of identity as being rooted in one’s being. Aquino and Reed 
theorised that there are the private and public aspects of identity and came up with 
two dimensions: Internalisation and Symbolisation. As Reynolds and Ceranic, (2007) 
observed, “Internalization reflects the degree to which a set of moral traits is central 
to the self-concept, whereas symbolization reflects the degree to which these traits 
are expressed publicly through the person’s actions”.  
As such, a person characterised as having a high internalised moral identity is one 
whose ‘morally relevant knowledge is chronically accessible in terms of quantity and 
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speed within the self-working concept’ (Aquino et al., 2009). Thus, when a person is 
regarded as high in moral identity internalisation, it simply means that their moral 
traits are quickly and readily accessible in any given situation, whereas when an 
individual is termed low in moral identity internalisation, this does not imply that such 
persons lack any cognitively accessible moral trait but that such traits are not readily 
accessible, consistently, quickly or easily as someone who is high in internalisation 
(Winterich, Aquino, Mittal and Swatz, 2013). Moreover, being high or low along the 
internalisation dimension according to Aquino and Reed, (2002) does not indicate 
whether a person is a moral person in a normative sense, that is, this does not refer 
to a moral capacity to determine right and wrong; and is also unlike Kohlberg’s (1984) 
stages for instance where moral development is hinged on a particular ethical 
system. On the other hand, a person high on symbolisation, the public dimension of 
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity dimensions, is someone who ‘tends to 
engage in visible activities that can convey to others his or her commitment to certain 
moral goals and ideals’ (Winterich et al., 2013). Therefore, a person low in moral 
symbolisation is simply someone who is less inclined to engage in public displays. 
Aquino and Reed, (2002) further explain that symbolisation level does not 
necessarily correspond to a person’s level of internalisation, although both should 
have some kind of positive relationship. Also that the terms ‘high’ and ‘low’ as used 
in this theoretical model does not refer to comparison of strengths of these elements 
across dimensions but rather within each dimension. 
However, in line with Aquino and Reed’s, (2002) submission that moral identity 
internalisation and symbolisation do not refer to whether individuals are moral in a 
normative sense, it can therefore be argued that the moral identity approach ignores 
the fact that individuals have to make judgements in any given situation and 
assumes that moral judgement is already carried out once an individual chooses to 
behave in accordance to internalised moral values. And it also seems to assume that 
this would always translate into moral behaviour, which may not be true especially 
within the capricious setting of organisations. The moral ramifications of this is that 
every action is moral as long as it can be justified with a moral trait held as central to 
one’s self definition. This kind of approach creates a subjective kind of morality that 
is not related to the main normative ethics norms of judging morality thereby creating 
a perfect setup for employees to completely alienate themselves from the moral 
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consequences of their actions and still justify such actions as moral, which was 
Hummel’s (1998) argument of the ‘dehumanising tendencies’ in organisations. Also 
since employees adapt their morality to suit the demands of their organisations, the 
satisfaction derived from being ‘moral’ is actually that of conformity to organisational 
norms and the acceptance, rewards and associated benefits. This therefore stifles 
employee moral inquiry capacity and ability to rise above the status quo habitus in 
their organisations.  
Also, in this approach, the individual who has better capacity in making ‘moral’ 
decisions is one whose moral values are readily, quickly and easily accessible in any 
given circumstance and vice versa. This also seems to ignore moral development in 
individuals and as Schwitzer (2004) argues ‘the assumption that the achievement of 
a firm identity, or the followership of what authority figures in power expect to see 
from employees or lower level managers is the basis for mature intimacy leaves out 
and deeply underestimates, the need for genuine interpersonal and community 
relationships and related ethical deliberations which are indispensable for healthy 
development’ (p.50). This may also lead to the avoidance of the real moral content or 
issue involved in any morally sensitive situations.  
Nonetheless, both internalisation and symbolisation have been empirically proven to 
predict moral behaviours with internalisation found to be more predictive than 
symbolisation (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reed and Aquino, 2003; Mulder and Aquino, 
2013). The critical role contexts could play in the functioning of moral identity has 
also been widely reported.  For instance, several studies (Weaver, 2006; Weaver & 
Agle, 2002; Bandura, 2001) have identified that ‘contextual influences can reduce 
the salience and influence of any particular identity’ (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) by 
activating or deactivating knowledge structured including the moral self (Shao et al, 
2008). For instance, observing a moral exemplar may activate moral self, making it 
more prominent in decision making whilst on another hand, large financial rewards 
for a simple task may activate other aspects of an individual’s identity and could 
deactivate the moral self (Aquino et al, 2008). However, empirical studies addressing 
the impact of contexts on moral identity are scant (Weaver, 2006) hence this study 
will be contributing to knowledge in this regard by investigating the impact of 
bureaucratic environments on moral identity of employees. 
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3.4 CMD and Moral Identity in Bureaucratic Contexts 
Following from the previous chapter and section, it is well established that 
bureaucratic contexts governed by the strict rules and hierarchical control create 
environments emphasizing strict compliance and conformity. This social setting 
could have different implications on both cognitive moral development and moral 
identity.  
3.4.1 CMD in a Bureaucratic Context 
Bureaucracies have been theorised to have stifling effects on the morality of those 
working in them (Jackal, 1988) and as such varied behaviours can be expected from 
individuals reasoning at different levels of Kohlberg’s CMD. Victor and Cullen, (1988 
pg. 105) developed an ‘ethical climate’ typology based on Kohlberg’s three 
reasoning levels. Their framework, which described different types of ethical climates 
created at each of Kohlberg’s CMD level, predicts moral behavioural inclinations by 
individuals reasoning at those levels. They submitted that at the pre-conventional or 
egoist level of reasoning, the ethical climate created is centred on ‘self-interest’ at 
the individual level (Victor and Cullen, 2002). In the ‘self-interest’ climate type, 
individuals within the organisation perceive that it is expected of them to relate to 
others on the basis of more instrumental or formalised exchange, or follow what is 
being asked of them with no moral questioning of demands while they seek to 
maximise their personal interests (Maesschalck and Vanoverbeke, 2005). “As such 
the (individual) usually seeks the alternative with the consequences that most 
satisfies his/her needs, ignoring/neglecting the needs or interests of others” 
(Parboteeah and Cullen, 2003:140). At the local or organisational locus of analysis 
however the ethical climate is aimed at maximising economic interest of the 
organisation based on how a given authority group defines it, referred to as 
‘company profit’ towards organisational ‘efficiency’ (Victor and Cullen, 1988).  All 
these seem to suggest bureaucracy may be very compatible with early and middle 
level conventional (Kohlberg 1971) thinking patterns in organisations. 
Au and Wong, (2000) commented on the inadequacy of this level of moral reasoning 
as well as the kind of ethical climate it creates. He submitted that the avoidance of 
punishment or an excessive focus on individual gains could encourage submission 
to authorities and execution of commands regardless of ethical values, especially 
within bureaucracies where obedience and respect for set authority are customary. 
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Therefore individuals reasoning at the pre-conventional level would be expected to 
maintain a ‘child-like’ adherence to rules or do so for just merely personal gain 
(Kohlberg, 1971; Trevino, 1992). In other words, they follow through an 
organisation’s rules as they are to avoid sanctions, queries or dismissal from their 
jobs and to get great personal benefits such as good reputations with the bosses, 
promotions, awards, bonuses amongst other possible rewards the system offers. 
Hence, moral capacity is essentially absent at this stage of reasoning, but individuals 
are willing to comply with what are asked to do to avoid punishments and gain 
rewards to have an easy life, without paying genuine attention to the moral 
consequences and dynamics of action.  
At the conventional level however, Victor and Cullen, (1988) described the kind of 
ethical climate created by this level of moral reasoning as that of superficial 
‘friendship’ loyalty ties at the individual level and ‘team interest’ negotiated against at 
the organisational level. Consequently, the moral implications of this in a 
bureaucratic system is such that the desire and imposed necessity to conform 
makes it difficult to rise above the status-quo or norms even if they are personally 
perceived as immoral (Trevino, 1992). This conformity is of course safe as Kohlberg 
(1971) critiques, while its conformity bias (Prentice, 2007) starts with newcomers’ 
socialization for example who observe others to learn office protocols and that rules 
should be guiding action.  A key characteristic of these stages is that rule compliance 
is not distinguishing meaningful or less meaningful rules and the ethical aspect of 
rules but absorbs and behaves compliantly vis-à-vis any rules. Often the concern is 
to look good, be perceived as loyal and a strong need for social approval, while this 
level capacities pressure people to endorse any behaviour from those in power roles 
just to find endorsement by authority or a sense of belonging in communities in the 
organisation (Asch, 1951) as employees assume those behaviours are inescapable 
norms (Dobson, 2003). In the worst cases this can lead to system level immorality; 
Byrne, (2002) explained for instance that an Enron employee admitted the 
organisation’s fast and loose corporate style wasn’t ‘so bad’ since ‘everybody else is 
doing it’. It is for this reason that a ‘corporate code of ethics cannot effectively 
compete with actual corporate cultures that are inconsistent with the code’s stated 
values’ (Dobson, 2003) hence no code of ethics can be effective when employees 
daily observe its breach. 
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Accordingly, within a bureaucratic organisational context, characterised by strict 
rules, procedures and hierarchical domination, it can be argued that an environment 
of strict rule based compliance could force employees to operate at lower levels of 
cognitive moral reasoning, regardless of their ‘usual’ CMD level. Bureaucratic 
environments achieve this by imposing compliance, providing rewards for abiding by 
the rules and sanctions for violating set rules, with little emphasis in the broader 
participation of employees to question, critique and/or change the rules. Thus, 
employees are constantly put on their toes to ensure their daily activities are carried 
out in line with company procedures or to please their superiors, which could then 
take their attention away from any moral red flags. Even when any ‘conflicts of 
interests’ are found, they may likely follow company rules for their own ‘security’. The 
end result is to keep being ‘good’, avoiding any problems with the organisation and 
hoping to get associated rewards in salaries, benefits, job security and promotion. 
This theory on alignment with authority was further buttressed in a laboratory 
experiment carried out by Stanley Milgram in 1963 in his studies on obedience in 
social settings. Participants were asked to carry out increasingly injurious shocks on 
innocent, protesting victims, who were merely pretending to be harmed (Milgram, 
1963). Contrary to initial predictions that less than 1 percent of participants would 
obey, more than 65% obeyed (Milgram, 1963) therefore Prentice, (2007) concluded 
that people tend to be more deferential to authority than they realise. Prentice, (2007) 
further argued that if mere individuals in lab coats could wield such an influence, how 
much more could bosses with the power to determine the economic future of their 
employees? Pleasing authorities comes with its rewards whilst displeasing them 
comes with heavy penalties. This further explains for instance, the emails of Blodget, 
an employee of Merill Lynch who had publicly praised a series of stocks but had 
privately wished he could express his firm beliefs that they were all nonsense 
(Prentice, 2007 p.18). Thus, two issues emerge: First that for hierarchical authority to 
have effect on employees, bosses need not expressly instruct employees to carry 
out unethical activities, but that employees are ‘intuitive politicians’ who can infer the 
wishes of their bosses and will be willing to carry them out to save their heads 
(Tetlock, 1991). Secondly, from Blodget’s case, employees may realise the unethical 
nature of their intended behaviours but the desire to satisfy personal desire or those 
of their bosses takes over. This Tetlock, (1985) referred to as ‘acceptability 
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heuristics’. The result is that employees frame answers that are acceptable and 
pleasing to their bosses rather than an ethical one. 
Also, group level associations could lower moral reasoning at the individual level by 
the concept of ‘group think’ (Janis, 1971). The groupthink instils a tendency in 
members of a group to avoid introducing stress into the group and to foster 
cohesiveness (Janis, 1982) by following the direction of the majority or their seniors 
in higher positions in spite of any perceived irrationality in such decisions. It often 
comes with pressure from superiors as well as peers, both of which are observable 
in bureaucratic systems through vertical and horizontal relationships. This desire not 
to transgress or bring jeopardy to the efforts of a group for instance limits the moral 
ability of the individual actors (Janis and Mann, 1977). Janis and Mann, (1977) 
explained further that the illusions of morality that comes with group think makes 
members believe that their decisions are morally correct thereby ignoring the 
consequences of such as in the Ford Pinto case Giola, (1992).  
A post conventional level thinker embraces ethics as an important feature of social 
and organisational life. In the early post conventional stages this starts by embracing 
a more principled and more independent approach to decision making often relying 
on self-chosen moral principles (Kohlberg, 1969). Thus, within the bureaucratic 
system, a strict adherence to personal moral principles is expected (Victor and 
Cullen, 1988). A next progression may display a contractarian approach to relate to 
others and act following universal ethical principles. Victor and Cullen, (1988) further 
explained that at the organisational level, post-conventional level thinkers would 
abide by company regulations and procedures except once they question these on 
ethical grounds.  But it is not clear yet how early post conventional moral reasoners 
approach conflicts of interests, which is often the case in large complex 
organisations. . It may also well be that in the case of organisations with rigid 
bureaucracies that face often conflicts of interests that are more related to financial 
and performance aspects undermining ethical dimensions of the issues at hand 
higher post conventional reasoners’ integrity may motivate them to eventually leave 
(Akrivou and Huang, 2015), which further accentuates the power of contextual 
morality dimensions of organisations.  
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Following from these, CMD has helped our understanding of the likely moral 
judgemental dispositions of individuals’ thinking at each level of Kohlberg’s CMD 
within bureaucratic contexts. What remains unclear is whether corresponding 
behaviour will follow the above predictions, a gap that is addressed by borrowing 
from the socio-cognitive based moral identity theory. 
3.4.2 Moral Identity within Bureaucratic contexts 
Moral identity as theorised by Aquino and Reed, (2002) conceptualises moral identity 
along two dimensions – Internalisation and Symbolisation. Following this approach, a 
number of empirical studies have studied the role of moral identity in unethical 
behaviours (Mulder and Aquino, 2013), moral elation (Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 
2011), religiosity (Vitell, and Patwardhan, 2008), moral behaviour (Aquino et al, 2009) 
and so on. However, within organisational contexts, particularly bureaucratic 
contexts, identity is prone to influence as long as any form of schematic cognition 
can be influenced by the attitudes and behaviour of organizational members and 
even fine details such as the “who we are” elements in organizational cultures 
(Weaver & Agle, 2002). Also, the functioning of rules and hierarchy within 
bureaucratic environments demand and could easily activate moral traits such as 
‘loyalty’, ‘obedience’ and ‘respect’ among others, which although are laudable traits, 
could however be easily misguided in such contexts. One way it does this as Moore 
and Gino, (2013) argued is through the ‘anonymity’ bureaucratic offices promote 
‘which could facilitate negative moral outcomes structurally and psychologically’. 
Through anonymity, individuals are protected from the consequences of their actions 
by the office they occupy and by the very “rule” of obedience to the chain of 
command in authority relations and are psychologically shielded from personal moral 
responsibility (Bakan, 2004).  
Therefore, employees behaving in accordance with the aforementioned moral traits 
could believe they are behaving consistently with their moral identities when in fact 
the ends to which they are contributing their ‘morality’ could be amoral and even 
immoral. It therefore implies that ‘unsuspecting’ employees could reinforce their 
positive self-images to consistently act in ways they believe are moral, or in ways 
their superiors want them to behave with obedience to authority valued higher than 
one’s ethical conscience. This is because employees may feel coerced into 
submission due to the power of their superiors to control rewards and penalties, or 
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simply because they are disconnected from the moral consequences of their 
decisions, hence misdirecting their morality. Moore and Gino, (2013) illustrated this 
using the example of a moral compass with a ‘true north’ and that the true north can 
be distorted as much as the moral compass can be lost in a social setting (Pasha, 
2006). They argued that ‘a present but misdirected moral compass could seduce us 
with the belief that we are behaving ethically when we are not, while allowing us to 
maintain a positive moral self-image’ (Moore and Gino, 2013 pg.55). This kind of 
misdirected morality is a possibility in a bureaucratic setting where even employees 
with strong moral identities can be disconnected from the moral consequences of 
their actions. Furthermore, hierarchies create ranks of greater and lesser powers as 
well as social status (Magee and Galinsky, 2008). This too has moral consequences, 
for instance, Jackal, (1988) submitted that passing moral responsibility up through 
the chain of command, leads to the shift in sense of responsibility where one feels 
one is acting on behalf of another person (Milgram, 1974; Bandura, 1999). It also 
enforces behavioural expectations such as obedience to set authority which could 
also result in conformity.  
Interestingly also moral identity has often been linked with pro-social behaviour. Pro-
social behaviours are ways organisational members behave because they perceive 
them as benefitting to others (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; 
Winterich et al, 2013). It must be highlighted that the concept of pro-social behaviour 
refers to ‘socially acceptable behaviour promoted by empathy, moral values and a 
sense of personal responsibility’ (Kidron and Fleischman, 2006) without necessarily 
paying attention to their moral ramifications. As such, Moore and Gino (2013) argued 
that there is the temptation to conform to requests by superiors in bureaucratic 
organisations that push people to act in a certain desired way valued by the 
hierarchy, but which may disobey one’s inner moral compass; because of the power 
they have over their subordinates. Jeter, (2003) for instance cited the example of 
Scott Sullivan who quickly rose through the ranks of WorldCom partly because of his 
willingness to do whatever the then CEO asked him to do. It eventually resulted in a 
5-year prison term after the WorldCom scandal was probed and Scott was among 
those found guilty (Searcey, Young and Scannell, 2005).  
Aquino and Reed, (2002) in another study had argued that there is every reason to 
believe that people high in moral identity internalisation (that is those whose moral 
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values are readily and easily accessible) will more likely behave in pro-social ways, 
than others. Hence, they would act in ways consistent with their self-understanding 
regardless of the ‘anticipated public or private nature of their acts’ (Winterich et al., 
2013) because of the need to maintain self-consistency at all times (Blasi, 1984). 
Winterich, et al, (2013) concluded in their empirical study of moral identity and pro-
social behaviour that symbolisation, the public dimension of moral identity (Aquino 
and Reed, 2002), motivates recognised pro-social behaviour amongst those with low 
moral identity internalisation. Hence, when the moral values individuals hold are not 
easily accessible in any given context, actions are driven by the desire to be seen as 
pro-social because of the recognition that comes with it. It would therefore imply that 
within a bureaucratic system for instance where strict obedience to rules and 
hierarchies are expected, people low in moral identity internalisation but are high 
along the symbolisation dimension would always want to openly demonstrate pro-
social behaviours because of their desire to ‘verify an important facet of the self 
through the reflected appraisal of others’ (Felson, 1985). And one way this is done is 
to act in socially acceptable ways of mutual benefits where others can witness or 
acknowledge the behaviour (Grant and Patil, 2012) which can be argued is 
synonymous to ‘playing to the gallery’ for social approval. Therefore, Winterich et al., 
(2013) argue that those who are high in moral identity symbolisation would be more 
sensitive to the recognition of their behaviours within the organisational construct 
when making decision whether to act pro-socially or not. This phenomenon can also 
be explained as ‘conformity’ and from Kohlberg’s point of view is no higher that 
stages two and three, at which desire to play along for instrumental gains are at work. 
Thus, people low in moral identity internalisation and high in moral identity 
symbolisation would readily ‘conform’ to any organisational demands for social 
acceptance. 
Conversely, people who are high in moral identity internalisation are expected to be 
intrinsically motivated to act in socially acceptable ways regardless of expected 
recognition (Winterich et al., 2013). Thus, when individuals are high along the 
internalisation dimension, it is anticipated that symbolisation would be less effective 
in motivating such persons to act in socially acceptable ways (Winterich et al., 2013). 
Instead, self-consistency, which is the desire to act in ways known as congruent to 
self-understanding, is the driving force (Blasi, 1983). Within the bureaucratic 
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environment therefore, such individuals would have their moral values readily 
accessible by contextual demands. Hence, for example, moral ideals such as loyalty 
or respect or others would be easily triggered and any action carried out would be 
justified based on these moral traits held as central to self-understanding. The 
problem with this however is that the moral outcome of behaviours is not the focus, 
rather it is self-rationalisation based on the centrality of moral values that justifies 
moral choices. Ethically therefore, this could lead to moral disengagement (Bandura, 
1999) since there are no other moral standards to which individuals hold themselves 
accountable from the lens of this theory. Also, since individuals are different and hold 
different moral values as central to their self-definitions, it therefore implies that 
different actions, including those with unethical consequences can be easily 
justifiable based on personal moral values. This makes individuals susceptible to 
being used by organisations to advance any ends including unethical ones since 
such individuals are distant from the moral consequences of their choices (Hummel, 
1998). Thus, what is unknown by the socio-cognitive moral identity theory is how 
individuals carry out moral judgement, since it can be argued that behaving 
according to personal moral values and beliefs does not necessarily translate into 
moral outcomes. And also since moral identities are built around cognitive moulds or 
schemas, they are exposed to distortions by contextual demands if such schemas 
are not grounded in some personally held universal law for example as Kohlberg’s 
(1984) theory suggests. From these, it follows that having a strong moral identity 
within a bureaucratic context does not necessarily guarantee an overall moral 
outcome. 
Therefore, the critical contributions of moral identity to the discourse of ethical 
decision making is in its exposure of the likely role of multiple identities (Shao et al, 
2008) in the negotiation of moral choices amidst plenty, difficult options. Moral 
identity theory is useful in that it shows how the demands of bureaucratic 
organisations for instance are embedded in professional identity and how this 
identity is such a core aspect of our other identities as much as it has the tendency 
to become the dominant identity. Professional identities are important and it is very 
natural in a way to find key roles and different professional categories having moral 
components to them and the moral component would be aligned to what the in-group 
would want them to do. For example job roles or responsibilities of an office in a 
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bureaucracy come with a set of behavioural expectations such that if that manager 
has a high need to be ethical, they could call giving in to organisational demands as 
ethical. Thus, the focus would be more towards aligning with their broader 
professional identities within the social construct and not on moral outcomes. It can 
then be argued that this positions them to act in ways that could advance the cause 
of the bureaucracies they work for regardless of the moral consequences of such 
ends. This was implied in the Ford Pinto case (Gioia, 1992) in which employees 
involved in deciding to keep the faulty Ford model on the road in spite of reported fire 
mishaps reported scripts in their roles dictated what they were to respond or ignore 
when making recalls. They followed the scripts to the letter and it resulted in several 
deaths (Gioia, 1992). Thus, to be ethical is to be a good bureaucrat and these 
translations are made that way because of the need to for esteem, acceptance and 
survival within the context.  
Thus, to be recognised and to find esteem in their particular groups, individuals 
would often go towards the values of their professional group. Matherne and 
Litchfield, (2012) argue that having strong emotional and social bonds with 
organisations could direct the moral identities of individuals working in them to 
conform with prevalent social organisational norms and in-groups or elite groups with 
whom they seek to maintain affective ties, which has been empirically proven to 
have a negative association with lying, implying conformity and possibly group think 
(Janis, 1972). That is, members of the same group are less likely to lie to one 
another and act in the ‘best interest’ of their teams (Winterich et al, 2013).  
On another note, when a professional group has a clear professional code of 
conduct, moral expectations may be clear but in management for example, moral 
boundaries are blurred in competitive environment, sales, functional roles or 
managerial roles. In the context of bureaucracy, it does wash out other personal 
moral identity elements. For example when doctors, lawyers etc are absorbed into 
managerialist ways of thinking it distorts their sense of professional balance. This 
was explained for instance, in the study by Oakes, Townley and Cooper, 1998; 
Kawashima, (1999) where in museums, professional archaeologists were asked to 
adopt strategic planning and suddenly had to create plans that translated into 
specific organisational outputs, distracting them from the core role of caring for 
artefacts. These professionals were thus made to compete with marketers as part of 
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the new managerialist orientation of museums and heritage sites, which undermined 
the professional identity of people with PhDs in Archaeology. Their core professional 
identities as curators, anthropologists, archaeologists etc were displaced by 
managerial and marketing identities. 
Similarly, the context of the current study provides a dilemma in which professional 
pharmacists are sent into stiffly competitive markets with clear sales targets to gain 
customers. These commercial realities undermine the morality that comes with their 
professional identity. Pharmacists are known to have some professional moral 
identity but since these persons are now absorbed into the managerial/bureaucratic 
ethics, the quest for success and competition logics instils the adoption of different 
views of right or wrong and also distracts from the core functions of pharmacists e.g. 
to succeed beyond any other or to sell more rather than developing a new drug for 
the purposes of curing diseases for instance. This replacement of core professional 
identity by a more managerial identity imposed by pharmaceutical organisations 
would play huge roles in affecting moral choices.  
3.4.3 Contributions of both CMD and Moral Identity 
In summary, the likely role of both the CMD and moral identity in affecting moral 
choices especially within the bureaucratic context has been critically discussed. 
Kohlberg’s CMD understudies the capacity to make moral judgement, which he 
supposes, is not socially constructed, but results from an interaction of individual 
cognitive processing responses and the influences of a given social context moral 
and broader characteristics. So for example, in families with more intellectuals, 
children pass quickly through the stages because they are groomed to be like that. 
This is the idea of Kohlberg, (1984) that an individual may be high up in moral 
reasoning but may be in the wrong environment and if they don’t have the character, 
maturity and skill, they may actually learn to operate at a lower level because they 
survive to get recognised. Thus, moral judgement capacity may not always result in 
following through with corresponding moral behaviour, for which we turn to moral 
identity theory. Moral identity theory adds value in a different way in that it espouses 
the interplay of multiple identities and their functioning in making moral choices. 
More importantly, that within organisations, there is the aspect of professional 
identity that takes over, making people’s values align with in-group demands 
especially with roles that value success, achievement and competition, which may 
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satisfy their moral desires but the final consequence may be unethical. Thus, this 
kind of replacement of identities and values indicates how individuals with moral 
judgement capacities and a strong sense of moral identity may still end up behaving 
in morally questionable ways. 
Furthermore, from Kohlberg’s CMD perspective, Reynolds and Ceranic, (2007) in a 
study of managers found that ‘ethical behaviours were at the highest reported level 
when moral judgements interacted with an individual’s strong moral identity’ 
(Matherne and Litchfield, 2012). However, Reynolds and Ceranic’s (2007) position 
can be argued is possible in cases where individuals reason at the post conventional 
stage, which has been found to be extremely rare in any modern business 
organisation, where average moral reasoning level is at the conventional level 
(Weber, 1990). Instead, what seems plausible in bureaucratic settings is that having 
a strong moral identity could in fact confine individuals to operate at the conventional 
level of moral thinking, which comes with its own moral implications. Individuals 
operating at the conventional level typically adjust to the morality around them in the 
bureaucracies but outside, behave in ways they feel is consistent with their own 
understanding of morality. This explains why employees engage lower levels of 
moral reasoning at work than they do in non-work scenarios (Elms and Nichol, 1993).  
Following from this, the capacity of bureaucracies to make employees with either 
strong or weak moral identities to reason at the lower conventional or pre-
conventional levels is also not in doubt given the right situational pressures and 
individual peculiarities. This position is confirmed in a study by Aquino, Freeman, 
Reed, Lim and Felps, (2009) for instance where it was observed that ‘situational 
cues can promote self-interest behaviours even among people for whom moral 
identity has high centrality’. However, this cannot be asserted as a universal 
possibility since the strength of moral identities varies in individuals and the moral 
traits held as central to self-definitions also vary. Also, high and low internalisation or 
symbolisation of moral identities also affects these outcomes, for instance, people 
with low moral identity internalisation are more likely to symbolise recognised pro-
social behaviours (Winterich et al, 2013). These scenarios only reinforce the fact that 
bureaucratic context indeed create ‘moral mazes’ (Jackal, 1988) in which what is 
considered moral capacity as in CMD or moral desire as in moral identity could be 
exploited by the demands of the system towards immoral ends.  
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3.5 Propositions 
Following from the observed impact of bureaucracies on the morality of employees, 
moral identity theory (Aquino and Reed, 2012) reveals the likely role having moral 
traits central to self-definition (Markus, 1977) could play in this phenomenon. 
However, given the need for esteem or rewards amongst other contextual demands, 
such as ‘loyalty’ to team members or obedience to rules and set authority, individuals 
regardless of the strength or weakness of moral identity could find themselves 
succumbing to the demands of the bureaucracy. This is to the extent that moral 
identity strength or weakness could become inconsequential in affecting the moral 
choices individuals make at work. It can therefore also be proposed that: 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features 
of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective 
sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers equally 
in all cases of moral identity (both stronger and weaker MI scores)  
The possibility of individuals especially managers and other individuals occupying 
key roles conforming to the prevalent demands of the bureaucratic system implies 
that they hardly transcend the imposed norms and morality of the system. Since from 
Kohlberg’s point of view, employees are prevalently categorised as conventional 
level thinkers. From the literature on bureaucracy, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (see Chapter 2 
pages 22-25) summarised the known negative impact of bureaucracy on individual 
employee morality from both theoretical and empirical studies. It was established 
that core bureaucratic features of strict rules and managerial control predominantly 
have negative impacts on individual morality by coercing employees to operate 
within permissive organisational tenets, whilst de-emphasising personal ethics. This, 
coupled with overwhelming evidence from the literature (Weber, 1990, Elms and 
Nichols, 1993) and from within the broader context of this study - Nigeria (Adewale, 
2011) that most employees in organisations reason at Kohlberg’s conventional level, 
it can thus be proposed that: 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with a Bureaucratic context is facilitated by 
and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role 
holders  
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Moreover, the critical pressure of what professional bodies for instance say a 
professional should be versus what a firm wants such professionals to be is also 
pronounced. Professionals, particularly within bureaucracies are often referred to as 
persons who exhibit a high level of competence, skill and knowledge in a field of 
endeavour. In other words, professionals are deemed to be experts in their chosen 
fields. Expertise then would suggest that general intelligence, competence and 
technical excellence would suffice to explain that a professional is ethical.  This 
would be a narrow understanding of how people in professional roles can be ethical. 
However, there have been objections to the sufficiency of expertise as the sole 
qualifying criterion for professionals. Koehn, (1994) in her book “The Ground for 
Professional Ethics” argues extensively that the concept of professionalism 
transcends expertise alone. For instance, Koehn argues that our decision to trust 
professionals is not often based solely upon cleverness or skilfulness since a skill 
could be complimentary to harmful service. Therefore skill alone may not be entirely 
sufficient and the need arises for us to review our judgement of professionalism to 
‘look beyond skill to some trust engendering feature of professional practices’ 
(Koehn, 1994: 11). Such trust engendering feature of professional practice as 
Fagermoen, (1997: pg.434) posits are the outward display of the ‘values embedded 
in meaningful practice’. Therefore in a study of the Nursing profession, human dignity 
and altruism were found to be the most prominent moral values patients identified 
with whereas intellectual and personal stimulation were the most significant work 
values (Fagermoen, 1997). Therefore, the conceptualisation of professionals does 
not rest on skill alone as but also on moral values that should underpin the ethics of 
such profession upon which trust is found (Postema, 1980; see also Appendix 4, 
page 334 for more on professional identity). 
However, within bureaucracies, in order to be liked, employees have to know and act 
in accordance to how their managers want them to act. What it is to be a good 
professional in the firm’s context may differ from how professional bodies for 
instance construe their members to be professionals. Individuals in organisation 
learn through socialisation, through their formal qualifications and earlier experiences 
within other context, they learn what it is to be a professional in the context of their 
firms, often inclined towards loyalty to the organisation’s management.  
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On these grounds, if professionals were only experts, no moral duty necessarily 
exists between such persons and their clients. Since experts are knowledgeable or 
skilled people, knowledge of how to do an activity does not create an obligation to do 
that duty in as much as having a thorough knowledge of a nation’s constitution does 
not make one a lawyer able to represent criminals in the court of law. Esoteric 
knowledge and applying it continuously cannot be a distinguishing trait of 
professionals. Koehn further argues that with experts, their aim is at perfecting 
technique, which is their main focus as it gives them power to exercise greater 
control. With greater control comes the possibility of furthering private agendas by 
displacing the client from the moral centre of the professional-client relationship. 
Along these lines also, Koehn argues that being a member of a professional group or 
body still does not constitute professionalism as it doesn’t insulate people from greed, 
lusts and morally objectionable practices as several examples in history reflects. But 
Koehn argues what she described as the essence of legitimate professions from a 
virtue ethics perspective and it is that the grounds of professionalism rises above the 
competence of professionals which she acknowledges into concepts of duty, public 
good and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value 
of organisational loyalty (as opposed to respecting broader professional 
codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees 
with both strong and weak moral identity 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has justified the choice of both Kohlberg’s (1964) CMD and Moral 
Identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984; Aquino and Reed, 2002, Carlo and Hardy, 2005) as 
theoretical tools in the study of individual morality in bureaucratic contexts. 
Kohlberg’s (1964) CMD posits three distinct levels of moral reasoning each with its 
own peculiarities that have been argued come with moral implications in bureaucratic 
contexts. The pre-conventional level is characterised by self-interest and obedience 
to authority to avoid punishments; the conventional level espouses conformity to 
prevailing social norms and the post conventional level deals with morally 
autonomous individuals using universal ethical principles as yardsticks in weighing 
their moral decisions. 
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The socio-cognitive based moral identity theory (Blasi, 1983, 1984) postulates that if 
moral traits were central to self-definition or self-importance, the tendency for such 
moral traits to affect moral behaviour would be high (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Hence, 
there are two dimensions – internalisation which is the degree to which moral traits 
are held as central to one’s self-definition and symbolisation, the degree to which 
these traits are publicly expressed. Therefore, individuals can be said to have weak 
moral identities or strong moral identities, both having varying consequences in 
varying situations as established in the previous section. However, it is also 
established from the literature that more empirical studies are needed to advance 
our understanding of these theories (Weaver, 2006), since contextual influences 
such as bureaucracies (Weber, 1974, Jackal, 1988, Moore and Gino, 2013) can 
either reduce or enhance the salience of moral identities for instance (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989, Weaver, 2006; Weaver & Agle, 2002; Bandura, 2001) or levels of 
cognitive moral reasoning (Weber, 1990). From these, three propositions were finally 
presented which will be explored in this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and critically discusses how this research was designed and 
executed. It begins by reiterating the overall aim of this research and the research 
paradigm employed in this study. Subsequent sections provide discussions on the 
choice of a qualitative research approach; the case study design employed in the 
study as well as all data collection tools including interviews, questionnaire, and field 
notes. Further, details of participants in this study, sampling methods employed, and 
a comprehensive description of interview settings, are also discussed. Beyond these, 
the final sections of this chapter present thematic analysis as the data analysis 
method and how themes were generated in this study. Other issues to be discussed 
include the ethical considerations for this study, researcher’s bias and limitations in 
the process of executing the study. It concludes with a reflexive piece by the 
researcher. 
4.1 Aim of the Study 
Contexts are known to influence behaviour and ethical actions (Weaver, 2006), 
especially with findings in the ethical decision making literature that have established 
employees adopt lower levels of morality at work than they do at home. As such, 
bureaucracy being a major contextual fabric in organisations by which work is 
organised has been widely reported to have negative impacts on the moral 
capacities of employees working in them (Merton, 1968; Jackall, 1988). However, 
there is little empirical evidence for this (Hummel, 1998; Weaver, 2006). This study 
therefore aims to investigate the interaction between bureaucratic contexts and 
employees’ moral identity in affecting moral behaviour.  
4.2 Research Context  
The choice of a context for this research in accordance with its overarching 
objectives was predicated on two factors:  a well known corrupt context and a fast-
paced, economic hub for firms in different industries, both of which Lagos, Nigeria 
offered. A detailed description and discussion of the context is given in the 
proceeding chapter, chapter 5.  
 67 
4.3 Research Paradigm 
Research in the social sciences is interested in generating knowledge about the 
social world. A paradigm is a way of looking at the world and often comprises a set 
of philosophical assumptions that guide thoughts and actions (Guba and Lincoln, 
1989; Lather, 1992). This research sits within the constructivism or interpretivist 
paradigm in line with its overall objectives to understand how bureaucratic contexts 
create social environments that impact on the moral perception and capacity of those 
working in them. With the aim of the study being to understand the interaction 
between individuals and their contexts from the perspective of the individuals 
themselves in affecting their own moral capacities, constructivism best captured the 
essence of this study. Within this paradigm, social scientists seek to uncover 
meaning from observable actions.  Thus, we make sense of the world from the 
perspective of actors by uncovering their meanings. As such, this approach 
presupposes that individuals construct their own realities thereby implying multiple 
interpretations in any given situation (Mertens, 2005). This in turn makes analyses 
very subjective, contextual and perhaps incomparable. The key essence of this 
paradigm is to seek understanding of others and explaining their actions (Morgan, 
2007). 
Furthermore, within the constructivism paradigm, reality is socially constructed 
(Mertens, 2009). According to Eichelberger, (1989) this paradigm has its roots in the 
philosophy of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and other studies of interpretive 
understanding called hermeneutics. Hermeneutics itself is the study of interpretive 
understanding or meaning (Mertens, 2009). The concept of hermeneutics as used by 
historians tried to uncover what an author was attempting to communicate within the 
time period and specific context in which the texts were written (Mertens, 2005). 
However, within constructivism, researchers use hermeneutics as a way to interpret 
something from a certain perspective or situation. Thus, all meaning, including the 
meanings of research findings is fundamentally interpretive (Clegg and Slife, 2009) 
and therefore the basic assumptions underpinning this paradigm are as follows: that 
as participants in a research process socially construct knowledge, so the researcher 
must understand the world of lived experience from the perspective of those who live 
it (Schwandt, 2000). 
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The ontological position of this tradition is that since reality is socially constructed, 
multiple mental constructions can be found on the same subject, some even in 
conflict with each other with the perception of reality likely to change throughout the 
study. For instance in the case of this study, the concept of morality, what is right or 
wrong is a socially constructed phenomena meaning different things to different 
people. Likewise the concept of individual moral values meant different things to 
different participants in the study. Therefore as Schwandt, (2000) charged, since 
constructivist researchers reject the notion of objective reality, the goal of the 
researcher is to understand the multiple constructions of meaning and knowledge. 
Epistemologically, this paradigm makes the assumption that ‘data, interpretations, 
and outcomes are rooted in contexts and persons apart from that of the researcher 
and are not figments of their imagination’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). As such data 
can be tracked to their roots and logic used to read explicit meanings into them in a 
narrative (Burnard et al, 2008). Also, claims to objectivity cannot be made as the 
researcher is personally distant from the participants in the study, rather the validity 
of claims made can be traced back to the multiple sources of data as well as multiple 
methods used in collecting data. Multiple direct quotations were made from the data 
to support any inferences drawn. Thus, Lincoln and Guba, (2000) posited that the 
concept of objectivity known in the positivist paradigm is replaced by confirmability in 
the constructivist paradigm.   
It therefore follows as Morgan, (2007) reckoned that qualitative methods such as 
interviews, observations and others are the most prevalent within this paradigm. 
These were applied with the understanding or assumption that the social 
constructing of reality is only possible through the interaction between the researcher 
and respondents (Lincoln and Guba, 2000) as also espoused in this research. Our 
understanding of how bureaucracies interact with the moral identities of respondents 
in affecting their moral dispositions was only possible when the researcher interacted 
with respondents within their own contexts in order to see through their eyes the 
effect of this relationship. This approach is referred to as hermeneutical in nature 
since it can produce multiple perspectives that can be compared and contrasted to 
yield a more thorough understanding of reality through ‘a dialectical interchange 
involving the juxtaposition of conflicting ideas, forcing reconsideration of previous 
positions’ (Mertens, 2009). Therefore in the words of Eichelberger, (1989), the 
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methodological works of a constructivist researcher can be described as wanting to 
“know what meaning people attribute to activities... and how that related to their 
behaviour. These researchers are much clearer about the fact that they are 
constructing the “reality” on the basis of the interpretations of data with the help of 
the participants who provided the data in the study.” (p.95). 
4.4 Research Design 
In planning this research’s design I made a number of decisions regarding sampling, 
methods and their implementation. The case study design was adopted as the 
specific strategy of inquiry. In line with its broader objective of studying how 
bureaucratic contexts affect moral identities and subsequent moral behaviour, the 
case study as Baxter and Jack, (2008) opined “affords researchers opportunities to 
explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources” 
(p.544).  
 
Case studies are based on the constructivist paradigms (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2008). 
The choice of case study approach in this study was informed by Yin’s (2003) 
suggestions of the factors to consider when deciding on the right research strategy 
as follows: The focus of the study is to answer how and why questions; the 
behaviours of those participating in the study cannot be manipulated; coverage of 
contextual conditions because of their perceived relevance to the phenomenon 
under study and finally when the boundaries are not clear between phenomenon and 
context (p.13). Likewise in this study, a case study design was chosen because the 
study was about understanding the impact of bureaucracies on the moral capacities 
of its employees. But understanding this would have been impossible without the 
context of bureaucratic organisations, where these employees spend at least a third 
of their day on a daily basis for weeks, months and years. Moreover, from the 
literature, it is established that all organisations offer slightly different bureaucratic 
settings (Gouldner, 1959; Hall, 1963) as earlier established in chapter two. Therefore, 
the need to study the phenomenon in their specific contexts becomes even more 
pronounced as it was anticipated that each group of organisations might present 
varying bureaucracies, and that particularly the manifestations of the bureaucratic 
features to be investigated in this study could vary in each context. 
 
 70 
In addition to these is the determination of the case or unit of analysis defined by 
Miles and Huberman, (1994) as, “a phenomenon of some sort happening in a 
bounded context”. For this research, that phenomenon is the widely documented 
impact of bureaucratic contexts on the moral capacities of employees working in 
them. More specifically, the case was about understanding the interactions between 
bureaucratic contexts and moral identities of employees and how this interaction 
ultimately affects moral behaviour. Thus, the boundaries of the case (Stake, 1995) 
were defined by its context (Miles and Huberman, 1994), in this case bureaucracy 
and its many moral issues (e.g bribing officials, inducements, drug trials amongst 
others possible ethical issues) known to affect employee moral identities. This clarity 
helps to avoid the common pitfall of attempting a topic too broad for one study (Yin, 
2003). 
 
Following from these is the determination of the type of case study to be conducted 
(Baxter and Jack, 2008). As this study sought to find answers to explain the links 
between bureaucracies and individual morality, it was an exploratory case study (Yin, 
2003). Furthermore, this study reviewed the bureaucratic phenomenon in multiple 
contexts hence a multiple exploratory case study design. As earlier advanced, our 
understanding that organisations have unique bureaucracies could imply a varying 
impact on employee moral capacities hence the justification for multiple case studies. 
Also, as Yin, (2003) further posited, “a multiple case study enables researchers to 
explore differences within and between cases such that the researcher can predict 
similar results across cases, or predict contrasting results based on a theory”.  
 
Thus this study applied the multiple case study approach by studying bureaucracies 
in three different firm nationality groups present within the context: American, Indian 
and Nigerian firms. The choice of these three case groups was informed by a 
comprehensive study of the African pharmaceutical landscape by IMS Health, (2012) 
in which three major types of pharmaceutical industry players were identified as 
follows: Western multinationals, Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies and 
local manufacturers (pg. 4). This categorisation already implied the crucial role firm 
nationality would play in the multiple case study design.  
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For the first group, the IMS study explained that Western firms are known to have 
had a long-standing presence in the African pharmaceutical market and have 
generally succeeded in ‘marketing, branded innovative and generic drugs to the 
private sector in urban areas’ (IMS Health, 2012:4). Examples of these western 
multinationals included Sanofi (French), GSK (British), Roche (Swiss) and so on. 
Since firms in this group were from different countries of origin, issues of validity and 
reliability of the overall research implied firms to be selected had to be comparable 
and very similar in size, length of presence in the market and most importantly 
nationality. The latter point of nationality immediately implied countries represented 
by one or two firms were not suitable for this study because there offered no 
comparable national firm and because they potentially would cause the violation of 
the ethical obligations this research had to meet. For instance, a crucial ethics of this 
research involved anonymising the identity of all firms and participants in the study to 
the extent that the data collated in this research or issues discussed will be 
untraceable to a particular firm. This was a particularly serious and difficult point of 
consideration at this stage of the study. Therefore, Western countries represented by 
singular firms were immediately disqualified leaving the researcher with American 
and British firms both represented by four and five multinationals respectively within 
the Nigerian market. This firm population offered a sufficient buffer to pick two firms 
to participate in this study without breaching the ethics of the research. The 
researcher then applied a pragmatic strategy based on access to make a final choice 
resulting in the selection of two American firms within the context based on ready 
access after all potentially explored British firms denied the researcher access. This 
therefore set the pace for the use of two firms in each of the other case groups to 
ensure anonymity and uniformity across all three case groups. Besides Yin, (2003) in 
discussing multiple case studies posited that for any meaningful research using this 
particular design, maximum firm population should not exceed six. This also implied 
this study could not study more than two firms in each case group. 
 
Within the Indian and Chinese broader group, a United Nations Comtrade, (2012) 
report recognised the rising influence of Asian firms in the African market. Indian 
firms were reported to have accounted for 17.7% of African pharmaceutical imports 
in 2011 alone, compared to 4.1% from the Chinese firms. Within the Nigerian market, 
the dominance of Indian firms over any other firm with Asian origin was also well 
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documented in a UNIDO,(2013) report on the Nigerian Pharmaceutical sector, as 
there were no reported Chinese firms in the study. Instead, the report included up to 
five major Indian players, with several others known to be present in the Nigerian 
market but not covered in their study. With the focus clearly on Indian firms, about 
five different firms were contacted for this study using emails provided in the UNIDO 
report. None of these replied to the emails and further efforts to gain access using 
the researcher’s professional network proved abortive. However, a referral to a 
manager in one of the many Indian firms by a colleague of the researcher opened 
access to this group and a second referral to a manager in a second pharmaceutical 
company by the first contact ensured two Indian firms were covered in this study. To 
ensure reliability and validity, a background investigation of the Indian firms revealed 
they were both comparable in size and had a combined presence in over thirty 
countries predominantly African nations. With both firms reporting turnovers in 
hundreds of millions of dollars as well as similar staff strength (about 50 each), and 
length of presence in the Nigerian market, both in excess of 10 years, comparability 
was established, thereby qualifying both firms as eligible for this study. Also to fulfil 
the ethical consideration of anonymity, these two firms were from a population of 
over nine well-established Indian multinationals within the context thereby fulfilling 
the ethics of the research. 
 
The final group of players in the market are the indigenous firms. The UNIDO, (2013) 
report identified increasing competition in the Nigerian market owing to the uprising 
of some big indigenous firms able to effectively compete with even the foreign 
multinationals. The success of some of these indigenous firms has been highlighted 
by their establishment of local manufacturing plants that have met World Health 
Organisation standards and are now also attracting manufacturing contracts from 
Western multinationals to ease the manufacturing costs and logistics costs of their 
generic brands (IMS Health, 2012). So for this study, the researcher focused on 
contacting about seven of such successful indigenous pharmaceuticals identified 
from the UNIDO, (2013) report. Of these, only one firm showed keen interest in the 
research and was the only firm that granted an official access to the researcher 
amongst all participating firms in this study. In choosing a similar second firm, the 
researcher focused on exploring other avenues of gaining access into any of the 
other six firms identified in the report. After a series of exchanges with the Human 
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Resources department of one of such firms, access was denied, however, referral to 
an internal lead eventually helped the researcher gain access to a second firm. Both 
indigenous firms were similar in size, posting profits in excess of tens of million and 
are both also quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE, 2015). Furthermore 
since these two firms were drawn from a very large population of existing indigenous 
pharmaceuticals, the ethical requirement of anonymising firm identity was readily 
and easily met.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of Case groups and Firm Characteristics 
Category Size Age Turnover 
American 
Firm A1 
Firm A2 
 
175 employees 
130 employees 
 
40 years 
35 years 
 
$40 Billion 
$32.5 Billion 
Indian 
Firm I1 
Firm I2 
 
150 employees 
175 employees 
 
15 years 
15 years 
 
$230 million 
$180 million 
Nigerian 
Firm N1 
Firm N2 
 
250-300 
employees 
250-350 
employees 
 
25 years 
54years (since 
becoming a wholly 
owned Nigerian 
company) 
 
9.7 Billion Naira 
8.0 Billion Naira 
 
Source: Firms’ Websites 
 
Thus, primarily the three broad types of players in the industry determined the choice 
of the three case groups in this study. Yet a second crucial criterion that validated 
the choice of this research design was based on the anticipated differences in the 
bureaucracies created in each case group. Since the firm nationality typified each of 
the case groups, it was expected based on a study of national bureaucracies by 
(Knill, 1999; Evans and Ruach, 1999; Evans and Ruach, 2000) that all three case 
groups have very different types of bureaucracies. According to Evans and Ruach, 
(1999), in their study of the impact of bureaucracy on economic growth, a Weberian 
scale based on ‘certain structural features that were key elements in Weber’s original 
characterisation of bureaucracy’ (p. 749) revealed there are considerable differences 
in the bureaucratic structures operating in all three firm nationalities under 
consideration in this study. Their Weberian scale comprised variables around key 
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features such as red tape, two measures on corruption (the likelihood of government 
officials to demand kickbacks and the degree to which business transactions involve 
corruption), speed and efficiency of processes as well as autonomy from political 
pressure (Rauch and Evans 1999; 2000). These were studied in the context of 35 
developing countries including India and Nigeria and both nations were found to 
have very different bureaucratic setups. Although American firms were not covered 
in the Rauch and Evans, (1999) study, it was only reasonable to assume that the 
same can be extended to America and her bureaucratic system, which would be 
different in its own ways. Whist the Rauch and Evans, (2000) Weberian scale did not 
explicitly state the specific differences in the bureaucracies created by each of these 
countries, it has however offered some much needed evidence to the expectation 
that each case-group differed in their bureaucratic features. Based on this, this study 
attempted to uncover the differences in bureaucracies more specifically by 
investigating the dominant Weberian features driving the operations of all firms being 
used in this study before it reviewed the impact of these on the morality of 
participants in the study. Evidences of dominant bureaucratic features in each case 
group are discussed in the findings and analysis chapters to follow. 
 
Overall, the multiple case study design is known to generally be robust and reliable 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Baxter and Jack, 2008), but it also has its drawbacks, as it can be 
really expensive to conduct as well as time consuming. For instance, executing this 
research design within the context required several hours of driving, car rental for 
months, expenses in telephone bills and other consumables, besides the three 
months it took to navigate through the terrain to conduct all interviews. 
 
4.5 Propositions 
Propositions are known to be generally useful in case studies but may not always be 
present. However, where they are present, Baxter and Jack, (2008) posit that it helps 
“the researcher place limits on the scope of study and increase the feasibility of 
completing the project” (p.551). Propositions for this study were drawn from the 
literature on bureaucracy as well as from the two ethical theories of Kohlberg’s CMD 
(1961), and Aquino’s Moral Identity theory, (2002) which were adopted as lenses for 
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a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. The following are the working 
propositions in this study: 
 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers equally in all cases of 
moral identity (both stronger and weaker MI scores) 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and 
rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value of 
loyalty to management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, 
practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both 
strong and weak moral identity 
 
4.6 Data Collection Tools 
A trademark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, which also 
enhances data credibility (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003). Thus, this 
research relied on multiple primary data sources and where necessary, secondary 
sources. Primary sources included in-depth interviews, survey questionnaires and 
field notes were used. Secondary sources included news articles and expert reports 
the latter were relied upon in defining some of the historical antecedents of the 
Nigerian pharmaceutical industry, its structure, features, moral issues, and scandals. 
Also, the description of the broader context of this study drew heavily on secondary 
sources as well as interview data. Combining all these data sources in the same 
research allows for triangulation. As Bryman, (2003:1142) explained, ‘triangulation 
refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research 
question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings’. Hence the adoption 
of multiple data sources in this study is simply to enhance confidence. Moreover, 
triangulation is not only restricted to data sources as Denzin (1970) identified, but 
could also cover theoretical triangulation, methodological triangulation, investigator 
triangulation and data triangulation. Of these four types of triangulation, three were 
used in this research as follows:  
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4.6.1 Data Triangulation 
Data triangulation according to Dezin, (1970) entails gathering data through several 
sampling strategies to ensure a more accurate coverage of data at different times 
and situations as well as persons involved. In this study, the simple, stratified and 
cluster-sampling methods were employed in selecting participants from their 
population. Specific details of how these sampling methods were employed are 
discussed in the ‘participants’ section (see 83).  
It was discovered that the use of data triangulation in this study was an effective 
means of controlling selection bias, as the researcher enjoyed a wider coverage of 
participants from within the population, which implied greater reliability of data as 
representative of the phenomenon being studied. This was also discussed in greater 
detail in the ‘participants section’ (Page 83). 
4.6.2 Theoretical Triangulation 
Theoretical triangulation refers to the use of more than one theoretical position in 
interpreting data (Bryman, 2003). Denzin, (1970) describes theoretical triangulation 
as ‘pitting alternative theories against the same body of data’. As established in 
preceding chapters, this study adopted Kohlberg’s (1981) CMD and Aquino and 
Reed’s (2002) moral identity theory as theoretical lenses applicable to the individual 
to offer unique insights into our understanding of the interplay between 
bureaucracies and such individual’s moral capacities. As Denzin, (1970) further 
argued, triangulating theory avoids the risk of researcher’s reaching atheoretical 
conclusions, selecting only data, which suit their biased views, or developing small-
scale theory, which has little reliance beyond the immediate situation.  Thus, 
theoretical triangulation as applied in this research and consistent with the view of 
Denzin, (1970, 1978) was about using two well respected theories in the field of 
ethics, the first being the old and reliable Kohlberg’s (1961) CMD and the other a 
relatively newer, yet fast growing theory that is gaining a lot of legitimacy in literature, 
Aquino and Reed’s, (2002) moral identity theory as predictors of the moral capacities 
of participants in this study. Both theories are able to explain moral behaviour in 
accordance with their theoretical traditions and as such are able to bring fresh 
perspectives and richer understanding to our knowledge of morality at the individual 
participant’s level. Both theoretical lenses were used to examine the same body of 
data to further understand the interaction of bureaucracy with personal morality and 
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the likely impact of this on moral behaviour. How relevant data to assess each of 
these theories were collected is discussed in the methodological triangulation section 
below. 
4.6.3 Methodological Triangulation 
Methodological triangulation is the use of more than one method of gathering data. 
In this study, different methods of data collection were employed. This included: in-
depth interviews, survey questionnaire and field notes. As Bryman (2001) observed, 
triangulation could be taken to mean the combined use of quantitative and qualitative 
research to determine convergence in findings. Denzin (1970) described this as the 
‘between-method’ triangulation in which contrasting methods are employed. 
However for this study, the adoption of multiple data sources is best explained by 
Baxter and Jack, (2008) who explained the use of multiple data sources in case 
study design employed in this research as forming different pieces of a larger puzzle 
and not as a multi-method strategy in the classic sense. In other words, the potential 
of triangulation in this study offers utility in terms of adding richness and complexity 
to inquiry (Bryman, 2003).  For instance, in capturing the most dominant bureaucratic 
feature in each of the case groups, a reliable and valid measure developed by Ferrell 
and Skinner, (1989) was used in the survey questionnaire, for which each 
respondent filled out based on their understanding of the context. Subsequent 
analysis on the questionnaire data revealed clearly the most dominant Weberian 
features of their work environments. But also, interview questions were targeted at 
getting participants to comment on the detailed structure of their organisations from 
which opinions were collated on the bureaucratic features of each case group. 
Details from both sources were then compared in order to have a clearer picture of 
the whole bureaucratic set up for each case group to discover the most dominant 
Weberian traits. This led up to a first level “typology” based on a dominant 
bureaucracy characteristic in each firm of the sample.  The accurate linkage of 
information from all data sources was achieved by using self-generated codes to 
identify all data collected from the same participant. This tactic ensured for instance 
that the researcher could compare responses from each participant on the 
bureaucratic tendencies in their organisations, as well as their moral identities from 
all data sources. Then correlations or variations were easily detectable across all 
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three data sources and such issues were further probed where necessary. By this, 
discrepancies were easily identified and data reliability was greatly improved.  
In assessing moral traits at the individual level, standard methods that is, the 
appropriate measuring tools were employed in the survey questionnaire. For 
instance, a moral identity scale developed by Aquino and Reed, (2002) and widely 
used as a very reliable scale for measuring moral identity was included as part of the 
measures in the survey questionnaires all respondents were required to answer. The 
moral identity measure was slightly re-phrased on the permission of the authors (See 
Appendix for their approval letter) whilst retaining the exact content of each element 
of the measure. This slight alteration was done to help potential participants 
comprehend the questions more easily and to ensure the questions suited issues 
relevant to the context of the study, where necessary. For example, the measure “I 
constantly give to charity” in the original Aquino and Reed, (2002) study became “I 
give to good causes” in this study. This was because the use of the word ‘charity’ 
could be ambiguous in the setting, where ‘charities’ are known as ‘Non-
Governmental Organisations’ (NGOs) and could as such be confusing to others. 
Also charity in the context, due to the prevalence of religions could be construed to 
mean different things. So, to cover these ambiguities, the researcher instead used 
the phrase ‘good causes’ to describe every scope of charitable giving the 
participants might be involved in. Based on these responses, participants could be 
easily categorised as having weak or strong moral identities. 
Even though the survey questionnaire was the most effective way of identifying the 
moral identity of participants, interview questions were also targeted at 
understanding this further. This was to control for the tendencies of social desirability 
bias from self-reporting measures in the questionnaire, although this bias was also 
checked in the questionnaires by negatively wording some of the items in the moral 
identity measure. Such were reverse coded at the analysis stage to account for what 
the respondent actually intended for such item. In most cases, interviews first took 
place before the questionnaires were filled. The researcher included questions 
around personal values, the most important things to the participants at work and 
outside of work amongst other questions that gave clear insights into the moral 
values these individuals held as central to their self-definition. Furthermore in 
accordance to theory, how these moral traits were easily accessible within the work 
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place were investigated by asking participants to cite examples of issues they have 
had to deal with, how they dealt with them and why they went about them the way 
they did. Other emerging issues of interests in this regard were also explored as 
deeply as possible to get clearer pictures. These responses were then matched with 
survey responses to have a bigger picture of each participant’s moral identity. This 
paralleling of responses was done using codes generated by the researcher to 
match participant’s interview and survey responses. At the analysis stage, combining 
these two sources of data ensured an accurate understanding of each respondent in 
the light of theory before further analysis was conducted.  
In assessing the CMD level of the participants, the second theory used in this study, 
the researcher had the option of using the standard Defining Issues Test (DIT) 
quantitative measure (Rest, 1991, Trevino, 1992) to determine the CMD level of the 
participants. However, the researcher employed other means on two grounds: First 
that the researcher had conducted a study using the same DIT tool on Nigerian 
managers (Adewale, 2011) within the context of this study and had discovered an 
average manager reasoned at the conventional level of moral reasoning, consistent 
with literature and also concluded on the cultural neutrality of Kohlberg’s CMD. The 
finding from this research implied the researcher already had some bias as to the 
likely CMD level of the participants, which is also widely reported in literature to be 
conventional in nature. Thus, to test this prevalent position, the Cognitive Moral 
Reasoning (CMR) level of each participant was instead carefully investigated using 
responses from the interviews, rather than the use of another self-evaluation tool 
subject to social desirability bias. At the interview stage, since participants were 
unaware that their responses would clearly depict their CMR level, their responses 
were more reliable. The researcher also allowed a natural progression of the 
interview discussions by not asking any leading questions but rather allowed issues 
raised by the participants themselves to suggest the next questions, whilst ensuring 
coverage of all salient issues in the semi-structured interview format. By this, the 
researcher’s own bias as well as the participants likely bias in self-evaluation 
questionnaires was controlled.  
Kohlberg’s (1981) theory offered comprehensive insights into behavioural traits of 
persons operating at each CMD level and how these persons construct their thinking, 
for instance conformity to societal norms, avoidance of punishments and so on. 
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Using these as clear guides, such evidence as provided by Kohlberg’s theory was 
sought from each participant’s interview data to uncover the CMR level at which they 
operated. This was achieved by using their responses to create a cognitive map, 
which was compared with each of Kohlberg’s reasoning levels to determine the level 
at which such persons reasoned. Detailed evidences of these categorisations can be 
found in Appendix 1 page 310. Besides, including a DIT measure into the 
questionnaire meant a lengthier questionnaire which would have discouraged 
volunteer participants all of whom had spared precious times to be a part of the 
study. The final questionnaire used in the study was four pages in length including 
the consent form at the front page. This was about the optimum length that seemed 
reasonable and encouraging to the participants knowing they had also granted 
approximately 90 minutes of interview to the researcher. Thus, robust measurement 
of participants in the light of the theories employed in this study was done.  
4.6.4 In-depth Interviews 
Interviews are the most common method of data collection in qualitative analysis 
(Bell and Bryman, 2007). They usually offer one-on-one question and answer 
sessions where the researcher is expected to employ a variety of techniques to 
uncover real information about the phenomena being studied. Interviews help 
uncover the world from the view of a particular individual or individuals in the case of 
group interviews. Among the different options (Bell and Bryman, 2007), this study 
adopted the semi-structured interview format. In executing semi-structured 
interviews researchers are typically expected to have a list of questions that serve as 
an interview schedule but variations can be introduced at the discretion of the 
researcher. The questions also are always general and the interviewer is expected to 
ask further questions to probe any interesting responses. Using the research 
objectives and theoretical lenses as guides, a list of questions were generated by the 
researcher as a guide. More often than not, throughout this phase of the research, 
there were questions that seemed to be potent in uncovering issues of interest to the 
researcher and these were marked as a staple in every interview. However, 
questioning using other questions on the list was done in addition to the researcher’s 
discretion who often took time to probe further into matters of interest linked to the 
overall research objectives. As (Surrey, 2015) also explained, the use of semi-
structured interviews works best when a researcher has a number of areas they 
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want to be sure are addressed in the interview in addition to the freedom to probe or 
follow new line of inquiry.  These advantages proved relevant to the nature of 
investigation this research aimed at achieving, hence justifying the choice of the 
semi-structured interview format. As anticipated, crucial issues, which the interviewer 
did not consider during preparation, came up during interviews and were further 
probed at will before the exploration of other written questions.  
 
However, as also experienced in this study, interviews are known to be very time 
consuming, at times very expensive, especially where the researcher had to cover 
long distances to get to his potential interviewee. As it was in the case of this 
research, the researcher had to travel on the average of between 30 - 40 miles daily 
to meet up with set appointments in different parts of Lagos. This also came with 
challenges of driving through heavy traffic for several hours which was subsequently 
minimised by timing travels to specific windows to reduce travel time based on 
known risks of plying roads in the specific appointment locations. It also required a 
lot of preparation and time including time taken to secure appointments, time to 
reflect on interview questions and so on, after which the process of transcription, 
which the researcher executed using a combination of software was also 
excruciating in some instances especially in the early stages. As the researcher did 
more transcription using the software, a 90-minute interview, which took about 270-
300 minutes to transcribe initially, fell to between 150-180minutes subsequently. 
 
4.6.5 Survey  
The second data collection tool relied upon in this study is a carefully designed 
survey questionnaire (see Appendix). By carefully combining a mix of open-ended 
questions with closed questions with options or scales to rank, a survey tool was 
developed. The rationale for the use of a questionnaire as an additional data 
collection tool was to ensure robustness and accuracy of data to be collected on 
some of the crucial elements of this research. For instance, in measuring 
bureaucracy in participating organisations, the researcher had tactfully covered this 
at the interview stage for all interviewees, yet a reliable and valid measure of 
measuring bureaucracy from the study by Ferrell and Skinner, (1988) was also 
adopted in survey questionnaire. Results from both instruments were subsequently 
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compared for patterns. Also, moral identity being one of the elements being studied 
in this research was covered at the interview stage, yet upon the permission of 
Aquino (2002), the same measure used by him was also employed for the context to 
test the moral identity salience of each participant. Validation of this survey 
instrument was carried out by a pilot study, which helped the researcher identify 
problematic questions from the perspective of potential respondents. Also, a group of 
experts led by the researcher’s supervisors critically evaluated the instrument before 
it was approved for use in the field. Surveys are known to facilitate clear 
measurement of issues and elements and are also easily administered. Also, in 
some cases in the course of this research, some respondents were eager to 
complete the survey before being interviewed. 
 
However, this approach is prone to some weaknesses. First, is the problem of social 
desirability bias especially since there were self-reported measures in the survey tool. 
Fisher, (1993) defines this bias as the tendency of the respondent to represent 
themselves in the best possible light especially on sensitive topics for ego defence or 
impression management reasons. The result of this is data that is systematically 
biased towards the respondent’s perceptions of what is correct or acceptable in 
social terms (Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954). In this study however, social desirability 
bias was checked through triangulation of responses as the researcher had interview 
questions covering crucial self-reported measures. Thus, at the point of analysis, the 
survey answers and interview answers of respondents are matched to check for any 
discrepancies with the interview data likely to be a more accurate depiction of reality 
since participants were unaware of these checks and balances in the interview 
process. There is also the challenge of unanswered questions or in some cases 
misinterpretation of questions by some respondents. Regardless, the triangulation 
technique adopted in this research ensured the reliability of data collated. 
 
4.6.6 Field Notes 
In addition to both the interviews and survey, field notes were also created in the 
course of the research to record salient facts that were of interest. The importance of 
note taking in the course of an interview or research is crucial as it helps record tacit 
knowledge (Wolfinger, 2002). These could become crucial in making greater sense 
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of the main data collected especially in qualitative analysis. For instance, in the 
course of this study, the researcher noted interesting points about the interview 
setting, body language of respondents, countenance, and other facts of interest. All 
of these were recorded against the interviews of respondents and attached to their 
transcribed files to ensure these are taken into consideration at the analysis stage. 
Also, on two occasions, the researcher could not audio record interview with 
participants and in those cases, copious notes had to be taken detaining interesting 
and useful responses to the questions asked. These actions and reactions as 
experienced by the researcher in this study bring more realness and life to collected 
data such that in the course of analysis, the researcher can almost relive the 
experience of the interview all over as the transcripts are being read. For example, 
during an interview with a senior executive of one of the firms, the researcher was 
rudely sent out of the executive’s office mid-way through the interview due to no fault 
of the researcher. However prior to this incident, the researcher had observed how 
the executive seemed a bit uneasy and sounded very firm with the questions being 
asked, most of these building up from issues he had himself raised in the course of 
his prior responses. It was some sort of mind game and perhaps as the executive 
sensed he would divulge sensitive information, he quickly terminated the process. 
This kind of tacit knowledge was recorded in the researcher’s field notes and 
contributed towards the researcher’s understanding of the participant’s actions. Field 
notes are known to offer some measure of objectivity although they may still be 
subject to the bias of the researcher. In some cases, they could be distracting to the 
researcher as full attention is always required to follow closely interviewee’s 
responses and to pick on issues that should be further probed. To forestall this, the 
researcher made mental notes of salient points, issues or emotions considered 
important and wrote them down very quickly after each interview on an electronic 
note.  
4.7 Participants 
Participants in this research are employees of all six pharmaceutical companies, 
with a large percentage of these being pharmacists or scientists. However, given 
that the pharmaceutical firms are very large, often with multiple departments, 
some participants were professionals from other departments including the 
accounting, information technology, and logistics departments amongst others. 
 84 
With this spread of participants, the study was able to capture more accurately the 
nature of interactions between the specific bureaucratic context and the moral 
identities of its employees. Also since it can be argued that every employee, 
regardless of position within the firms is exposed to ethical issues in different ways; 
they all are potential participants in this study.  
 
To narrow down the population to a sample able to capture the essence of this 
research, sampling had to be applied. According to Lohr, (1999), the sample 
should be “representative in the sense that each sampled unit will represent the 
characteristics of a known number of units in the population”. Thus, there are two 
broad categories of sampling methods: probability sampling or random sampling 
and non-probability sampling or non-random sampling (Latham, 2007). The choice 
of which sampling method to be used depends on the goals of the researcher. As 
MacNealy, (1999) suggested, when a researcher needs to have a certain level of 
confidence in the data collection, probability sampling should be employed. As 
such, Frey, Botan and Kreps (2000) further explained that the difference between 
both sampling methods differs in “how confident we are about the ability of the 
sample to represent the population” (pg.126). Since a fairly decent level of 
confidence is required in this research, probability-sampling methods were 
adopted. Probability sampling allows every unit of a population the equal chance 
of being selected hence; it eliminates the danger of researcher’s bias in the 
selection process (Frey, 2000). There are four types of probability sampling as 
follows: simple random sampling, systematic random sampling, stratified random 
sampling and cluster sampling. The table below summarises the selection strategy 
of each of these types of probability sampling: 
 
Table 4.2 – Probability Sampling Methods 
Type of 
Sampling 
Selection Strategy 
Simple Each member of the study population has an equal 
probability of being selected 
Systematic Each member of the population is first listed. Then, 
sampling begins with a random start, then members are 
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selected at equal intervals 
Stratified Each member of the study population is assigned to a 
group, and then simple random sampling is employed in 
selecting sample. 
Cluster Each member is first assigned to a group, then groups are 
selected at random and all members of selected cluster are 
included in the sample. 
Source: Adopted from Henry, (1990) and Latham, (2007) 
 
In this study, three of the probability sampling types, simple, cluster and stratified 
sampling were employed in different instances across the three different case 
groups. The choice of sampling method in each case was dependent on a number 
of reasons: access through an internal contact, the cooperation of firm with the 
researcher and the willingness of volunteer participants in the research process. In 
almost all the case groups in this study, a combination of different probability 
sampling methods were employed even within the same participating firms. For 
instance, in five of the six firms studied in all three case groups, having an internal 
contact made access easier and as such the leads of such internal contacts were 
followed in randomly selecting participants for the study. This can be argued to be 
some form of cluster sampling in which members of the organisation were first 
categorized into the ‘friends network’ of the internal lead before random selection 
of all those within that network ensued. But this approach immediately raises bias 
concerns in which those within that friend’s network may all have similar opinions 
about the firm and would therefore give similar responses to the researcher’s 
questions, thereby generating a lopsided dataset. The researcher was aware of 
this and reduced this tendency by not relying only on the ‘friend’s network’ of the 
internal leads alone, but by using his people skills to interact and engage other 
‘neutral’ employees within the firms to extend the participants for the research. 
This obtained extra interviews outside of the ‘friends’ network’ and easily 
controlled this likely bias problem. Besides, it was very interesting to note that 
even within the networks of the internal leads, there were obviously noticeable 
variations in their responses to almost all the questions asked. This further implied 
that the likely bias that could skew dataset in one particular direction was 
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significantly reduced in this research process. 
 
The internal lead approach is very similar to the snowball method, a type of non-
probability sampling method except that as group members identified additional 
members to be included in the sample, the researcher still had the choice of 
randomly selecting from among this group and others outside of such groups. For 
instance, in all five firms accessed through internal leads, the researcher 
capitalised on physically being granted access into the firm’s premises to gain 
legitimacy by chatting with other employees using the names of previous 
participants, and in some cases, the continual physical presence of the researcher 
in the firm created an informal familiarity with some of the staff who had been 
seeing the researcher entering offices and moving about freely. As earlier 
explained this gave the researcher opportunity to get more participants for the 
study, which turned out to be a good way of controlling bias all around. Since the 
additional participants were not particularly within the network of the internal lead, 
and the researcher had no bias in selection whatsoever as simple random 
sampling was employed in such cases. Simple random sampling also known as 
straight random sampling, as MacNealy, (1999) explained requires that each 
member of a population stand an equal chance of being selected. Thus, each 
member of the population is “selected one at a time, independent of another and 
without replacement; once a unit is selected, it has no chance of being selected 
again” (Fowler, 1993:14). This was the case with the extra participant secured by 
the researcher, as the researcher simply randomly walked up to employees, 
explained the research and was often granted audience. In cases where 
participants turned down the researcher’s proposal, it was often on the grounds of 
time, since the interview process and filling of survey questionnaires often lasted 
up to two hours and beyond, a lot to demand of an individual out of their busy time 
schedules. As such, a combination of both simple and cluster sampling were 
employed within these firms. 
 
However in one of the firms in case-group three, where the top management had 
granted the researcher full access to all members of staff, stratified sampling was 
employed. In this case, employees were first split into different groups based on 
their department within the firm and then the researcher randomly selected 
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participant from each of the departments to participate in the study. Also, in one of 
the firms used in this study, the snowball technique was employed with the 
researcher relying on the lead of group members to identify additional members to 
be included in the sample. In such organisation the snowball method was 
employed, access was highly restricted and with the help of an internal lead who 
had presented the researcher as his personal guest, several interviews were 
conducted by strictly following the lead’s choice of additional participants in the 
study. Although it is understood from literature (Henry, 1990; Fowler, 1993; Lohr, 
1999) that each of these sampling techniques could be used to achieve different 
outcomes, adopting them in this research was strictly based on reduction of 
selection bias. As earlier explained, the use of multiple sampling techniques within 
the firms enabled the researcher reach a wider range of participants with whom 
the researcher had no prior contact nor were within the network of in internal leads 
thereby lending greater credibility to the data collected from all participants. 
Secondly, the adoption of different sampling techniques in each firm was in 
response to the different internal scenarios presented by each firms. Since the 
core strategy to gain access was to be pragmatic, the researcher had to devise 
the best possible ways of selecting participants in each of the firms but as each 
firm was a different environment, it called for different sampling strategies. As such, 
the researcher could not have stuck to a particular sampling method but had to be 
flexible and adaptive to different scenarios posed in the firms. 
 
A total of 36 participants took part in this study as detailed in table 4.3 below: 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of Participants  
s/n Participant Job Role Background 
1 A1a Pricing and Access Manager Pharmacy 
2 A1b Sales Manager Pharmacy 
3 A1c Marketing Manager Pharmacy 
4 A1d Logistics Manager Biology 
5 A1e Fleet Manager Engineering 
6 A1f IT Manager Computer Science 
7 A1g Medical Representative Pharmacy 
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8 A2a Sales Representative Sciences 
9 A2b Medical Representative Pharmacy 
10 A2c Country Manager Pharmacy 
11 A2d Senior medical representative Pharmacy 
12 I1a Human Resource Manager Management 
13 I1b Sales representative Pharmacy 
14 I1c Medical representative Bio-Chemistry 
15 I1d Senior Medical representative Pharmacy 
16 I1e Medical Representative Bio-Chemistry 
17 I2a Regional Manager Pharmacy 
18 I2b Sales representative Chemistry 
19 I2c Senior medical representative Pharmacy 
20 I2d Medical Representative Bio-Chemistry 
21 N1a IT Manager Computer Engineering 
22 N1b Operations Manager Pharmacy 
23 N1c Product Manager Industrial Chemistry 
24 N1d Human Resources Officer Management 
25 N1e Administrative Assistant Marketing 
26 N1f Audit Manager Accountancy 
27 N1g Corporate Services Manager Journalism 
28 N1h Administrative Assistant Secretarial Studies 
29 N1i Regulatory Officer Pharmacy 
30 N2a Brand Manager Pharmacy 
31 N2b Regional Manager Chemistry 
32 N2c Trade Marketing Marketing 
33 N2d Trade Business Manager Pharmacy 
34 N2e Sales Executive Pharmacy 
35 N2f Sales Executive Chemistry 
36 N2g Business Development 
Manager 
Pharmacy 
Source: Fieldwork 
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4.8 Interview Setting 
There were three major types of setting in which interviews took place namely: 
Within office premises with an open setting; office premises with closed setting; and 
off-site. Each of these settings had noticeable effects on the interviewer and their 
responses to the interview questions. Those in the offices – were a bit cautious and 
very professional in their responses. This was further accentuated in settings where 
there were chances of other members of staff listening in on the conversation 
between the researcher and the interviewee. A large difference was observed in 
other interviews that took place inside the same organisations but behind closed 
doors. There was a noticeable greater sense of freedom and privacy with 
participants that were interviewed under this condition and they easily opened up to 
answering interview questions. However, the most interesting responses were 
obtained from interviews that took place outside of office premises in neutral places 
like restaurants, inside the researcher’s car, shopping malls or just outside office 
premises etc. The choice of such neutral off site locations was informed either by the 
itinerary of the interviewer or as it was noticeable in employees of Indian firms, the 
fear of insecurity in participating in such interviews. With these employees, there was 
a sense of apprehension and unwillingness to hold interviews within office premises 
for the fear of being caught and victimised by their superiors or by fellow staff that 
may be loyal to management. Yet, once such participants were outside of the office 
premises, they fearlessly spoke with strong opinions about the firm in the light of the 
researcher’s questions. Two interviews that took place within the premises of an 
Indian multinational were the most intense of all interviews in this study. The tension 
in the atmosphere as the interview was conducted was so real; respondents were 
jittery at times almost speaking in hushed tones for the fear of being heard. Freedom 
of speech was indeed curtailed in such settings. However, most of the interviews in 
this study were either conducted in closed settings, in office premises or off site 
thereby lending some credibility to reliability of the responses to the interview 
questions.  
 
Table 4.4: Interview settings 
Setting Number of Interviews 
Office premises (At the respondent’s desk, a 27 
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separate meeting room or reception area of the firm) 
Offsite (office car park) 3 
Offsite (Other locations including various sales 
points, shopping malls, and restaurants) 
6 
Source: Fieldwork 
 
4.9 Procedure  
A full description of the research procedure is available in Appendix 3, page 328. 
 
4.10 Data Analysis  
The initial stages of data analysis required the transcription of all collated data. In all 
fifty-six interviews were collected from 8 firms initially, but narrowed down to thirty-six 
interviews from six firms. This was due to the fact that only six of the eight firms were 
comparable in size and in capacity within the industry.  Transcription of all data took 
about 3 weeks overall. On the average, an hour-long interview is often predicted to 
take four times longer to transcribe using manual means than using a combination of 
transcription software. However, the researcher devised an electronic means of 
transcribing data thereby significantly reducing transcription time. Two software 
packages: ‘InqScribe’ and ‘Dragon Speech Dictator’ were purchased for this purpose. 
Dragon is a speech dictation software able to work with any installed software on any 
computer with the feature of it being trained to recognise the researcher’s voice and 
accent if any. InqScribe on the other hand is a transcription software that allows the 
import of interview audio files into a work space and also allows the use of keyboard 
shortcuts to playback, stop and rewind with ease whilst also allowing the researcher 
to transcribe as this is being done. So by combining both software, the researcher 
simply had to listen on InqScribe, repeat what is heard into an external microphone 
(Blue Yeti Microphone) previously owned and used by the researcher for podcasting 
and dragon does the typing on InqScribe. With this tactic, a lot of transcription was 
done with a short period of time. Also, this allowed the researcher to listen to all 
interviews and also read at the same time allowing for greater immersion in the 
details of each interview. In cases where particular emotions were expressed, the 
researcher simply paused the audio file and dictated in words to indicate emotions 
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which dragon inserted into the text files. Also, these emotions where expressed had 
also been recorded in the researcher’s field notes. All transcribed interviews on 
InqScribe were exported into a Microsoft Word document for spell checks and 
corrections where necessary. Also, all Microsoft Word files were securely saved 
using the same codes that had been apportioned to each audio file and its 
corresponding survey response. These cleaned files were then used at the next 
stage of the analysis process.  
 
The next phase of the analysis process involved the use of qualitative research 
software, NVIVO. Nvivo is arguably the most widely used qualitative research data 
analysis software in recent times (QSR, 2015). Nvivo’s ability to electronically 
resolve tasks such as coding, highlighting, word counts, text search query amongst 
other immensely useful functions makes it a useful tool for any qualitative research. 
Thus, MS Word versions of transcribed interview data were imported into NVIVO for 
further analysis. First an initial coding process was conducted to skim through all the 
data to capture emerging themes. This gave an overall picture of key trends within 
the data. For instance, at this stage, the external context of the research as 
described by the participants was captured as well as the description of the 
bureaucracy within which participants work. Each participant’s moral values and 
dispositions within their various bureaucracies were also captured at this initial stage. 
Overall, this level of analysis gave room for a succinct descriptive narrative of the 
issues of interest to this research. A crucial advantage of this approach as described 
by Baxter and Jack, (2008) is such that the researcher at this stage need not work 
with any theoretical bias in mind as this preliminary review of data is being done 
hence, allowing for some good measure of objectivity. Beyond these initial stages 
however was the comprehensive analysis to take place. At this level of analysis, 
propositions generated from both the literature on bureaucracy as well as the CMD 
and Moral identity theories guided the codes generated for a deeper level analysis.  
4.11 Thematic Analysis  
One of the few, shared skills in qualitative analytical methods is thematizing 
meanings (Holloway and Todres, 2003). Building themes from a data set is 
understood as a fundamental process in any qualitative research analysis and as 
such Thematic Analysis (TA) can be defined as ‘a method of identifying, analysing 
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and reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:6). 
Hammersley and Atkinson, (1995) describe TA as aiming to generate descriptions of 
behaviours through identifiable themes and patterns in living and talk. There are two 
major conceptualisations of TA in literature.  It is on one hand categorized as a mere 
tool used in the process of performing major analytical traditions (Boyatzis, 1998) 
such as discourse analysis or narrative analysis (Meehan, Vermeer and Windsor, 
2000) and on the other hand, it is regarded as a method in its own right (Ryan and 
Bernard, 2000; Attride-Stirling, 2001). Even though thematic analysis (TA) provides 
core skills that are useful in conducting other forms of qualitative analysis, scholars 
like Braun and Clarke, (2006) have defended the latter position on the grounds that 
TA differs from other methods (e.g. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis or 
thematic decomposition analysis) that seek to describe patterns across qualitative 
data and are also theoretically bound. Therefore, since TA does not require detailed 
theoretical knowledge of approaches compared to grounded theory for instance, it is 
thus a more accessible method of analysis. Also, since TA does not exist within a 
pre-established theoretical framework, it is applicable with different theoretical 
positions and can be used to do different things within those frameworks (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006), hence its flexibility. In addition to all these, TA according to Willig, 
(1999) can be used as a realist method (reporting experiences, meanings and 
realities of participants) or a constructionist method (examining how realities, 
meanings, events affect series of issues) or ‘contextualist’ method (ways in which 
individuals make meaning of their experiences and the impact of broader social 
settings) in its application. Thus, TA is useful beyond just creating ‘themes’ but in 
reflecting reality and to uncover the surface of that reality as emerging themes then 
become categories for analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Therefore, the 
adoption of TA as the qualitative analytical tool in this study rests on a tripod of 
reasons: (1) Its flexibility and applicability in different research paradigms; (2) Its 
ability to generate unanticipated insights (3) Its allowance for social and 
psychological interpretation of data. 
The flexibility of TA, arguably its greatest strength, makes a very useful research tool 
that is applicable across a range of theoretical and epistemological traditions, 
thereby offering potentially robust and complex account of data. This is unlike other 
qualitative analytical methods, such as discourse analysis (Willig, 2003), grounded 
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theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) narrative analysis or interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, known to stem from particular theoretical or 
epistemological positions and as such offer one-way rigid approach to analysis with 
both limited variability of how the methods are applied and in some cases ‘different 
manifestations of the method from within the broad theoretical framework’ (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006 p. 4). Besides, its flexibility, TA is also known to be a ‘useful 
method of working within participatory research paradigm, with participants as 
collaborators’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:37), as is the case with this research. It can 
also generate unanticipated insights whilst also allowing for social as well as 
psychological interpretation of data, all of which are essential to the success of this 
study.  
However, the flexibility advantage of TA has often been subject to criticisms of 
‘anything goes’ (Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter, 2002) in cases where it is poorly 
applied without clear guidelines on one hand and without clear stipulations of the 
researcher’s epistemological and ontological positions on the other. Yet as other 
scholars (Attride-stirling, 2001; Tuckette, 2005) argue, applying TA within clear and 
concise guidelines ensures its robust applicability in qualitative studies.  On these 
grounds, Holloway and Todres, (2003) submitted that beyond applying method to 
data, it is essential for researchers to make all their assumptions both 
epistemological and others explicit, in addition to stating clearly what is being done, 
why and most importantly how the analysis is being conducted.  To meet these 
crucial requirements for a sound analysis, this study has adopted Braun and Clarke’s 
(2006) six-phase guide to carrying out a rich and thorough thematic analysis (see 
figure 4.1 below) in addition to a declaration of the epistemological assumptions of 
this study. 
Table 4.5 – Six-Phase Thematic Analysis Process 
Phase Process Description 
1. Familiarization with the data Transcription, reading and re-reading as well as noting 
down of initial ideas 
2. Generating initial codes Coding interesting features systematically across each 
the data set 
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3. Search for themes Collection of codes into potential themes 
4. Reviewing themes Level 1: checking themes work in relation to coded 
extracts  
Level 2: checking themes work in relation to the entire 
data set, hence generating a ‘thematic map’ of the 
analysis. 
5. Defining and naming themes Continuous analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme, and the overall story the analysis tells; 
generating clear definitions for each theme 
6. Producing the report Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final 
analysis of selected extracts. Relating analysis back to 
the research question and literature and finally, 
producing a scholarly report of the analysis. 
Source: Adapted from Aronson (1994), Braun and Clarke (2006) 
In applying TA to this study, a theoretical thematic analysis was employed. As Braun 
and Clarke, (2006) argued, a theoretical thematic analysis is driven by the 
researcher’s theoretic and analytical interests. This provides a more detailed 
analysis of some aspect of data tailored to meet the gap the research aims at solving 
from the theoretical perspective. As such coding and analysis in this study was 
guided by propositions already generated from literature and theory. Further, TA was 
applied as a contextualist method (Braun and Clarke, 2006) to aid our understanding 
of the interactions between bureaucratic contexts and employee’s moral identity in 
affecting ethical decision-making abilities. Collected data is thoroughly examined and 
themes are generated along the key constructs of bureaucracy, moral identity and 
ethical behaviour or dispositions. From these descriptions, explanations and 
relationships between these are categorised and are further explored and refined by 
application to other participants, cases and contexts. The result is a well-developed 
narrative explanation that can account for or accurately describe the phenomena, 
which this research is interested in namely how bureaucracies affect moral 
capacities in employees. This thematic analysis approach is different from a 
grounded theory approach in that ‘it summaries data into themes that are then 
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explained, rather than necessarily developing a novel theory to describe the findings’ 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2000). 
However in the use of TA, a few pitfalls had to be taken into consideration. Braun 
and Clarke, (2006) identified five common errors researchers make in the application 
of thematic analysis as follows: failure to analyse the data at all, use of questions as 
‘themes’ that are reported, weak and unconvincing analysis, mismatch between the 
data and the analytic claims that are made about it and finally the mismatch between 
theory and analytic claims. The first three pitfalls are avoidable by following the clear 
guidelines provided by authors such as Attride-stirling, (2001); Tuckette, (2005) and 
Braun and Clarke; (2006) who have specified how to execute a thorough thematic 
analysis. The last two however lie within the honest judgement of the researcher 
whose objectivity is required at this stage. A potentially useful practice is to revisit the 
theory section as much as possible during the analysis and discussion stages to 
ensure the theory is well represented using the data available and that no falsehood 
or bias has been introduced by the researcher to alter the outcome of the research.   
4.12 Generation of Themes and Sub-themes 
With all data gathered, interviews transcribed and imported into NVIVO, the first 
theme generation process in this research was aimed at having a big-picture of the 
whole data set. By this, emphasis was placed for instance on participant’s 
descriptions of the broader context, their organisation and self. Similar opinions were 
gathered together into separate nodes on NVIVO and labelled accordingly. As other 
interviews within the case groups were perused, participant’s responses that 
matched the main nodes earlier created were further included into relevant nodes. At 
the end of this first review, contents of each broad node were carefully revised and 
new subthemes were created based on the core content of such statements. This 
process was repeated until under the broad node ‘Nigerian Context’ for instance, 
about five subthemes were generated, each depicting different features of the 
Nigerian context will all corresponding references to each one carefully arranged in 
the relevant sub nodes. This same process was repeated for the firm context as well. 
Thus, this first round of analysis was adopted for the descriptive analysis section of 
this study. It was at this level, the researcher for instance could draw out five domain 
features of the broad context, Nigeria that was consistent with the descriptions given 
severally in theory.  Also, at this level, practices and cultures, norms etc of firms in 
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each case group were very clear and also gave clear insights into how firms in each 
case group ran their affairs. This pointed towards the kind of bureaucracy within 
them related to dominant Weberian features. For instance, it became obvious that 
the American firms that took part in this study were driven by strict rule orientation as 
it came across in all interviews within the context and the Indian firms had a strong 
preference for hierarchical structure in their organisation, driven by racism such that 
Nigerians are never allowed into top management to in order to preserve their 
control from the top. Table 4.6 below summarises samples of themes and sub 
themes generated from data in this study. 
 
Table 4.6 – Sample themes generated from data 
Theme Subtheme Sub-Sub theme 
General Context Country description Economy 
Political environment 
Corruption 
The People 
Industry Context General description Key players 
Challenges 
Opportunities 
Key stakeholders 
Firm Context Structure 
Culture 
Reporting lines, hierarchy 
Strictly formal, informal 
and relaxed, cordial, 
company’s reaction to 
issues, punishments, 
rewards, tacit norms 
Bureaucracy Rules 
 
Managerial control 
 
Relationships 
 
Forms of rules – formal, 
informal 
Forms of control – 
authoritarian, personal 
Cordial, rule-based, 
transactional 
Self-description Value system 
 
Demography 
 
Moral reasoning 
Values central to self-
defining 
Age, Experience, Number 
of years working in the 
firm 
Pre-conventional, 
Conventional and Post-
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conventional 
Source: Fieldwork 
4.13 Ethical Considerations 
In maintaining the ethics of this study as agreed with the school’s ethics research 
committee, all participants in the study signed consent forms before interviews were 
conducted. It is also noted that all participants were expressly informed about the 
nature of research, its aims and that all interviews were to be recorded on the 
premise of full anonymity. On these grounds participants signed and agreed that 
their interview could be audio recorded. Therefore in upholding the ethical 
requirements of this study as agreed with participants and the researcher’s institution, 
names of firms that were used in the study were anonymised. Achieving this ethical 
requirement was a serious consideration at the research design stage as all the firms 
that were targeted in the study from the UNIDO, (2013) report were big firms that 
were easily identified in the industry. But, dividing case groups by nationality and 
choosing two firms from the broader population in each case group as discussed in 
preceding sections ensured this requirement was met. At the end of this research, all 
collected data and evidences will be destroyed to fully protect the identity of those 
that took part in the study. 
4.14 Trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of this research is hinged primarily on the multiple triangulations 
tacitly employed throughout the execution of the research. As discussed in earlier 
sections, the validity of this research was at the methodological level as well as the 
data collection levels such that at each stage of this research, multiple sources 
guaranteed greater validity of the whole project. Also, I cross-validated the interview 
content with field notes in making sense of data for all the interviews. In some other 
instances, I crosschecked responses on the same issues by different respondents to 
assess any significant differences. This helped me assess the frankness and 
openness with which the interviewees responded.  
4.15 Potential Research Bias and Subjectivity 
Bias cannot be completely eliminated from any research, more so a qualitative 
research that is dependent on judgement and experience and on largely subjective 
epistemologies regarding both the subjects/participants and the researcher(s). Bias 
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is an ‘unhealthy’ influence a researcher can have on a study at different levels which 
may distort the results of such study. Bias could be design bias, selection/sampling 
bias, procedural bias, measurement bias, interviewer bias, response bias and 
reporting bias (Shuttleworth, 2009). For this study, the researcher had no personal 
contacts or familiarity with the subjects in the industry or firms chosen for the study 
thereby significantly reducing possibilities of bias at the execution stage. However, 
due to a good knowledge of the corrupt context in which the study took place and the 
knowledge of its impact on everyday morality,  care had to be taken to avoid the 
interviewer’s bias as much as possible. This was avoided by using a semi-structured 
interview format that allowed objective questions to be asked and where necessary 
probe participant’s responses honestly without asking any leading questions to get 
what the researcher ‘thinks’ is going to make the research ‘interesting’.  Also, the 
possibility of selection and interviewer’s bias was further reduced by the fact that the 
researcher met most participants for the first time at the point of interviewing them, 
as explained in previous sections.  This limited the chances of bias that could have 
come from familiarity and cordiality and leading the respondents to certain types of 
lopsided responses. Besides this, the researcher had no methodological, sampling 
or design bias as the broader objective of the research dictated the direction and 
designs chosen for its successful execution. 
4.16 Reflecting on my cultural / personal proximity with the context  
4.16.1 My Background 
I have lived all my life in Nigeria until 2010 and have always been a part of the 
culture of corruption having given bribes myself on a number of occasions to get 
through red tape and bottle necks with speed. For instance, paying to get documents 
from government agencies in a couple of days instead of going through the usual 
process, which could take weeks. My first encounter with ethics was in my final year 
of undergraduate studies where I was introduced to professional ethics as a real 
estate surveyor. I found this module very intriguing as it presented in plain language 
the conducts of professionals in the real estate profession. Yet, having worked with a 
lot of firms as a contract surveyor, I could easily cite countless examples of violations 
of these professional ethics. This got me a bit curious but also uncomfortable. I 
desired to investigate this trend but did not have the opportunity. I wanted to know 
why in spite of knowing the right things to do, people chose to do the exact opposite. 
 99 
Growing up in a Christian home, we were taught the value of truth, integrity, honesty, 
excellence and so on. And these were further reinforced into us at Sunday school 
and in our various schools. These values were regarded as the binding fabric of our 
society and those who violated them were often subject to disgrace. But with time, I 
realized the world was not black and white and to my own amazement I found myself 
doing the things I was told were wrong even though I thought I did not have an 
option. At this point I had little knowledge of corporate scandals in multinationals until 
2008 when crisis rocked the Nigerian banking sector and highly respectable figures 
were sentenced to jail terms. Although all of these may have made me less neutral 
and distanced to the context of study, I hope my “subjectivity” helped with research 
quality and insight, rather than hindered with additional bias. 
 
4.16.2 My Motivation 
Upon resuming my master’s program here in the UK, in 2010, a lot of concerns I had 
held about ethics re-surfaced in the ethics module. My curiosity was heightened to 
the extent that I chose to do my dissertation in this field which led to my interest in 
pursuing a PhD in it as well. My quest was to simply find out why good people ended 
up being bad in our organisations, even though they know the ‘right’ things to do.  
 
4.16.3 My Approach 
If there are any biases I had going into the field, they were three major ones: first my 
understanding of corrupt Nigerian context and that therefore, nothing is 
straightforward and secondly that multinationals are deceptive about the actual 
impact of their roles in the contexts they operate in. Thirdly through my knowledge of 
theory, I had come to expect certain types of responses. At least I had come to 
embrace the latter through my exposure to ethical case studies in various modules 
here in the UK. However, I had no preconceived ideas about the pharmaceutical 
industry even though I knew it was riddled with moral issues in various ways. The 
specifics of this remained elusive to me until I started interviewing the participants 
who began to describe these issues. My quest to understanding what I had always 
wanted to know was now becoming a reality and my mind-set as an interviewer as I 
worked hard to gain access to the firms was to be as open as possible and to also 
get as much out of the participants as possible through open and honest research. 
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Even though I could anticipate certain types of responses from my participants, I 
wanted them to tell these things without my prompting or undue influence. At least, 
the fact that I was meeting all my participants for the first time implied I had to be 
careful with my approach to them as I had one chance to make an impression. With 
these at the back of my mind, I therefore paid particular attention to the questions I 
asked and the way in which I asked them, when I asked them and how I asked them 
and also reflected on these as I progressed. I wanted each interview to be a unique 
journey with my participants in charge, taking me through a terrain I did not know, 
rather than one I may have thought I knew. I therefore kept a consciously distant and 
(I hope) open mind to all I thought I knew from the literature knowing that research is 
not always an accurate description of reality, else there would be no need for this 
research.  
 
I practiced a daily reflection and wrote down all my direct impressions and 
events/stories before and after each interview day. Knowing that I could 
unconsciously affect the interview process with my bias, I always indulged in self-
reflection questions before and after each interview.  To check my intent, I often 
asked myself – What do you want to see in today’s interviews? Initially, I thought of 
so many things I desired to see based on my knowledge of theory and the various 
contextual issues but would often curtail any unnecessary desperation by ensuring 
the interview questions were not leading in any way towards this direction. I 
consciously allowed responses from my participants during each interview to birth 
newer questions that further led to newer questions and issues. I discovered this 
semi-structured approach took us from one point to a series of related issues that 
proved very relevant to my further understanding of the process. After each day’s 
interview, I reflected carefully on the day and often asked myself the question: What 
did you see today? In all cases, I could not articulate exactly what I had heard save 
for striking examples and interesting characters I had met. For instance, a participant 
was surprisingly honest to explain that he is ‘double faced’ at work and that although 
his religion is against it, he still would continue to play the devil’s advocate in his firm. 
On another occasion, a couple of respondents were open to say they give bribes and 
that it was encouraged by their firms. Such responses to me were a positive sign that 
I hadn’t collected data that reflected what I simply wanted to hear but that I had 
allowed all interviews to follow a proper course of investigations. This also meant I 
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had to wait for the transcription to get the richness of the discussions I had with my 
participants even though I had some highlights of our discussions. As the interviews 
progressed daily, I realised that I actually didn’t have anything I wanted to hear save 
for the issues surrounding the research and for that I wanted the true picture of the 
situations in each of the firms and not my own picture of the place. I wanted to be 
surprised by my findings and to do this, I was very open throughout the process. I 
also practiced continuous reflection during the interview process. For instance, as 
interviews progressed, I noted questions that seemed to generate a lot of 
discussions and often opened up fresher interesting issues relevant for this research. 
I noted these and often applied them in subsequent interviews with much success. 
Also because all interviews were very different in their own way, through how I 
started engaging the participant from a common history we shared, or an opinion 
about something I knew interested them etc., I had to constantly rearrange questions 
in my mind to ask the participants. No particular order was therefore applicable in the 
course of each interview.  
 
On an interesting note and consistently with a previous observation in this section, I 
realised also that some of my bias had very positive effect on me during the process. 
For instance, knowing that an average senior manager could be a loyalist to their 
firm implied I shouldn’t simply accept all they told me but to find clever ways of 
probing issues deeper. I developed tests of confirmability throughout my interview 
processes whereby I noted questions that I had asked them and asked the same 
questions later on in the interviews an hour into the interviews when they would have 
forgotten their previous responses and checked if both responses matched. Where I 
found any new ‘twists’ to their answers, I probed these new twists further. I also 
learnt that asking ‘how’ questions made interviewees describe issues and processes, 
which often also led to further interesting issues and insights.  
Also, whilst my understanding of the terrain could be said to introduce some 
elements of bias into the research, I actually leveraged on this to do a thorough job 
as a researcher. First, my knowledge of the context was actually a positive tool as it 
helped me word my questions appropriately to suit the research context in a way that 
I could get the real things happening within them. Also, I knew exactly how to ask 
questions and how to get participants into the place where they would see me not as 
an outsider but a ‘brother’ they could trust without getting too personal with them as 
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well. At times I gained credibility and respect to get to this level in their eyes because 
they saw me as a young man from the UK doing a PhD research and that to them 
was impressive. Coupled with my usual amiable personality, I was able to penetrate 
all participants who felt very comfortable opening up to me about the firms and how 
things worked. I believed the connection I had with my participants was so strong 
that in many cases many would share with me the wrong things they did and why 
they did them. Overall this allowed for transparency in the processes and I was 
satisfied through it all that I had collected good and rich data able to help further this 
research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CONTEXT IN NIGERIA 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter offers a critical description of the research context. It begins by profiling 
the economic, social and institutional environment of the country, Nigeria.  The 
context has been marked as I show by a history of scandals within the Nigerian 
context. This is discussed to present a context relevant canvas of immoral practices 
by MNCs in the pharmaceutical industry in Africa/Nigeria. Beyond these, a detailed 
description of the specific firm contexts in each of the three case groups is presented. 
5.1  Research Context 
The choice of a context for this research in accordance with its overarching 
objectives was predicated on two factors:  a well-known corrupt context and a fast-
paced, achievement driven economic hub for firms in different industries, both of 
which Lagos, Nigeria offered. This context is also a familiar setting to the researcher 
and is therefore relatively easy to navigate. Nigeria has a population of 170million 
people and 20million of these live in Lagos (CIA, 2013). The potential for economic 
prosperity in Nigeria has been particularly celebrated globally as one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world (Robinson, 2015) and Lagos being the commercial 
nerve of the nation and home to the headquarters of several multinationals is at the 
epicentre of this prosperity. Similarly within the pharmaceutical industry, the specific 
context of this study, most known global brands are headquartered in Lagos. Yet 
amidst these huge prospects are very weak institutions, a culture of corruption and 
poorly regulated industries (IMS Health, 2012) all of which validate the choice of this 
context as a viable ground for an ethics research. The choice of the pharmaceutical 
industry in particular was also guided by the ethically sensitive nature of the industry 
as well as a long history of ethical issues including drug adulteration, illegal drug 
trials, bribery, and corruption amongst other critical issues (NAFDAC, 2015) that lend 
the industry to the discourse of ethics within this context. Further, stiff market 
competition and individual and organisational drive within the industry exacerbated 
by the fast growing economy have also exposed firms to more and more nuanced 
waves of ethical problems centred around profit maximisation at the expense of 
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saving lives (IMS Health, 2012) thereby creating a context charged with high moral 
tensions.  
 
Reports on the Nigerian pharmaceutical landscape from the World Bank, (2014) and 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2013) and 
Transparency International, (2014) reveal five crucial contextual features that typify 
the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry as follows: Illegal processes, corrupt 
government officials, greed, economic uncertainty and stiff market competition. 
These features have also been severally confirmed in different other scholarly 
studies on the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001; 
Garuba, Kohler and Huisman, 2009). Of these five features -three of these being 
Illegal processes, corrupt government officials and greed - are direct offshoots of 
corruption in its various forms as manifested and reported in the region whilst the last 
two are economic factors.  
5.2 A Culture of Corruption 
A Transparency International, (2015) report identified corruption as one of the major 
reasons for the prevalence of counterfeit drugs in Nigeria, in addition to inadequate 
legislation, ineffective enforcement of existing laws, loose control systems, high cost 
of drugs, drive, greed, and ignorance (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001; World Bank, 
2014). Furthermore, a United Nations report on the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry 
(UNIDO, 2013) also confirmed the role widespread corruption in most transactions 
plays in the pharmaceutical industry, attributing its effect to lack of access to quality, 
affordable essential medicines, illegal trading, drug adulteration amongst others 
(UNIDO, 2013). Examples of corrupt practices as cited by the one of the regulatory 
bodies in the industry, National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and 
Control (NAFDAC) included ‘extortion of bribes from applicants for drug registration, 
deliberate over-supply of drug samples for resale, and acceptance of perquisites and 
material gifts from companies being inspected’, to name a few (NAFDAC, 2015). 
Stemming directly from this culture are three features within the industry as identified 
by Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, (2001): 
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5.2.1 Illegal Processes 
Nothing gets done unless the process is ‘helped’ or ‘fast tracked’ and following 
proper procedures is tantamount to a waste of time. Hence, to get things done such 
as securing a major contract, register a company, clear an import, and as many 
other activities covered in the gamut of the industry’s value chain, people expect to 
bribe their way through processes to get speedy response. Garuba, Kohler and 
Huisman, (2009) in a study of the industry reported that every aspect of the industry 
– registration, procurement, distribution and so on are susceptible to corruption by up 
to 89% of the time.  
 
5.2.2 Corruption amid Government officials  
Akunyili, (2005) explained that active players in the pharmaceutical industry have to 
constantly liaise with government agencies as part of regulatory requirements. This 
could be for different reasons including inspection, procurement, and registration 
amongst others (Cohen, 2006; Garuba, Kohler and Huisman, 2009). But owing to the 
culture of corruption, government officials often fell entitled to extra income from the 
roles and responsibilities assigned to them and would often not perform their 
statutory duties unless they are tipped (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001). This 
prevalent extortionist behaviour in government officials has often made easy 
processes unnecessary cumbersome, increased transaction costs for industry 
players and often hindered many firms from doing well, besides the broader impact it 
has on drug prices (Akunyili, 2006).  
 
5.2.3 Greed 
At the centre of both illegal processes and corrupt government officials is greed. 
There is a prevalent culture of greed within the context often stemming from a sense 
of ‘entitlement’ by all stakeholders (Akomah and Nani, 2016). For instance, 
Pharmaceutical representatives complain doctors always find clever ways of 
extorting them. Corrupt government officials are driven by the greed of wanting to 
make more money than they ought to (Cohen, 2006). The Pharmaceutical firms too 
are also driven by the desire to maximise profits by setting financial targets. The 
result is a system of different pressures and misconducts characterised by doctors 
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requesting for pay-outs to prescribe drugs and companies putting doctors on pay 
checks for prescribing certain volume of drugs periodically.  
 
5.2.4 Cut throat competitive drive 
A lot of generic drugs have flooded the Nigerian market from different parts of the 
world (IMS Health, 2012). This is fuelling the already stiff competition amongst local 
and foreign pharmaceuticals currently doing business in Nigeria (UNIDO, 2013). For 
malaria alone, there are over 200 drugs that claim to be very effective in malaria 
curative and preventive treatment. Other categories of ailments likewise have a lot of 
competing brands from established pharmaceuticals and generic brands. All these 
tend to make pharmaceutical representatives engage the context outside ethical 
norms to meet their sales targets. Only the multinationals with patented drugs enjoy 
some measure of immunity in this regard. 
 
5.2.5 High Economic Uncertainty 
In spite of anticipated prosperity, a large percentage of Nigerians still live below 
poverty line whilst the fears of economic dividends not trickling to the bottom abound 
(World Health Organisation, 2007). This creates constant fear in the middle class 
who feel the pressing need to survive. With rising living costs as well as few jobs to 
match this pressing demand, the sense of insecurity has gripped many thereby 
limiting their chances of changing jobs (World Bank, 2015). These five features 
depict the kind of ethical context in which this research was conducted and these will 
be taken into consideration during the analysis of all interviews. 
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Figure 5.1: Features of the Nigerian context 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, (2014), UNIDO, (2013), Transparency 
International, (2014) 
 
In the section to follow, I present an example of a scandal within the context 
reflecting how all the aforementioned contextual features played out through the 
actions of a multinational and Nigerian officials resulting in devastating effects. 
 
5.3 The Nigerian Pharmaceutical Industry: Firm X’s Scandal 
‘We did not suspect that our children were being used for experiment’ 
Victim’s Dad (Murray, 2007) 
One of the aftermaths of the weak institutional context in Nigeria is a celebrated 
clinical trial scandal case. In the 1990s, following the outbreak of a disease in a 
major city in Nigeria, a major multinational (Firm X) reportedly moved in first hand 
inside a few weeks of the outbreak to administer a drug, Drug Z on infected children. 
Drug Z was in its last stages of development and a test on human specimens would 
validate its potency as a potential ‘blockbuster’ drug as had been predicted in Wall 
Street (Stephens, 2006). However the clinical trial was soon riddled with lots of 
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controversies including the death of many children and the deformity of several 
others.   
Arguments surrounding Firm X’s actions have generally been categorised as either a 
genuine move to save lives or a greedy drive to make profit, with evidence skewing 
more towards the latter than the former (Stephens, 2006). First, Drug Z had been 
predicted to generate $1billion in revenue (Brichacek, 2001). Given the huge sums 
that go into drug development often spanning ten years of more, a real time 
epidemic offered the perfect platform to test the drug, get final approvals for global 
deployment and make predicted profits. Further investigations soon also revealed 
Firm X had falsified consent letters to carry out the trial, that they had administered 
lesser doses than required by law and that the parents of the victims were not 
properly informed before their children were administered the unregistered drugs 
(Abdullahi, 2002). A parent famously retorted, ‘The white people and some local 
doctors gave Anas this evil drug’ (Murray, 2007).  
Furthermore, a World Bank report in 2002 ascribed the scandal to the repressive and 
corrupt regime of the era, which had weakened all institutions, including the drug 
regulatory agency in Nigeria, rendering it incapacitated to carry out its statutory 
duties of protecting lives (World Bank, 2002). This made it possible for Firm X to 
obtain ‘quick’ permissions from the authorities without any delays, although it can be 
argued that the urgency of the matter could have contributed to this. An initial 
response to the epidemic by a charity medical organisation in the region was 
administering another antibiotic, which reportedly had some success (Murray, 2007). 
But it was the allegation that Firm X kept the children on their drugs even when 
improvements were not observed that further accentuated their motive in the trial. 
Firm X in response to accusations claimed Drug Z reduced mortality rates from 20% 
to 10% and that they sought oral consents due to low literacy in the region using 
interpreters to communicate their intentions to parents. Firm X also claimed to have 
sought appropriate consent from regulatory authorities and insisted that ‘Drug Z 
helped save lives’ (Firm X, 2007:1). Finally, Firm X denied that Drug Z was 
responsible for the death of the children in question but that the disease killed them 
coupled with the fact that they had supported the state government with 18million 
Naira in contributions and support towards the epidemic. 
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Whilst Firm X would not claim responsibility for the children’s deaths and insisted 
their actions were ‘ethically justifiable’ the company suppressed every attempt to 
allow a fair hearing of a lawsuit levelled against them in the United States (Stephens, 
2006) since there is an accusation here that they “suppressed” evidence. Initial 
hearings of lawsuits brought against Firm X in the United States were dismissed on 
grounds that the case be heard in Nigeria (Stephens, 2006). However in 2009, the 
Nigerian government filed a $7billion lawsuit against Firm X following which Firm X 
was found guilty and subsequently fined (Goldacre, 2013).  
Firm X’s actions and responses opened up several debates, including the 
appropriateness of carrying out experiments during epidemics amongst others. What 
perhaps is of more interest in this study is the involvement of local medical staff, 
particularly Firm X’s employees in this case. This kind of interaction between firm 
context and employee morality will be the focus of the discussions in subsequent 
chapters.  
5.4 Case Group 1 – American Firms 
5.4.1 Company Profiles 
This paired case-group comprised of two very similar American pharmaceuticals 
(Firms A1 and A2) in the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. Historically, both Firms 
A1 and A2 have been operating in the African pharmaceutical landscape for over 50 
years with evidences of strong operations and proven brand reputation within the 
Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. For instance, both firms have a track record of 
owning production facilities and manufacturing drugs locally in Nigeria and in other 
parts of Africa. They also have both extended investment into other strategic 
businesses such as consumable and veterinary products. In terms of size, both firms 
have similar workforce strength globally, each having about 70,000 each and 
specifically within the Nigerian context, both having less than 100 employees each. 
Furthermore, revenue wise, Firms A1 and A2 are among the top 20 highest earning 
pharmaceuticals globally as well as within the African context. Both also have 
comparable strength in research and development as well as marketing and 
distribution on the continent. The drug portfolios of both companies also address the 
same diseases with both having more strength in different disease categories than 
the other. Most importantly in relation to this study is that both firms have had to 
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navigate arguably very similar weak institutional contexts over five decades and 
have had their fair share of scandalous activities. These include allegations of 
bribery, illegal lobbying and patent-related scandals. All these make both firms A1 
and A2 suitable choices for studying how their bureaucratic practices interacts with 
employee morality in affecting moral behaviour. 
5.4.2 Bureaucratic Context in the American Firms 
American Pharmaceuticals are considered among the strongest players in terms of 
profit and market share in the Nigerian industry. From analysed survey data, 
confirmed by interview data, managerial control and formalisation (Standard 
Operating Procedures, SOPs) are the most dominant elements of the bureaucracies 
in these American firms. Both of these features exist as means of quite rigid 
formalized controlling of most firm activities and employees’ transactions within their 
professional settings, especially since there is a common knowledge of the corrupt 
business landscape, and to help the mother firms effectively do business in a weak 
institutional environment. As such, the need to be seen as ‘ethical firms’ within the 
corrupt Nigerian context is the principal driver of this bureaucracy type in the 
American firms. SOPs exist for every category of firm activity and they are set rules 
governing actions and decisions employees must make, when and how to make 
them. As such in engaging with stakeholders on the field, there are selling models 
that guide how sales calls are to be made, how different categories of stakeholder 
are to be approached and handled under different circumstances and so on.  
 
Doing business ethically implies the necessity to avoid fines, scandals and damage 
to brand reputation, all of which drive the need for strict rules and managerial control. 
Therefore, the only way the American firms believe this can be achieved is for 
employees to be compliant to all SOPs. Implicit in this approach is that employees 
must have faith in the efficacy of the SOPs in helping them do business ethically 
besides the need to avoid the punishments that could arise from violating such SOPs. 
Penalties include heavy fines, suspension without pay or even being laid off without 
benefits, all of which are unwelcomed in a particularly difficult economic context. 
Hence there is little or no latitude for employees to make independent decisions on 
behalf of the firm and this is believed will leave little room for error. This is a widely 
held belief by the employees too, who see adherence to SOPs as the way of doing 
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business ethically but also as adequate ‘cover’ in case of unexpected consequences, 
in which investigations would begin from whether such employee adhered to the 
SOP guiding related activities. One way compliance is instilled into employees is 
through frequent training, used as a means of getting employees to imbibe SOPs for 
different activities. For instance, ethical case studies are often used during trainings 
to test how employees would respond to certain issues on the field, to which set 
scripts on what to say and how to act are taught to employees. In strange situations, 
employees are not allowed to make decisions on their own but to refer such cases to 
their bosses who are expected to tell them what to do. This is one of the roles of 
managerial control in this setup.  
 
Internal work environments are very structured yet are also experienced as cordial. It 
was a common expression throughout this process in one the firms used that change 
is the only constant thing and therefore change agility is a crucial skill to have on the 
job. You could occupy a position today and the next it is gone leaving such persons 
to apply for other internal positions or leave the firm. It thus seems to create an 
environment of uncertainties. Very warm vertical relationships exist among ranks, 
respondents described the environment as ‘family’ ‘cordial’ and ‘open’ with all 
employees encouraged to ‘say it as it is’ yet the environment has zero tolerance for 
disrespect of colleagues and any breach of compliance. Punishments for such are 
extreme and very harsh, hence as an employee, focus is on doing things right. As 
such, American MNEs believe in continuously training their staff periodically and also 
exposing them to case studies that test their ability to effectively apply SOPs to real 
life scenarios. In addition, these firms have some of the best welfare packages in the 
industry with employees receiving all possible incentives – new cars, high salaries, 
among others to give security and discourage any unethical practices on the field. A 
solid welfare package, strong emphasis on compliance, robust marketing, strong 
brand reputation, patented drugs and qualified professionals guarantee that 
employees would hold up to very high moral standards within and outside of the 
organisation. Thus, American firms are known to create highly secure environment 
for their employees with less monetary pressure, less emphasis on sales targets and 
opportunities for personal development and career progression. 
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It is widely believed also that the strong interconnectedness that exists among 
departments also encourages high standards, whilst employees are not expected to 
physically handle company products during any sales transactions, unlike several 
other pharmaceuticals. They are simply expected to generate orders and third party 
agents close up the deals. Many employees believe this kind of context makes them 
feel protected from the tough business landscape by instilling confidence in them 
that they are working in an organisation that not only pays well but also encourages 
them to do things right by adhering to laid down rules. Employees tend to believe 
that integrity is one of the core values of the organisation that is doing what the rule 
says and being an ethical organisation in a very tough corrupt context. Some who 
aspire to start off their own company in coming years also submitted that they are 
modelling their businesses after what that have learnt because they believe it will 
produce a solid brand. Many went ahead to suggest they are comfortable on their 
jobs because it doesn’t allow them do things that contravene personal moral beliefs. 
Many employees cited the ‘alignment’ of personal values with organisational values 
as a major reason. Others posited that their job espouses values they personally 
esteem and are therefore happy with doing their jobs daily. In response to the weak 
institutional setup, American firms therefore encourage their employees (who are all 
Nigerians), in a compliance driven environment to respond in the following ways: 
Creativity in marketing their products, Building Relationships, Avoidance of identified 
agencies, Leveraging on brand power, and Firmness in dealing with doctors on the 
field.  
 
Also, American MNEs adopt a common industry practice of sponsoring a select few 
doctors to international conferences and subscribing to medical journals on their 
behalf as contributions towards increasing awareness of global medical trends. They 
also organise free screening workshops open to the public. However, concerns were 
raised as to the influence these gestures have on doctors who may feel indebted to 
the firms and respond by continually prescribing their drugs. But, the American firms 
claim they insist all doctors sign an agreement that their acceptance to be sponsored 
for a trip abroad is not in any way an inducement to make the doctors prescribe 
company products. They go as far making them declare that these gestures are for 
their professional development only and that they still maintain full discretion to 
prescribe drugs they feel will help their patients the most. The documentations and 
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processes involved are also quite long and tedious for obvious reasons and many 
doctors have been reported to complain bitterly about the processes involved 
thinking it is almost an insult on their pride. Thus, only few are able to wade through 
the maze to get the prize. Whoever is eventually sponsored is however not for 
employees to decide but the senior management. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Participants in Case-Group 1  
s/n Participant Job Role Background 
1 A1a Pricing and Access Manager Pharmacy 
2 A1b Sales Manager Pharmacy 
3 A1c Marketing Manager Pharmacy 
4 A1d Logistics Officer Biology 
5 A1e Fleet Coordinator Engineering 
6 A1f IT Officer Computer Science 
7 A1g Medical Representative Pharmacy 
8 A2a Sales Representative Sciences 
9 A2b Medical Representative Pharmacy 
10 A2c Country Manager Pharmacy 
11 A2d Senior medical representative Pharmacy 
Source: Fieldwork 
Table 5.1 above summarises the participants within this case group, their current job 
roles and their backgrounds. Of these 11 participants, two are in the senior 
management, three were mid-level managers and all others were the lower level 
within the organisations Also, majority of employees engaged in the sales of the 
American firms’ products were also registered pharmacists with their professional 
affiliations with the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria.  
5.5 Case Group 2 – Indian Firms 
5.5.1 Company Profiles 
This second paired case-group comprises two very similar Indian pharmaceuticals 
(Firms I1 and I2) in the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. Historically, both Firms I1 
and I2 have been operating in the Nigerian pharmaceutical landscape for about 15 
years, solely marketing and distributing drugs manufactured abroad by their parent 
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firms in the region. With a similar structure, both firms are have their senior 
management comprising only of Indian nationals and believe in employing only 
Nigerian nationals to do their selling on the field. In terms of size, both firms have 
similar workforce strength globally, each having about 10,000 each and specifically 
within the Nigerian context, both having less than 100 employees each. Furthermore, 
revenue wise, Firms I1 and I2 averagely gross between $230-250 million globally, 
including the Nigerian market (Reuters, 2015). The drug portfolios of both companies 
also address the same diseases with both having the same strength in different 
disease categories. Most importantly in relation to this study is that both firms have 
had to navigate arguably very similar weak institutional contexts, employing very 
similar approaches – ensuring the senior management are only Indian nationals in 
order to maintain a strong control of all firms’ activities. This stems from a history of a 
series of internal frauds within both firms that has led to the employment of tighter 
internal regulations in order to control the companies effectively. All these make both 
firms I1 and I2 suitable choices for studying how their bureaucratic practices interact 
with employee morality in affecting moral behaviour. 
5.5.2 Bureaucratic Context in the Indian Firms 
Indian pharmaceuticals are largely marketing and distribution firms within the context 
of the industry value chain. With production facilities in India, subsidiaries in other 
parts of the world service the marketing and distribution of parent company products 
to local markets. In a highly competitive business environment known for its 
institutional frailties, the Indians are very unpopular for their low-cost approach to 
business. With this approach, they employ mostly non-pharmacists to do the job of 
pharmacists as a way of reducing overhead to be incurred by paying qualified, 
registered professionals. Internally, there are strong cultural and racial divides within 
the Indian firms. This is evident in the composition of the upper echelon within the 
firms, structured such that only Indian expatriates occupy the mid and senior 
managerial positons with minimal job progression opportunities for Nigerian 
employees. This is explained by the fundamental assumptions Indians have of 
Nigerians as follows: The first (who most usually occupy more senior / management 
roles) don’t trust the latter (who occupy employee roles) and vice versa, second, the 
Indians seem to believe that Nigerians cannot successfully run businesses if put in 
charge hence their firm control of key positions. Also there is a belief among the 
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roles higher in this hierarchy that Nigerians are best used to deal with Nigerians 
whilst the expatriates oversee operations, which may indicate chances of promotion 
despite being from the less privileged national group in this organisation’s sociology. 
Once, a Nigerian was appointed as national sales manager but was soon removed 
on grounds of being vocal and confrontational. Generally, Indians may not be open 
to such confrontations from Nigerian employees regardless of their position within 
the firm. As a result of this, internal collaboration among employees is not allowed 
such that during meetings with senior management from India, employees are not 
allowed to air their views collectively for the fear of rebellion. Thus, freedom on jobs 
is highly curtailed for office staff whilst sales force has plenty of autonomy with no 
clear punitive measures in place to curb any excesses. Thus, there are no clear 
boundaries outside of the office environment and internal rules that exist protect only 
the interests of the company. Also, with very uncordial vertical relationships smeared 
with issues of mistrust, low wages (less than £100 a month), very tight management 
control on internal processes, the resultant context is one which is aggressive and 
frustrating as most employees describe the contexts of the firms.  
 
At the foundations of these issues also are some unpleasant stories the Indians have 
had among themselves and with their Nigerian employees. In times past, there have 
been series of internal high profile defrauding that have often led to constant 
changes at the top, and also some Nigerian employees have absconded with huge 
sums of money and have remained at large. Interestingly, the Indians have not 
responded with force nor were law enforcement agencies engaged for fear of being 
further exploited and perhaps also because of tax offenses as an employee pointed 
out. This informed a rather interesting bureaucratic model the Indian firms in this 
study have adopted in response to these issues – one in which rules are employed 
as a control tool in regulating all internal firm activities. The most prominent of the 
rules is that employees are expected to service all orders they generate from the 
market with their money before clients pay. That is, when an order is generated, 
before the company releases products to the client, the representative in charge 
must pay the order sum, thereby shifting the risks 100% on their employees. This 
has also often led to some employees cutting corners and entering into deals with 
potential customers to reduce their risks. 
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In all of these, employees have responded in two major ways: decision to quit or to 
remain had to be made. Those who confessed they are contemplating quitting have 
done so because of their personal moral convictions which they believe has been 
eroded and professional aspirations for which they believe their current job cannot 
give them. They cited that they are beginning to do things they would never have 
considered doing by virtue of their upbringing, religious convictions and personal 
integrity. On the other hand, employees who have chosen to remain have done so 
by focusing on the money they make from soft deals on the field in place of wanting 
to rise up the ranks. Also, the helplessness many feel from prevalent economic 
conditions have forced them to stay for fear of losing a secure means of livelihood in 
a scarce jobs market.  
 
Table 5.2 – Summary of Participants in Case group 2 
s/
n 
Participan
t 
Job Role Background 
1 I1a Admin/HR Manager Business Admin 
2 I1b Sales Representative Pharmacy 
3 I1c Senior Sales Representative Bio-Chemistry 
4 I1d Senior sales Representative Pharmacy 
5 I1e Sales Representative Bio-Chemistry 
6 I2a Sales Manager Pharmacy 
7 I2b Sales Representative Engineering 
8 I2c Sales Representative Microbiology 
9 I2d Sales Representative Chemistry 
Source: Fieldwork  
Table 5.3 above presents a summary of participants in this case group. All 
employees interviewed in this case group are categorised at the lower level based 
on the structure of the Indian firms and are all locals. As such they all have reporting 
lines in the senior management (all ethnic Indians). None of the managers were 
accessible to be interviewed in this study and as such interviews were conducted 
only with Nigerian employees. This was a limitation in this particular case group. Of 
the nine employees interviewed, only three are trained and registered pharmacists 
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with a majority having science related backgrounds and only two having a non-
science background. However,  
 
5.6 Case Group 3 – Nigerian Firms 
5.6.1 Company Profiles 
In the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry saturated with foreign multinationals, there 
are eight 100% wholly owned Nigerian plc, quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange 
with turnover in billions of naira. These local firms are also known to be strong 
enough to effectively compete with the foreign firms in the context. The two Nigerian 
firms used in this study are examples of such firms. For instance both are similar in 
size and capacity, as well as owning fully functional, World Health Organisation 
(WHO) standard local production facilities. In terms of employee strength, both firms 
have a work force of about 500 each and also have similar pay packages for their 
employees. In terms of age, firm N2 has been in Nigeria for a 100 years but first as a 
wholly owned British company. However in the 1970s, the British sold the company 
to Nigerians who have since run the organisation even though it can be argued that 
not all of the inherited culture would have changed over time. This may have 
important ramifications for the existing culture in the firm. Firm N1 on the other hand 
is a 21-year-old organisation, which started as a small firm and has now grown into 
an industry giant. Interestingly however, both have two different cultures, internal 
structure and approaches to the market. 
5.6.2 Bureaucratic Context in the Nigerian Firms 
5.6.2.1 Firm N1  
Firm N1 is a 21-year-old organisation that is also publicly quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. The organisation has been judged as the best indigenous 
pharmaceutical firm in Nigeria and is also reputed to be in the league of top 
multinationals in the industry. A culture of excellence and integrity has been 
deliberately built and instilled in employees through the visible modelling of such 
virtues by the senior management of the firm. Employees within this context typically 
show a lot of admiration and respect for the leadership of the firm, particularly the 
Managing Director (MD), known for his charisma. The MD has been described as 
humble, friendly and approachable such that any of the firm’s 250 employees can 
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walk up to him at any time. This trait is also found in the entire senior management 
team such that employees also respect all their leaders. Therefore, the atmosphere 
within the organisation is very calm and cordial with top management often freely 
interacting with all levels of employees. An employee submitted that their HODs are 
the face of the values of the organisation and that as employees typically embrace 
the values that see in the leaders they respect. Interestingly, this firm does not have 
SOPs in place to govern processes however employees have a common 
understanding of the values that bind them as an organisation. 
Also, the board of trustees of Firm N1 include some notable figures in the medical 
field including Nigeria’s first professor of medicine known for his moral values. 
Besides the cordiality and warm relationships, there is a Christian fellowship for 
employees within the organisation. Some of the staff point to the fellowship as a 
strong moral reinforcement for them and one that is held in very high esteem within 
the firm. An employee also submitted that the way the system is run, any fraudulent 
act is thrown up almost immediately hence they know it is not an option to even think 
of any dubious acts. The kind of context this has created is that which is free, 
inspiring and ethically sound and the company prides itself in having over 100 
employees who have served for more than 10 years. In response, employees feel 
very comfortable working in such a huge establishment and would often use the 
words ‘privileged’ ‘honoured’ with a sense of joy that a Nigerian firm is stepping up 
with strong values in a poor institutional context. One complaint that however 
seemed to come up a few times was that the cordiality at times breeds an 
atmosphere of unprofessionalism and some form of looseness in executing daily 
tasks. A respondent who had worked in a highly bureaucratic establishment most of 
their career opened up that it took them 2 years to adjust to the free culture of Firm 
N1 and that they still wouldn’t mind returning to a regimented setup for the sake of 
clearly defined daily objectives and outcomes.  
Table 5.3 – Summary of Participants in Firm N1  
Participant Position Background 
N1a IT manager Engineering 
N1b  Operations Officer Physiology 
N1c Product Manager Pharmacy 
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Source: Fieldwork  
 
5.6.2.2 Firm N2  
Once partly owned by a British firm but now wholly Nigerian, Firm N2 is a 100 year 
old organisation trying to regain relevance in the modern market having lost a lot of 
ground to advancements in the industry. In times past, the company’s products were 
household names, but with changes to the industry, it has become a name among 
the crowd trying to get its reputation back. The company’s vision is to become one of 
Nigeria’s biggest pharmaceutical companies by 2020. Termed a very complex 
organisation with red tape, access into the organisation was difficult. There are no 
clear rules or SOPs within Firm N2 hence employees tend to play by their own rules. 
As such, the context of this firm is largely unregulated. In comparison with other 
companies, an employee who had worked in top multinationals opined that working 
for the multinational firms keeps one in a ‘cocoon’ of ideals where it is impossible to 
bribe or do anything wrong. However in Firm N2, ways of doing things are not written 
in black and white, everyone is expected to ‘know’ what to do and this could include 
giving bribes to secure deals amongst others. In fact, a manager opined that it is a 
common practice to provide a budget for bribing doctors to prescribe their products 
under the guise of promotion.  
Table 5.4 – Summary of Participants in Firm N2 
N1d HR Officer GCE 
N1e Admins Assistant Management 
N1f Internal Auditor Accounting and Finance 
N1g Corporate Services Manager Marketing and 
Communications 
N1h Secretary  Secretarial Studies 
N1i Compliance Officer Pharmacy 
Participant Position Background 
N2a Brand Manager Pharmacy 
N2b Regional Manager Marketing 
N2c Trade Marketer Pharmacist 
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Source: Fieldwork 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above present a summary of participants in firms N1 and N2 this 
case group. A higher number of interviewed participants in Firm N2 are registered 
pharmacists. Interviewed participants in Firm N1 on the other hand were picked 
across departments of the firm, out of which only two had registered pharmacists 
occupying them. Also, this sample had a good mix of managers and lower level 
employees within the context. 
In conclusion, the capricious nature of the external context in which these firms 
operate has been discussed. Also case specific contexts have been presented with 
each case group showing some distinctness. The chapters to follow present the 
analysis and findings on how the bureaucracies espoused in each of the case 
groups affect employee morality. 
  
N2d Trade Business Officer Pharmacy 
N2e Medical Representative Pharmacy 
N2f Senior Medical 
Representative 
Pharmacy 
N2g Business Development 
Manager 
Pharmacy 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE GROUP 1: AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICALS 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings on the first paired cases - the two 
American pharmaceuticals. Two major bureaucratic features typify the American 
case group: Formalised rules through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and 
managerial control. Formalised rules refer to strict SOPs guiding every employee 
activity. Employee effectiveness and efficiency are often tied to complying with these 
rules. Managerial control however exists to enforce compliance to the SOPs, often 
through informal means. Both of these features function together to create a 
“Traditional Bureaucracy” context. Evidence that shows this will be presented 
alongside a critical discussion of the impact of this traditional bureaucracy on the 
moral capacities of employees. To this aim I shall be using evidence from interview 
data and secondary sources to present relevant findings.  
6.1 Formalised Rules - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
'We have standard operating procedures for everything. They train us on the SOP...' 
(A1b) 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are set rules and detailed guidelines on 
every aspect of firm activities. As stated on the website of both American firms, 
SOPs exist in the form of manuals referred to as ‘Compliance Guidance documents’. 
They cover employee conduct within and outside the organisation and could be quite 
detailed such as in several instances offering prepared scripted responses to 
questions and scenarios faced whilst executing job activities. For instance, ‘selling 
models’ are a type of SOPs that detail all the processes that must be followed in 
engaging doctors and other potential clients in the field. They cover crucial aspects 
such as ways of approaching clients, how sales calls must be made including 
specific elements that must be involved, answering objections, selling approach, and 
so on. Included in some of these are also prepared scripts on how employees are 
meant to approach any ethical challenges faced on site.  
More importantly however to report amid key data themes is the measure of 
compliance employees are expected to accord to these set rules. The salience of 
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SOPs in this case group is such that they provide the yardstick by which the 
‘accuracy’ of job execution are measured and are considered as the reality check for 
any job related activity. That strict adherence is required of all employees and 
violating them could attract disciplinary consequences is a theme that appeared not 
just in interviews but even more so on the website of one of the firms: 
“Our Compliance Guidance documents educate colleagues about our 
company's commitment to compliance. The Guidance documents put all 
colleagues, including management, on notice that failure to adhere to 
our compliance standards may have disciplinary consequences, up to 
and including termination of employment. If an investigation suggests 
that discipline may be warranted, appropriate action is taken…” (Firm 
A1 Company Website) 
This theme was evident in both A1 and A2, where, employees understand the 
different compliance guidance documents and other SOPs to be the ‘holy grail’ of 
working effectively within the American firms. Employees appear to justify the need 
to accept the strict compliance culture as a way by which the firms’ respond to the 
Nigerian context as explained below:  
'Well, today Nigeria is the seventh or ninth most corrupt country of the 
world and they tell us that the country is already in the red light…and 
they really want us to be different from what is perceived…so, things 
you are not clear about that are still not spelt out you still want to ask… 
Have I been compliant? Am I doing the right things?' (A2a) 
“…It's also a place where compliance is very very important. We value 
compliance ahead of business, rather forfeit the business if it is filled 
with weaknesses of compliance....” (A1c) 
Therefore, strict adherence to the SOPs commands an environment characterised 
by rule / impersonal compliance. Employees also rely solely on the rules as their 
standards in measuring not only their performance but also what is and what is not 
right in the moral sense, since following the rules is expected to result in doing the 
‘right things’ at work. With this, a rule-compliance driven morality is created by which 
both performance and morality are measured using checklists generated from the 
(formalised) rules.  
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Rules are communicated to employees through very frequent training whilst top 
executives are also meant to help enforce all rules. Firm A1’s website stated: 
“ Firm A1 is committed to providing effective training to employees, 
managers, officers, and directors on the Compliance Program. Training 
resources include online compliance education, as well as online 
access to policies…” (Firm A1 Company Website) 
A respondent categorised the training as thus: “Product trainings, scientific trainings, 
sales training, marketing trainings, capability trainings etc…” (A2a). Obviously 
training is a more direct way of imparting firm rules and ideologies into the 
employees, and as such training is meant to act as a compliance-socialisation 
mechanism. Therefore what is right within the context of the American firms is what 
the rules say. This kind of system creates different mechanisms that ultimately affect 
the morality of employees in this case group. I start with the following perceptions 
employees have about the rule-based system as follows: 
 “Yes, the beauty of it is that you are always confident you are working 
in a company that will not ask you to do things that are not compliant…It 
is a company where your conscience is clear especially that the drugs 
you give to the patient, they are the best quality, you are not doing 
anything unethical even with government officials...”(A1c, Marketing 
Manager) 
 
“…I guess for me I think being straightforward, getting things right, and 
organised and a straightforward system, those are the kind of things 
that I appreciate and admire and expect to see in any place. I guess 
that was what drew me to Firm A1, like I said the fact that they have this 
compliance thing, they have standards, which they work by and it's the 
kind of person that I am...” (A1g Medical Representative) 
 
From the quotes above, it seems clear that functioning effectively within a rule-based 
rational bureaucracy creates a general sense of both professional and moral self-
esteem in employees. Competence in this context is the feeling of proficiency arising 
from the belief employees have that they are working for organisations with high 
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professional standards and a commitment to ethics. However, when it comes to 
morality, it is noteworthy that quotes such as the above do not seem to say 
something about what specific values are the source of being ethical and why people 
would wish to aspire to these. Yet the rule based system could easily create a 
perception within employees that the bureaucratic rules align with their own 
personally held beliefs thereby reinforcing the feeling of competence. This could 
easily distract them from any personal moral inquiry since employees trust the rules 
as indeed sufficient in safeguarding their morality.  
Also, the strict compliance and rule-based environment tends to create a sense of 
generalised fear to act in compliance in order to maintain one’s job in employees 
who do not want to violate set rules because of associated punishments. An 
employee simply explained the implications of not following the rules as, “For us it is 
as bad as you can lose your job” (A1g). Examples of such violations and subsequent 
punishments were described below: 
“You also have when consistently things don’t happen the right way, 
people get fired...We had the case of a lady who fights everybody 
practically, yeah, fights her boss, fights her direct report, fights her 
peers, fights her customers, that is even the biggest, that's suicide...” 
(A1a) 
“…I think we've had one and the guy lost his job. It had to do 
with…something about receipts… You know there are some filling 
stations you go to especially in Lagos and they don’t have receipts, if 
you ask for a receipt they just look at you ‘weirdly’ so he went to print 
receipts for a filling station so he was using it for his expense. 
Whenever he buys fuel he just uses it to get his reimbursement. And 
he's a pharmacist. (How was he caught?). It was very obvious, all your 
receipts are the same, the numbers are probably the same and they 
were following each other and you know those things are not usually 
obvious…” (A1g) 
Also as earlier quoted, the implications of violating set rules especially in relation to 
financial transactions with externals is explicitly written on the websites of these firms, 
ranging from suspensions to outright termination of appointments. Employees 
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typically want to avoid such embarrassments and ascribe professionalism to doing 
things right according to the rules. Within this also comes a sense of safety, whereby 
employees feel secure as they comply with set rules. As an employee said, “I like the 
covering the rules provide for me…” (A2d). This sense of safety comes with a feeling 
of being covered and protected as long as rules are upheld. In summary therefore, it 
would follow that employees are expected to derive legitimacy within the system by 
strictly following set rules. Through mechanisms of competence, fear, and safety, the 
rule-based system encourages strict compliance to set rules in order to do things 
right. 
6.2 Managerial Control 
Managerial control in this case group manifests to enforce rule compliance 
behaviours. Whilst SOPs are the most visible entities in the operations of the firms, 
managerial control is subtler yet critical in this case group. Rules are tools, albeit 
powerful tools but power also lies in the hands of those who wield influence with the 
rules as one of their many tools. This is where the superiority and subtlety of 
managerial control lies as the following quotes show:  
“…Everything is based on (personal managerial) approval…if approval 
is not given you wait and it helps things better because once you do 
things without approval and issues emerge from such, the penalties 
are usually very high...”(A1d) 
“The thing is that they are more attentive to Nigeria even the little 
things you do, you even have a manager that will monitor you and 
because you already know so, things you are not clear about that are 
still not spelt out you still want to as - Have I been compliant? Am I 
doing the right things?” (A1c) 
“Even if issues happen and policies don't cover it, you might have to 
seek your supervisor's consent.” (A1f) 
From the above quotes, the mechanism of managerial control seems to aim at 
creating a personalised monitoring system via management approval requirement of 
most actions that ensures employee compliance to the set rules in all their activities. 
Employees are asked to defer to their bosses for any uncertainties faced on the field 
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instead of figuring it out themselves. This implies that the managers are the 
‘enforcers’ of the rules with a seemingly ‘superior’ understanding that comes with the 
latitude to make decisions on behalf of the firm based on this. This disempowers 
employee moral judgement, while by extension it seems to overly empower 
managers as the sovereign guardians of morality that perhaps disempowers 
employees to do so equally. In other words, managers are the ‘eyes’ and the ‘nose’ 
of the system which creates a very authoritarian work climate. As a manager 
explained: 
“I have days when I am on the field working with my 
colleagues…Tuesdays to Thursdays I’m on the field with my direct 
reports ensuring they are delivering what is expected of them…We run 
a system called mobile intelligence so your next level manager sees 
what you are doing without being on the field with you. He knows who 
you are calling on, he knows what product you are talking about, and he 
knows what activities or events you are doing without being on the field 
with you so long as you are reporting…” (A1b) 
As the eyes, managers constantly follow up on their direct reports on the field 
through different means (including daily field reports, frequent phone calls, 
impromptu field inspections etc) such that they have constant updates on 
happenings on the field. As the nose, they are expected to ‘sniff-out’ any faulty, non-
complaint behaviours in the activities of their direct reports and to set things straight 
based on the SOP. Furthermore, the extent of power and responsibility given to 
managers also implies they are the go-to persons by other employees in case of any 
issues whatsoever. This tends to put excessive power in managerial hands and as 
noted earlier disempowers non-managerial role holders from exercising moral 
agency. This is stated on the website of one of the firms: 
 “Firm A1 adheres to an "Open Door Policy," and encourages 
colleagues to discuss all issues, concerns, problems and suggestions 
with their immediate supervisors or other managers without fear of 
retaliation and with the assurance that the matter will be kept as 
confidential as possible…” (Firm A1 Website) 
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It may therefore also follow that managers themselves are less under scrutiny of the 
same rules they enforce thereby conferring on them enormous powers and 
responsibility. For instance, managers are able to allow obvious violations of SOP go 
unpunished as implied by an employee who spent lavishly on certain marketing 
activities beyond the stipulations of SOPs: 
“…We can have our meetings somewhere and if it is more than a 
certain amount of money, your boss asks you why do you do it in such 
a location, you just say this was the best option you had in this vicinity 
and its done!   And they just sign it off since they can defend it also with 
their boss. They just give you a verbal warning to say be careful 
because it is really expensive…” (A2d) 
Hence, it seems clear that managers are able to manipulate the rules such that as 
long as they say an action is okay, it is okay, regardless of the SOPs. This could 
easily create a lax morality within the system, whereby manager’s endorsement of 
certain non-compliant acts could legitimise them with employees.  
Interestingly, the mechanism of managerial control in this case group thrives in an 
environment of informality, which is in contrast to the more formalised experience of 
working under the rigidity of SOPs. In other words, when it comes to the 
management and employee relations control is not achieved through force or 
hierarchical distance amongst members of different ranks but through subtle means 
central to which are respect and close bonds. Hence, within this case group, there is 
strong cordiality between senior managers and their direct reports, a family-like 
feeling that creates a sense of bond, respect and trust, which is acknowledged by all 
employees in this case group. In the words of a manager: 
“…The Firm A1 system is more like a family where everybody operates, 
we are connected one way or the other which is okay which is the best 
way to function. For that working relationship to be as impactful as 
possible there has to be some social relationship that kind of family 
setting where everybody feels responsible or accountable to one 
another so it's a beautiful family, a beautiful house…” (A1c) 
From the quote above, a lot of emphasis is placed on being a beautiful ‘family’ 
defined as being accountable and responsible to one another. This may serve as a 
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mechanism for normalising and rationalising obedience as it easily fosters a 
collective group mentality and morality able to suppress individual moral agency. 
Through these, managers are able to connect closely with their direct reports in such 
ways that they are able to further mentor, coach and instruct them along the tenets 
of the bureaucracy. However, most of this does not seem to serve the development 
of a shared yet independent moral responsibility but instead seem to exist to shut 
down inquiry, or criticisms or disagreement. More in depth data however has not 
supported this. A likely result is to have employees who find the ‘cordial’ bureaucratic 
environment appealing such that their trust is easily earned, thereby lowering their 
resistance towards the demands of the bureaucracy. An employee below stated: 
“…One thing for me again is that the way this organisation is designed 
it make the work to flow so we don't have stress, it is not like a 
bureaucratic set up. In a bureaucratic set up you get things done very 
difficultly, very difficult to get things done but in this kind of setup we 
have here we can get things done faster and especially also when you 
have to relate with people, interpersonal skills need to constantly come 
to play…” (A1e) 
The norm of cordiality as construed by these employees even makes them feel they 
are not working in a bureaucratic organisation. Consequently, employees see 
cordiality as a ‘comfort’ factor and a good feature of their organisation such that they 
feel safe raising any objections they may have about anything or being able to defer 
to their superiors for counsel and/or more rigid monitoring direction set by superiors 
on any work related matters as shown below: 
“That is very cordial (referring to relationships with superiors). I must admit 
that that is one thing Firm A1 tries to promote. We have a cordial 
relationship, if you notice everyone is on a first name basis...” (A1g, 
Medical Representative) 
“Oh! Firm A1 does not condone jerks at work place… We have what we 
call straight talk policy in Firm A1 whereby I can address an issue with the 
person about the matter even no matter how highly placed you are within 
the organisation…there will be a reason why you will say you did not agree 
with his point of view so it's a place where you will not feel threatened…it's 
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a place that does not encourage you to talk anyhow or behave anyhow to 
colleagues…” (A1c, Marketing Manager) 
Also working in this sense is the mechanism of respect as the respondent above 
stated. But in reality, this kind of ‘cordial’ setting could create an environment where 
things seem right on the surface but the real issues are masked, and employees are 
unable to speak up on some of their core concerns as an employee explained: 
“Okay yeah…previously cohesion used to be better. We used to be much 
more close and bonded than we are now. I think people don't really have 
faith and trust in the organisation like before. We feel like we are not being 
protected we feel like our needs are not being met, we raise issues with 
them they sweep them under the carpet... it’s just another little teams of 
individuals everyone is driven so as to achieve something… but really the 
culture thing I don’t really think is as strong as it used to be…because I am 
not really enthusiastic about work anymore and that’s just a truth. I am not 
excited…despite the fact that we talk on a first name basis, there is still a 
lot of subjectivity…”(A1g, Medical Representative) 
Thus, it seems clear from the quote above that there are unvoiced feelings of 
mistrust and dissatisfaction amongst certain employees which are ‘swept under the 
carpet’ within the environment of cordiality that claims to encourage freedom of 
speech. Also, within the environment some employees seem unable to objectively 
voice their concerns for perhaps certain fears that may not be disconnected from the 
power managers have over the employees. However, there was insufficient data to 
prove this connection. Furthermore, employees are made to believe that they are 
working in a near perfect system where following the rules is sufficient and this 
makes life and career easy and good. In reality however, managers are still unable 
to totally monitor their employee activities on the field. As such the only way they 
claim to measure compliance is when there are zero-incidents of non-compliance as 
a manager explained below:  
“So, if you train your reps well, giving them scenarios and how to handle 
objections and all that then to a large extent you are ensuring compliance. 
(How do you measure that?) It's a difficult one because the only way to 
measure compliance is if you have zero incidences of non-compliance. If 
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we have none for the year that’s a very good year. If I have one it then 
depends on whether it is manageable internally or to escalate it to the 
top… How would I know when there is an issue, the answer to that 
question is really difficult.  Unless I stumble on a doctor who would tell 
me I wouldn't know because there is no tracking device on them. I keep 
saying prevention is better than cure. So the aim is to avoid it by getting 
the right person training and communicating…” (A2c) 
Nonetheless, that there are zero incidents in a year does not imply that employees 
have been fully compliant. They could have violated the rules of the bureaucracy and 
may have gotten away with such either by themselves or by the endorsement of their 
managers as earlier established.  
In summary, managerial control functions when managers excessively monitor 
activities within the system based on set rules often to the detriment of individual 
moral agency. Control is however achieved through subtle means of cordiality over 
work matters and respect between managers and their direct reports with clear lines 
of seniority that maintain that managers and SOPs are the moral arbiters in the firms 
of this sub-sample. This in turn facilitates working relationships based on supervision, 
coaching, mentoring and trainings, all of which are channels of propagating 
bureaucratic compliance morality to employees. Yet, there was clear absence of any 
other conversation or interaction regarding moral inquiry such as more subtle 
aspects of professional ethics, or any  moral dilemmas, as if there were none. These 
however appear to disempower moral disagreement or inquiry and independent 
moral agency even though employees tend to see compliance as a way of ensuring 
their jobs are properly done. 
6.3  The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees’ 
Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities 
As previously established, the morality of the studied employees in this study is 
evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral development levels and 
moral identities. From preliminary findings, the moral identity (MI) scores and 
assigned cognitive moral reasoning (CMR) level of each employee are presented in 
table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants 
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Participa
nt 
CMR Path Moral Identity 
Strength 
A1a Conventional Level (stage 4) 6.47 (strong) 
A1b Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.18 (strong) 
A1c Post-conventional Level (stage 5) 6.06 (strong) 
A1d Conventional Level (Stage 4) 5.00 (strong) 
A1e Conventional Level (Stage 3) 4.71 (strong) 
A1f Conventional Level (Stage 4) 6.76 (strong) 
A1g Conventional Level (Stage 3) - 
A2a Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.47 (strong) 
A2b Post-conventional Level (Stage 
6) 
4.29 (strong) 
A2c Conventional Level (Stage 4) - 
A2d Conventional Level (Stage 4) 5.11 (Strong) 
Source: Field Work  
The table above shows that the CMR levels of participants vary significantly (from 
pre conventional stage 1 to post conventional stage 6). However it must be noted 
that these CMR levels were allocated based on the researcher’s subjective 
evaluation following a few yet carefully observed patterns of thinking in interview 
data for each participant and not with the appropriate tool. Hence, it could have 
some errors prone to researcher bias. On the other hand however, MI scores show 
all participants have predominantly strong moral identities, which is unexpected and 
immediately raises some concerns. First, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure was 
used in getting the MI scores of each participant. This measure has been 
documented to have very high reliability and validity (Aquino and Reed, 2002, 
Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). Also, studies (Reed and Aquino, 2003, Aquino 
et al 2007, Shao et al 2008, Aquino et al, 2009) that have adopted this measuring 
tool have found significant variations in the moral identity scores of all tested 
samples. The results in this case group however reveal an anomaly that could imply 
there is inflation in the moral perception of participants. Whilst this indicates some 
weakness in the MI measure as a self-scoring measure, it also points to the likely 
effect a rule-based bureaucracy could have on employee understanding of their own 
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morality. In this next section, this possibility will be explored along three key 
propositions: 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of 
moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)  
This simply means that the subjectively perceived moral identity strength in the oral 
interviews seemed to be “inflated” compared to the “actual” scores of MI found when 
using the relevant measure (Aquino and Reed, 2002). 
A justification for this proposition is: Moral identity theory presumes all individuals 
have moral traits they hold as central to their self-definition. Thus, people with a 
strong sense of moral identity are those who prioritise moral commitments above 
other commitments, obligating themselves to live consistently in integrity to their 
deeply held moral beliefs. In principle, such persons have their moral traits easily 
and readily accessible by situations and contexts, which in turn affects how decisions 
are made in those circumstances. Individuals with weak moral identity on the other 
hand do not prioritise moral commitments and have their commitments in other 
ideals such as having wealth and so on. It also therefore follows that their moral 
traits would not be readily accessible in situations making such traits less likely to 
affect their decision-making.  
Thus, within a bureaucracy driven by compliance to rules and managerial control, it 
is likely that employees with strong moral identities would more readily obey set rules 
for the sake of acting consistently in accordance to their moral values. Those with 
weak moral identities could also follow the rules but for benefits such as self, public 
praise and rewards where they feel they follow the bureaucracy’s rules without 
questioning them at all. 
 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and 
rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
The justification for this proposition is: Kohlberg’s theory suggests that conventional 
level thinkers are more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist 
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behaviours to social norms. This implies that employees reasoning at this level are 
less inclined to critical moral inquiry and are more likely to embrace set rules, norms 
and standards without questioning them. Within bureaucracies, such employees see 
issues only through the lens of the SOPs and are often unable to bring other 
perspectives to bear in their decision-making. Post-conventional level thinkers on the 
other hand are expected to employ universal moral principled concern expressed in 
reasoning and their reporting of action in their organisations, while it is also expected 
to find a more nuanced and sensitive moral inquiry relevant to the post conventional 
moral reasoners. Within bureaucracies, they are able to see issues not only from the 
firm’s perspective but also through the lens of higher moral principles. Since it is 
typical of bureaucracies to be characterised by formalised rules and other qualities 
often requiring strict compliance from its employees, it would therefore follow that 
bureaucracies would more likely reward conventional level thinkers hence this 
proposition. 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and 
values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak 
moral identity 
 
The justification for proposition 3 is that there are potential conflicts between how 
professional bodies define the nature and role of their members versus how firms 
want such professionals to behave within their contexts. A profession is an 
independent body (outside of any organisational interests) which advises people who 
undertake a particular strand of work and which provides some core ethical criteria 
and norms about the essential purpose of this profession for society, independently 
of the context/employer where the professional exercises this (Hall, 1968, Freidson, 
1973, Forrester, 1988). A profession is beyond and above an institution within which 
professionals work, while professional bodies are the guardians of very long lasting 
ethical traditions about practicing a particular profession (McCloskey and McCain, 
1987). There is therefore a clear difference between looking good (doing what the 
bureaucracy wants) and being ethical (following professional code of ethics). Outside, 
acting ‘ethically’ in accordance with the professional guidelines of the Pharmacists 
Council of Nigeria or personal integrity guides a sense that one pursues “the good” 
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and is a person who seeks to act in ethically good ways on the basis of their 
personal professional integrity. However, inside this bureaucracy that combines rule 
compliance and close personalised managerial control mechanisms, most 
employees - with strong and weaker moral identity- have no other option than to 
comply with firm’s policies and rules. This could be rewarded as “good” behaviour 
insofar as it is successful and this may inflate a false sense of stronger moral identity 
even for employees with weak moral identity, once they adopt a moral relativistic 
way of valuing such as “when in Rome act as the Romans”.  Similar mechanisms 
may also influence employees with strong MI towards more compliance behaviours. 
6.4 Proposition 1 
Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all 
cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
As noted in moral identity theory it is presumed that all individuals have moral traits 
they hold as central to their self-definition. Thus, people with a strong sense of moral 
identity are those who prioritise moral commitments and integrity responses, while 
people with weak moral identities maintain moral duties as less of a priority. As 
within this bureaucracy rule compliance and managerial authority decide on what is 
right to do irrespectively of moral dimensions of the matter, there could be an 
avoidance of self-shame by employees with weak moral identities to assume what is 
right in managerial and operating procedure terms should be also named “ethical”, 
which enables these person, to maintain a sense of acting consistently in 
accordance to their moral values (which reduces obviously cognitive dissonance). 
Those with weak moral identities substitute a lack of moral conscience strength with 
a more passive rule followership behaviour. This also grants weak moral identity 
employees public praise, recognition and rewards whereby they feel “I am moral 
because I follow the SOP, although being moral is not significant for my identity if it 
comes as a side effect of something I would anyway do (to succeed/keep my job) 
why should I not celebrate it?”  
Interestingly, as earlier discovered, all participants in this case group have reported 
to have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) moral identity 
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measure so there was no gap between the orally self-reported and the measured 
moral identity scores. But all the scores of the latter were high. This can be a 
weakness itself of the moral identity operationalization as a self-report measure, in 
that it may be that contextual factors can easily “contaminate” (inflate or deflate) the 
self-reported scores. In this case, I assume that a compliance driven bureaucratic 
context will want to maintain a belief they have strong moral identities. On another 
hand it could also be because of the individual’s desire to reduce any guilt/self-doubt 
if following the rules may be at odds with their moral instincts in some cases when 
their moral faculties tell them they should question or break the rules thereby 
distorting their real moral identity strength.  
The possibility of the latter is tested in this section accordingly and findings are 
presented below: 
6.4.1 Finding 1: Employees with strong moral identity see SOP and overall 
managerial compliance as synonymous with displaying a strong morality. This 
creates a sense of moral self-righteousness, which in turn influences how 
employees perceive/esteem their own moral identity 
The first finding within this proposition is that employees all of whom have strong 
moral identity scores see ethics as part of SOP. It is interesting to observe that this 
finding may manifest gradually after the passage of a certain period of time when 
people become gradually used to passively following all the rules and when 
compliance becomes internalised and not just a contextual demand. In this case a 
process or longitudinal study could yield more in depth and detailed data on this 
phenomenon. This finding is particularly crucial in that it offers the foundation upon 
which subsequent findings of the effect of SOPs on employee moral identity scores 
are based. Table 6.2 below presents evidence of how employees take ethics as a 
part of standard operating procedures.  
Table 6.2: Seeing Ethics as part of SOP 
Participant Quote 
A1f 
 
“For example, let me come down to my level, you go to hospital, 
and you tell a doctor that you shall sponsor him for a particular 
program and that he would prescribe your drugs more, what should 
he or she do? The answer of course is NO (based on the SOP). 
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You would tell him, of course it isn’t the proper thing to do, 
sponsoring the doctor would imply that you are influencing him and 
inducing him to prescribe your drugs which is not what we do, we 
are a company that stands for quality as in what you offer should 
sell for you and not trying to induce anybody.” 
A1d “…And everything is based strictly on compliance and you don't do 
things because you want to do it. You might be doing it and 
somehow to the applause of every other human it is okay and will 
evaluate it by looking at the laid down rules in terms of compliance, 
were the rules followed? So you might more than be penalised. 
You may be saying that okay you've done so well but did you get 
the approval before you went ahead so that's the issue... But in the 
case of the multinational like ours even if you get the job done the 
question we ask is did you follow the procedure?... Some of us in 
terms of looking at Firm A1 as a company we like to impose strictly 
by the rules and follow the laid down rules set by the mother 
company in America.” 
“…So policies and procedures put in place help us to be morally 
alert and sensitive to the environment and the people concerned 
that is the end users…” 
A2d “…I like the rules, they offer me protection, a covering so I know I 
will not get into trouble…” 
A1a “…Now, if you are talking to a government official, there are set 
guidelines. For a smart employee what you would do would be to 
come back to the office before meeting the person and have a 
scenario painting and say okay this is the best case, this is the 
worst case then you go, if you need any approval, you go with the 
worst case approved...” 
A1e “…Even if you want to get the job done you have to follow strictly 
written rules in getting it done. You need to perform based only on 
set rules…We have policies in place that guide some of the 
decision-making that has to do with the fleet management…Even if 
issues happen and policies don't cover it, you might have to seek 
your supervisor's consent.  Once it is granted your fine…” 
Source: Fieldwork  
 
From the evidence above, what comes across very readily is the emphasis of each 
participant on how things ought to be done by following the rules and a sense of 
compliance that comes with each response. Compliance to the set rules means 
everything ‘proper response’ to ethical issues on site according to participant A1f 
means responding how they have been told to respond at SOP training. There has 
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been no evidence of moral inquiry on why these rules are important in all cases, or 
cases when they may be questioned. Likewise ‘doing things well’ according to 
participant A1f means strictly adhering to set rules, without which results could be 
considered null. In abiding by these rules comes a sense of security and 
righteousness in the responses of the employees, a confidence that suggests that 
once the rules are followed, everything else, including morality falls into place. As 
such, employees tend to see compliance to SOPs as synonymous to displaying a 
strong moral identity, since the rules are the ultimate guidelines and following them is 
meant to always guarantee moral outcomes. 
Following from this, it is also discovered that as employees comply with the rules of 
the bureaucracy in their daily duties, it confers on them a sense of moral self-
righteousness as shown in table 6.3 below:  
 
Table 6.3: Perception of employees’ to SOPs in relation to personal moral 
values  
Participant Quote 
A1b 
 
“…Yes, there are challenges with the Nigerian markets and there 
are things most of your clients would expect you to do to you 
know gets the business rolling… We have rules. You cannot 
bribe… You cannot induce a client to get business with anything 
whatsoever be it cash or kind. You can’t do that so when you 
understand these rules which in many cases for me aligned with 
my personal values. That is not something I want to do even if the 
organisation allows me to do so. So whatever kind of business 
advantage we are trying to get or gain is secondary to your 
personal values. I would rather lose the business advantage than 
go against what the company set for me...”  
A1d “…Everything we do as a company also affect you as an 
individual because of either having a cordial relationship with my 
customers, it also affects... I as a person, I also value them. 
They're very key to us apart from any other thing...” 
A1f  “The core value of the organisation that breeds the kind of culture 
that we have that I appreciate is also impacting on the as an 
individual positively because if in an environment whereby you 
cannot steal, then it is going to help you stand firm that this is an 
environment and I love it. So you live for that every day, it is 
incorporated into you that these are the norms that's why I said 
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that I like what we have here.” 
 “…We have core values that guide our culture. Okay one of our 
core values as customer services, integrity and performance. All 
these links make the culture the relation so strong because 
everyone is striving for excellence, because you have to do your 
best, you don't want anyone to see that you are the one making 
the progress to be slow or to have a flaw…”. 
A1c “…For us, integrity is very important [you hold that too as an 
individual?] I do too…that's why for me I can work in Firm A1. The 
company itself, the policy somehow dovetails into what I 
personally hold as what ought to be done. Where I may get a bit 
concerned is when I feel, oh this is too much, you can’t do this. It 
is not... Sometimes some issues are not because it is a 
compliance issue…” 
Source: Fieldwork 
 
From the evidence above, following the rules appeals to a good subjective sense of 
moral identity strength in all the employees/managers of this sub-sample, even 
though in some instance as in the response of participant A1b, moral inquiry was 
either missing or naïve when analysing the speech and thought patterns of the 
person via the interview material. For example to illustrate, participant A1b talks of 
the important ethical norms around the rules not allowing bribes and inducements, 
which he claimed he also believes in. Participant A1f on another hand also explained 
how the rules and values of the bureaucracy would not allow employees to steal; 
whilst some others explain how they believe the rule-based system helps keep their 
integrity intact. Hence, the rules seem to appeal to desires of the employees to for 
instance be seen as loyal, honest, upright etc that wins their trust that the rules 
surely enhance ‘shared’ moral values between them and the bureaucracy. They 
therefore exude a sense of knowledge of the rules, and the system in such ways that 
they believe it’s a perfect moral setting for them. The result of this is that employees 
completely buy into the values of the firm, as seen in their claims that the rules and 
values of the bureaucracy ‘impacts them positively’ and that it ‘strengthens their own 
personal value system’. 
 
Subsequently, lines between values of ethical nature on one hand and rules of the 
bureaucracy on the other hand become blurred, hence the claims that 
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personal/shared normative values are in alignment with what bureaucracy values in 
terms of its standard operating procedures. As one of them explained, (s)he would 
rather not get a business deal than go against what the company has set for them. 
Such is the trust employees have in the rules and values of the system that they 
believe it perfectly aligns with theirs. It therefore follows that individuality is potentially 
lost or misplaced within the broader ethic of the bureaucracy. Yet it is at this point 
where employees believe the rule-based bureaucratic system aligns with their own 
moral values that their sense of moral competence originates. With this sense of 
moral competence, they believe they know their left from right and are able to make 
informed ethical decisions based on the belief that the rules of the company 
buttresses their personally held moral beliefs. This feeling as seen in each 
participant’s response drives a sense of strong moral identity and this shows a first 
direct link between following the rules and the sense of strong moral identity 
employees claim to possess. However, CMR results show each participant reasons 
at different CMR levels, which explains the degree of sophistication across the 
participants’ moral self and context of ethical awareness.  
 
6.4.2 Finding 2: Managerial sanction trumps SOPs  
Within this case group, managers are expected to be enforcers of the SOPs. The 
system expects managers to echo the SOPs and ensure they are followed to the 
letter. However, it was discovered that there is a possibility for managerial sanction 
to trump SOPs and that the approval of certain activities by managers could validate 
those actions as being ‘right’ regardless of what the SOPs say.  For instance, a 
participant who is a senior medical representative in one of the American firms 
identified an obvious gap in the rule system of his firm as shown below: 
“One issue is in Nigeria, what we term a gift.  It does not align with 
SOP. Standard procedures see that it should not be an extravagant 
gift. They just kept it like that. They don't put a price tag to it…So 
extravagance is very very ambiguous. So what is extravagant to one it 
may not be extravagant to another… They have it like it should not be 
extravagant and all this fanciful terms…” (A2d) 
 
 “…But we will still sponsor doctors to education conferences even 
though we make them sign. The truth is we make them sign, everyone 
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makes them sign that it's not only give an undue advantage but it's an 
unwritten... After we have taken you to Barcelona, put you in a four-
star hotel for one week why will you come back to Nigeria and see 
medication for my drugs and write and other drug?  That African thing 
just to say thank you, human sentiment.” (A2d) 
 
The participant above indicated that there are ambiguities in the SOPs regarding 
gifts and what is permissible. But it is also implied that as long as certain gifts are 
approved by top managers as implied in the second quote, they become okay even 
though such acts may confer undue advantage which is a clear violation of SOP. In 
another instance, the same employee made reference to another incident as earlier 
mentioned (see page 136 above). Again on this occasion, the participant’s manager 
waived what seemed to be an obvious violation of set rules. SOPs gives a 
presumption of moral righteousness, because as the organisation claims to forbid 
certain acts and actions, in reality, there is an underlying mechanism in which 
management could say yes if it suits an objective of the bureaucracy, for instance, 
meeting target sales figures. The possibility of managerial sanction to trump SOPs 
able to create a sense of being morally upright in employees was further highlighted 
in another incident as follows:   
“...before you do something, always confirm with your boss…Like I 
had a situation on Friday, I was talking with my boss. There was a 
consultant haematologist; he is the chairman of the Nigerian HIV/AIDS 
task force, quite big. We sell ARVs and we are trying to get into the 
market. We have some generic competition so I was talking to my 
boss about it and he was telling me that we should come and make a 
presentation somewhere and talk to him. I asked my boss, what's in it 
for this man?...Before we go any further…” (Participant A2d) 
From the above incident, the question being asked by the participant of his boss 
about the person in question indicates that managers can decide what will be 
deemed correct in that situation, even if it violates SOPs as earlier shown but as long 
as it furthers the objective of the bureaucracy. On another note is the behaviour of 
the participant who clearly shows that following the sanction of managers is critical to 
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surviving in this bureaucracy. The deference to the boss for how to act in such a 
situation is typical within this bureaucracy and further demonstrates how employees 
could also gain their sense of strong moral identity by doing what the bosses say, 
which becomes the right thing in that instance.  
From the following findings, it seems clear that indeed following the rules of the 
bureaucracy as well as the sanction of managers confers a sense of strong moral 
identity in employees. In some cases, the enhanced moral self-esteem of employees 
was really good and thoughtful and in some cases naïve and morally dubious. The 
CMD levels of these participants may help distinguish whether the enhancements in 
MI level increased moral awareness or completely shuts it down. Overall, these 
findings confirm proposition 1 to be correct. 
6.5 Proposition 2 
Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards 
conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
I test this proposition by attempting to show that what SOPs and managerial control 
require of managers is consistent with conventional level thinking. It can be said that 
this proposition is partly true and partly false. It is partly true in that bureaucracies 
deliberately appoint conventional level thinkers into managerial positions within the 
firm. However, responses to ethical issues faced by the participants suggest that 
individual CMD levels may have a stronger influence, contrary to what this 
proposition suggested. The proposition suggested that the bureaucracy drives 
conventional level reasoning observed in middle managers however, individual 
reasoning abilities had a stronger influence than the bureaucracy. Evidence and 
findings are presented below: 
6.5.1 Finding 3: Bureaucracies seem to prefer individuals with conventional 
level moral reasoning in managerial roles  
It was found that bureaucracies tend to deliberately appoint and prefer conventional 
level thinkers into managerial positions. Table 6.5 below show quotes from 
managers in both American firms to this effect with some explaining how this is 
achieved from the recruitment stage to expectation whilst on the job as follows: 
Table 6.5: Conventional level thinking in Managers 
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Participant Quote 
A2c 
Marketing 
Manager 
“…So, ultimately we make sure first and foremost that we have 
people were really wanna take ownership of the business. We're 
very centred about the result...” 
“…So what I mean is that it begins with the interviewing process, 
where you're bringing in someone into the organisation you have 
to look for that from the beginning Firm A2 is not a single entity 
we make Firm A2. Every single staff is eminently wherever you 
are you representing the organisation so right from the interview 
that's what we look for. We want to know exactly what you're 
VABs. Values Attitudes Beliefs. We make sure that is an 
alignment between what you stand for and what the company 
believes in. If there is something about alignment, You are most 
likely going to be a perfect candidate, It starts that way. When on 
the job of course there’s series of trainings making you 
understand what is obtainable so there are no assumptions of 
course…” 
A1a 
Senior 
Manager 
“Quality, customer focus, community focus, integrity, respect for 
people, they are there on our website. And personally there are a 
number of them I also see reason for one individual to adopt - 
collaboration. I like collaboration and I know that I like 
collaboration. How I know I like collaboration is first of all, the 
coordination, I could see and even when I am playing games, I 
can be a good midfielder, and midfielder if you don’t collaborate, if 
you don’t pass those balls, if you don’t recognise who to give at 
any given time, you just be messing up the game. You will just be 
holding the game to yourself and everybody will be suffering so I 
play that midfield very well and sometimes guard. If I play football, 
midfield, if I play basketball, I play guard so the whole thing is that 
I respect that whole collaboration and why wouldn’t you 
collaborate since the work is too big for one person.” 
A1d 
Logistics 
Officer 
“Actually that XYZ case although (long silence) we have been 
advised not to say much about that because anything like that this 
channel to the legal department but we are aware that it has been 
settled. It was some it was a case about some years back about 
an outbreak. The drugs were administered but for me I just see it 
all as political blame you understand, because Firm A1 doesn't 
cut corners…but the good thing is that a case has been settled. 
We're really not told and I don't really want to say much but rather 
to be channelled to the legal department…But the beauty is that 
the case has been settled and we have been told not to say much 
but rather but to be channelled to the legal department.” 
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A1g 
Senior Medical 
Representative 
“…Like these are online trainings, they give us Case studies of 
situations and ask what we will do, we will give them the answer 
and they tell us either yes or no this is what you should do in such 
situations and then if you have such situations you report them so 
basically it is like trials, they tell you what to do more situations 
more often than not they are telling you this is how you shall 
handle this,…For example, let me come down to my level, you go 
to hospital, that you shall sponsor him for a particular program 
and that he would write your drugs more and then the person and 
as to wish on what should he or she do? The answer of course is 
NO…” 
Source: Fieldwork 
The above quote suggests the American firms are careful in selecting people who 
share the values attitudes and beliefs of the firm. This would ensure there is some 
measure of alignment between such individual’s values and those of the firm. The 
result would be that such employees would readily conform to the norms of the 
bureaucracy. And as participant A2c further explained, such persons will be able to 
take ownership of the business. These criteria clearly suggest that bureaucracies 
carefully select and prefer persons who are conventional level thinkers into position. 
That is, employees who show the most prospect of conformity to the demands of the 
bureaucracy. And when on the job, series of trainings further help mould such 
employees into the employees the bureaucracy wants them to be. This conformity to 
its tenets is what the bureaucracy tends to encourage and reward.  
 
6.5.2 Finding 4: Employee’s responses to ethical issues varied according to 
their individual CMD levels 
Firms A1 and A2 have both been involved in series of scandals in their several years 
of existence within the context. Hence as part of the interview process, the 
researcher probed the opinion of employees on one of such scandals involving their 
firm. Of the three managerial role holders that refer to this scandal during the 
interviews, two were conventional versus only one post-conventional level reasoner. 
It was discovered that the conventional level managers did not show signs of moral 
inquiry in their perception of the scandal in question. They rather approached the 
issue based on how the firm instructed employees to approach it in a show of 
conformity. The post-conventional level thinker however showed some signs of 
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moral inquiry by indicating where the firm went wrong and was able to indicate the 
goal of the firm as profit driven in spite of claims by the firm’s headquarters that that 
was not the case. The responses of the three participants are presented in table 6.5 
below: 
Table 6.5 Sample of Participants’ responses to their firm’s scandal 
Source: Fieldwork 
On one hand, it has been established that the bureaucracies demand compliance 
from employees. As shown from the sample quotes above, the response of 
participants A1g reasoning at the Kohlberg’s conventional stages 3, showed a strong 
inclination towards complying with how the firm want issues addressed. Participant 
A1g also responded in a way that showed some allegiance to the firm in a somewhat 
clever defence of the firm. But more importantly is that the responses of participant 
A1g to this issue indicates strong signs of conventional level thinking (conformity) 
and that this CMD level dictated how they responded to the query. In other words, 
the bureaucracy was less of the driver of the employees’ responses to the question 
asked.  
Participant Quote 
A1g 
Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
“…honestly speaking, I know, I can't say I have the full 
details of what really happened of course because I work in 
the company, they claim to have gotten the required 
information that was needed but apparently someone who 
wanted something just decided to... Because they were not 
offering, they decided to rise against them and made it look 
like they didn't get the required permissions. Probably 
because I have had the story from Firm A1’s end I feel that 
the Nigeria factor came to play… Let me say the company 
had to pay some money apparently…” 
A1c 
Post 
Conventional 
level, Stage 6 
 
“…It was like more of an improperly managed arrangement 
err, some people saw it (the situation) as an opportunity to 
make money and apparently falsified things because 
apparently Firm A1 too didn’t, may be people who handled it 
did not cover their tracks too early, they didn’t go through 
certain things, they didn’t document things well because you 
want to give people something...because ooh you saw a loop 
hole to make money and so make people who were not 
involved also come to lay claim...” 
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This becomes clearer with the response of participant A1c, a post conventional level 
thinker whose response shows some measure of moral inquiry. His approach 
showed he did not see the issue through only the lens of the narrative provided by 
the SOP or managerial dictates but through the lens of other moral principles. For 
instance, he was able to state his firm did not manage the situation well, a position 
not many other employees declared. He also was bold to declare that the intention of 
his firm was to exploit a situation to make money, a position his firm denies. 
Subsequently, he adopted a diplomatic approach that seemed not to directly 
apportion blame but also highlighted his firm’s wrong doing. Although his diplomatic 
approach to answering the question can be understood given his interview took 
place in an open area inside the firm in question, his response did however reveal 
the weaker influence of the dictates on the bureaucracy on his responses and a 
stronger role of his individual CMD capacity was more pronounced. The different 
responses obtained from these participants based on their CMD level suggests the 
role individual factors could play within the bureaucratic context as different from the 
suggestion in this proposition that the bureaucracy drives conformity. 
6.5.3 Finding 5: Post-conventional level thinkers seem to be less directly 
influenced in their moral reasoning / behaviour patterns by a bureaucratic 
context.  
As established throughout this chapter, bureaucracies expect certain behaviours 
from employees and as the case may be, employees show different reactions to 
these demands. It was discovered in this case group, that post conventional level 
thinkers seem to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by a 
bureaucratic context. Therefore post-conventional level thinkers showed strong signs 
of moral autonomy on their job and effectively create different strategies to survive in 
the bureaucracy. This could be a self-chosen ‘moral defence mechanism’ (see table 
6.6. below).   
Evidence was drawn from the interview data of participant A2b, one of the two post-
conventional level thinkers in this case group. She made no reference to SOPs in 
her explaining how she handles ethical issues on her job. Rather, her moral point of 
reference was in a higher conscience rooted in her religious belief in God. 
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Table 6.6: Participants A2b’s moral point of reference in reacting to moral 
issues at work 
Participant CMD level/ 
MI 
Quote 
A2b 
Senior Medical 
Representative 
Post-
Conventional 
level, Stage 6 
Strong Moral 
Identity 
“...Because you yourself you know that okay for 
example, the most common one is when the 
doctors want to be bribed to prescribe your 
drugs, first of all my conscience is there to judge 
me, I wont be at rest and secondly, the doctors 
too, they are not your friends.” 
“God first and is centre for everything, then your 
relationship with people, being trustworthy like 
being reliable, owning up to what you can do 
and what you can't do you say it there.” 
Source: Fieldwork 
Furthermore, in her detailed account of handling difficult ethical situations on the field, 
it was also discovered that this participant relies on strategies to survive in the 
bureaucracy. The scenario in question was one in which a key entity in a major 
hospital was constantly seeking bribes from them. This person is highly placed and 
the hospital in question was also crucial to a bulk of their financial target. The table 
below shows three key strategies employed by this post conventional level thinker in 
handling the issue:  
Table 6.7: Coping mechanisms employed by Participant A2b 
Strategy Quote 
Focus “So for me, meeting my target all I do is that I have quantities, 
how many doctors can give me this prescription, how many 
pharmacies and I work around even if I don't meet it, I fall 
within 80% or 90% of the figures.” 
“Well, it was just discernment and intuition, what was just 
coming up and I use it to act and I was calm and I was just 
confident. I didn’t want to play like he was doing me a favour, I 
still will always talk about this patient the drug and all of that.” 
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Avoidance “…The person is sold out because of the quality and not just 
because you’re bribing so what I try to do is that I avoid them 
because I know that me, my own strategy is that, it's not all 
doctors that must prescribe my product…” 
Diplomacy “I'll make sure that I greet him well. Sometimes I may even 
‘blackmail’ him that he has forgotten about our product. I just 
try to balance it and when I am doing meetings, I let him know 
if there are refreshments.” 
Source: Fieldwork 
With the focus strategy, this participant understood how to meet her targets by 
focusing on what worked for him/her on the field and by keeping her conversations 
solely on the benefits of the drugs being marketed. Besides focus, this participant 
explained that she would often deliberately avoid any doctors that are known to be 
corrupt by understanding that not all doctors must prescribe her products. Finally, 
this employee explained (s)he employs high measures of diplomacy in their dealings 
with doctors. Diplomacy as she uses it capitalises on a cultural principle of mutual 
respect such that when one is properly greeted as though highly esteemed, the 
tendencies to want to ruin such honour with frivolities is reduced. These three 
strategies are the coping mechanisms employed by participant A2b, a post 
conventional level thinker based on other ethical principles outside of SOP which she 
made no mention of in her discussions. In summary therefore, it can be said that 
individual reasoning abilities had a stronger influence than the bureaucracy.  
6.6 Proposition 3 
Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice 
and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong 
and weak moral identity 
 
The key indicator from the data to test this proposition is to observe whether there 
are any differences in the definition and roles of a pharmacist according to the 
Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in 
Nigeria and how this bureaucracy defines a pharmacist and their role. The 
characterisation of a pharmacist by the professional body to which all pharmacists 
are expected to swear an oath is the broad professional identity meant to govern the 
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activities of pharmacists anywhere in the context. Evidence from the literature 
(Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible that the broader professional identity could 
be lost within the agenda of bureaucracies such as profit maximisation or 
managerialism. In such an instance, the view of a pharmacist projected by the 
bureaucracy and embraced by participants, as compliance to SOPs would require a 
narrower professional identity. However since all employees in this case group all 
have strong moral identities, only one part of this proposition’s focus will be tested. 
This is investigated by observing whether participants in this case group describe 
their jobs as more in line with the stipulations of their governing body or with that of 
the bureaucracy.  
 
6.6.1 Finding 6: Bureaucracies narrowly define employees’ professional 
identities to demonstrate organisational rather than professional loyalty and 
integrity.  
As the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria, states in their code of ethics, “The code of 
Ethics which has been designed by PCN is a means of assisting Pharmacists to 
discharge their moral and professional obligations resting upon them to observe 
standards of conduct appropriate to their callings.” (PCN, 2015) The emphasis is first 
on moral obligations yet; bureaucracies tend to distract registered pharmacists away 
from this overarching objective. Table 6.8 below presents some of the descriptions 
participants, who are pharmacists, gave about their jobs to prove this:  
Table 6.8: How participants describe their jobs 
Participant Quote 
A2a 
Sales 
Manager 
“Basically I promote the company's product, I detail doctors, health 
care providers generally and I also engage in marketing activities, I 
do roundtable meetings and also do clinical presentations” 
“I think most part of my life has been sales and sales so I have 
come to enjoy sales and marketing which I think I will like to grow 
along that line so it's something that keeps driving me I actually 
want to see myself on top of the sales chart 1 day been like maybe 
the country manager or the managing director and all that so it's 
something that is driving me” 
A1c 
Marketing 
Manager 
“And remember that I am a marketing person, there is money 
involved in taking the product from one point to the other, there is 
money involved in taking the message of the product from one 
place to another so if those people are not doing their work, there 
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will be problem.” 
“…as a marketing colleague, you develop the message, the 
material, the programs that this person will use to pass on the 
message and generate prescription. So you develop strategy, you 
develop the tactic, you monitor the businesses day to day and you 
are responsible for certain products not for every product. I want to 
know who are the customers we need to meet, where do we find 
them, what do we tell them. How do we support them, how should I 
bring the message to them...” 
A1b 
Sales 
Manager 
“As a sales manager, it’s clear, your work is basically to manage 
direct reports, in other words you want to engage talents and by so 
doing. I have 8 direct reports and ermm I am expected to coach 
them and ermm based on the Firm A1 selling model [okay]. What 
exactly are their deliverables or objectives on a daily basis? You 
want to ensure that each of them is on track in their personal 
objectives which of course is in line with the organisational 
objectives.” 
Source: Fieldwork 
From the respondents’ understanding of their job role(s), their emphasis is on 
‘promotion’, ‘marketing’ and ‘sales’ rather than a commitment to a more clearly 
professional universal ethical value, such as saving lives for instance. This finding 
was found even though the subjects here  are trained pharmacists. The above 
quotes also show elements of loyalty to the bureaucracy and its tenets, which can be 
argued is distracting from the broader identity of pharmacists. Also implicit in the 
descriptions above is a performance-oriented culture, which typifies these 
bureaucracies. It is seen as part of the expectation of any employee based on the 
rules and managerial duty within the bureaucracy. A sales manager said: 
“…I am going to put it more like expectations. This is what is 
expected of me and by so doing weekly basis; I have days when I am 
on the field working with my colleagues…I’m on the field with my 
direct reports ensuring they are delivering what is expected of 
them…And then also of course, the overall objectives is to ensure 
that everyone delivers on their numbers. It is a sales organisation 
whatever you are doing; your total overall picture is to impact results. 
That also you want to ensure so these are very straightforward 
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expectations. Nothing ambiguous or complex about that.” (Participant 
A2c) 
As such with employees seeing their firms as sales companies with clear sales 
targets given to every employee, managers are meant to ensure these targets are 
met. By this employees understand that the measure of their competence as 
pharmacists is by their figures as agreed and stipulated by the rules and demands of 
the bureaucracy. Consequently, the notion of success within these firms is tied to 
narrow job performance objective and the role in the context of the employer. This is 
much narrower to and potentially also in conflict with the broader notion of ethics and 
integrity for the profession of healthcare/ pharmacist; for instance relevant to this 
latter notion is the oath professional pharmacists are made to pledge to upon 
induction in the profession and  their accreditation by the major professional body.  
 
Accordingly with the data patterns in this case, rewards are attached to being the 
kind of pharmacist that is appropriately “loyal” to the employer organisation according 
to the job performance objectives that is a sales persons bringing in profit as this 
senior manager explained: 
 “…Well basically a lot of things have been rewarded. Like I 
mentioned there are sales calls that we need to make so these are 
like activities and there are rewards for activities. We have a target 
for number of clinical meetings that you should do, were you able to 
do them, in what centres did you do these meetings, there is a 
particular number of doctors and pharmacists you shall see every 
day so did you see these doctors? Then also, like the bulk of the 
reward is actually from the target - What percentage of your target or 
you would to meet? Which enables you to win an incentive.” 
(Participant A1a) 
Yet another observation from this case group is the fact that patients are treated as 
‘customers’ and not ‘patients’. The notion of a customer is synonymous to that of any 
organisation that trades in the exchange of goods and services. Within the 
pharmaceutical industry however, it can be argued that the patient should not be 
treated within the category of a customer, yet as a participant said: 
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 “We hold our customers first on our top chat or top on our list... It's our 
customers we have different customers we have customers like patients. 
External customers the patient is highly esteemed....” (Participant A1d) 
It may also be worthy of mention  that the names given to roles within both American 
firms in this case group would easily place them on a par with any other type of sales 
organisation in any other industry. Ranks and positions such as ‘marketing manager’, 
‘sales manager’ and the likes are the roles in this case group yet trained pharmacists 
occupy these. Furthermore, pharmaceutical representatives are often referred to as 
‘reps’ akin to any other sales organisation with no clear differences except for the 
fact company products in this case are drugs. As such, the role of a pharmacist is 
not encouraged by the job descriptions. Hence, being a pharmacist could be easily 
lost under the job role of a ‘sales director’ in which job specifications are defined 
along this line able to easily alter the disposition and perception of employees 
occupying such roles as the quotes in table 6.8 above showed. 
These kind of effects that narrow the broader professional identity as defined by the 
governing body of pharmacists into a ‘narrower’ identity suitable to the objectives of 
the bureaucracy is the ‘narrow professional identity’ of a sales manager that this 
proposition is putting forward. As a reminder, all employees in this case group 
reported to have strong moral identities based on the self-measure tool of Aquino 
and Reed, (2002). Therefore, it can be said that employees with strong moral identity 
display organisational loyalty by sticking to narrower sets of professional identity 
espoused by their bureaucracy. This sense of narrower professional identity as 
observed in all the evidence above is prevalent in all employees from the senior 
managers to the medical representatives at the bottom of the organisation. 
In summary, it has been established from the data that there is a discrepancy and in 
some cases a clear disconnect between who the American bureaucracies want 
pharmacists to be and who the professional regulatory body for instance requires 
them to be. Hence, employees adopt a partial view of their profession in order to 
satisfy the demands of the bureaucracy.  
6.7 Conclusion 
In summary, both SOPs and managerial control were identified as the dominant 
features of the bureaucracies in this first case group. Whilst the SOPs drive a 
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compliance culture, managerial control exists to enforce this compliance orientation 
through excessive monitoring that often puts a lot power in the hands of the 
managers. As such, employees tend to derive their morality by following all set rules 
and by obeying their managers, with individual moral agency stifled in the process. 
This implies that following the rules within bureaucracies creates a sense of moral 
competence in employees. This sense of competence is one of the crucial 
mechanisms that instil a sense of strong moral identity in them. However, the CMD 
level of individual employees in this case group was flagged as a crucial determinant 
of the real moral capacity in individuals. 
In the second proposition it was discovered that bureaucracy does deliberately select 
conventional level employees to advance its objectives. Conventional level thinkers 
were discovered in line with theory to show little or no moral inquiry in their 
relationship with the set standards of the bureaucracy because they are conformists.  
This was different as expected from theory in the case of a post conventional level 
thinkers in this case group who make moral decisions based on their own universal 
moral belief system. In this case, individual CMD levels were found to be more 
influential than contextual elements of rules and managerial control in the 
behavioural disposition of participants, hence this proposition was partly correct and 
partly false. Finally, based on the prevalent rule system of the bureaucracy in this 
case group, it was discovered that this bureaucracy actually does influence those 
with strong moral identity to adopt a narrow professional identity aligned with 
organisational norms. Bureaucracies were discovered to achieve this by adopting job 
categorisations that enhance their profit orientations, whilst distracting unsuspecting 
employees who are mostly trained pharmacists from the core of their calling.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE GROUP 2: INDIAN PHARMACEUTICALS 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings on two Indian pharmaceuticals, the 
second case group in this study. Unlike the American case group, this case presents 
a different scenario in which both rules and managerial control have an intertwined 
influence that creates a ‘Caste Bureaucracy’. Caste bureaucracy is a culturally 
dominated system that employs both rules and managerial control in a way that 
creates a stratified organisational dynamic and boundary between upper 
management role holders who are predominantly Indian nationals and other role 
holders, predominantly Nigerian nationals. In subsequent sections, I shall be using 
evidence from interview data and secondary sources such as organisations’ 
websites to critically present my findings.  
7.1 Management Control  
“Management is faceless…”(I2d) 
 
Management control and formalised rules wield intertwined influence in this case 
group. This coupling and combined dynamics of both features that is found in this 
case may be due to the history of fraud and lack of trust existing within this 
bureaucracy’s context as discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 5). The 
structure of this bureaucracy is such that there is a narrow span of control, with 
about three direct reports to senior managers. These firms show a preference for 
maintaining a clear boundary between the upper management layer and lower level 
roles.  So, in each of the firms, an Indian director is the overall head overseeing all 
firm operations in Nigeria. He represents the interests of the organisation in Nigeria 
and has been given a great degree of freedom to make decisions but reports to the 
group CEO back in India. The entire senior management team under him are also 
Indian nationals consisting of the superintendent pharmacist, national sales manager 
(NSM) and the regional manager who collectively supervise and monitor all medical 
representatives. Representatives also have been given a direct access to the 
director, who is also involved in the supervision of all lower level employees as well 
as overseeing internal firm processes. Hence, management control within this 
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context manifests in the form of close monitoring of all employees and internal firm 
activities and processes.  
 
The above sociology of this organisation creates both a quite stratified organisational 
dynamic and a boundary between the (more homogeneously Indian) management 
role holders and other employees.  This often involves the physical involvement of 
managers in actively micro-managing the organisational activity.  Accordingly, 
various steps of approvals and decisions as some employees are found, as 
explained below:  
 
'…the way the system is run…the way it is structured there is nothing 
you can do in the system that they don't know about... they monitor 
everything that goes on here, they monitor from the sales right to the 
distribution so there is no how you can come in and say you want to 
play pranks because that is why they place themselves everywhere, 
like in  finance they are charge of the finance, then in charge of the 
stock, they are in charge of most of the things…’ (I1c)  
 
“Most times he (the director) tells you what to do, I work based on 
instructions that’s why I don't have the final say so whatever he says 
even if anyone comes around and needs something I only pass it on 
to my boss so whatever he says is final. So everything that comes up I 
have to follow up on the matter and give feedback...there is no 
freedom” (I1a) 
  
From these quotes, it seems evident that the internal system is highly regimented 
and monitored such that the senior management are actively monitoring and 
controlling every process. Managerial approvals for every stage of all internal 
processes are strictly required, for instance stock acquisition and payment processes 
without which orders are stalled. This is a more closely personally monitored method 
employed in this bureaucracy to ensure the firms’ internal business processes alone 
are duly followed by the employees (Indian version of Western Bureaucracy). This 
was also evident in the second quote, which appears to suggest that employees 
have little or no decision-making autonomy within the firm. Participant I1a above is a 
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manager whose duties are more office-based. She claims to work only based on 
instructions, which are to be executed without questioning. From her narrative, the 
understanding is that the director and his senior management team are constantly in 
charge and that in their absence, all processes are delayed. They make all decisions 
within the firm. 
 
The managerial control system also dictates the kind of rules and policies in place 
within the bureaucracy, as it appears appropriate. For instance, the most significant 
mechanism employed by the Indian firms to maintain control of the context over 
people’s personal and group action is by ensuring mainly their nationals occupy all 
core strategic decision making positions at the top management as these 
participants explained: 
 
'Yes very close system, that is why the national sales manager has 
always been an Indian man because the time they tried to bring in a 
black man, the man was really confronting them telling them what to 
do and they felt… it can't allow them to succeed… One thing I notice 
is that ... they don't always give room for we the representatives, like 
now I expect to be a manager by now by all rankings... I don't see the 
reason why a national sales manager can't be a Nigerian, so that is 
the thing that I see about the company” (I1c) 
 
“Well, they (Indian managers) want it (not having Nigerians in senior 
management) like that… I think I know for Indians whilst I was in XYZ 
as well I got to a stage where I should have been the next person that 
should have gone for things like regional manager but they still kept us 
as area manager.” (I2a) 
 
“What I think is that they just don't want to put Nigerians in those key 
positions for reasons... it beats me as well... I have asked myself why 
and it was actually something I fought a lot over in Firm I1. I worked in 
there for like 9 years, they made me area manager when I was seven 
years there and I was like in other companies you work two years 
three years you do well you become a manager somehow, before you 
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know it you’re a general manager in a region before 6-7 years … but 
Indian companies run by Indians they would rather call someone from 
there (India) to sit in the position you are supposed to be sitting so 
they would either be paying somebody else.” (I1d) 
 
These quotes show that the rules set cynically serve one group only of 
organisational members, which creates an experience of separation and injustice (by 
the lack of equal chances for people to rise in managerial careers). Hence, there 
may be a non-explicit norm whereby Nigerians may not easily rise to senior positions 
within the bureaucracy. Medical representatives who have been working in the firm 
for an excess of seven years have only been promoted once to senior medical 
representative roles, whereas, equivalent experience within the industry commands 
higher roles. This reflects a broader issue of in-group of managers based on the 
culture of Indians that generally affects how appointments into senior positions are 
made. As Reed Elsevier, (2008) reported in their cultural navigator, usually, Indian 
firms tend to hire based on caste and other social profiling attributes, which limits the 
kind of people allowed in certain top management positions. In the past, when a 
Nigerian was hired into senior management, he was eventually sacked for been 
vocal and challenging lots of internal processes. Some participants in their interviews 
explained that the Indian managers do not like confrontations of any kind and also 
actively discourage any form of collaboration among employees as explained below: 
 
“…They (Indians) don't like confrontations. Like now if we are to have 
a meeting with the board (consisting of top management in Nigeria 
and shareholder representatives from India)...we expect that the talks 
would be in groups, so what they usually do is that they talk to us 
individually so that we won’t be able to confront them so they always 
try to limit us from coming together, they find it a threat to them so they 
always try to curtail it. They think by doing that (allowing collaboration 
among employees) we might go against them, which they don’t like…” 
(I1c) 
 
'... Each time they (representatives from the Headquarters in India) 
come around that is, once a year, they tend to like shield us from 
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some questions that you want to ask them about the system, it's like 
telling you what to tell them so if you like want to talk about the 
system… they will not want you to pronounce what is really going on, 
that's one thing that is really going on…' (I1d) 
 
All employees meet with the board of the organisation, comprising the senior 
management team in Nigeria and representatives from the firm’s headquarters in 
India annually. Employees believe such a board meeting is the best place to 
collectively express their concerns in the presence of the more senior members of 
the organisations from India with a view to enforcing some change to the system. 
However, they are often not allowed by the senior management to speak as a group 
to disallow collective protests as the employees above implied. These reflect the 
Indian management style Reed Elsevier, (2008) referred to as ‘autocratic’ and 
‘authoritarian’ in which Indian managers like to maintain a centralised power 
structure and exert their influence on subordinates. They do not expect to be 
questioned about any decisions made (Reed Elsevier, 2008). However, the motive 
for this kind of control as most participants opined is driven by profit maximisation as 
these employees explained: 
 
“...I think it is more driven by let us maximise profit and the fact that 
they are not confident... that if you give this representative any product 
or money he's going to use it for the agreed purpose. They are not 
that confident, because they don’t follow you everywhere...” (I1e) 
 
“That is one thing about organisations particularly let me say the Asian 
guys. Most of these Indians, you know, they are so much concerned 
about what they will take and will fly back to their country. (I2d) 
 
Another result of all the above is an environment where there seems to be no 
genuine social-professional relationship between the managers and their employees. 
Such relationships require a clear respect of professional expertise and the 
empowerment of the professionals rather than the opposites, what is currently the 
case. As a lot of employees describe their relationship with the organisation even 
after more than five years of service, they believe it is a purely instrumental 
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relationship, one that functions on a sort of ‘give and take’ system that does not 
require respect, friendship or trust, as explained by these employees:  
 
“No it is not (cordiality of relationship with management) …There is no 
relationship, relationship is just on the business... they just want it as 
business so you have the feeling they don’t like Nigerians; they just 
want to take something and go. I believe relationship should exceed 
that sometimes…' (I2b) 
 
'I think it basically boils down to the relationship with the top managers, 
the relationship is not cordial, the man prefers for you to call him and 
tell him sir, I am off duty today I wont work today and tomorrow so that 
he will be glad to target your accounts that this guy did not work, so 
deduct your salary…’ (I2c) 
 
As implied from the quotes above, the aftermath of the close, personal managerial 
control style adopted in this bureaucracy is a kind of suppressive control in which 
employees are restrained from freely expressing themselves or challenging the 
authority about their grievances such as their remuneration packages, career, fair 
treatment.  More relevant to this dissertation, employees become rationally 
convinced that expressing any ethical concerns or objections, or moral reflections is 
clearly neither wanted, nor it will serve them any good as depicted in the quote of 
participant I1c above (see page 156). What is more apparent hence as noted is that 
this bureaucracy seems to create a stratified and divided organisation in which there 
are free, sovereign despots who are seen to be the managers and representatives of 
the owners on one side versus the ‘not so free’ and fully monitored employees on the 
other. The obvious ethnic division between both groups that fosters an artificial and 
unjust society, largely influences this.  How employees respond to such a system is 
explored later. 
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7.2 Formalised Rules 
'There are no rules as such for this job, just go out and sell' 
  
Formalised rules are the second dominant feature of the bureaucracy within this 
case group. Although it appears that both formalised rules and managerial control 
are two independent features of this bureaucracy, in reality rules prove to be a 
mechanism that helps senior management implement control within the bureaucracy. 
Due to the prior history of fraud in this context, it seems that rules are employed as 
control mechanisms to forestall future occurrences by regulating all internal firm 
activities and how lower level employees can function within the bureaucracy, for 
instance, how they can obtain stocks or process orders. It must be noted however 
that the management themselves are not neutral nor their positions and decisions 
are value-free, since they are mainly Indian nationals wanting to maintain a firm 
control of the organisation. Thus, organisational rules or SOP are the rules put in 
place by the Indian firms to regulate internal activities and processes as they see fit, 
without any evidence whatsoever that there is an effort for value neutrality, justice or 
virtue in how rules are implemented except an evident concern for some additional 
efficiency. As a participant explained: 
 
“We have company imposed rules. The company imposed rules is that 
you go through the distributor when you want to pick stock..., there 
were times when using our names, you just use your name if you want 
to buy bring your money and use your name but thereafter they said 
no, you have to go through a distributor, get a distributor and make 
sure the distributor is registered with them, ... so this is one of the 
rules”. (I1d) 
 
“...You must bring your money to buy whereas other companies will 
give cash, credit facilities to the sales representatives and say after 
may be a certain period say 30 days, turn over this thing, return back 
the money, turn it over, it gives you room to operate...” (I2d) 
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Following from the above quotes, table 7.1 below shows a list of some of the rules 
within the bureaucracy: 
 
Table 7.1: A list of major Internal rules within the bureaucracy 
Rules Type  
Every order must be cash and carry sales, i.e. all 
employees must bring in their cash to process orders 
Sales policy  
Stocks cannot be obtained in the absence of any of the 
senior management members 
Sales Policy 
Orders must be ratified by the director before they are 
processed 
Sales Policy 
Only the director can approve monetary transactions.  Monetary Policy 
Employees are required to meet set sales targets on a 
monthly basis 
Monetary policy  
Car loans are to be deducted from employee salary until 
agreed sum has been fully paid. Maximum sum that can 
be borrowed for car purchase is 300,000 Naira. 
Monetary policy 
All monies owed through defaults in meeting up with 
sales targets are to be deducted periodically from 
employee salary until full sums are paid  
Monetary policy 
Source: Field notes & Companies’ Websites 
 
It is interesting to note that the major internal rules as highlighted in the table above 
are more inclined toward economic transactions and gains. It is therefore rather 
surprising that in a post-fraud context, there are no ethical rules within the 
bureaucracy. This highlights a major internal inconsistency and also demonstrates 
that organisational rules within this case group are more instrumental, towards 
economic gains in contrast to the previous American case group where rules were 
seen as the ultimate moral guide. Also, the rules are many yet simple with the ‘cash 
and carry’ rule (No 1 rule in the table above), being the most significant one because 
it seeks to protect the firms’ economic interests. This also has the greatest impact on 
how employees function within the bureaucracy as an employee explained: 
 
 161 
“...if you (sales representative) wants to buy your products you must 
bring your cash, except you're coming from a government hospital that 
is recognised, that they can verified the order... But as a 
representative, if you want to buy it must be cash..., if you don't have 
capital if you don't have someone to borrow you money, if you don't 
have a bank to loan you there is no way, you will lose your job at the 
end of the day…” (I1d) 
 
As seen from above, employees have to service orders with their own money, 
without which such transaction will be forfeited thereby jeopardising the efforts of the 
employee in a highly competitive market. Yet the Indian firms emphasize stringent 
sales target on their employees such that not being able to service orders to achieve 
sales targets will also often result in the loss of their jobs. In fact it was explained by 
one of the participants that a criterion for getting employed within the bureaucracy is 
to check whether potential employees have the cash to do business. This shows that 
rules within this case group are instrumental mainly towards the ends of protecting 
the economic interests of the firm whilst shifting all financial liabilities and risk to 
employees. On the contrary, outside of the firm, in dealing with different stakeholders, 
there are no clear rules guiding employee actions as these employees explained: 
 
“The rules are not complex, very simple. There are no rules as such 
for this job, just go out and sell… I am allowed freedom of judgement 
on my job…we might be in the same place but it depends on how you 
relate to your boss” (I1e) 
 
“Yes they do have some rules [are they clear rules?] (Very hesitantly) 
Will I say they are clear? I just say sometimes they do go against it 
sometimes in a way...” (I1c) 
 
The quotes above show two interesting trends. First, the simplicity of the rules 
referred to by participant I1e implies that all internal rules are algorithmically clear 
and it is expected that all employees memorise and remain aware of these as the 
way to do business within the bureaucracy following this bureaucracy’s convention of 
looking rule-compliant and non questioning (as listed in table 7.1 above). Of course, 
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there is an equally simple logical explanation to justify each rule, which may also 
discourage ethical reflection and conversation. This creates an internal environment 
of very standardised way of working.  But outside of the firm, there are no rules at all 
governing how representatives are to sell. This external context is governed by a 
“laissez faire” approach that anything that can be done to gain business is ok, and 
there is not much support in how to do this.  
 
Secondly, within the firm also, as participant I1c explained, senior management have 
freedom to bypass the rules despite their expecting everyone else to comply with 
them.  So at times it was found that management ‘go against’ set internal rules which 
participant I1e implied to mean that rules are very relative – they are for employees 
but are bypassed by management. Bypassing the rules in the first case brings 
legitimate penalties and sanctions that managers impose which increases their power. 
In the second case of management bypassing the rules there is no consequence as 
it appears that their superiors in India are either not informed or they do not care 
enough. This is often determined by how individuals relate with their direct 
supervisors who can sanction certain actions outside of the set rules. That is, if the 
managers particularly like an employee, rules are applied differently and rather 
unequally. 
 
The implications of the quotes above suggest that employees must manage two 
realities in executing their daily duties. The first reality being that they work for 
companies that have strict rules on how to carry out internal processes: Specifically, 
on how stocks can be obtained and cash policies. But once outside of the firm, where 
most employees who are sales representatives are expected to sell drugs to different 
customers and stakeholders, they face a different reality. One not controlled by any 
firm ethical rules but a personalised subjective and transactional sense as the person 
who applies rules and the freedom provided as to how key professional ethical values 
learnt (via education or earlier career) apply. Regarding this, individual employees 
face different moral dilemmas in engaging with the different stakeholders on the field. 
For instance, the common industry practice of whether to bribe doctors to meet their 
sales targets, or making promises of periodic stipends to doctors who prescribe their 
company products amongst others are such examples. Decisions and actions of 
individuals regarding matters such as this transcend the simple technical component 
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of marketing the science behind the drugs being sold to making moral decisions to 
which such employees may or may not comply with any professional ethical values, 
where available or their personal subjective sense of morality as the participant below 
explained: 
 
“...Your discretion basically...because there are the ethics of the 
profession we don't sell to anyhow people. You must sell to accredited 
distributors... the registered pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria, they 
know them you can Google the name on the website to see your 
distributors if there's anything you can trace them and if it is anything 
they can trace you. That's one of the rules, ethical rules...” (I1d) 
 
“…They have a clear-cut rule as in it is not like you mustn't do it (give 
bribes), you're not supposed to say you do it... not really that it is a 
rule, No, it is not like however you like, there are rules, you must not 
do anything like offer a doctor money or stuff like that … a lot of 
people still do it...” (I2a) 
 
From the two statements above, it is clear that Participant I1d who is a registered 
pharmacist with the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) highlights one of the 
council’s ethical rules of ‘who to sell to’ in detail. However, nothing exists about the 
matter of ‘how to sell’. Most moral and action dilemmas faced by all employees in 
this case group are often on ‘how to sell’ in a competitive market known for its 
various informal forms of incentives employed in making good sales. The Indian 
firms on the other hand as implied by Participant I2a would often state on paper that 
employees are not supposed to give bribes but there is an absence of clear 
enforcement mechanisms of this ‘rule’ since employees can still do what they want to 
do and get away with it. Also, since cash purchase policies already protect the 
economic interests of the firms, it can be argued that the firms do not seem inclined 
to regulate the activities of their employees outside the firms, more so in providing 
moral guidelines for them. Therefore, employees have the latitude to decide how 
they sell on the field and have to rely on their own sense of right-wrong applying 
professional discretion, as they learn and internalise broader professional values via 
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their academic professional education and prior experience as the employees below 
explained: 
 
“I came here to do supply and they told me when coming to buy lunch. 
I got there and I discover she (the lady on duty) has been working 
since morning, she's been the only person, seeing so many crowds, 
she was exhausted, I need to drop money for her. On whose accounts 
is that? If you discover the amount I do that with every month, you will 
be surprised. There was one particular order and I had to drop one 
million naira to get the order. Fine! I would still get back the one million 
in the deal but this is what you have to do to get the big order. I will still 
get it back which we know but I still need to do it.” (I1d) 
 
“…When you tell them (the management) I have to take a doctor to 
lunch, you ordinarily should be telling the doctor what he needs to 
know, some doctors may ask for recharge cards... you can at your 
own discretion be willing to spend your money even though you still 
make money off the products… you know we are all different when it 
has to do with giving. The one who is generous may feel that I still 
make money so I can take care of this but the one who is saying I am 
in Firm I1 just to make money for myself may not want to do that…” 
(I1e) 
 
The actions in the quotes above are examples of scenarios that require the use of 
personal discretion whilst on the field selling drugs. For instance, the decision to buy 
or not buy items for doctors from their personal finance is a very common one. 
Secondly, the decision to part or not to part with huge sums of money to secure huge 
deals, both of which are examples of moral dilemmas employees face on the field. 
For these kinds of decisions, employees have to rely on their personal discretion in 
the absence of clear professional and firm guidelines for making decisions in such 
situations on the field. Here, the personal subjective morality of the employee is 
employed in deciding the best line of action. Hence, decisions made are rationalised 
based on individuals’ subjective interpretation of the situation and desirable outcome.  
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In summary therefore, rules as they exist within this context are employed as tools of 
managerial control. They are used to regulate internal activities of employees and 
processes within the bureaucracy in order to protect its economic rationale. This can 
be easily inferred from internal cash policies put in place requiring reps to have paid 
the company upfront before products are released to them. Outside of the firms 
however, where employees are expected to sell to different stakeholders and where 
they face a lot of moral dilemmas, there are no clear ethical rules guiding their 
actions. Instead, employees are left to their personal discretion of choice between 
professional values where available or a personal subjective sense of morality to 
guide their decisions.  
7.3 The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees’ 
Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities 
As previously established, the morality of employees in this study’s interviewed 
sample is evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral reasoning 
levels and moral identities. The moral identity scores and assigned moral reasoning 
level of each employee are presented in table 7.1 below. 
Table 7.2 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants 
Participa
nt 
CMR Path Moral Identity 
Strength 
I1a Conventional Level (stage 3) 6.53 (strong) 
I1b Conventional Level (stage 4) 2.18 (weak) 
I1c Conventional Level (Stage 4) 6.76 (strong) 
I1d Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.71 (strong) 
I1e Post-conventional Level (stage 6) 4.94 (strong) 
I2a Post-conventional Level (Stage 
5) 
5.53 (strong) 
I2b Conventional Level (stage 4) 4.82 (strong) 
I2c Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.00 (strong) 
I2d Conventional Level (Stage 4) 5.53 (strong) 
Source: Fieldwork  
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The table above shows that all but one of the participants in this case group claim to 
have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure 
employed during this study. Whilst it is interesting that the results show a rather 
skewed distribution of employees towards those with strong moral identities, it must 
be noted that self-reported measures such as the one used in this study are liable to 
participant bias and prone to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; 
Spector, 1994; Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). But generally, the Aquino and Reed, 
(2002) measure is widely documented to have high validity, reliability and significant 
variations in large samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 
2011). On a general note however, the fact that all but one employee claim to have 
strong moral identities could be an indication that the bureaucracy’s intertwined 
complex interaction between the two contextual (bureaucratic) features of rule 
compliance and followership (no matter what rules) can inflate employee moral 
identity. How this is achieved will be further investigated.  
Participants’ cognitive moral reasoning however shows a close to normal distribution 
of moral reasoning levels across the conventional and post conventional levels. It 
must be noted that the CMR levels of these participants were determined using their 
dominant patterns of thinking from interview data and not through an established 
measuring tool; hence it may not be entirely accurate due to researcher’s bias. In the 
sections to follow, the effect of the bureaucracy on the employees’ moral identity and 
CMR levels is explored along the three propositions of this study as follows: 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of 
moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and 
rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and 
values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak 
moral identity 
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7.4 Proposition 1 
Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all 
cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
The proposition simply means that in certain cases and contexts contextual variables 
are so strongly influencing the subjective employee experience that they may well 
create an inflated moral identity general pattern. This is totally true in this case. The 
bureaucracy espoused in this case group is driven by an intertwined influence of 
both organisational rules and personalised managerial control. This proposition 
therefore suggests that employee behaviour in accordance with both organisational 
rules and management control enhances a subjective sense of an inflated (stronger) 
moral identity in both employees and their managers. In this sense having both 
strong and weak moral identity will be affected within the bureaucracy to the extent 
that there may be no differentiating results in employee moral identity insofar as 
everyone is compliant with the rules of a bureaucracy (see also chapter 6). A 
longitudinal study will however be required to further establish this claim. 
On one hand, the strict organisational rules within this bureaucracy are for internal 
processes mainly and seem to protect the interests of the firm as earlier established, 
whilst employees are left to their professional discretion on the field. On the other 
hand, the managerial control style of the firm as also earlier discussed signified an 
environment of total control maintained by a senior management team comprising 
only Indian nationals via internal rules. Thus, within this bureaucracy, it is likely that 
employees with strong moral identities would readily feel some internal pressure to 
unquestionably obey set rules for the sake of acting in accordance with a need for 
social validation that they are “morally good”.  Also obedience to authority is a driver 
of compliance obviously (Milgram, 1963) and this may be in line with African tribal 
culture. Therefore in this case a confused sense of morality is experienced between 
what actually acting ethically is/means i.e. pursuing ethics and integrity as ends in 
themselves, and engaged in authentic moral inquiry versus what behaviours comply 
to the morality of this bureaucracy in order to succeed and be liked. The “morality” of 
this bureaucracy is really about pursuing actions that increase external gains or a 
sense of approval, or being part of the in-group (belonging) in terms of social moral 
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identity recognition. These are further examined using interview data and the key 
findings are presented below:  
7.4.1 Finding 1: Employees are not comfortable but act to follow rules- i.e. 
action driven. There is a lack of any evidence of moral contemplation and 
moral awareness to take full responsibility for actions, rather than pursue 
them because the rules say so. This also involves the employee-management 
relations that seem to be rather transactional. 
First it has been established that in this case group, binding rules exist only for 
internal organisational processes. Outside of this, all employees are expected to use 
their professional discretion. However, it was discovered that all employees are not 
comfortable with organisational rules but act to follow them without any evidence of 
moral contemplation and moral awareness. This reflected in evidence indicating that 
employees do not take full responsibility for their actions within the ethnically divisive, 
stratified system. Reviews of employees who claim to have strong moral identities 
suggest that majority of them resort to finding ways of ‘adapting’ to the system as 
participant I1c explained: 
“Well, like I said the environment isn’t that conducive, I just have to adapt, 
adapt in the sense that whatsoever comes my way, as long as I'm in the 
system I just have to play along with it. I'm not happy but there is nothing 
I can do about it and in Nigeria now the job opportunities are so slim so 
anyone that you have, you just have to get hold of it except you get a 
better one and you leave that's just what I'm doing.” (I1c) 
The quote above suggests that even though employees are not comfortable with the 
rules and control of the bureaucracy, they act to follow them. Adapting and playing 
along with the system is a typical mind-set amongst employees in this bureaucracy, 
which also comes with an absence of any personal moral inquiry as much as it 
results in a rather transactional employee-management relationship. This results in 
different moral responses including for instance cheating the organisations, contrary 
to what might be expected of persons who truly possess strong moral identity in 
theory. Participant I2d, explained as follows: 
“ …Let me just try to come home a bit you know the company, because 
of this welfare problem, people also find a way to cheat the organisation, 
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they create loopholes, avenues to cheat the organisation. Company 
does not take it lightly with anybody, so they believe in men and women 
of high integrity... and to be frank it is far from it, far in the sense that 
what could have actually enhanced that is not even on board so people 
are actually creating an avenue probably to beat the system… they 
make some claims which are actually fictitious …” (I2d) 
Participant I2d in the above quote implied that unethical practices of cheating the 
organisation are justifiable on the grounds of poor welfare, even though, the Indian 
firms expect their employees to act with integrity. However, poor employee welfare, 
which is one of the side effects of this bureaucratic context, conditions employees to 
initiate ways to cheat the organisations in a bid to make up for the unfair treatment. 
One way some employees do this as further explained by participant I2d is by selling 
other companies’ products for a fee: 
“…Some of my colleagues sell other company products… you can't 
question this person because it is the person you have not been 
paying his expenses for months and you expecting them to cooperate 
he can't do magic… I will not, I will not. I will only query in areas where 
I feel that you know they are unfair enough to the company if the 
company is 80% to 90% fair to you… if you cannot get hundred per 
cent from all these guys, if with this poor response of the company 
they still give you 60% 70% or 80% of your target I think they are on 
track. So I put all these into consideration, so for reasons like that I 
don't report such things…”(I2d, strong moral identity) 
It would seem from the above quote that participant I2d who is a manager and 
claims to have a strong moral identity, sanctions the reaction of his subordinates to 
the bureaucracy on common grounds of poor welfare and opportunism to which he is 
also exposed. And this kind of sanctioning also denotes the tendency of employees 
to leverage the poor welfare system as an excuse to do unethical things. These 
indicate that individually held moral traits could be contextually sensitive, especially 
within contexts such as this bureaucracy in which taking a bold immoral stance is 
easily excusable justified with the use of logical arguments. For instance, another 
manager, who also claimed to have a strong moral identity, in a clear case of 
 170 
rationalising his unethical practices explains how he ‘bends’ the rules but does not 
break them as follows: 
“…What you do is... you don't break the rules but you bend it, that's 
one of the things you do as a sales man you have to work smart. You 
don't only work hard but you work smart…there are times when a 
hospital needs order, and the order is just 50,000, you can ask at the 
pharmacy to write another 50,000 because you need it to meet up 
your target and you need the products so you can ask the pharmacist 
to add your own to it which are some of the unethical things that the 
office has forced you to do which ideally shouldn't be.” (I1d, strong 
moral identity) 
The mentality of ‘bending the rules’ or ‘working around them’ is ethically problematic 
as it implies he consistently fails to engage in genuine moral inquiry of what is right 
and good versus what is not right and ethically bad. This can be argued to make 
ethical concerns less and less relevant in the given context. For instance, in the case 
of the participant above, inflating orders to make extra money to meet a target is 
seen as ‘working smart’. The result is that a practice such as above is easily 
rationalised, as much as it is done in a way to ensure internal organisational rules 
and protocols are duly followed. However, as noted earlier “bending the rules” is 
consistently experienced as the practice for management versus non-management 
incumbents that is a second source for the gradual rationalisation and adoption of 
this practice in the organisation.  
Another employee who claimed to have a strong moral identity openly admits to 
taking from monies to be remitted without telling his superiors as follows: 
“...the company at times they haven't paid you for like two months and it's 
the third month I have not been paid, sometimes you just wonder how 
you're going to eat. Goods pass through us to the final consumer… if I 
am remitting money I'll have to use my head, like I don't have money and 
company also wants work done, there is no way that is easy. I don't have 
money to go for work today because I don’t have fuel in my car, 
sometimes I just take money from the money I am meant to remit, I don't 
score my manager for that so I just take it…” (I2b, strong moral identity) 
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“…Every organisation has ways in which they achieve results. We all 
have core values what we believe in or principles, but all in the name of 
you want to achieve your targets you compromise some things. One of 
the things I can actually say is, going through the back door to get some 
things done but naturally it is against my faith but because of my job what 
will I do?”(I2d, strong moral identity) 
Therefore, the reactions from the employees above suggest that the bureaucracy 
does put employees in a difficult state of moral choice and responsibility in which the 
predominant reaction from employees who claim to have strong moral identity is to 
use the shortcomings of the bureaucracy as an excuse to remain conformist and 
avoid ethical behaviours (e.g avoid to display ethical courage or systematic ethical 
inquiry) and engage in and rationalise unethical conduct as necessary rule 
followership. In all of these also, the role of the unregulated, free-for-all industry 
standards in which employees are not bound to any rules per se contributes to the 
ease with which employees may or may not assume moral responsibility for their 
actions on their jobs. Furthermore, it was also discovered that even though 
employees do not willingly follow the bureaucracy, their actions to follow the rules 
had an instrumental drive behind it. These are shown in table 7.3 below: 
Table 7.3: Instrumental reasons for remaining in the bureaucracy 
Coping/rationalisation 
Mechanism 
Quote 
Career Drive  “…but for people like me am not looking at that welfare 
direction why because I really want to achieve one or two 
things with these guys, get the exposure get the experience, 
very vast with the job and can compete with my contemporary 
in the industry… I actually want to develop myself, achieve 
some things…but over the time I'm trying to build the 
experience and get the exposure...”(I2d, strong moral identity, 
sales representative) 
“I am an entrepreneur, I am a businessman, I was a 
businessman before I joined this company, I was working for a 
fashion place, I wasn't hungry so what I am on in this company 
is like someone that is going for an industrial training, am trying 
to learn everything because one am not going to stay in this 
company forever, I just want to learn, I just believe I want to 
learn and I just want to learn that is it…” (I2b, strong moral 
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identity, sales representative) 
Monetary benefits  “…You know the good thing is that thank God you're making 
money so if you want to balance it, if you're the type that you’re 
career conscious not money conscious, Firm I1 is not the best 
place, you look out. But if you're the type that after a while let 
me get the money and set up my own I'll say to good place 
because the Avenue is if you hard-working you will make 
money…” (I1d, strong moral identity) 
“…We have freedom to mark up. So you can make profit from 
there…” (I1b, weak moral identity, sales representative) 
Personal/Socio-
economic reasons 
“…what will I do? I told you I'm a family man… in Nigeria now 
the job opportunities are so slim so anyone that you have, you 
just have to get hold of it except you get a better one” (I1c, 
sales representative) 
“In this present-day Nigeria I would say the economy is 
bad…You and I drive cars and we know how much we 
spend…costs are very expensive for public transport... So we 
keep talking about these things.” (I1A, Admin/HR Manager) 
Source: Fieldwork 
Employees’ provide financial and economic reasons to justify their unwillingness to 
engage in moral inquiry in this case. This is akin to the theoretical prediction of the 
behaviour of persons with weak moral identity as much as it may be a sign of the 
weakening effect that the bureaucracy may have on moral identity across time since 
employees do not exercise moral decision-making to leave the amoral environment. 
Interestingly, the same reasons applied to employees who claimed to have weak and 
strong moral identities excluding one participant (participant I1e) who was the only 
participant exercising moral decision-making in the context and hence showed signs 
of non-conformity and willingness to leave the bureaucracy. The context created by 
the bureaucracy in this case group is one in which moral responsibility is by choice 
and not obligatory. But in this case the underlying drive was to be seen as morally 
good. To this effect employees pursue actions that increase external gains expected 
by the bureaucracy, for instance to meet their financial targets or acting in a way that 
is liked by management to appear both doing what management requires and 
maintaining a moral justification, which may itself serve to justify “how things are 
done around here”. The result is that compliance to rules replaces a sense of 
personal trust, mutual respect and a sense of freedom to think, act and decide, such 
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that employees do not take full moral responsibility for their actions, often citing the 
weaknesses of the bureaucracy as excuse for their actions.  
In summary, it seems clear that the context created by the Indian firms is one that 
does not necessarily encourage or nurture morality and ethical being. Employees on 
their part react to this bureaucracy by showing strong signs of discomfort at its 
dominant mechanisms, which in turn invokes a sense of conformity often tied to 
instrumental ends, such as meeting financial targets, acting in a likeable manner for 
the Indian managers.  This expects individuals to act not only to be seen as a good 
employee but also to make more money but this is often seen as normal given the 
poor remuneration package offered by the bureaucracy and the weak promotion 
opportunities to management roles. Generally, all but one employee showed signs of 
non-engagement in any critical individual moral inquiry, which is a major indication of 
conformity and in all cases; they also did not take full moral responsibility for their 
actions. As such, they would often blame the system for their actions and even 
rationalise it citing excuses of poor welfare, injustice and issues of mistrust 
underpinned by ethnic divisions inflicted by the mechanisms of the dominant features 
of this bureaucracy. Further signs of weakened/weakening moral identity were 
demonstrated in all employees who mostly cited non-morally inclined reasons of 
career drive, monetary benefits and personal social economic reasons as their 
motivation for conforming to the demands of the bureaucracy knowing that most of 
these employees are basic wage earners with families to support in a difficult 
economic context. Moreover, these findings could be also be linked to the fact that 
six of nine employees in this case group were non-pharmacists and that these six do 
not to have a professional code of ethics as part of their background which limits 
their ability to see broader than the notion of what is right within the bureaucracy. 
This will be explored further in proposition 3. Besides, the fact that only one person 
with strong moral identity takes full moral responsibility for his actions as pressured 
by the bureaucracy implies others are operating with a subjective sense of strong 
moral identity and also indicates the probability that CMR is a stronger predictor of 
moral reasoning.  
7.5 Proposition 2 
Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards 
conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
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As explained in chapter 6, Kohlberg’s theory suggests that conventional level 
thinkers are more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist behaviours to 
social norms. This implies that employees reasoning at this level are less inclined to 
critical moral inquiry and are more likely to operate around the rules and conventions 
in showing a convenient compliance with set rules, norms and standards without 
genuinely embracing moral inquiry at individual or community levels. This they do 
even when there are no consequences for obedience or disobedience unlike post 
conventional thinkers who employ universal moral principles in their reasoning 
processes and are more inclined to critical moral inquiry. Within bureaucracies, they 
are able to see issues not only from the firm’s perspective but also through the lens 
of higher moral principles. Since it is typical of bureaucracies to be characterised by 
formalised rules and other qualities often requiring strict compliance from its 
employees, it would therefore follow that bureaucracies would more likely reward 
conventional level thinkers, who do not actually think too much about their everyday 
behaviour besides what is convenient and comfortable and given, based on the CMD 
theory (Kohlberg, 1961), hence this proposition.  
In the previous case group (American Firms), rewards are often tied to compliance 
whilst punishments are associated with non-compliance. However the bureaucracy 
in this case group as earlier explored is different. Its compulsory rules are internal 
and therefore inside the firm one has to act around red tape to succeed.  Also, the 
management control employed within this bureaucracy is considered very rigid from 
employees’ perspectives whilst they have wider degrees of freedom to decide how to 
act on the field.  In this proposition I explore whether acting in alignment with both 
these aspects of this bureaucracy is facilitated by and rewards conventional level 
thinking in middle/lower managers. Evidence will be presented to show whether the 
bureaucracy encourages uncritical obedience to set rules thereby encouraging 
conformist behaviour and whether the bureaucracy then rewards such conformity. 
The following is the key finding: 
7.5.1 Finding 2: This bureaucracy encourages conventional level thinking but 
it neither rewards conformity nor does it punish non-conformity. Instead it 
rewards being liked by management a personalised reward mechanism that is 
less transparent. 
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Amongst the participants in this case group, seven out of nine were adjudged to be 
reasoning at the conventional level (see table 7.2 above). This may immediately 
suggest that this bureaucracy is congruent with conventional reasoning level since 
most participants’ reasoning is at that level. However, as discussed in the opening 
sections of this chapter, the bureaucracy demands obedience to its rules and it 
employs rules as a personalised managerial control mechanism to enforce this 
obedience. As such, employees tend to obey the rules but do so grudgingly with 
instrumental reasons in most cases (See table 7.3 above). On one hand, this is due 
to the fact that the internal rules safeguard the acquisition of stock without which 
employees cannot do business hence they are often bound to complying with those 
internal rules aimed at protecting the interests of the firm. Yet, as also discovered 
from the first proposition, some employees devise clever ways of circumventing 
those strict internal rules to obtain stock, which they sell to make extra money. It 
must be noted however that internal rules are essentially cash policies and other 
rules relating to how stocks are obtained (see table 7.1 above). These are aimed at 
protecting the firm’s profit/interests and not necessarily moral rules creating moral 
guidance for employees. And as earlier established, employees are expected to use 
their discretion on the field, based on personally held moral beliefs, professional 
affiliations and so on. Therefore, what’s right or wrong in this context is not derived 
from the firm but from personal and wider society’s moral values. 
Following from above, it was discovered that there is no clear evidence that 
compliance with the rules and tenets of the bureaucracy attracts any rewards from 
the bureaucracy. If anything, it is only required for employees to keep their jobs in a 
difficult job market. Also, it was not evident that the bureaucracy rewards appropriate 
moral conduct on the field. An employee explained that the reward system is almost 
non-existent as follows: 
“… Reward is meant to come in 2 ways – there is promotion, a long-term 
reward and there's what we call incentives. Promotion comes maybe 
when you at least achieve 70% to 90% of annual target and at the end 
of the day the company will promote you but apart from that also there is 
this kind of reward called incentives. We expect to get incentives for 
making some payments to the company, achieving targets, selling some 
products etc. But even those are not there…” (I2d) 
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On the other hand, there are also no punishments associated with non-compliance 
as indicated by most participants.“...Are there any punishments? I don't think so, they 
don't have that, there is none.” (I1c). Another employee explained, “…there is no 
disciplinary action, it all depends on what the person has done…” (I2b). This can 
however be traced to the fact that rules could be personal in the system as noted 
earlier (see rules and formalisation section) such that if a manager likes an employee, 
different rules apply. Participant I1e also explained as follows:  
“I would tell you that the executive director is a very rigid person, is a very 
very rigid person and for him to change a rule, you must have to address 
them or approach in person, explain why he has to do certain things... 
but his rules are his rules and most representatives do not like to 
approach him. Whenever I have had to approach him I think have come 
to discover that he is as soft as it can be. But then he carries this hard 
man look to keep the representatives off so you don't always have to go 
to his office… It has to do with trust and I'm one of the reps he trusts the 
most.” (I1e) 
This implies that the bureaucracy could be neither explicitly rewarding nor explicitly 
sanctioning based on clear and transparent criteria that apply fairly. But in this case it 
is a more subtle, personalised and less meritocratic way whereby recognition and 
belongingness at work is for employees who act as obedient followers. This is so 
that increasingly it is broadly evident that the right thing to do as expected by this 
bureaucracy is to conform to set rules and regulations. By so doing, employees 
could become less and less inclined to engage in any critical moral inquiry since 
managerial sanctions gained through personal relationship with the superiors trumps 
the need to engage in such high level thinking. Whereas, those who actually engage 
in higher degree of moral inquiry and reflection may be left out and not recognised 
but actually feel very uncomfortable with the bureaucracy and show willingness to 
leave the amoral environment for such reasons. This was depicted in the response 
of the only employee who reasoned at the post conventional level as shown below:  
 “…This job is changing, it is getting to me, and I’m beginning to do 
certain things I think I'll never do so it's part of the reason I want to leave. 
I am beginning to do certain things that have always been against my 
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own value system because to be honest if you're here long enough, you 
would lose who you are and become something else even if you didn’t 
use to be that sort of person who believe in tips and bribes for doctors. 
That is one change the job is bringing to me making me think at least I've 
had enough here…” (I1e, strong moral identity) 
The participant above highlights that this bureaucracy pushes people into ‘acting’ 
and ‘doing’ without integrity-based thinking and conscience and on the grounds of 
reasons. Thereby this is consistent with encouraging conventional level thinking and 
not providing opportunities for personal moral growth beyond this level, which is 
another problem in itself. However, this participant was the only one who did not only 
admit to conforming to the bureaucracy’s standards but assumed a position of moral 
responsibility by engaging in personal moral inquiry resulting in him taking a moral 
stance against what he clearly identifies as a violation of his moral values. 
Interestingly, this participant is also the only one adjudged to be reasoning at 
Kohlberg’s stage six, which also indicates that CMR could be a better indicator of 
moral reasoning capacity in employees. Rather this bureaucracy seems to reward 
people on a personalised basis, whereby being liked (disliked) by management can 
enforce a way of acting in the service of idiosyncratic needs or wants of 
management.  And it characterises a personalised reward mechanism that is less 
transparent and unclear. 
In summary therefore, it can be seen within this case group that this bureaucracy 
encourages conventional level thinking in its employees by pushing people into 
acting and doing things without any moral reflections. Also, the bureaucracy creates 
an environment where personal relationships with superiors tend to trump any need 
for personal moral inquiry since employees benefit from having sense of 
belongingness and recognition within the system. The result is a system that neither 
explicitly rewards nor punishes its employees for conformity or non-conformity. 
Furthermore, it was also discovered that employees’ responses to ethical issues 
varied according to their individual CMR levels. Post conventional level thinkers 
seemed to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by this 
bureaucratic context as it was with Participant I1e one of two post conventional level 
thinkers who clearly admitted the wrong doings whilst also taking a firm moral stance 
of choosing to leave the system. His reason was that the bureaucracy is making him 
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to do things against his personal values, things he thought he would never do, that 
are beginning to get to him in a negative way. Other employees who operated at 
other levels of moral reasoning complied with the bureaucracy’s stipulations, and 
where they did show concerns, they did not seem to have the capacity to take a 
stance against it as Participant I1e. Therefore the findings above support the first 
part of this proposition that conventional level thinking facilitates acting in alignment 
with this bureaucracy but this is neither explicitly rewarded nor explicitly sanctioned. 
7.6 Proposition 3 
Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice 
and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong 
and weak moral identity 
 
Within this case group, there are three registered pharmacists and six non-
pharmacists. One way of testing this proposition is to observe whether the 
bureaucracy in this case group affects how pharmacists make sense of their role 
within the bureaucracy in relation to their professional obligations stipulated by the 
Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in 
Nigeria. And this will be done in comparison to the effect of the bureaucracy on how 
the non-pharmacists in the case group make sense of their role within the 
organisation. As Koehn (1994) suggests that the ground for moral authority for any 
profession is in public pledge or oath, which is binding on the professionals. Hence, 
the characterisation of a pharmacist by the professional body to which all 
pharmacists are expected to swear an oath is the broad professional identity meant 
to govern the activities of pharmacists regardless of their employer within the 
context. 
 
Evidence from the literature (Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible that the broader 
“learnt” professional identity (via education, socialisation and oath in a specific 
profession) could be lost within the self-interest agenda of bureaucracies such as 
firm profit maximisation or managerial rationality. Managerial rationality in this case 
means what is good is what enhances the managers’ goals and agendas and makes 
a practice appear successful. In such an instance, the view of a pharmacist projected 
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by the bureaucracy and embraced by participants, would require a narrower 
professional identity. Also, the bureaucracy within this case group provides no clear 
moral or professional rules guiding conduct hence employees are expected to use 
their discretion, which may or may not employ their broader professional identity in 
moral decision-making. Furthermore, within this bureaucracy that combines rule 
compliance and close personalised managerial control mechanisms, most 
employees - with strong and weaker moral identity- have no other option than to 
comply with firm’s policies and rules. In so doing, they will more likely adopt a moral 
relativistic way of valuing such as “when in Rome act as the Romans” for which they 
will have to employ the narrower professional identity as demanded by the 
bureaucracy in making moral decisions.  
 
Also, outside of the firm where most employees who are sales representatives are 
expected to sell drugs to different customers and stakeholders, they face different 
moral dilemmas. These could be such as choosing to or not to give money to secure 
large orders or whether to keep servicing personal needs of stakeholders in order to 
show commitment to the business relationship. These kinds of scenarios transcend 
technical or professional expert judgement into realms where moral decisions have 
to be made. Instead it appears again that there is a personalised dynamic whereby 
agents of the firms and external agents or stakeholders mutually are trying to serve 
each other; this is consistent with applying conventional CMD in the external 
stakeholder relationship arena. At this level, decisions are not clearly subject to any 
firm ethical rules but a personalised subjective sense. This creates a sense of 
transactional rather than professional behaviour, as the person who applies rules 
and the freedom provided as to how key professional ethical values learnt (via 
education or earlier career), if available, apply. Since most employees in this case-
group are non-pharmacists without professional backgrounds, they are lacking the 
requisite professional ethical values that could contribute towards making informed 
moral choices on the field. This could therefore significantly impact their capacity to 
engage is critical moral inquiry thereby making them more inclined to doing the 
easier things on the field that gives them the recognition of being loyal employees to 
the bureaucracy’s objectives. This also creates an impression that they are being 
good employees and are ‘professionals’ on their jobs even though their actions could 
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be more inclined towards satisfying the demands of the bureaucracy. These are 
further investigated with findings presented below: 
 
7.6.1 Finding 3: This bureaucracy encourages ‘expertise’ (narrower 
professional identity) over ‘professionalism’ (broader professional identity) in 
pharmacists and non-pharmacists  
As reviewed in chapter 3, Koehn, (1994) argues that even though professionals are 
often referred to as persons who possess a lot of knowledge and skill in a field, 
merely possessing esoteric knowledge makes one an expert but not necessarily a 
professional. As she further argues, knowledge alone does not confer moral 
obligation or duty, essential to be a professional. Therefore, expertise could readily 
foster a narrower professional identity and as such ‘experts’ could be inclined to 
using their knowledge as a tool to further advance self-motives which in this case of 
this bureaucracy could be to advance personal agendas, or to sell drugs and to 
make money for the firms. Professionals on the other hand as Koehn, (1994) argue 
function by public pledge or oath, which confers a moral duty to act in accordance to 
the stipulations of such oath. This as earlier discussed is the broader professional 
identity, expected to guide the actions and decisions of employees who are affiliated 
with any regulating professional body, in this case PCN. As such, ‘experts’ are not 
bound by any moral obligation per se and can therefore act in ways that advance the 
objective they wish to serve.  
 
The bureaucracy in this case group employs pharmacists as well as non-
pharmacists to do the job of pharmacists. Out of the nine interviewed participants, 
three were pharmacists and six non-pharmacists. However, of the six that were non-
pharmacists, four have science related backgrounds for instance, degrees in 
microbiology and biochemistry. Two have non-scientific backgrounds, with one of 
them having his previous work experience as a sales person in the fashion industry. 
As one of the managers who is a pharmacist explained: 
 “…If you see a lot of pharmaceutical companies right now do have a 
lot of representatives that are not pharmacists you see they believe if 
they train you on the job as time goes on you will know how to market 
it and all they care about actually is how to sell this product ideally. 
You are I know that pharmacists should be the ones handling stuff like 
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this because he knows pharmacology…a fresh pharmacists is even 
allowed with his licence to import poisons as long as you're graduated 
as a pharmacist you can do that but a lot of these companies feel 
pharmacists always request for plenty amount of money so they want 
to pay little for what they want and you know as it is right under a lot of 
people looking for jobs so for people were requesting N150,000, 
there’s someone that is looking for N100,000 but is ready to do that 
job and there is someone that is also looking for N50,000 to do the job 
the N100,000 guy can do and you are here as a pharmacist waiting for 
N150,000. Before you know it, the job is given to someone else …” 
(I2a) 
 
According to the manager above, the Indian bureaucracies favour a low cost strategy, 
thereby facilitating the employment of non-pharmacists into their fold. But more 
importantly as he also highlighted is the fact that the bureaucracy believes non-
pharmacists can be trained to do the job of pharmacists. To the Indians, the crux of 
their business is selling products (drugs) and it can be done by anybody as long as 
such persons acquire the knowledge of the science behind drugs. In this regard, the 
bureaucracy does not distinguish between sales requiring technical knowledge and 
non-technical knowledge; in other words, they could be selling anything else besides 
drugs. This focus aligns with the ‘expertise’ concept highlighted by Koehn, (1994) as 
an insufficient model of professionalism. Under this concept, employees are more 
inclined to obtain a vast knowledge of selling drugs in order to advance the profit 
maximisation cause of the bureaucracy, as expressed by the manager above. Since 
such employees do not have any professional code of ethics guiding their actions, 
their understanding of who they are is defined mostly by the bureaucracy steering 
them towards the narrower professional identity and ultimately towards taking 
actions that recognise them as loyalty to the organisation. The bureaucracy was 
discovered to achieve this in two ways and was also found to affect pharmacists and 
non-pharmacists as presented below: 
7.6.2 Finding 3a: First, the notion of a client in the bureaucracy differs from 
the notion of the clients registered pharmacists have sworn to protect.  
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Below are quotes from two of the registered pharmacists in this case group. In their 
interviews, they described their clients on their jobs as other stakeholders besides 
those they have sworn to protect, besides describing themselves as ‘sales men’ 
instead of pharmacists: 
“…We have three clients, we have the doctors in the hospitals, we have 
the pharmacists and then we have the main business people based in 
‘Idumota’ (a large public market). Those are the three major groups we 
deal with so basically we are doing the redistribution to all these people 
because the major ones are the ones in Idumota, that is the drug 
market…” (I1c) 
“…We are the sales representatives, the distributors are people that 
come to buy from us, they buy in bulk they don’t sell retail, all the small 
pharmacies around go to them...”(I1d)  
According to Koehn’s (1994) study, the client is anyone desiring a public good, for 
instance health. Hence, ‘the client cannot be reduced to the person upon whom a 
doctor decides to bestow health... rather the client is the person seeking health who 
has come to the doctor because of the doctor’s public promise to promote health, 
which is the good the client desires (pg. 54). Registered pharmacists in Nigeria 
swear to protect the health of the ‘patient’ (PCN, 2015) similar to Koehn’s concept of 
the client, which in this case refers to persons who are pursing the public good of 
health through the guidance of a medicine expert. However, the clients referred to in 
the above quotes are not patients whom the pharmacists have sworn to protect but 
other stakeholders who in this case are not directly seeking the public good of health 
but other goods such as profit. Hence the bureaucracy’s notion of a client is clearly 
not the same as the notion of the client under professional oath the pharmacists are 
meant to practise by. The focus of the bureaucracy on sales, marketing and 
distribution shifts the focus of registered pharmacists from those they have sworn to 
protect to the market segments the bureaucracy expects them to serve. The 
professional ethos of PCN does not cover this client type thereby leaving even 
registered pharmacists to their personal discretion with the option of doing things in 
ways that satisfy the bureaucracy in order to be seen as ‘professionals’. For instance 
one of the pharmacists when faced with a moral issue of whether to pay an entity in 
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order to secure a huge deal opted to make the payment in order to meet his sales 
target, satisfy the demands of the bureaucracy and also to make some more money 
for himself. Thus, it seems clear that the notion of a professional is not governed by 
oath but by salesmanship and this fits the narrower professional identity.  
It can therefore also be argued that the relationship between the employees of the 
bureaucracy (including those who are registered pharmacists) and the ‘clients’ in this 
case (that is the three client groups mentioned in the quotes above) is purely 
transactional, which according to Koehn is the kind of relationships ‘experts’ and not 
professionals have with their clients. This transactional relationship is driven by the 
profit motive of the bureaucracy, which the employees, in this case registered 
pharmacists have bought into making them behave as experts instead of 
professionals. This becomes more of a self-serving relationship. Also as Koehn 
(1994) argues, clients should not be treated as market segments, but in this case, it 
seems clear that the clients are market segments these pharmacists are meant to 
sell to in order to meet the sales targets imposed on them by the bureaucracy. These 
two violations of the concept of the client by the bureaucracy buttresses the finding 
that it encourages expertise over professionalism and one way it does this is by 
distorting the notion of who the clients being served are.  As it was expected, non-
pharmacists in the context also show very similar traits. Since they do not have any 
professional oaths to which they have sworn, their allegiance is thus fully with their 
organisation or the furtherance of any personal agenda. 
7.6.3 Finding 3b: Both pharmacists and non-pharmacists in the context refer 
to their firms as ‘marketing companies’. As the following employees explained: 
“I see Firm I2 pharmaceutical as a purely marketing company. They 
believe so much in marketing and the ideology of marketing is so much 
in because within the shortest period of time, I have to be a pioneer 
member of the company, they have been able to achieve...” (I2c) 
“This firm is just a sales company, just sales sales sales.” (I2b) 
“We are dealing with more of relationship marketing…we are selling 
products, we sell science… as a representative of the company it is 
more of relationship marketing” (I2d) 
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This notion may not be entirely surprising as the Indian pharmaceutical companies 
within the context of the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry engage primarily in sales 
and marketing of drugs produced by the parent companies. But the import of this is 
that little emphasis is placed on the pharmaceutical aspect of the business and a lot 
of emphasis is placed on sales and marketing. So, it can be argued that another way 
the bureaucracy succeeds in deconstructing the broader professional identity of 
registered pharmacists to fit its narrower professional identity agenda is through job 
roles and description. For instance, one of the pharmacists above (I2c) alludes to the 
fact that the company he works for is a marketing company and not a 
pharmaceutical one. Also, non-pharmacists like participants I2b and I2d above say 
the same. This construction of organisational identity and their job roles as ‘sales 
representatives’ and ‘distributors’ can be argued affects how employees see 
themselves as sales persons rather than pharmacists. In the case of non-
pharmacists, they are employed as sales persons and therefore have no other 
professional identity. As one of such participants explained: 
 “…I am an entrepreneur, I am a businessman, I was a businessman 
before I joined this company, I was working for a fashion place …” (I2b) 
“I have been a representative for some time now… I sell products… the 
doctors need the product... our products are always having an edge in 
there was something in the market already, as will offer something that is 
much more…” (12c) 
From the quotes above, the first participant shows clear interest in advancing his 
knowledge because he wants to become an expert in his job and he sees the 
bureaucracy as the place to achieve his aims. Likewise the second participant 
describes herself as a sales person. The job here is not being a pharmacist but 
being a sales person because that is the identity the bureaucracy has given to them 
and it seems clear that such roles are devoid of any clear moral obligations as 
Koehn, (1994) rightly argued. The result is that neither the contextual moral codes, 
which seems non-existent in this case nor personal moral standards (internalised via 
contemplation and personal earlier socialisation and learning if a person has been 
exposed to ethically demanding contexts and institutions) can produce effective and 
good ethical responses and ways of valuing. Within this context therefore, 
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compliance seems to replace true professionalism in Koehn’s terms such that in as 
much as employees act in accordance to the rules of the bureaucracy, they tend to 
see themselves as professionals.  
In summary, it can be said that this bureaucracy does influence towards abiding 
strictly with behaviours that show a sense of loyalty towards it rather than towards 
broader professional codes and values. The bureaucracy in this case group was 
identified in this proposition that not all employees are registered pharmacists, the 
moral implication of which is that not all employees have a professional moral point 
of reference to guide their actions, which Koehn posits comes through public oath. 
Secondly, the fact that the bureaucracy is focused on ‘sales and marketing’ can be 
argued will have its effect on how all employees (both pharmacists and non-
pharmacists) make sense of their job roles. But as Koehn, (1994) suggests, the 
highest form of alignment should be with the profession and that’s why they come 
with pledges and oaths. Regardless of whom a pharmacist works for, allegiance 
ought to always align with one’s profession based on oaths. However in this case, it 
was interesting to note that pharmacists and non-pharmacists alike saw themselves 
in the light of the narrower professional identity as espoused by their job roles within 
the bureaucracy. This was the case regardless of employee’s moral identity. As such, 
there is no difference between how the pharmacists and non-pharmacists construe 
their job roles within the bureaucracy because adherence to the objectives of the 
bureaucracy is taken as being professional in this context. These also make 
employees less inclined to engage in critical moral inquiry of moral situations at work 
since adhering to the bureaucracy’s objectives creates a sense that they are good 
and loyal employees. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In summary, both managerial control and rules were identified to have an intertwined 
influence in this second case group.  Rules are employed as tools for personalised 
managerial control of employees and processes within the system. As such there are 
internal rules guiding every aspect of internal firm activities. Outside of the firms 
however, in engaging stakeholders in the field, there are no clear ethical rules and 
employees resort to their personal discretion in making moral decisions. As such, the 
bureaucracy in this case group is one that creates an environment in which moral 
responsibility is the choice of employees.  
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In the first proposition, it was discovered that employees showed strong signs of 
discomfort with the dominant mechanisms of the bureaucracy even though they still 
acted in obedience to its tenets. However, they often used this as an excuse not to 
take full moral responsibility for their actions, thereby showing evidence that they are 
lacking in moral contemplation and moral awareness. Besides their decisions to 
conform to the bureaucracy were also discovered to be associated with instrumental 
ends such as meeting financial targets in order to be seen as good employees and 
also to make more money to augment the poor remuneration package offered by the 
bureaucracy. In the second proposition, the role of the bureaucracy in promoting 
conventional level of reasoning was tested. It was concluded that the bureaucracy in 
this case group does encourage employee conformity to its rules and standards but 
it does not reward conformity neither does it punish non-conformity but is often the 
only option for employment. It was also concluded that post conventional level 
thinkers seemed to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by 
this bureaucratic context, indicating that the CMR is a more reliable measure of 
morality within the context. 
Finally in the third proposition, it was discovered that this bureaucracy employs a lot 
of non-pharmacists as a low cost labour strategy. As such it does encourage 
expertise (a narrower view of professional identity) over professionalism (broader 
view of professional identity). Interestingly also, registered pharmacists were also 
discovered to work with this narrow professional identity describing themselves as 
sales persons and distributors. This was traceable to the fact that the bureaucracy 
has a different notion of who its client are which shifts the focus of pharmacists to 
market segments as different from individuals seeking a public good of health. This 
was also discovered to make employees less inclined to engaging in critical moral 
inquiry of moral situations they find themselves since adhering to the bureaucracy’s 
objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CASE GROUP 3: NIGERIAN PHARMACEUTICALS 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and findings in a sample of two Nigerian 
pharmaceuticals. This is the third case group in this study. Unlike the two previous 
case groups however, this case group presents a pair of dissimilar firms. 
Interestingly, both firms appeared to be similar in structural characteristics (size, 
employee strength and revenue) but it was discovered that each have divergent 
bureaucratic traits thus, were analysed separately. The first (N1) is a quasi-
bureaucracy with charismatic authority underpinning its bureaucratic features hence 
is regarded as a ‘Charismatic Bureaucracy’. The second (N2) is an ‘Entrepreneurial 
Bureaucracy’ characterised by a laissez-faire opportunity seeking culture. In this firm, 
entrepreneurship is less about innovation but more about opportunism and corrupt 
ways of exploiting gaps for economic gains (Cressy, 1992). Evidence of these two 
different bureaucracies are presented in the sections to follow. Finally, relevant 
findings along the three key propositions explored in this study are presented using 
evidence from interview data and secondary sources. 
8.1 Management Control  
 
8.1.1 Firm N1 
In the two previous case groups, managerial control was found to emanate from 
power conferred on managers.  Specifically it has been found that through their 
managerial roles, managers monitor and regulate the activities of their subordinate in 
a way that promotes the “morality” of a given bureaucracy.  
In this case group however, two different patterns of managerial control were 
discovered. The first (N1) is stemming from a form of authority Weber called 
charismatic authority.  The second (N2) is a rather enterprising competitive firm 
context that is not a typical Weberian bureaucracy as I show (see page 192). This 
second appears as an “unregulated” system and the traces of managerial control 
were not readily evident in this second firm. Evidence from these two different 
bureaucracies are further presented and their impacts on employee morality 
subsequently discussed. 
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Firm N1 is a firm characterised by its family-like work environment. The structure of 
this bureaucracy is such that there is a wide span of control, with more than five 
direct reports to managers depending on the department, thus, giving employees a 
great degree of independence. Also, this firm showed a preference for a very cordial, 
informal system such that even though there are clear hierarchies, upper 
management layer and the lower level roles naturally interact without rigid 
boundaries based upon formalized roles. This is not typical in classic bureaucracies 
because such bureaucracies are also typified by impersonality hence human 
personality is not often present (Weber, 1978). The firm is headed by a well-
respected Nigerian director, representing the interest of an all-Nigerian board of 
directors, also comprising of highly reputable individuals. The senior management 
team also comprises only Nigerian nationals. Together, both managers and their 
subordinates often work very closely together without any perceived ‘power distance’ 
amongst the hierarchies of the firm. Hence, it was discovered that within this firm, 
managerial control exists through charismatic authority.  
Charismatic authority is defined by Weber, (1947:10) as “authority resting on 
devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him". As such 
within this case group, it was found that the managing director (MD) of firm N1 and 
his entire management team were described to exude certain levels of sanctity, 
which makes employees regard them as heroes and role models. In other words, the 
MD and his team through their character and conduct make the moral values they 
hold in esteem visible, such that they impact how employees perceive the team and 
the organisation. This notion was a dominant theme throughout the interview data 
gathered from the firm across multiple departments and hierarchy as shown below:  
 “When you see men you can look up to and I can tell you I have found 
several of them in Firm N1 and they are like driving forces for me. The 
MD has been like a huge inspiration to me and I know he is a man for 
God. He’s being a good example and I tell it every time…I thank God for 
the management team... Asides from the spirituality, they are men who 
are focused…I could remember the MD has said several things that 
really played big on me, I picked them and actually applied them and I 
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found out that they are principles that you find in men who are actually 
aspiring to be great…” (N1d) 
“…When I just came in, it was my first week of work I had not met the MD, 
I did not know him and that day I was working late with my boss. We 
were actually at my seat I was typing something and MD came in and 
was standing opposite me and he began to have a lengthy chat with me 
and we were all laughing he was jesting with everybody so when he left 
my boss said to me that is the MD, I was like WOW... he said don't worry 
you get to know him better and really not only the MD, you will see that in 
this organisation people have stayed for 9, 10, 15 years, something 
would have made them stay outside of salary so the relationship they're 
able to maintain with their staff is very very cordial…My bosses, they 
have made my life easy. I don't see work as work…”(N1e) 
“I first thought Firm N1 was a multinational owned by foreigners then I 
could remember that during my interview I was telling them that when I 
usually pass by when I was working in an auditing firm, I would say I like 
to work in this place because of the environment and all of that…I never 
knew it was owned by a Nigerian so it was when I came by that I 
discovered all of that and I was so amazed and that the man (MD) is 
someone that is a visionary leader, I respect him a lot…” (N1f) 
From the quotes above, the effects of charismatic authority can be seen in the way 
that employees describe and revere the leadership of the organisation. For instance, 
employees seem to be satisfied with their jobs because of the cordial nature of the 
work environment owing largely to the visionary likeable leadership of the firm as 
much as employees see in their leaders individuals worthy of being their role models 
and mentors. The MD for instance is described as a visionary leader, known for his 
Christian beliefs; he is also known to be quite free, approachable and easy to talk to. 
Further, he is described to have the ability to see potential in his employees and 
would often help them nurture it. For instance, one of the participants above 
explained that he used to be a school dropout and security official with the firm, and 
upon losing his job approached the MD who sponsored his education and employed 
him thereafter. Today, he is an HR staff with the organisation.  
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“…One thing I will credit this company for is that the top management 
have no restrictions to anybody, you can walk up to them and express 
your feelings and it'll be noted. If it is one that needs to be implemented 
you will be recognised and commended for it…They have given me the 
opportunity... I was a school dropout when I joined them and I have been 
given the platform to grow with the company, they learn to identify talents. 
I am now studying entrepreneurship and business management at the 
National Open University and I will be finishing soon. That will be my first 
degree, because when I dropped out, instead of being on the streets 
though it seemed like my world collapsed, they took me in…” (N1d) 
This kind of relationship between managers and their subordinates is an inspirational 
one that creates an environment of mutual trust based on the mutual respect 
employees seem to have for their superiors and vice-versa. The quotes above also 
suggest that the leaders within this firm exude virtues that the bureaucracy taps into. 
For instance, the managing director was reported to have very strong religious roots, 
from which his value system is derived. This was discovered to have informed the 
norm of daily morning prayers and fellowship within the organisation as explained 
below: 
 “Predominantly in Firm N1 we have an ethical standard. The 
management team always pushes that into us.  Funny enough you know 
we have a fellowship in this company. We do Fellowship (prayers) 8 AM 
to 9 AM every morning…It is not everybody that goes but no matter how 
important the job is, if you are not on your desk and your boss comes in 
asks where is this person? They say fellowship. It is more or less like an 
official thing... nobody would complain so I think with that and they hold 
on to religious values and I think religious value is the best standard for 
any ethical thinking person...” (N1b) 
“I think they have that spirit of Fellowship, of friendliness here… We have 
a fellowship centre downstairs, this is the first time and I could not 
imagine that I will get in a Nigerian company that set aside an hour for 
devotion, fellowship and all that to me it is something that is out of the 
ordinary…the spirit here is friendliness, people are open and there is 
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nobody that is too big, everybody’s cordial the MD can come here now, 
they can even eat with you, very simple, it's a really nice place” (N1f) 
As such, it seems evident within this bureaucracy that the person (character and 
conduct) of the managing director has a huge effect on how employees perceive the 
organisation and its management team. The religious beliefs of the MD for instance 
encourage the fellowship within the firm where employees freely pray together every 
day without obligation. This can also be argued affects the moral conduct of 
employees within the organisation by increasing their awareness to moral issues 
whilst promoting a sense of shared values in the community. Employees also 
reported that leaders within the organisation lead by example, often demonstrating 
their deeply held values in conduct and character by the way they handle their work 
as a participant explained below:  
“I'll give them integrity; they really try to do what they say they do. 
Sometimes in seeking money you can get carried away, you can't cut 
corners and shortcuts and all that. At least I work closely with the 
people that are at the helm of affairs in decision-making and 
sometimes when there are issues the way they pick it up like our name 
is at stake. We are known for integrity there is something up here even 
without the public having to react first...” (N1e) 
The testimony of the participant above suggests that when leaders show through 
direct association and continuous modelling the virtues they stand for, they are 
further respected, admired and followed. Thus, one of the participants (N1b) above 
explained, a prevalent and accepted understanding among employees is that the 
ethics of the firm is grounded in Christian values hence there is a common 
knowledge that Firm N1 has high standards of morality as employees also perceive 
from the observable conduct of their leaders. These in turn create an environment of 
social accountability in which employee conduct and performance can be informally 
monitored, yet professionally. 
This system of social accountability is a self-regulatory control mechanism based on 
mutual trust in which the employees themselves have a sense of shared responsibly 
based on commonly held beliefs acquired from their leaders to act only in ways that 
are in line with the firm’s values. Through this shared belief mechanism, violations 
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are easily spotted and dealt with accordingly as one of the managers explained 
below: 
 “In a system that has been able to thrive itself for more than 19 years 
based on the fact that people have a high level of integrity, then 
definitely it will be very difficult for you to employ one younger 
accountant that will want to be dubious and you won’t quickly know. The 
system would throw the accountant up. Before you manipulate one or 
two figures, the whole system will see you and it will throw you up, so 
because…the culture is ingrained in them... The first value that is held 
in high esteem is integrity… this is what has been able to drive this 
organisation up to this point, and it based on integrity” (N1g) 
“…The face of the values are all the HODs, don't look at it from the point 
of the directors alone, all the HODs are the value drivers… because it is 
not about the director, the set of people that do make it happen is the 
heads of the apartment, they are the ones that enforce the culture… 
they're the ones that enforce the principles, they are more or less like 
the role models for everybody who work in their Department. So, they 
are the value drivers or shall I say moral drivers in this system are all 
HODs who are also at the prime age of 30s…” (N1g) 
As such, this bureaucracy ingrains certain moral values into its employees especially 
those that are passed down from the leaders through visible modelling and direct 
association. These create a moral system that all employees respect and trust 
because they esteem those who serve as the face of those values (the managers) 
and therefore have a collectively shared responsibility of watching over the system to 
ensure there is compliance to known moral standards. This environment of moral 
awareness and accountability makes it easy for misconducts or violations to be 
detected.  
8.1.2 Firm N2 
I now focus on the second firm (N2) that is a very different case.  Firm N2 on the 
other hand represents an ‘Entrepreneurial bureaucracy’ that is typified by its ‘loose’, 
unregulated environment laced with red tape.  The concept of entrepreneurship in 
this firm is less about innovation and more about opportunism, in which employees 
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are encouraged to look for ‘gaps’ in the market to be ‘exploited’ for economic gains 
(Cressy, 1992). This can be attributed to an historical antecedent that the once 
renowned brand name in the pharmaceutical industry now struggles in an 
increasingly dynamic, highly competitive local pharmaceutical industry context in 
which the firm operates (See Chapter 5 for contextual descriptions). Besides, the 
firm has a lofty goal of becoming the biggest pharmaceutical company in Nigeria by 
the end of the decade, thereby encouraging an opportunistic environment within the 
firm. This comes with a preference for performance driven environment with an 
unusually free and unregulated system driven by excessive desires for economic 
gains. This bureaucracy also has a wide span of control, with managers having 
direct reports in the excess of five employees. By this, there seems to be 
unnecessary layers of bureaucracy but no true accountability amongst them. This is 
able to create a distance between the employees and the firm thereby creating a  
system of levels of management that maintain power but no accountability as 
described below:  
Bureaucracy is the number one thing that affects my job and the second 
thing is the no so open attitude here…it’s like there are cabals and it 
affects my job because if for example I create a document four people 
or three people have to look at it and each person has to make his own 
different opinion... Put it to your line manager maybe he reviews it four 
times, your line manager sends it to his own line manager and feels 
some other thing should be added… You go back to the drawing table 
then the line manager's line manager's line manager has to go through 
it again... So, you find out that this speed for you to do anything is very 
very slow and you will still have to be measured on timeline. Did you 
meet the timeline? Whereas a lot of the timelines you may not have 
control over it.” (N2a) 
Thus, there seems to be no clear accountable way of getting things done within the 
firm as explained below:  
“I can’t put my hand on how we do things. In management, things are 
slow; things are not as fast as you expect them to work… When you're 
working in a multinational, they have a culture, which everybody knows. 
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Immediately you get into the system, you tend to fall in line with the 
culture. But here there is nothing really clear like that… You can do 
anything you feel like doing to a large extent… as long as you can 
justify it and of course you can always have a reason for it. Its unlike the 
multinationals where you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they do 
the anti-corruption law every time…But whilst you are here there is 
really no code of ethics as long as you can justify it.” (N2a) 
 “Our core values…it is more of just lip service, people don't understand 
what it is when we say integrity. So easy for us to say integrity... If you 
tell me we have integrity then if I tell you okay I am going to pay you 
your incentive on 27 May, you should pay it but it doesn't happen so 
that means even as a company we have team work as one of our core 
values but the level of internal conflicts to me is so high, I am trying to 
do this at times you can seek advice from someone and that is what the 
person we use against you up there…so in terms of the core values I'm 
not sure we are doing enough, and that's just a truth” (N2d) 
As implied from the quotes above, employees are able to do things as they wish as 
long as such actions can be justified mainly along the economic objectives of the 
bureaucracy. Hence, what are described as firm values on paper are not practised 
nor enforced in reality, hence employees seem not to be guided by any clear internal 
mechanism. As the employees above explain, the firm seems to breed a body of 
individual opportunists merely functioning within an enabling fabric with no real 
sense of collective purpose other the quest for economic gains. This also implies a 
lot of internal conflicts arise in what seems like unhealthy internal competition, further 
buttressing the opportunistic nature of this bureaucracy. Individual inclination 
towards this within the bureaucracy is further expressed in the words of the following 
employees:  
“I love results, and I am very passionate about getting results (financial 
results). I love getting results, getting things done like what I do I just 
set targets in a week, what I need to do and that drives me all through 
the week. I give myself targets. I just love achieving results that 
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summarises my person, no matter the obstacle. When I set a target, 
that's what I want to achieve…” (N2b) 
“…Okay if we discover that…okay let's use the air conditioner example, 
that's an opportunity you can tie sales to, you can immediately create 
a promotion, possibly a soft promotion, by this promotion you ask, can 
you do this volume for us and we give you this? You see that he has a 
need for it. He says yes, what are you talking about, how does it run? 
By then you must have done some mental calculations, okay by 50 
cartons of this product, the margin on top of it can get him what he 
wants or you involve the company okay I have a deal with this person, 
he says he can do this volume and I committed myself that I will do 
this in return within this period of time that I would give him an air 
conditioner because he hasn't got one and the Company looks at the 
deal you are giving to him, I think we can make this happen.” (N2c) 
The quotes above further reveal the nature of individuals’ opportunistic behaviours 
and Firm N2’s unregulated environment where such employee behaviour are often 
encouraged and supported as long as it has financial gains. But more importantly is 
the nature of morality depicted in the quotes above. As expressed by participant N2b 
above, the main focus of the bureaucracy is an orientation to maximizing economic 
gains within a context of blurred accountability.  The management of the firm was 
evidencing this as it was found to be empowering employees to ‘strike deals’ or do 
anything they have to do to meet financial targets. As such morality seems non-
existent in this environment as employees find it easy to thrive within the 
bureaucracy that does not encourage any form of personal moral inquiry. Rather, 
employee decisions seem readily sanctioned by the firm creating an environment in 
which individual employees are comfortable to do anything they choose as 
instrumentally necessary because their actions can be easily justified and the need 
for any form of moral contemplation is trumped. 
In summary, the two firms in this case group present different manifestations of 
managerial control. One has its managerial control stemming from charismatic 
authority, which also drives the values embraced within the organisation thereby 
shaping the moral awareness and responsiveness of its employees in the process. 
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The second represents a bureaucracy characterised by red tape and an 
opportunistic environment in which bureaucratic features seem to exist at the surface 
without any clear functional influence in reality. As such employees are encouraged 
within this unregulated environment to do as they wish as long as their actions can 
be justified along the economic objectives of the bureaucracy. This in turn breeds a 
set of individual opportunists existing within an environment where moral inquiry and 
contemplation is insignificant. 
8.2 Formalization and Rules 
8.2.1 Firm N1 
Formalised rules also called standard operating procedures (SOPs) are written rules 
aimed at guiding how employees execute their job duties. Such rules could be very 
comprehensive and strict as discovered in the first case group (Chapter 6) or 
targeted at guiding only internal activities and processes as found in the second case 
group (Chapter 7). It was interesting to discover that both bureaucracies in this case 
group shared some similarities in how rules are expressed yet differed in their 
functioning and effectiveness within both contexts. For instance, in both firms, there 
are no clearly written rules or code of ethics guiding employees’ activities even 
though rules were often deemed ‘verbal’ and ‘non-explicitly’ written. Where rules 
existed as in the case of Firm N1, they weren’t necessarily SOPs but ‘instructions’ 
handed down by leaders, which employees have institutionalised as rules on issues 
such as punctuality, work ethic and in some instances work processes as the 
employees below explained: 
“I said that earlier that when we first came, in each of the departments 
that we visited we discovered that they were not having SOPs 
especially inventory. I can speak for my unit…I discovered that there 
was no system in place in terms of SOPs, in terms of stock 
management, timely imputing of stock and so on…” (N1f) 
“There is a Firm N1 way... is it written in black and white? It is not but 
there is a Firm N1 way. I think the Firm N1 way, the way I see it… but if 
you ask everybody in this company they will give you different answers 
there is a way we perceive it from our own vintage point. My point is that 
the Firm N1 way is more of an ethical way...”(N1b) 
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“Are there rules? There is no law that is cast in dye. My job allows me to 
take initiative, there are no hard and fast rule… Yes I have a job 
description but it is the task given that I do…” (N1e) 
The quotes above are indicative of a system where SOPs may not be explicitly 
written yet there is a common sense of understanding of how things work within the 
firm. There also seems to be a sense of shared values and beliefs guiding how 
employees think and do things within the bureaucracy traceable to the influence of 
the leadership of the firm. As earlier established, firm N1 functions under the 
influence of charismatic authority, such that the leaders of the firm are respected and 
their virtues embraced by employees who ‘idolise’ their leaders. The result is that 
there may not be a need for clearly written rules since the moral awareness of 
employees is being continually shaped by the leaders’ direct and continuous 
association with their employees, to the extent that there seems to be an alignment in 
the moral thinking of leaders and their employees. However, in some departments, 
for instance, sales, some form of rules exist as explained by one of the managers 
below: 
 “If you follow the laid down rules, you should be able to beat the 
competition. Laid down rules in that you do your part what I ask you to 
do, to wake up early in the morning as early as 9 AM, be in the 
institution, create the demand, detail this product, talk to the prospect, 
see a certain number of doctors in a day for this product, do clinical 
presentation on this product and try as much as possible to leave 
behind pens...these are things that generate awareness for the product. 
After you have done all those bits, if you see those doctors 
consecutively, you do your work, your clinical meetings, the doctors will 
remember your product and will prescribe.” (N1c) 
But, as can be seen from the quote above, the rules are not written rules but more of 
handed down instructions on how employees within the department are being asked 
to go about their selling duties. Of note also is the way the manager above explained 
he personally instructs his subordinates on what to do and how to do them. In 
another environment, this approach can easily be deemed dictatorial and 
authoritative, however given that the managers within this context are loved and 
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respected, employees consider the instructions as beneficial guidance that can be 
institutionalised since they trust their leaders.  This is indicative of the nature of 
charismatic authority within the bureaucracy and by this, moral virtues easily flow 
down from leaders to employees who may readily adjust their own moral values to 
conform to those of their leaders out of respect for them. An employee explained: 
“I would first say we run as a family with rules guiding it. You can take 
the father and the son, I can say that a child would do well if the father 
will take interest in him...but when their child begins to exhibit some 
characters that don’t fit into what he has been taught, he will be 
severely warned… so everything here is clearly spelled out...”(N1d) 
As such morality is easily shared yet this environment also creates an avenue for 
employees who already possess moral values to freely express themselves. This was 
implied in by the response of several employees who described the environment as 
free and enabling for them to be themselves.  
8.2.2 Firm N2 
On the other hand, Firm N2 also did not present any clearly written down rules and 
procedures on how things ought to be done. But unlike Firm N1, where there are 
unwritten rules yet shared understanding of how things work through the influence of 
charismatic authority, firm N2 presents a completely unregulated context where 
anything is justifiable as long as it brings economic dividends. What exists, as rules 
in Firm N2, were administrative rules on report writing, order for document approvals, 
which a lot of employees complained is more of a burdensome red tape than proper 
SOPs. Some of the employees explained as follows: 
“Yes, there are verbal rules. There is no written down rule…They won’t 
tell you that you can do certain things but if you did it to make money, 
nobody is going to harass you…a lot of times, there are rules that guide 
my job... we have a work plan, you have an idea of what you're 
supposed to do, you're supposed to give a weekly report of what you 
have done so that is clear-cut…” (N2a) 
“There aren’t rules as such… and there are no boundaries per se. It's 
just that writing plans and other bits, it must make sense for it to be 
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invested in. If you want things to fly you need to know how to carry 
people along...” (N2h) 
Given the largely unregulated environment of firm N2, employees seem to have the 
freedom to do anything as long as they can be justified on the grounds of economic 
benefits to the firm as participant N2a above mentions. That is, employees are 
supported by the firms to go about their duties anyhow they deem fit because firm 
N2 is a largely opportunistic environment that is predominantly oriented towards 
economic returns. This kind of system likely creates a body of individual opportunists 
who benefit from being part of a body that gives them collective advantages, making 
it easy to thrive in the bureaucracy. An effect of this as an employee explained is a 
model of selling called the money-medical selling in which employees are allowed to 
bribe potential customers or use any possible means to strike bargains since 
anything goes as explained below: 
“Multinationals have professional-medical selling. The generic guys do 
money-medical selling. Most major companies do money-medical 
selling… they sell with money, whilst the other guys do professional 
medical selling…The way the Nigerian business runs really is anything 
goes, anything goes there.” (N2a) 
This use of terminology suggests an attempt to legitimise this type of transaction by 
normalising it as a legitimate alternative to professional-medical selling. By this, 
decisions are easily justifiable based on prevalent behavioural patterns of other 
employees within the system and as such people easily systematically disengage 
from any form of moral inquiry, since groupthink is a huge possibility within the 
context.  
In summary therefore, both bureaucracies presented in this case group seem to be 
free in certain ways even though one showed clear measures of regulation and the 
other did not. Both bureaucracies do not have clearly written rules yet in Firm N1, 
regulation is achieved through charismatic authority in which employees see 
instructions and the conduct of their leaders as guidance for their personal conduct 
within the system because they respect their leaders. Firm N2 on the other hand is 
an unregulated environment where rules don’t exist and employees are given the 
free hand to decide how they want to do business thereby making it easy for them to 
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systematically disengage from personal moral inquiry and follow prevalent 
behaviours within the system. The periodic sales targets employees are expected to 
meet drive this, from which they also get incentives from sales and marked-up prices.  
8.3 The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees’ 
Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities 
Consistent with prior chapters, the morality of employees in this study’s interviewed 
sample is evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral reasoning 
levels and moral identities. From preliminary findings, the moral identity scores and 
assigned moral reasoning level of each employee in both firms are presented below 
in different tables. Summaries for both firms N1 and N2 are presented in tables 8.1 
and 8.2 below. 
Table 8.1 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants in 
Firm N1 
Participant CMR Path Moral Identity Strength 
N1a Conventional Level (Stage 4) 6.53 (Strong) 
N1b Post Conventional Level (Stage 6) 4.64 (Strong) 
N1c Post-conventional Level (Stage 5) 5.94 (Strong) 
N1d Conventional Level (stage 4) 6.05 (Strong) 
N1e Conventional Level (Stage 4) 2.59 (Weak) 
N1f Post-Conventional (Stage 5) 5.59 (Strong) 
N1g Post-Conventional Level (Stage 5) 6.11 (Strong) 
N1h Conventional Level (Stage 4) 5.59 (Strong) 
N1i Conventional (Stage 4) 3.88 (Weak) 
Source: Fieldwork 
 
The table above shows that all but two of the participants in this case group claim to 
have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure 
employed during this study. Interestingly, both of these are in Firm N1, the more 
regulated of both firms in this case group with clear moral values. Overall this was 
the only case where weaker presence of lower and mid conventional moral 
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reasoning levels were clearly found, and stronger presences of upper conventional 
and lower post conventional moral reasoning levels.  
Table 8.2 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants in 
Firm N2 
Participant CMR Path Moral Identity Strength 
N2a Post-Conventional Level (Stage 5) 6.23 (Strong) 
N2b Pre-conventional Level (Stage 2) 5.64 (Strong) 
N2c Pre-Conventional Level (Stage 2) 5.70 (Strong) 
N2d Conventional Level (Stage 4) 6.00 (Strong) 
N2e Conventional Level (Stage 4) 5.11 (Strong) 
N2f Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.00 (Strong) 
N2g Conventional Level (Stage 3) 5.20 (Strong) 
Source: Fieldwork 
 
In firm N2, on the other hand, it is interesting that the results show a rather skewed 
distribution in which all employees claimed to have strong moral identities. Given that 
the context of firm N2 is an unregulated one that tends to discourage moral inquiry, a 
feeling of strong moral identity amongst all employees of firm N2 could be indicative 
of the same pattern found in previous cases, i.e. an inflated sense of identity as 
inspired by the context whereby everyone seems to be identify themselves as “moral” 
just by following the bureaucratic conventions. It must be noted that self-reported 
measures such as the one used in this study are liable to participant bias and prone 
to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; Spector, 1994; Lanyon & 
Goodstein, 1997). But generally, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure is widely 
documented to have high validity, reliability and significant variations in large 
samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). On a 
general note however, the fact that all but two employees claim to have strong moral 
identities could be an indication that an intertwined complex interaction between the 
two contextual (bureaucratic) features of rule compliance and managerial control in 
both firms can disorient employee moral identity towards everyone who loyally obeys 
the bureaucratic rules feeling entitled to a strong moral identity. This will be further 
investigated.  
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Participants’ cognitive moral reasoning however shows a close to normal distribution 
of moral reasoning levels across the pre-conventional, conventional and post 
conventional levels. It must be noted that the CMR levels of these participants were 
determined using their dominant patterns of thinking from interview data and not 
through an established measuring tool; hence it may not be entirely accurate due to 
researcher’s bias. It was interesting however to note that the two pre-conventional 
level thinkers were managers in firm N2 whilst firm N1 reported a high number of 
post conventional level thinkers. In the sections to follow, the effect of the 
bureaucracy on the employees’ moral identity and CMR levels is explored along the 
three propositions of this study as follows: 
Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the 
organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of 
stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of 
moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and 
rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and 
values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak 
moral identity 
8.4 Proposition 1 
Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in 
each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity 
in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both 
stronger and weaker MI actual scores) 
The proposition simply means that in certain cases and contexts, contextual 
variables are so strongly influencing the subjective employee experience that they 
may well create an “inflated moral identity” general pattern. In this sense having both 
strong and weak moral identity will be affected within the bureaucracy to the extent 
that there may be no differentiating moral standard to distinguish employees’ and 
managers’ moral identity qualities. As noted insofar as everyone is compliant with 
the tenets of a bureaucracy each person is entitled to a sense of moral goodness. 
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This proposition therefore suggests that employee behaviour in accordance with 
both organisational rules and management control enhances a subjective sense of 
an inflated (stronger) moral identity in both managers and employees. This is tested 
in the context of both Firms N1 and N2 even though a longitudinal study will be 
required to further establish this claim.  
As earlier established, the two firms in this case group are a contrasting pair. One on 
hand, Firm N1 is a firm driven by charismatic authority. Managerial control within the 
context of N1 is based on social accountability, a self-regulatory system stemming 
from trust in shared character values modelled by the leaders within the organisation, 
whom the employees greatly esteem.  This case (N1) is the only case where data 
disconfirm proposition 1. Organisational rules are more verbal and unwritten yet a 
binding and common understanding exists on what the firm stands for amongst all 
employees. This is owing to the influence of the MD and his management team 
within the context, whose virtues are respected and embraced by their employees, 
thereby influencing how employees understand their work climate. Thus within this 
bureaucracy, it is likely that moral identity strength appears for the first time objective 
and in reference to real and meaningful character virtues that express a strength of 
moral identity.  It is the only case where this is not a subjective and relative matter. 
That is, the context may not inflate employee’s moral identity strength but rather 
genuinely contributes to the development of moral identity strength of its employees 
through high standards of morality championed by the leaders whose moral virtues 
condition the moral climate of the context. In such a context in which respect for 
leaders drives compliance, looking good is being ethical in accordance to shared 
values which may be further enhanced by the African culture of respect for people in 
authority especially when they role model excellent moral character. In this case 
therefore, what is ethical is actually demonstrated by those in leadership for which 
employees have an understanding that the organization clearly acts ethically at the 
top echelon, so employees feel they are part of a larger community of moral actors.   
Not surprisingly, firm N2 presents a different scenario, and findings show support for 
proposition 1 in this firm. This bureaucratic context is quite unregulated and 
opportunistic in nature as noted earlier. As such, evidences of the main bureaucratic 
features (organisational rules and managerial control) were not clearly visible within 
the firm. In this firm therefore, employees have a free hand to do anything they feel 
 204 
like as long as they can justify their actions in terms of economic gains. The 
bureaucracy also supports them to the extent that morality in this firm is really about 
pursuing actions that increase the economic gains or a sense of approval of being a 
part of the in-group of the organisation. Since it is easy to thrive in a system that 
brings together individual opportunists, moral identity strength becomes 
inconsequential insofar as employees act along the tenets of the firm. Thus, 
decisions are easily justifiable and could therefore lead to an inflated sense of strong 
moral identity in an environment where ‘anything goes’ and ‘everyone does it’. These 
are further examined using the interview data and the key findings are presented 
below: 
8.4.1 Finding 1a: The bureaucracy in Firm N1 contributes positively to the 
moral awareness and perception of its employees; hence morality is not a 
relative and subjective matter. Conversely, employees in the unregulated 
environment of Firm N2 show no evidence of moral contemplation and moral 
awareness, which contributes to the inflation of their moral identity strength. 
In the opening sections, it was established that charismatic authority in Firm N1 has 
a positive effect on the perception of employees about the bureaucracy. Charismatic 
authority also underpins both organisational rules, which manifests in the form of 
unwritten but commonly understood rules and managerial control, which manifests in 
the form of social accountability within Firm N1. Hence, it was discovered that 
employees feel very comfortable about the bureaucracy; its leaders and what it 
stands for as the following quotes show: 
“Our way is trust… a process that conforms with the most cordial 
environment.... that cordial environment explains our way you can see 
how we relate and I think that is what has brought us this far. Our 
suppliers, our customers trust us…that's why people marvel and see 
you've been here for 15 years you guys have gone far. Yes, God has 
been with us, I think trust has been a very key factor.” (N1b) 
“My bosses, they have made my life easy. I don't see work as work. 
Inasmuch as you get tired with traffic, the hustling, I have never got to 
that point where I have had to wake up in the morning and complain 
that I have to go to work again…. I'm just lucky or I am blessed to work 
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with the kind of people I work with, the sales and marketing director is 
a wonderful person, he is the most caring man I have ever met in my 
life… I do know what to use for that relationship…For me they are very 
family friendly too…”(N1e) 
The quotes above highlight that employees are very comfortable with the 
bureaucracy and the cordial, friendly environment it promotes and that this family-like 
environment fosters a system built on trust and shared values. Therefore, even 
though rules are not explicitly written, employees have an understanding of the moral 
codes that govern the bureaucracy based on the virtues demonstrated by the leaders 
they respect and act based on these. As such, employees make constant reference 
to their understanding of the firm’s moral stance, indicative of the effect of the 
environment on their perception of the bureaucracy. This in turn is discovered to 
enhance employee moral awareness as much as it facilitates an environment for 
moral contemplation and personal moral inquiry in employees as seen in some of the 
quotes below: 
“It's like a moral way.  Basically what I was trying to say then was me, I 
come from a family that holds up to very high morals so on my job, I 
would not lower the standards of what should be obtainable at my 
desk so I ensure that everything that emanates from my desk is 
authentic, valid and I can back it up with documents and I think that 
speaks for every department in this organisation. That’s why said there 
is a moral, ethical way, accountability. If you go to every department 
every this is what you get…” (N1b, Strong moral Identity) 
I'll give them integrity; they really try to do what they say they do. 
Sometimes money can get you carried away, you can't cut corners 
and shortcuts and all that. At least I work closely with the people that 
are at the helm of affairs in decision-making… so if you say Firm N1 
what will come to my mind would be integrity (N1e, weak moral identity) 
Thus, the quotes above show that employees with weak and strong moral identity 
alike understand the moral stance of the bureaucracy. The participant with strong 
moral identity showed signs of moral contemplation and awareness in his/her 
response linking this to what is generally obtainable within the bureaucracy. 
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Interestingly, the participant who claimed to have a weak moral identity in theory 
should not be perceptive to moral traits, however as seem above he/she was able to 
identify with the integrity in the system as seen in key decisions makers. This 
perhaps validates the positive effect and effectiveness of charismatic authority within 
the bureaucracy since Participant N1e (weak moral identity) recognises integrity as 
demonstrated in the character and conduct of leaders within the bureaucracy.  Thus, 
it can be said that the character and conduct of leaders within the context does affect 
the moral virtues employees are constantly exposed to which in turn contributes to 
their moral awareness and perhaps helps them imbibe those moral virtues as the 
quote below further explains: 
“The face of these values are all the HODs, don't look at it from the 
point of the directors, all the HODs are the value drivers ... Because it 
is not about the director but the set of people that do make it happen is 
HODs they are the ones that enforce the culture, the rules, regulations, 
and principles, they are more or less like the role models for everybody 
working in their Department. So, the value drivers or shall I say moral 
drivers in this system are all HODs were also at the prime age of 30s” 
(N1f) 
Thus, it seems evident that the managers in firm N1 are the moral drivers of virtues 
within the system. By this, employees understand their firm as having moral 
standards rooted in Christian religious values, which in turn could reinforce personal 
moral beliefs where they already exist or create moral awareness in employees with 
weak moral identities in whom moral traits are not usually readily activated for moral 
decision-making. Thus, this kind of environment is unlikely to inflate moral identities 
in employees with weak moral identities as it reveals to such employees moral values 
they may be lacking in and should aspire towards. By this, employees see 
themselves for who they really are. For instance in the case of participant N1b who 
already had moral values from his strong family background, working in Firm N1 
reinforces already held personal moral beliefs, whilst in participant N1e an increasing 
awareness to moral values could begin to strengthen their moral identity. Thus the 
environment in firm N1 suggests that individually held moral traits can be further 
encouraged in employees whilst helping those who don’t have such traits to become 
aware of them and perhaps imbibe them through continual exposure to these values 
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as seen in the leaders they idolise within the context. Either way the bureaucracy in 
firm N1 seems to be an enabling one for all employees both with weak and strong 
moral identity. In this case therefore, the sense of moral identity strength can be said 
would be more objective than subjective. That is, the moral identity strength is not 
inflated since employees willingly embrace and act according to virtues visible in the 
top management team. 
8.4.2 Finding 1b: Employees in the unregulated environment of Firm N2 show 
no evidence of moral contemplation and moral awareness, which contributes 
to the inflation of their moral identity strength. 
In firm N2, employees generally do not show signs of discomfort at the context even 
though some of them acknowledge the environment is largely unregulated. From the 
lens of an employee who objectively painted the real picture of the bureaucracy, it is 
clear that there is a big difference between what is said on paper and what happens 
in reality. As such employees are allowed to act in opportunistic ways to ensure the 
economic objectives of the firm are met as shown below: 
“…In the long run when decisions are to be made, they have to be 
made based on the figures than every other thing. At times, there is 
this conflict so at the end of the day, I feel we are more interested in 
the figures than the processes so at times you always find conflicts 
between the representatives and the managers by telling them this is a 
process to follow and they tell you if I follow this process my figures 
are not likely to add up. At the end of the day, this is what you will 
judge me with, that means the culture is not really there…That means 
most of the things we do, they are more of lip services. I want you to 
do this, follow these steps but when it comes to decision making do 
you follow those steps?” (N2d) 
From the above quote, it seems clear that the environment in Firm N2 encourages 
opportunism expressed as a quite “laissez faire” standard of behaviour, aiming to the 
ends of economic gains. In this case employees are often left to play by their own 
personal rules in the absence of any collective rules or guidance as long as the 
figures add up in the end. This is the general understanding within Firm N2 such that 
adapting and playing along is a typical mind-set amongst employees in this 
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bureaucracy, which comes with a strong sense of unwillingness to engage in 
personal moral inquiry as is the case with the participant below: 
“…For example we had a particular product that customers were 
complaining that its shelf off take was too slow but I did research on a 
particular customer and I discovered that based on the nature of his 
patients, if I give him 50% of what he will be worried about, he will 
consume it if he can get the right motivation. So I did my background 
check, information, everything about him… And he asked a particular 
question, If I do this, look at my experiences, would you do this? I said 
I'm already ready, he felt I was joking. He said if I pay something like 1 
million, I get XYZ as agreed? I said before you pay me you would see 
it and he felt I was joking.  I went and I came in and installed 
everything for him immediately. He just came back and saw everything, 
the guy was like surprised, shocked and that was it.” (N2b, Strong 
moral identity) 
The result of an unregulated environment is that employees easily rationalise their 
decisions and thrive in the firm and outside by doing things as they please as long as 
they can be justified as contributing to the economic objectives of the firm. This is 
clearly seen in the quote above where the participant has shown no signs of moral 
contemplations or inquiry in describing an obvious process of inducement and bribery. 
This manifested an attitude in this bureaucratic context whereby “the means justifies 
the end”. The participant also claimed to have a strong moral identity, however the 
nature of the quote above seems to suggest the contrary. Thus, it can be said that 
the unregulated context in firm N2 does facilitate a sense of inflated moral identity 
strength. Also employees get support from the firm to do anything they deem fit as 
the participant below explains: 
“…They won’t tell you that you can’t do things but if you did it to make 
money, nobody is going to harass you…You can do anything you feel 
like doing to a large extent… as long as you can justify it and of course 
you can always have a reason for it. It’s unlike the multinationals 
where you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they do the anti-
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corruption law every time…But whilst you are here there is really no 
code of ethics as long as you can justify it. (N2a) 
“You know here, buying a digital satellite television for a hospital is not 
a big deal body. Is it adding value to the doctor? The answer is no. Is it 
adding value to the patient? The digital satellite television does not 
add value to the patient because you're putting it in a room. How does 
that improve the practice of the Dr to help the patient? So here they 
say I want a digital satellite television, okay buy the television no 
problems with that. But in foreign multinationals, it’s not allowed but 
when Firm N2 is putting it in, we write on it that it is donated by Firm 
N2.” (N2a) 
Thus, it seems that the largely “entrepreneurial environment” within the bureaucracy 
does not encourage moral contemplation or moral inquiry in the ways the employees 
and managers do their job and their sense of serving their personal integrity as much 
as serving the bureaucratic conventions.  It however creates an enabling 
environment for employees to become systematically insensitive to moral concerns 
whilst also discouraging moral responsibility. And as the moral identity scores reveal, 
no employee in Firm N2 claimed to have a weak moral identity, implying that they 
may have gradually developed personal defence mechanisms, whereby their 
obedience to superiors and the bureaucratic rules automatically signifies a sense of 
strong moral identities. However, only participant N2a above showed signs of moral 
contemplation due to previous work exposure in top multinational pharmaceuticals 
where compliance was by obedience to rules as found in the American case group in 
Chapter 6; hence he/she is able to show some sense of moral awareness, yet his/her 
continual existence within the context questions the participant’s true moral reasoning 
capacity. But generally, other employees and managers easily follow the norms of 
the bureaucracy, which creates an environment where things can be easily 
rationalised and often results in an inflated sense of moral identity.  
In summary therefore, it can be said that Firms N1 and N2 present a strikingly 
different picture (based on the evidence presented here) regarding proposition 1.  In 
Firm N1, it was discovered that moral inquiry is being encouraged and a sense of 
social accountability exists, while both these are tied not in the features of the 
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bureaucracy per se but in the moral character of the leader and his team. This 
supports a genuine moral identity concern by employees with strong moral identities. 
Conversely, firm N2 presents a context where the unregulated environment makes it 
easy for employees to rationalise their actions, thereby rendering them 
systematically insensitive to moral issues. This in turn results in an inflated and 
subjective sense of moral identity strength in employees who clearly showed 
evidences of weak moral identity. 
8.5 Proposition 2  
Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards 
conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
This case group presents a contrasting pair of firms. N1 is a quasi bureaucracy with 
charismatic authority as the closest reference. N2 is an entrepreneurial loosely 
regulated context with only limited attention to organisational rules that mainly seeks 
economic profitability. In this proposition I explore here whether acting in alignment 
with both these aspects of the bureaucracies (managerial control and rules in both 
N1 and N2) is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in middle/lower 
managers. Evidence will be presented to show whether the bureaucracy encourages 
uncritical obedience to set rules thereby encouraging conformist behaviour and 
whether the bureaucracy then rewards such conformity. The following are the key 
findings: 
8.5.1 Finding 2a: The bureaucracy in Firm N1 encourages higher conventional 
level and entry level post-conventional reasoning levels in employee by 
empowering them to maintain a good sense of their individual moral reflection 
and reasoning / action “spaces”. This is the only case where more systematic 
instances of higher CMD are being found. 
Amongst the nine participants interviewed in Firm N1, five were adjudged to be 
reasoning at the conventional level whilst four were adjudged to reason at the post 
conventional levels (see table 8.1 above). Across the three case groups studied in 
this dissertation, this firm alone has produced the highest number of post 
conventional level thinkers. This could be linked to the fact that charismatic authority 
underpins the bureaucratic features of this firm. As such, employees are more 
morally sensitive because they are more inclined to embrace moral virtues they see 
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on display through the leaders they respect as different from morality enforced by 
rules. As earlier discovered, this also has a positive impact on employee moral 
awareness such that employees have a common understanding of what the 
organisation stands for. But also more importantly, it was discovered that this 
bureaucracy encourages employees to maintain a good sense of their individuality, 
which is healthy for the development of individual moral reasoning as described by 
the employees in the quotes below: 
“I just have to be me. I can't change myself. The system encourages 
me to be myself. What I came here with is what I am maintaining I 
can’t change… you cannot change your inherent character. I don't see 
any reason why I should try to be what you think I should be. I am not 
really particular about you trying to please somebody…I am just 
myself...(N1f) 
“There is this free mindedness here… Firm N1 is an environment 
whereby you're not so scared of anybody even the bosses. I would 
also use an example of my director who grew me up to have 
confidence in myself no matter how critical or terrible you are you can 
stand up and just express yourself…we are free with one another you 
know sometimes in some companies you could go up and say I want 
to see the MD and they say see the secretary... it is not like that here 
you walk up to him and say this is what I have, it is a friendly 
atmosphere, this freedom that is the best in my opinion, the freedom is 
there, expressing yourself in a well mannered way, not in an abusive 
way, you are free to express yourself…” (N1h) 
The quotes above suggest the bureaucracy in Firm N1 encourages individuality and 
supports individuals being empowered to display their own moral acumen, as 
expressed by employee interviews. Furthermore, participant N1h above indicates 
that the mentoring of one the leaders equipped him to be expressive and free. This 
in turn seems to instil a strong sense of confidence in employees. By this, it can be 
said that employees are not coerced into conformity whereby it’s all about following 
the rules, but they are allowed freedom of choice which can be healthy for moral 
reasoning as depicted in the following quote by one of the employees: 
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“I come from a family that holds up to very high morals so on my job, I 
would not lower the standards of what should be obtainable at my 
desk so I ensure that everything that emanates from my desk is 
authentic, valid and I come back it up with documents and I think that 
speaks for every department in this organisation. That’s why said there 
is a moral, ethical way, accountability standard that we try to 
maintain…” (N1b) 
As depicted above, the sense of individuality not being lost but encouraged within 
the context of firm N1 explains why it is easy for employees to operate at higher 
levels of moral reasoning compared to both N2 and other cases analysed in previous 
sections. As seen in table 8.1 above, the lowest moral reasoning level found in this 
case group is conventional level stage 4. At this level of reasoning, individual 
employees collaborate to maintain a social order, which in this case is the social 
accountability system earlier discovered to be operational within firm N1. In a few 
more instances, employees showed strong signs of post conventional stage 5 
reasoning, a level at which employees feel they are free to disobey wrong rules and 
act consistently with personal principles as can also be inferred in some of the 
quotes above. Hence it can be said that the bureaucracy in firm N1 does encourage 
conventional level reasoning, not at the mere conformity level but at the level where 
its free environment supports collaborative maintenance of social order. This also 
seems to support higher levels of reasoning in which employees feel empowered to 
have the right to disobey wrong rules (if and where they exist) and embrace personal 
principles as inspired by the leaders within the bureaucracy. However, there were no 
evidences that this bureaucracy explicitly rewards employees for acting in 
accordance to the bureaucracy. 
8.5.2 Finding 2b: The bureaucracy in Firm N2 however encourages lower CMD 
kinds. Specifically evidence shows pre-conventional and conventional level 
thinking are being evidenced, via the opportunistic behaviour patterns found 
in interviewees.  
In firm N2, majority of employees were adjudged to function at the conventional level 
of moral reasoning. This may immediately suggest that this bureaucracy is congruent 
with conventional reasoning level since most participants’ reasoning is at that level. 
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However, as discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, this bureaucracy is 
largely unregulated discovered to encourage opportunistic behaviours in its 
employees. Thus, employees are not bound by any rules but have the freedom to 
make their own choices as long they contribute to the economics objectives of the 
firms. The firm as explained below also encourages this behaviour: 
 “…We put things in place in order to get a government business, it is 
part of the norm of a typical Nigerian business. Nobody will see it as a 
bribe. No. It's only if you're working for a multinational that people can 
see you've giving government something. It is just a typical Nigerian 
way so there is nothing bad about it, giving a government official 
money so that they can put your products under government tender, 
there is nothing bad there as far as the system is concerned”.  (N2a) 
As seen from the quote above, the bureaucracy in firm N2 is described as an 
environment in which decisions can be easily rationalised and justified in terms of 
their instrumental functionality in terms of economic values (profit, sales etc). As 
such, a quite shocking finding was that obvious acts of inducements and bribery are 
being considered ‘normal’ and ‘typical’ business as usual, because the bureaucracy 
presents it as the norm. Whilst this can foster conventional levels of moral reasoning 
in which employees conform to the bureaucracy’s standards without showing any 
critical moral inquiry, this was also discovered to support pre conventional reasoning 
level in employees. Thus, the opportunistic environment of firm N2 encourages 
employees to reason at the level in which critical moral inquiry is not in their purview 
but ‘what is in it for me’ mentality or that ‘I am okay because others are doing it’ 
mentality all aimed at being seen as loyal employees to the firm. This kind of 
reasoning was shown in the words of two managers as follows: 
“I enjoy selling and the figures are coming in. I calculate what I will 
make from transactions and I have had to give the money because 
there was a condition for that if you can do this we get this.  So I don't 
have to start calling the office again. You know at times you need to 
get back to the office mostly because of the price issue but this 
particular incident there was already a provision because I've 
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complained that we need to take out something because of the 
challenge we have and they actually keyed in…” (N2b) 
“We build relationships, we also work on their emotions, and we 
discover opportunities. You might walk into a customer shop, there are 
opportunities there which nobody has filled up, not only giving the 
person the product but there are needs in his business that have not 
been identified or taken care of you know so discovering does 
opportunities and in helping the person to meet those needs will also 
increase his loyalty to your brand. In marketing they call it a war at the 
front you must do whatever, you use all the strategy that you can ever 
think of in order to make sure you win” (N2c) 
Signs of both pre-conventional and conventional reasoning are seen in the 
opportunistic nature exhibited in the quotes above. The aim is to win at all cost and 
the methods encouraged by the bureaucracy include anything necessary to get 
customers to buy in. This encourages employees to go all out to get what’s in it for 
them as participant N2b suggested. Thus it seems clear that within firm N2, 
employees are disengaged from moral inquiry and since the firm sanctions their 
actions, it is easy for them to thrive in the firm. This encourages employees to reason 
by enforcing instrumental self and group interests. This is really what the pre 
conventional levels of CMD (found in this case) are about. Only one employee 
reasoned at the post conventional level and this was owing to the fact that in all the 8 
years of work experience the participant has had, all have been in multinationals 
where rule compliance existed. Hence, coming from a more regulated environment 
into an unregulated one made a huge difference to his/her perception of firm N2.  
Lacking longitudinal data it is uncertain if the employee with the higher CMR 
continues this way. 
To summarize, in firm N1, the bureaucracy is established to facilitate freedom for 
individuals to engage in genuine personal moral decision making, which also 
promotes a social sense of moral accountability. This was also linked to the higher 
CMD reasoning patterns in this firm. In firm N1, conventional level thinking was the 
more prevalent level of reasoning due to the collective, shared values that create an 
environment of social accountability hence employees work to maintain such social 
 215 
order. In firm N2, both pre conventional and conventional level of reasoning are 
encouraged. Pre-conventional reasoning is easily exhibited in persons who are all 
out to make gains for themselves and the firm in order to be seen as loyal 
employees. Conventional level of reasoning displayed by the employees is often 
towards the ends of conformity to the bureaucracy’s environment or maintaining the 
social order of being in an environment of like-minded opportunists. In other words 
employees’ don’t have the capacity to reason above the prevalent norm since moral 
inquiry is discouraged.  
8.6 Proposition 3 
Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards 
management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice 
and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong 
and weak moral identity 
In Firm N1, interviewed employees were selected from various departments from 
which two of nine participants were pharmacists. Only these two roles require 
pharmacists to occupy them. Other roles, for instance the audit officer had to be an 
accountant as much as the corporate services manager had to be a marketing and 
communications expert. Thus, there is a mix of other professionals other than 
pharmacists amongst interviewed participants in Firm N1. However, interviewed 
participants in firm N2 were all pharmacists except one participant despite the fact 
that he/she is involved in the sales and marketing of drugs for the firm.  
 
One way of testing this proposition is to observe whether the two bureaucracies in 
this case group affects how pharmacists or other professionals make sense of their 
role within the bureaucracies in relation to their professional obligations stipulated by 
the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in 
Nigeria or any other professional bodies. As Koehn (1994) suggests that the ground 
for moral authority for any profession is in public pledge or oath, which is binding on 
the professionals. Hence, the characterisation of a profession by its professional 
body to which all registered members are expected to swear an oath is the broad 
professional identity meant to govern the activities of such persons regardless of 
their employer. Evidence from the literature (Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible 
that the broader “learnt” professional identity (via education, socialisation and oath in 
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a specific profession) could be lost within the self-interest agenda of bureaucracies 
such as firm profit maximisation or managerial rationality. Managerial rationality in 
this case means what is good is what enhances the managers’ goals and agendas 
and makes a practice appear successful (Shenhav, 2008). In such an instance, the 
view of a pharmacist or professional projected by the bureaucracy and embraced by 
participants would require a narrower professional identity.  This is reviewed in the 
context of both firm N1 and N2 and the findings are presented below: 
 
8.6.1 Finding 3a: The quasi-bureaucracy Firm N1 encourages 
‘professionalism’ (broader professional identity) over ‘expertise’ (narrower 
professional identity) in pharmacists and non-pharmacists. 
Koehn, (1994) argues that professionals are not more than mere experts if 
professionalism is simply based on possessing a lot of knowledge and skill in a field 
(See Appendix 4, 334) for grounds of professional ethics. From her position, it was 
clear that expertise could readily foster a narrower professional identity since 
‘experts’ could be inclined to using their knowledge as a tool to further advance 
management motives which in this case of this bureaucracy could be to make money 
for the firms. Professionals on the other hand as Koehn, (1994) argue function by 
public pledge or oath, which confers a moral duty to act in accordance to the 
stipulations of such oath. This as earlier discussed is the broader professional 
identity, expected to guide the actions and decisions of employees who are affiliated 
with any regulating professional body, in this case PCN or any other recognised 
professional body. As such, ‘experts’ are not bound by any moral obligation per se 
and can therefore act in ways that advance the objective they wish to serve. 
 
In firm N1, more non-pharmacists were interviewed based on their job roles within 
the organisation. Nonetheless, individuals who belonged to professional bodies 
occupied most of these roles. For example, the audit officer is a chartered 
accountant registered with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), 
the regulatory body for all Nigerian accountants. It was discovered that the 
bureaucracy in Firm N1 created an enabling environment for this audit officer to 
express his professional identity without interfering with his duty as an employee of 
firm N1. In fact, according to the audit officer, he sees himself more as a chartered 
accountant than an employee of Firm N2, a notion that helps preserve his 
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professional identity needed to execute his duties within the firm. This is shown 
below: 
 
“I think what is important are your core values as a professional 
because that we sell you anywhere, maybe you're not in Firm N1 
maybe you are an external auditor…your core values as a 
professional supersedes all that. But in terms of my professional core 
values and that of Firm N1, do they really met my expectations, yes… 
we have brought our professional competence into the system just to 
ensure that it matches with the core values here and in doing that 
ensuring that there is improvement as well.” (N1f)  
“Yes, when you talk about confidentiality, integrity, professionalism you 
have to be professional… Our institution (ICAN) our code of conduct, 
we are guided by that so for you to be a chartered accountant or to be 
in the profession you have to have a high level of all those code of 
conduct just thinks inform our job, our daily activities… yes they do you 
have to find a way of streamlining your professional code of conduct 
with that of Firm N1 in terms of commitment, hard work and all of 
that….And there are no conflicts of interests…It has to be more 
towards my professional discipline because I can leave tomorrow but 
my professional discipline my core value as a profession will always 
follow me wherever I go.” (N1f) 
As observed from the quotes above, it seems clear that the participant above spoke 
more as a professional with his professional identity coming out strongly in his 
descriptions above. The environment in Firm N1 is largely referred to as being in 
encouraging towards professionalism as different from expertise. Thus the 
bureaucracy seems to create an environment where conflicts of interests for 
professionals are minimal through the alignment of the bureaucracy’s values and 
those of the professional body, in this case ICAN. Hence, the employee does not find 
it difficult to exercise his professional identity and can remain faithful to the oath 
he/she has sworn as a professional whilst being an employee of the organisation. An 
enabling factor as explained by one of the managers in Firm N1 is that the 
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bureaucracy is a ‘free’ environment that gives employees opportunity to express 
themselves as shown below: 
“The culture here is such that it gives room for people you know to 
express yourself, to be easily seen and to grow. It doesn't have what I 
call a kind of limitation to the way you can aspire in your profession, 
the culture is such that people take you... we work as a family, we 
work as a team, it is like carrying everybody along you understand in 
doing things.” (N1c) 
The quote above seems to credit the free, cordial environment in Firm N1 has being 
an enabler of employees to be themselves as professionals. By this, employees feel 
empowered by the system to function in an environment where their voices are heard 
and one in which all employees embrace mutual respect as well as the shared values. 
This can also be explained as creating a less distracting environment for employees 
such that they can focus on being professionals as different from being pressured by 
management into meeting the objectives of the bureaucracy which itself could 
systematically distract employees away from their professional identity as discovered 
in case of the Indian firms in Chapter 7. 
8.6.2   Finding 3b: The Firm N2 encourages a personalised instrumental sense 
of being an expert over ‘professionalism’ in pharmacists and non-pharmacists  
Seven of eight participants in firm N2 are registered pharmacists. As earlier 
established, Firm N2 operates a largely unregulated bureaucracy with an excessive 
focus on economic gains. This cultivates an opportunistic environment in which 
employees play by no rules and are regulated by no one other than themselves. By 
this, employees are free to do anything as long as they can justify them based on the 
economic objectives of the firm. The result is that this kind of environment is able to 
easily distract employees from their sworn professional identity into pursuing the 
objectives of the bureaucracy. Focus in this bureaucracy shifts from how to be a 
good pharmacist to how to be a good sales person as the following employees who 
are registered pharmacists with strong moral identity demonstrated: 
 
“…It has been challenging, it has been interesting. I like selling so it's 
the same thing, there is nothing new about it is just that there is a 
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change in industries for me… I came from Fast Moving Consumer 
Goods (FMCG) where you sell whatever you like whatever you sell 
you promote but… the competition is stiffer here than in other 
industries… I enjoy myself, I enjoy selling. I love selling and selling and 
the figures are coming in...”(N2b) 
I have also learnt a great deal about brand, brand building, we just 
been finished a training on market strategies, market penetration, we 
just finished that and also in a broad view, market development and all 
the strategies all the processes and everything that has to do with 
marketing because I love marketing than sales. I love marketing and 
marketing activities. (N2c) 
The quote above reveal that these employees who are registered pharmacists 
reason and see themselves more as sales and marketing experts than pharmacists. 
More importantly they seem to have an instrumental personalised sense of being 
experts in their own rights based on their capacity to sell in order to meet their 
targets. With the focus on the figures coming across strongly again, participant N2b 
above claims to enjoy ‘selling’. As a registered pharmacist, the focus of saving lives 
seems to have been systematically replaced by the joy of sales and making money 
even though employees of firm N2 have a similarly good pay package as employees 
in firm N1. Furthermore, the types of training employees are exposed clearly shows 
they are being equipped to further advance the cause of the bureaucracy - becoming 
‘expert’ sales men/women or marketers who are knowledgeable enough to penetrate 
markets in meeting the demands of the bureaucracy. In this again, employees seem 
to be systematically desensitised from their professional calling through continuous 
exposure to an opportunistic environment where looking good is all about the figures 
and trainings are about making the figures roll in. Also, the fact that ‘clients’ are 
being treated not as clients (people seeking a public good) but market segments 
further contravenes the notion of professionalism as Koehn (1994) posited. 
Therefore, the environment in Firm N2 seems to bear a semblance with the Indian 
pharmaceuticals in the previous chapter. The loyalty of employees regardless of their 
moral identity is towards the management of the bureaucracy.  It is visibly less about 
a sense of personal and professional integrity as presented in the theory of 
professional ethics (cite).  This is typically encouraged by an unregulated 
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environment coupled with a strong focus on economic gains and rewarding and 
rationalisation of such behavioural motivation for action over and above professional 
integrity and excellence.  
In summary regarding findings in proposition 3, it can be said that again this case 
shows contrasting evidence.  The bureaucracy in Firm N1 is actually enabling 
towards behaviour that show a sense of loyalty to employees’ professional codes 
and values. This is achieved through the free, cordial yet regulated environment in 
Firm N1 driven majorly by shared values, mutual trust and respect for the 
bureaucracy and its leaders. In the unregulated firm N2 however, the opportunistic 
environment coupled with an excessive focus on economic gains is distracting for 
employees whose behaviours show a stronger inclination towards the objectives of 
management over their profession. These also make employees less inclined to 
engage in critical moral inquiry of moral situations at work since adhering to the 
bureaucracy’s objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees. 
8.7 Conclusion 
Firms N1 and N2 are dissimilar pairs of firm within this case group. Firm N1 is a firm 
driven by charismatic persons that resembles the Weberian form of charismatic 
authority bureaucracy but is not a typical bureaucracy really.  
Managerial control within the context of N1 is based on the symmetry between 
personal responsibility and social accountability, a self-regulatory system stemming 
from trust in shared values and virtues modelled by the leaders within the 
organisation, whom the employees greatly esteem. Organisational rules are more 
verbal and unwritten yet a binding and common understanding exists on what the 
firm stands for amongst all employees.  
Conversely, Firm N2 (Entrepreneurial Bureaucracies) presented an unregulated and 
loosely coupled and opportunistically driven organisational context in which elements 
of rules and managerial control were not clearly visible within the firm. It is a 
performance and opportunity driven business context. Hence, employees play by 
their own rules often sanctioned by the firm towards the ends of economic gains. 
In proposition 1, both firms present contrasting evidence on the effect of acting in 
accordance with the bureaucratic features on employees’ moral identity. In Firm N1, 
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it was discovered that the bureaucracy enables moral inquiry by encouraging an 
environment in which employees are morally aware through the actions of their 
leaders. This in turn contributes positively to the moral identity strength of employees 
rather than subjectively inflating it.  
Conversely, firm N2 presents a context where the unregulated environment makes it 
easy for employees to rationalise their actions, thereby rendering them 
systematically insensitive to moral issues. This in turn results in an inflated and 
subjective sense of moral identity strength in employees who clearly showed 
evidences of weak moral identity. 
In the second proposition, the bureaucracy in firm N1 was established to facilitate 
freedom for individuals to express themselves, which also promotes moral 
awareness and inquiry. Conventional level thinking in this context was more 
prevalent due to the collective, shared values that create an environment of social 
accountability hence employees work to maintain such social order. However this 
firm reported the highest number of post conventional thinkers across the three case 
groups.  
Regarding the second proposition in firm N2, both pre conventional and conventional 
level of reasoning are encouraged. The opportunistic environment encouraged 
employees to go all out to make gains for themselves and the firm in order to be 
seen as loyal employees. Conventional level of reasoning displayed by the 
employees is often towards the ends of conformity to the bureaucracy’s environment 
or maintaining the social order of being in an environment of like-minded 
opportunists. In other words employees’ don’t have the capacity to reason above the 
prevalent norm since moral inquiry is discouraged.  
Finally, in proposition 3, bureaucracy in Firm N1 is actually enabling towards 
behaviour that show a sense of loyalty to employees’ professional codes and values 
where they have one as different from Firm N2. This is achieved through the free, 
cordial yet regulated environment in Firm N1 driven majorly by shared values, mutual 
trust and respect for the bureaucracy and its leaders.  
In the unregulated firm N2 however, the opportunistic environment coupled with an 
excessive focus on economic gains is distracting for employees whose behaviours 
show a stronger inclination towards the objectives of management over their 
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profession. These also make employees less inclined to engage in critical moral 
inquiry of moral situations at work since adhering to the bureaucracy’s objectives 
creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees. 
  
 223 
CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
9.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, a critical discussion of the prevalent themes across the three case 
groups explored in this study will be presented. It starts by giving a general overview 
of the four different hybrids of bureaucracies that typified each of the case group. 
The key patterns found relevant to the effects specifically of formalised rules and 
managerial control (representing the two Weberian bureaucracy dimensions in this 
study) on employee morality are also discussed2. There then follows a discussion of 
three key emergent themes common across the case groups which are implicated by 
bureaucracy: respondents inflated perception of their own morality, cognitive moral 
reasoning as a better predictor of morality and the encouragement of expertise over 
professionalism which are compared and contrasted with the relevant literature. 
From discussion of the above, I conclude this chapter with implications for theory. 
9.1 Interpretations of Bureaucracy 
A primary contribution through this study is an empirical investigation of bureaucracy 
as an overall organisational normative context, according to research aim 1 (page 4).  
The data reveal that a bureaucracy is not merely a cluster of related characteristics 
or general typology as it is often abstracted in the literature and relevant theory (e.g 
Weber, 1978). Instead, even within the characteristics of a common type there are 
subtle differences. This confirms the position of Udy, (1959) and Hall, (1963) who 
both opined that the study of bureaucracy is more empirically valid when it is treated 
as a condition that exists along a continuum, with varying degrees of each of its 
components, rather than a condition that is present or absent. It also presents 
opportunities for utilising the empirical findings to further develop theory by extending 
key theoretical works on bureaucracy (Downs, 1964; Albrow, 1970; Weber, 1978) 
and its effects in human relations (Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 2007). 
                                                          
2 The choice of these dimensions  (rules and control) had been justified in Chapter 2 and a key 
justification for focusing on these two is that they are specifically important in the industry 
context. 
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 Accordingly with the above, with the subtle differences in each of the characteristics 
of bureaucracy come varying effects that often result in hybrid or new forms of 
bureaucracy. This was the case in the bureaucracies across the three case groups in 
this dissertation. Moreover, this finding extends both key theory as well as earlier 
primarily western studies of bureaucracy to emerging markets. As foreign firms 
expand into new terrains (as it was in two of the three case groups in this study), 
bureaucracies tend to manifest new and different forms within those new contexts 
(Evans and Ruach, 1999). As such, within the context of this study, four different 
types of bureaucracies were found in the three investigated case groups namely: 
Traditional Bureaucracy (found in the American Case group), Caste Bureaucracy 
(found in the Indian Case group), Charismatic Bureaucracy and Entrepreneurial 
Bureaucracy (both organisations in the Nigerian Case group sample). Each of these 
showed different manifestations of the two major bureaucratic features explored in 
this study, namely Formalised rules and Managerial control. Also, the role of national 
cultures in each of these hybrids cannot be ignored as well since the culture of the 
firm’s HQ is known to directly affect the ways their subsidiaries function in foreign 
contexts (Pahlberg, 1995; Lee and Shah-Hosseini 2013; Victoria, and Dipak, 2014; 
Hofstede, 2015). This could therefore have a direct impact on the type of 
bureaucracies such subsidiaries espouse and the specific functioning of the 
Weberian elements within them. However, this is outside of the scope of this 
research and clearly merits further study. Overall, these different types of 
bureaucracy are found to have different effects on the morality of the employees 
functioning within them. 
9.1.1 Traditional Bureaucracy 
The Traditional Bureaucracy as found in the American case group exemplifies 
Weber’s (1974) typical bureaucracy ideal type. It is driven by strict formalised rules 
and personalised managerial control. According to Weber’s categorisation, rationality 
is driven by certain characteristics of which written rules of conduct, hierarchy of 
authority and impersonality are central (Downs, 1964). Within this quintessential 
“western” organisational bureaucracy context of the American firms, rules in the form 
of standard operating procedures (SOPs) govern every aspect of employee activities 
both internally and outside of the firm, such that they are regarded as the ‘holy grail’ 
of working effectively within the context. These SOPs also originate from the US 
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parent firm without any or little modification for the Nigerian context. It is thus 
believed that compliance with set rules helps drive effectiveness and efficiency 
towards achieving the objectives of the bureaucracy. This in turn makes employees 
feel very competent on their jobs.  
Also as theorised by Weber (1974), any non-compliance to rules is often sanctioned 
just as in this case; employees are fined, suspended or may in extreme cases be 
fired if found to violate the set rules. This is often achieved through personalised 
monitoring by the managers within this bureaucracy such that managerial control is 
intended to enforce compliance to rules. This often invokes a sense of fear in 
employees given the harsh economic realities within the wider context of Nigeria 
(see chapter 5) hence employees understand strict rule compliance as the basis of 
“survival” within the bureaucracy. The findings show that as long as such rules are 
followed, employees (and management itself) feel covered, and having a safe 
professional career future in the firms, which normatively means bureaucratic rule 
following is linked with being seen as good employees. The legitimacy of this 
approach by the American firms is often linked by management to the broader 
context in which the firms operate and the belief is that since this is thought to be a 
context with government and system corruption, it is only through compliance with 
rules and managerial control that employees be ‘guided’ into ‘sound’ practices at all 
times. This may also manifest that rules may serve as a contrast between the in-firm 
American multinational cultural context and the outside local cultural context; this 
may serve to remind employees (who in majority are locals) that the first should be 
valued and is superior to the latter. Hence, employees are made to believe that their 
compliance to set rules is for the greater good, firstly to act as good citizens who will 
not contribute to corruption within the context and secondly to be identified as good 
employees who are exhibiting ‘professional’ behaviour in their jobs. 
Based on the above, correctness within the system is derived from compliance to 
rules, which drive a feeling of competence and safety. A sense of fear is derived by 
the conscious attention of the firm’s employees to clearly not violate any rule. Instead 
interestingly, there is a conscious acceptance that rule violation legitimizes sanctions 
and penalties in this bureaucracy. Rule rationality is key here. However, this comes 
with an unhealthy tendency that seems to align with Weber’s warning that ‘...as 
desire for organisational order tends to focus too much on rationality of rules in and 
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of themselves, over intellectualising the moral and ethical values critical to 
organisational lives and making decisions according to rules, without regard for the 
people involved becomes a possibility’ (Kalberg, 1980:1158).  
This may ultimately lead to the figurative iron cage: ‘the rationalisation and rules that 
trap humans in a figurative cage of thought based on rational calculations’ (Weber, 
1958: 180-181). True to Weber’s concerns, the Traditional Bureaucracy in the 
American case group creates an environment in which employees become ‘so 
enmeshed in creating and following a legalistic, rule-based hierarchy that the 
bureaucracy becomes a subtle but powerful form of domination’ (Barker, 1993:3). 
This is to the extent that employees show a strong allegiance to the bureaucracy on 
the grounds that it provides an environment where they ‘do the right things’ by 
following set rules and higher authority. Within this context it is rational to not 
question the rules in any way (especially once it is the rule that prescribes that rules 
–and being given penalties for not following these- may not be questioned), which 
may explain a moral disengagement linked with this bureaucracy. All actions and 
activities prior to execution have to be weighed on the scale of set rules and any 
found wanting are often referred to superiors or discarded. Such is the reverence for 
rules that employees see the SOPs as not just professional rules but also as moral 
rules that must be obeyed at all times and in all circumstances for the greater good. 
This therefore comes with the tendency to trap employees in the ‘iron cage’ whereby 
individual moral agency is completely tamed and rules replace human capacity to 
decipher moral cues and subsequent action. For instance, in handling moral issues 
faced on their jobs, employees are told to refer to ‘model answers’ they have been 
taught to give through moral case studies during training. As such employees are fed 
with the answers they are to recite and not allowed to process moral issues through 
genuine critical moral inquiry. 
Rule compliance is further enhanced by the role managers are empowered to play in 
enforcing already set rules within the bureaucracy. For instance, managers are 
regarded as having exclusive powers of deciding the standards of what is 
right/wrong and moral/immoral based on already established rules while their 
interpretations fit rather financial/performance objective standards rather than moral 
matters.  They have legitimacy of possessing a superior understanding of processes 
and procedures and are thus the enforcers of the rules. This creates a sense that 
 227 
only managers are entitled to be moral arbiters or that at least their viewpoint will 
prevail and followed, that can gradually create passivity and lack of engagement.  
This tends to foster the rational-legal authority anchored on impersonal rules that 
have been legally established such that employees are expected to defer to their 
managers in situations of uncertainty (Aron, 1970 and Coser, 1977). In literature, 
impersonality is considered critical to the functioning of managerial control within 
bureaucracies (Barker, 1993) however; control within this traditional bureaucracy is 
achieved through a subtle means of cordiality and respect between managers and 
their direct reports. This in turn enables working relationships based on supervision 
and training, all of which facilitate easy learning of the bureaucracy’s ways and also 
fosters channels of propagating bureaucratic compliance amongst employees. In 
Weber’s ideal type, this trait was not accounted for and as Downs (1964: pg.7) 
reported, this aspect of the Traditional Bureaucracy was neglected by Weber despite 
emphasis by ‘many sociologists that informal structures of authority and 
communication are inevitable in any cooperating group of human beings’. However, 
the fact that cordiality drives subtle yet powerful means of control highlights one of 
the main features of this bureaucracy as much as it confirms Down’s (1964) position 
that information within bureaucracies spreads faster and is more powerful through 
informal means. The above also means that there is potentially a division in the 
organisation between groups of bureaucrats who follow a compliant chain of 
command and (an out-group of) other professionals who may try to relate and 
communicate based on shared norms of professional ethics. This is explored in the 
third discussion theme later on. 
As such a large amount of power is in the hands of managers who are not just 
enforcers of the rules but are also seen as guardians of morality and the main 
legitimate role holders telling what is right or wrong based on their own ‘superior’ 
understanding of the rules in force within the bureaucracy. This contradicts with that 
the managers may or may not be seen as the ones who truly have a superior moral 
and ethical status in the firm, as other “moral authorities” outside the formal structure 
may be seen as a threat to the sustainability of this bureaucracy itself. Consequently, 
employees tend to derive their morality by following all set rules and by obeying their 
managers, with individual moral agency stifled in the process. As Reed, (2005: pg. 2) 
also highlighted, the functioning of this whole fabric as characterised by a strict rule 
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based compliance and enforced managerial control necessitates employees ‘to 
subordinate their own desires to the collective will of the organisation’ such that ‘they 
surrender some autonomy in organisational participation’. This often results in the 
tendency for rules to completely replace human moral reasoning processes to the 
extent that employees may actually systematically and progressively surrender all of 
their autonomy to the bureaucracy as they learn the ways of the bureaucracy within 
the social setting (Bandura, 1977). This renders employees incapable to spot 
discrepancies or to not over exaggerate deficiencies of firm rules since the very 
mechanism of SOPs requires and develops individual and group uncritical allegiance 
to rules and the reality of the firm. This in turn fosters an inability to decipher the 
broader moral consequences of their actions within the system, enabling the 
bureaucracy to easily use employees towards its own ends.  
9.1.2 Caste Bureaucracy 
The Caste Bureaucracy within the context of the Indian firms presents another type 
of bureaucracy. In Weber’s (1948) description of the ideal bureaucracy similar to the 
Traditional Bureaucracy above, strict rules enforced through personalised 
managerial control specify and regulate desired behaviours. Employees are also 
rewarded and sanctioned based on their compliance to these rules. However, within 
the Caste Bureaucracy, implicit culturally charged rules underpin control. As Jaeger, 
(1983) posited, national culture from a firm’s headquarters could be used as a tool in 
subsidiaries to specify and regulate behaviour of managers and employees alike. 
This was the case in this bureaucracy that is culturally dominated and functions 
based on an intertwined and subtler co-influencing of managerial control and rules. 
Like the ideal Weberian bureaucracy, there are strict rules or SOPs within this 
bureaucracy but unlike the Traditional Bureaucracy these rules regulate employee 
conduct only within the context of the Indian firms but not outside the firms. Coupled 
with the strict internal rules are implicit, unwritten cultural rules that are aimed at 
maintaining a total control of the bureaucracy in order to protect its economic 
interests owing to previous histories of fraud within the Indian firms. Also in the Caste 
Bureaucracy, managerial control is more personalised resulting in a strict status and 
stratification linked personalised monitored compliance. This is only as far as 
employees’ activities within the firms are concerned but distinct from the Traditional 
Bureaucracy in being very formal and inclined more towards an authoritarian style. 
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Interestingly also, there are no rewards and sanctions are often minimised to meagre 
deductions from salaries within the Caste Bureaucracy disparate from the Traditional 
Bureaucracy where non-compliance attracts heavy sanctions such as being fired.  
Hence, rules and managerial control within this bureaucracy are employed together 
in an intricate and more intertwined way. This appears to be done with an aim to 
maintain a clear organisational division in terms of status, power and influence. 
Specifically this is materialised via an explicit boundary between the upper 
management layer (more homogeneously Indian management role holders) and its 
middle management gate keepers on one hand, and the lower level roles (all 
Nigerian nationals) on the other hand. Thereby this is justifying the labelling of this 
bureaucracy type by borrowing the metaphor of a social caste system. In this case it 
is thereby restricting Nigerian nationals from rising into the senior management 
positions within the bureaucracy.  
This is interesting as within traditional bureaucracies, employees would be entitled to 
pursue career and professional progress in the hierarchy, but in this case it appears 
unlikely. So for instance, whilst there are unwritten norms and rules that limit the rise 
of Nigerian nationals within the firm, an authoritarian managerial control style through 
personalised compliance is employed to closely monitor and regulate all employee 
activities within the firm. Accordingly employees do not have any freedom within the 
firm: they are not allowed to question management decisions and are expected to 
follow orders without complaining. This confirms the cultural navigator report by 
Reed Elsevier, (2008) in which it was posited that in Indian firms, authority is often 
really authoritarian and autocratic and managers display their influence by directing 
employees as they wish and expecting nothing but total obedience and compliance 
(Reed Elsevier, 2008). This is however different from the Traditional Bureaucracy in 
that this control exists only internally within the Indian firms. Outside of the firms, 
employees enjoy total freedom and have full discretion in deciding how to go about 
their business which is not so in the previous bureaucracy. Also, within the Indian 
management style according to the Reed Elsevier, (2008) report, Indian firms tend to 
hire based on caste and other social profiling attributes, which limits the kind of 
people allowed in certain top management positions, as discovered within this case 
group.  
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This trait of the Caste Bureaucracy is not uniquely relevant to Indian firms. For 
example it may also apply to Anglo-Saxon institutions, perhaps in the non-profit or 
government sectors. For instance in British universities, it has been noted that 
specific rules are invented in a way that a very specific culture and philosophy are 
served (HESA, 2015; Shepherd, 2011; Grove, 2014). Specifically, The Guardian 
revealed that out of 14,000 British professors, only 50 are black (Shepherd, 2011) 
and this was attributed to institutional norms that limit the rise of particular groups of 
people within the university system. Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA, 
2015) also confirmed this on a larger scale reporting an over 90% disparity in the 
population of white employees compared to a meagre less than 10% of black 
employees in British institutions. This same type of disparity was also reported 
between male (66%) and female employees (34%) and professors in British 
institutions (HESA, 2015). Hence, the impersonality of the rules fits in well with the a-
relational and impersonality of British culture, and in this bureaucracy, the more 
authoritarian kind of rule monitoring resembles the Indian culture and reproduces the 
Indian caste system culture.  
The result of this kind of control is an environment where there seems to be little 
genuine social-professional relationship between the managers and anyone in non-
management roles. There is accordingly rarely co-participation. Instead, such 
relationships across different hierarchical and role profiles (exacerbated by clear 
differences in gender, race and other demographics) are based more on economic 
grounds and the ability of employees to be eager to meet their performance targets 
as at when due. In this case it was the stress of meeting individual sales targets 
which evidence that people saw it as quasi immoral to fail performance targets, that 
demonstrates the effects on employee morality from this caste bureaucracy (will be 
discussed later). Hence a lot of employees describe their relationship with the 
organisation even after more than five years of service, as a purely transactional 
relationship, one that functions on a sort of ‘give and take’ system that does not 
require respect, friendship or trust.  
Therefore, this bureaucracy’s characteristics are found to create a stratified 
organisational dynamic that often entails the physical involvement of managers in 
actively micro-managing the organisational activity of individual employees via strict 
personalised monitored compliance. Thus, Indian management takes the form of a 
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Foucauldian panopticon (Foucault, 1975). The concept of the panopticon refers to a 
circular prison with cells constructed around a central tower from which prisoners 
can be watched at all times. In relation to this bureaucracy, managers who are akin 
to Foucault’s ‘considerable body of militia, commanded by good officers and men of 
substance’ (pg. 195) are part of a ‘surveillance system’ that ceaselessly inspects 
every move made by their employees. Their gaze is everywhere and each stage of 
any process has an observation post to sanction the process to the next phase, 
without which the process falls through. Hence, managers actively monitor and 
control all internal firm processes.  
As noted earlier in caste bureaucracy, morality becomes confused with meeting 
performance targets to being recognised as a good (moral) employee, which is quasi 
immoral to fail these. There is little surprise then that this comes across as “naturally” 
legitimizing a typically utilitarian culture where the welfare of the more powerful and 
majority prevails and there may be little concern for the weaker, minorities and 
persons as ends in themselves (Crane and Matten, 2006). A utilitarian culture 
suggests decisions are being made for the greater good of all. Consequently, asking 
for excessive compliance and personalised monitoring and excessive management 
interference in various and mundane decisions and actions (micro-management) 
seem to have been imposed under a general “rule” that it is good for the general 
welfare, which in this case has been linked with a rational justification that it is “good” 
because of the previous history of fraud. So this utilitarian culture still preserves the 
“rational” Weberian element of bureaucracy (Weber, 1978) while it creates a strong 
bureaucratic kind of utilitarian morality. Thus in this case it is evident that the overall 
effect of the Caste Bureaucracy does not allow ethical contemplation and personal 
reflection but instead the experience of working within it is experiencing a gigantic 
centralised power with a utilitarian ethic façade.  
Therefore the “morality” of this bureaucracy is really about pursuing actions that 
increase external gains or a sense of approval, loyalty and a “feudal” kind of 
belonging to clearly stratified in-groups, while there is a strong rationalizing the rule 
of managerial monitoring as necessary in order to help prevent a repetition of 
previous fraudulent organisational history as noted in chapter seven. Accordingly, 
the morality of this organisation is a sense of legitimacy and privilege of employees 
being part of the in-group (belonging) of the organisational family (despite not being 
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able to ascend the caste system itself).  This surface level “belongingness” confers 
social moral identity recognition from superiors to subordinates.  Regarding this, 
individual employees are not bound by any rules outside of the firm but have a 
personal sense of moral authority and responsibility. Therefore, employees are 
expected to rely on their own sense of right-wrong applying professional discretion, 
as persons learn and internalise broader professional values and rules earlier via 
their academic professional education and prior experience. 
9.1.3 Charismatic Bureaucracy 
The Charismatic Bureaucracy is found in the context of firm N1, one of the two firms 
within the Nigerian case group. This bureaucracy has clearly defined hierarchical 
structures similar to Weber’s (1978) ideal type. There are also clear reporting lines 
within this bureaucracy however unlike a typical bureaucracy, relationships across 
the hierarchies are not impersonal as Weber theorised in his ideal type. Instead, 
employees relate freely with their managers and vice-versa with little or no barrier in 
interactions. As Merton, (1949) expressed, bureaucracies often stress the 
depersonalisation of relationships which he explained leads to ‘trained incapacity’, 
however in the case of this Charismatic Bureaucracy, even though clear hierarchies 
exist, there were no perceived power distance between the upper management role 
holders and their subordinates. This is also contrary to the general cultural norms of 
the national context in which power-distance between managers and employees is 
often very high (Hoftstede, 2015). Furthermore, within this bureaucracy, there are no 
strict clearly written rules as found in the Traditional Bureaucracy, instead employees 
and managers relate based on mutually understood implicit norms and values to 
guide their actions and decisions. Compliance is therefore not rule based but based 
on mutually shared and accepted social and moral norms enforced through social 
accountability. Thus, the Charismatic Bureaucracy presents a quasi-bureaucracy 
and not a typical bureaucracy governed by clear rules and impersonality according to 
Weber’s (1978) typology. It is instead a positive type of post bureaucracy, which 
Grey, (2007:480) in Knights and Wilmot (2007) defined as an organisation ‘based on 
trust, empowerment, personal treatment and shared responsibility’. 
Thus, the bureaucratic features of this organisation are underpinned by the genuine 
charisma of the managing director and his management team whom employees love 
and respect. In this case the charisma has been clearly linked with the principled 
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character and conduct of these persons in senior leadership. Respecting the person 
who is behind the role of CEO for their personal morality and overall personality in 
the profession is therefore a key to the characterisation of this as quasi-bureaucracy. 
This bureaucracy is unlike the legal-rational type, governed by strict rule compliance, 
which underpins a typical Weberian ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1958). In other words, 
charismatic authority according to Blau, (1964) is often dynamic and non-rational 
such that authority rests on the appeal of leaders to whom employees claim 
allegiance because of the force of their extraordinary personalities based on a pure 
personal social relationship (Weber, 1978; Elwell, 1996). As Shamir, House and 
Arthur, (1993: pg.578) further explained, the charismatic authority emphasises 
“symbolic behaviour, visionary and inspirational messages, nonverbal 
communication, appeal to ideological values, in self and subordinates”. This they 
explained gives meaningfulness to work by “infusing work and organizations with 
moral purpose and commitment rather than by offering material incentives (and a 
recognition premised upon compliance or in its absence) the threat of punishment” 
(Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993:578). With this, employees have a sense of an 
entirely personal devotion to their charismatic leader based on the senior 
leadership’s abilities to perform heroic acts (Weber, 1978). 
This is the case in N1 in which the managing director and his team are the 
charismatic figures within the organisation. They are often described by their 
employees as ‘inspirational’, ‘visionary’, ‘role-model’, ‘fatherly’ and ‘amiable’ such 
that they freely interact with employees at every level and have personal 
relationships with them in different capacities. Thus, authority as found in this 
Charismatic Bureaucracy is not based on discipline and impersonal agency on the 
basis of rationality (as in the traditional bureaucracy), nor a “class” (Adair and Toteff, 
2005) and loyalty to serve this class, as it was in the Caste Bureaucracy but on 
personal relationships and social interactions. By means of charisma, managers are 
able to influence and win over employees in ways only the employees can express 
whereby the latter are respected and free to reflect and relate to the authority as 
equals with no fear of penalties and not a stimulus for rewards on the basis of 
compliance or servitude.  
Therefore, in the case of N1, employees describe the managing director and 
his team as men of integrity, worthy to be emulated and whose character reflects in 
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how they do their job, often visible to the employees. As such, the MD and his 
management team in this case take on the ‘super-hero’ figure implied by Weber. 
This was exemplified in the instance of a current employee whom the MD mentored 
and sponsored from being a delinquent youth working as a security guard at the 
firm’s premises into a now fully educated young man who also serves as a Human 
Resource officer in the firm. Such gesture is widely cited amongst employees as 
heroic and visionary. Likewise, the manners in which the MD and his senior 
management team are known to personally handle incidents of complaints on the 
firm’s products are also regarded as practical demonstration of the integrity and 
accountability they claim to live by. For example, the MD was said to have on one 
occasion left his busy schedule to fly down to a distant location to personally handle 
one of such complaints to the surprise of the persons involved and the entire staff 
within the organisation. These types of gestures don’t just show acts of “heroism” but 
also show clear “morals” in the person of the MD and his senior management team.  
Weber (1958) also expressed that charismatic authority thrived more in loose 
structures and that charisma itself is temporary. This could be the case in the context 
of firm N1 where there were few written rules and managerial control was not rigid 
like the traditional bureaucracy, however the temporariness of this charismatic 
authority cannot be determined without longitudinal data. But this charismatic 
bureaucracy showed preference for a very cordial, informal system based on a 
sense of common understanding on binding values that is prevalent amongst 
employees. This is encouraged by the sense of awe and respect employees have for 
the visible character and conduct of the senior management, which also instils a 
sense of shared moral values. However as Riesebrodt, (1999) opined, charismatic 
authority can be “routinized” in several ways one of which is that orders are 
traditionalised. In the case of N1, even though there were unwritten rules, such rules 
take the form of instructions handed down by the senior and middle management, 
which employees institutionalise as the way to get things done. For example how 
employees are to handle sales orders are not clearly documented but managers 
instruct their direct reports on how to do this.  After a few implementations these 
become tacit traditionalised norms on how orders are to be processed. This is often 
the same for other processes such as how complaints are handled as well as how 
employees engage with hospitals and other potential stakeholders. Therefore, as 
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employees embrace such instructions from leaders they respect and are socialised 
within the system, they thrive more on shared values and regard themselves as part 
of a family, which creates a strong sense of social accountability within the 
charismatic bureaucracy. This is driven by the collective sense of respect and loyalty 
employees have for their inspirational managers that also drive genuine compliance 
such that no one wants to violate that communal trust (Carter, 1994). As Weber 
(1958) explains, employees under the charismatic authority are like disciples who 
show unflinching loyalty to the managers they have come to adore. 
Importantly, the literature on charismatic authority recognises the possibility of 
charisma being a ‘double-edged sword’. On one hand as Howell and Avolio, (1992) 
explain, charismatic managers can be destructive in which case they harness their 
charisma for selfish and immoral ends. Graham, (1991) cited examples of 
charismatic leaders who used their charisma to influence subordinates into 
committing heinous acts under the guise that they are being done for the common 
good with a confusion regarding what this may be and how it may be common. In 
such instances, charismatic persons may employ charisma as a façade to advance 
selfish interests or demand excessive loyalty and devotion of employees time and 
identity for the organisation’s goals in a way that is all about the leader showcasing 
self or the leader seducing the staff to make less attention to work life balance and 
other important broader social and professional roles / duties.  
On the contrary, another face of charisma is one in which charismatic persons 
genuinely use their charisma to benefit their subordinates, organisations and at times 
an entire society (Howell and Avolio, 1992). In this case, charisma is not a device or 
a hypocritical means to an end, but genuinely social tool towards a constructive 
collaboration for the common good. For example, leaders who use their charisma to 
fight for the freedom of oppressed groups in a society (Graham, 1991). Graham, 
(1991) further indicated that in cases where charisma is used to benefit an 
organisation or a society, it is often the reflection of the moral ideologies of the main 
character. These different faces of charisma could therefore have different 
implications for the sort of morality they create in organisations and also highlights 
the need to understand the type of charisma espoused in the case of N1.   
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The nature of the charisma found in N1 shows the more beneficial, type of charisma 
in which charisma is utilised in meaningful and ethical ways and via instilling 
common universal ethical values such as justice or fairness as earlier illustrated 
through the actions of the MD and his management team above. This type of 
‘ charisma’ put in the service of ethical ends is found in this context of N1 to be a 
good example of the post conventional (stage 6) level of thinking amongst 
employees as well as allowing personal moral inquiry amongst them. As noted in  
the literature review, Kohlberg’s stage 6 is a generally higher level of moral 
reasoning that utilises universal ethical theories such as justice and fairness in 
reasoning processes compared to the conventional level, which is more about 
conformity, and maintaining status quo. Interestingly, this Charismatic Bureaucracy 
produced the highest number of post conventional thinkers across all three case 
groups and hybrids of bureaucracy found in this study. And although this finding was 
not hypothesised, it is a remarkable finding about the effect of Charismatic authority 
not explained by Weber, as he did not explore how this could affect morality. It is 
known from literature especially Jackall, (1988) that this is very rare in any 
bureaucracy and the expectations are that bureaucracies typically encourage 
conventional level thinking among employees. However, the discovery that 
Charismatic Bureaucracy has an unusually high number of post conventional level 
thinkers implies this particular hybrid is ethically minded and thereby contributes new 
knowledge to Jackal’s, (1988) study as well as Weber’s, (1958) theory of authority. 
This is however an emergent finding that may not be conclusive and needs further 
investigation.  
The process through which the charismatic bureaucracy achieves the effects 
presented above could be explained in two ways: First, charismatic authority creates 
a mutual interaction process between the management and employees morality 
thereby creating a tacit diffusion of morality. This can be achieved through the direct 
influence of the management’s morality on the moral norms of employees, which 
could take a process of time not fully proven in this dissertation and as such requires 
further research.  
Secondly, since the kind of morality found in this bureaucracy is a mirror of the kind 
of organisational environment created by the management, the management may 
have the tendency to bring in people who are like themselves and these people will 
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recreate the identity of the organisation. This process is called the attrition-selection-
attrition process (Dreher, Ash and Bretz, 1988; Burkhardt, 1994; Boone et al, 2004), 
which presupposes that this charismatic bureaucracy has the tendency to attract, 
select and retain people that are like the senior management in their personal values 
and perspective. Dreher, Ash and Bretz, (1988) explained this process to imply that 
those attracted to a particular organisation are more homogenous than the general 
applicant pool. The implication of this is that as like-minded employees are brought 
on board, the organisation becomes more conventional. Overtime, this process 
means that conventional level thinking will actually influence the identity of this 
organisation. But in so far as authority is charismatic, they will try to attract and 
maintain post conventional level thinkers rather than to discourage and distance 
such moral reasoners from the organisation. Nonetheless, the general effect of this 
bureaucracy on morality is that it enhances individual and collective moral reflection 
and engagement. There is also the issue that the moral climate of the firm is only 
preserved for as long as the charismatic leader is in place. 
9.1.4 Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy  
The Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy is found in the context of firm N2, the second of the 
firms within the Nigerian case group. Like the Charismatic Bureaucracy, this 
bureaucracy is not characterised by any clearly written rules. This is also a 
fundamental difference between this Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy and the traditional 
bureaucracy. However, there are clearly defined hierarchies in this bureaucracy like 
in the traditional bureaucracy even though the nature of managerial control is not 
based on rule compliance. Instead, managerial control is underpinned by the quest 
to serve the economic interests of the key groups in power, or to mutually agree and 
act to promote economic interests of the most dominant groups who have more clear 
access to resources (financial, technology, managerial support). Here, what prevails 
is autonomous economic agency (still of utilitarian kind), but there were no visible 
signs of managers interfering or restraining their subordinates on any grounds, which 
makes this bureaucracy also a type of post bureaucracy (Knights and Wilmot, 2007), 
albeit a negative type.  
In this bureaucracy, the concept of Entrepreneurship is less about innovation really, 
but it is clearly about opportunism on the basis of rational self-interest. This clearly 
distinguishes this type from charismatic N1 type presented in the previous pages. 
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Courpasson (2000) suggests that organisations should be seen as soft 
bureaucracies, in which centralization and entrepreneurial forms of governance are 
combined, and this is the case in N2. The opportunistically driven entrepreneur(s) 
according to Reynolds et al. (2002) ‘is driven by the achievement of success through 
exploiting an opportunity for some form of gain, often believed to be economic’ 
(Carsrud and Brannback, 2011:14). Human relations are therefore subordinated to 
opportunistic alliances that may be there to support opportunistic relationships on the 
basis of self-interest. In other words, opportunistic entrepreneurs rely on exploiting 
‘gaps’ in any space towards economic ends. This was indeed the prevalent thinking 
in the employees of N2. The idea of competition or salesmanship according to them 
begins with identifying gaps in places where they are expected to market drugs and 
their duty is to leverage the gaps in order to secure deals. In a clear instance, one of 
the managers in the firm explained that wherever they are expected to market their 
company’s product, they look for needs that can be met. In some cases, it could be 
providing televisions in those hospitals, or a promise to install air conditioning in 
them if such hospitals are able to sell an agreed amount of their products. In some 
other cases, monetary commissions and incentives are offered to doctors to ‘push’ 
their products to sick patients. In doing these, employees in N2 believe they are 
being smart to exploit such gaps and would often meet their targets by so doing. This 
they are able to achieve with the support of the firm such that as Carsrud and 
Brannback, (2011:14) explained, ‘the intention of the entrepreneur and the pursuit of 
the recognized opportunity are critical but still require motivation to drive those 
intentions or exploit those opportunities.’ In the case of N2, the primary motivations 
are making as much money to feel accepted in the firm and also the knowledge that 
their firm supports anything they have to do to get whatever they want.  
Furthermore, in presenting four models of corporate entrepreneurship, Wolcott and 
Lippitz (2007) defined the opportunistic model of corporate entrepreneurship as a 
model ‘without any designated organisational ownership of resources, corporate 
entrepreneurship proceeds (if it does at all) based on the efforts and serendipity of 
intrepid “project champions” – people who toil against the odds, creating new 
business often in spite of the corporation’ (page 76). As such within this bureaucracy, 
there are fewer rules; neither are there any visible managerial control measures in 
place. Employees set their own rules and operate by their own principles as 
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supported and encouraged by their firms. Therefore, firm N2 is an environment that 
nurtures and values individual opportunistic behaviour brought together by the fabric 
of the organisation mainly channelled to serve the purpose of economic gains.   
Furthermore, opportunistic entrepreneurs are motivated by the need to achieve and 
to succeed (as measured in economic terms) (Walley and Taylor, 2002) and this 
came across strongly in N2 in which success is the measure of morality. Employees 
are driven by the desire to achieve and opportunistically collaborate also encouraged 
by set financial targets, which they are obligated to meet. Hence, their attitude and 
approach to their job comes across as driven but unregulated. In one of the 
instances cited, an employee of N2 explained how they got into a financial 
agreement with a senior doctor to ensure their company’s products are prescribed 
for particular ailments and that guaranteed the doctor certain monthly pay cheques. 
The prevalent mentality in N2 is that there should be no problem that cannot be 
bypassed and that employees are to use their initiative and senses to spot 
‘opportunities’ the firm can tap into to make money. By this, employees consider 
themselves as champions and competent employees in their own rights by proudly 
citing many examples of how they have succeeded in ‘closing deals’ and 
successfully meeting their targets. This is interesting because Downs (1967) had 
suggested that bureaucracies have a non-market orientation and are unable to use 
the objective monetary measure of profitability to evaluate the specific activities they 
undertake but the case of N2 and the other bureaucracies in the study disconfirm 
Down’s position. This also adds to our understanding of Weberian bureaucratic 
organisations in that what is rational and efficient may not necessarily be how work is 
organised alone but could be by how much economic gains are being made. Just as 
in the case of N2, rationality is conceived more in economic terms than in how work 
is organised.  
Wolcott and Lippitz, (2007:76) further explained that ‘the opportunist model works 
well only in trusting corporate cultures that are open to experimentation and have 
diverse social networks behind the official hierarchy (in other words places where 
multiple executives can say yes)’. Similarly, as an employee of N2 explained that 
there are various cabals within the system each servicing their own interests, hence 
they are able to support and empower their loyalists to do the things that will bring in 
economic gains. By this, employees are encouraged not to critically engage their 
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choices and actions since their managers can easily sanction these as long they 
satisfy the economic interests. This further explains the difficulty in seeing a unified 
managerial control mechanism within N2 as different interest groups exist achieving 
their respective goals of economic gains in different ways through different means. 
Hence another employee explained that anything done within N2 is permissive as 
long as it can be justified as bringing economic gains.  
Therefore, the context of N2 seems to allow ‘anything’, which is detrimental to any 
kind of personal moral inquiry especially insofar as it questions or places distance 
from the morality of opportunistic self interest and the building of in-firm professional 
relations mainly on this basis. Also the resultant unregulated environment that is 
prevalent in the context could easily encourage conventional level reasoning among 
employees. In a setting that brings together like-minded individual opportunists 
working towards a common goal, there is a greater likelihood of prevalent 
conventional thinking. This becomes a vicious cycle evidently, as an encouragement 
of conventional thinking (Kohlberg, 1971; Jackall, 1988) further enhances 
bureaucratic rationality and (in this case) opportunism – rather than innovation, as 
noted.  This is to the extent that employees in N2 can easily rationalise their actions 
based on the expectations of the system and how other are also achieving results in 
the same setting. This is congruent with Jackal’s (1988) finding on the prevalence of 
conventional level morality in bureaucracies. However, this bureaucracy is also 
found to be the only one to record pre-conventional level thinkers. This is because 
the sense of competition and recognition encouraged by the Entrepreneurial 
Bureaucracy tends to encourage reward driven mentality. As such, with an excessive 
focus not just on economic gains for the firm but the personal monetary gains and 
recognition that comes with selling more than others can easily relegate employees 
to the pre-conventional level of reasoning at which the focus is often on rewards and 
‘what’s in it for me?’  
As such, the effect of the context of N2 on employee morality was found to be 
generally negative. First, employees can easily find legitimacy in their actions based 
on the ease with which the setting supports their results regardless of how such is 
obtained thereby encouraging an uncritical moral inquiry. Secondly, constantly 
working within an opportunistic environment has the capacity to systematically 
distract employees from elements of morality causing them to focus on other things 
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whilst making them feel good about themselves.  Thirdly, working in this 
entrepreneurial bureaucracy motivates people to rename (the more negatively 
morally charged term) “opportunism” into (the more neutral term in moral terms) 
“innovation”, and while there were no clear signs of the latter, it appears to enable 
business legitimacy to all those who act to sustain and grow this type of bureaucracy 
further. In the case of N2 this explains why all employees in tie claim to have strong 
moral identities when most show no or very little sensitivity to any moral values on 
their jobs. Thus, pre-conventional and conventional levels of cognitive moral 
reasoning are mostly prevalent in this context such that the highest numbers of pre-
conventional level thinkers were reported in this bureaucracy. This findings 
contributes to our understanding of the effect of bureaucracy on morality especially 
Jackal (1988) in that bureaucracies could also easily foster pre conventional level 
thinking where the focus is more on economic objectives with little or no managerial 
control.  
In summary, Figure 9.1 below presents a matrix categorisation of the four 
bureaucracies along the two Weberian dimensions of managerial control and SOPs 
explored in this study. Generally, SOPs manifested in two major ways – codified and 
uncodified ways whilst managerial control manifested either in personal or 
authoritarian ways. The four hybrids are located in these two dimensions as seen 
below: 
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Figure 9.1: Categorisations of the four bureaucracy hybrids along the SOPs 
and Managerial Control dimensions 
 
From the figure above, the four bureaucracy hybrids are presented along the 
continuum of SOPs and Managerial Control. The Traditional Bureaucracy, as have 
been discussed in the opening section exists on the top left where managerial 
control is highly personalised and SOPs also highly codified. The Caste Bureaucracy 
on the other hand is at the bottom axis, at the intersection between a highly 
authoritarian managerial control and a neutral SOPs setting as also earlier discussed. 
The neutral setting implies there is a split with a dual existence in equal proportion of 
internal rules as well as no rules externally. The Charismatic and Entrepreneurial 
Bureaucracies however both exist in the same spot, where managerial control is 
highly personal and are also both more inclined towards uncodified rules. However, 
the different impact of these two bureaucracies on the morality of employee 
highlights there are subtle differences in the type of personalised managerial control 
function within both bureaucracies as discussed by Adler, (1999) in the distinction 
between enabling and coercive social structures. However, the effects of these 
bureaucracies on employee morality have been discovered to be generally negative 
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except the charismatic bureaucracy that showed signs of positive effects (see Table 
9.1 below).  
 
Table 9.1: Effects of the four types of bureaucracy on morality 
Type of 
Bureaucracy 
Type of effect  Effects on Morality 
Traditional  - Negative - Rules are regarded as the ‘holy grail’ of 
effective and efficient functioning in this 
bureaucracy and are also often expected to 
be valued above other ‘moral authorities’ 
outside of the bureaucracy. 
- Large amount of power in the hands of the 
managers who are seen as the guardians of 
morality able to tell ‘right from wrong’ and 
that their viewpoint will prevail and be 
followed. This can gradually create passivity 
and lack of engagement  
- Rules compliance as enforced by the 
managers subsequently replaces personal 
critical moral inquiry 
-  Professional and moral competence is 
derived from compliance to rules which 
encourages an inflated sense of moral 
identity 
Caste - Negative - Internal rules protect firm’s interests but 
there are no restrictions outside of the firm 
and managerial control is mainly 
authoritarian 
- Relationship between managers and 
employees is purely transactional 
- Morality in this bureaucracy is about pursing 
actions that increase external gains and 
sense of approval 
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- Morality becomes confused with meeting 
performance targets to being recognised as 
a good (moral) employee, which is quasi 
immoral to fail these 
- This creates a superficial level of 
belongingness that confers a social moral 
identity recognition from superiors to 
subordinates which inflates their sense of 
moral identity 
Charismatic - Positive -  The charisma of leaders showcases good 
character and moral conducts employees 
often admire and embrace 
- The strong personal interactions between 
the charismatic senior management and 
their subordinates allows for a tacit transfer 
of moral values to employees 
- Organisation norms are collectively and 
mutually derived which fosters a system of 
social accountability that also increases the 
moral awareness of employees 
- Employees are allowed to be themselves 
and to question things which in itself is good 
for ethics 
- It encourages personal moral inquiry, which 
also results in a high number of post 
conventional level thinkers. This 
bureaucracy produced the highest number. 
- Through the process of attrition –selection 
post conventional level thinkers are 
attracted, employed and retained into the 
bureaucracy. This is because they are 
similar in character and conduct with the 
senior management and this explains their 
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prevalence in this bureaucracy.  
Entrepreneurial - Negative - Success is the measure of morality 
- The unregulated system of no rules and 
non-visible managerial control allows 
employees to make their choices and justify 
them on economic grounds 
- The collection of individual opportunists into 
the same firm encourages conventional 
level thinking. 
- This bureaucracy motivates people to 
rename (the more negatively morally 
charged term) “opportunism” into (the more 
neutral term in moral terms) “innovation”, 
and while there were no clear signs of the 
latter, it appears to enable business 
legitimacy to all those who act to sustain 
and grow this type of bureaucracy further 
- Excessive focus on profits also encourages 
a personalised reward based mentality or 
pre-conventional level thinking of  “what’s in 
it for me?” mentality.  
 
Now I shall be presenting three discussion themes based on all the data patterns, 
each corresponding to the relevant more specialised propositions I explored in this 
study.  These three also correspond to the second, third and fourth research aims in 
page 4.  
9.2 Discussion Theme 1: General pattern of “inflated” moral identities: 
A need to reflect on the potentially contaminating role of bureaucratic 
context over the construct/operational measure of moral identity in its 
literature. 
This first discussion theme is linked to the first proposition explored in this study: 
Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in 
each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity 
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in employees as well as in managers equally in all cases of moral identity (both 
stronger and weaker MI scores). In the traditional bureaucracy, large amount of 
power is in the hands of managers who are (but not just) enforcers of rules. 
Moreover they are also seen as guardians of (the bureaucratic) morality who are 
able to tell what is right or wrong based on their own ‘superior’ understanding of the 
rules in force within the bureaucracy.  This is so regardless of any other sources of 
moral authorities outside the structure of the bureaucracy. Consequently, employees 
tend to derive their morality by following closely and without questioning or any 
critical reflection the set rules and by displaying obedience to managers. These both 
stifles individual moral agency in the process; as Reed, (2005: pg. 2) also highlighted, 
the functioning of this whole fabric is characterised by strict rule based compliance 
and enforced managerial control. 
In the Caste Bureaucracy, “morality” is really about pursuing actions that increase 
external gains or a sense of approval, rationalizing the role of managerial monitoring 
as necessary in order to help prevent a repetition of previous fraudulent 
organisational history as noted in chapters five and seven.  Accordingly, the morality 
of this organisation is a sense of legitimacy and privilege of employees being part of 
the in-group (belonging) of the organisational family (despite not being able to 
ascend the caste system itself).  This surface level “belongingness” confers social 
moral identity recognition from superiors to subordinates, which also inflates a strong 
sense of moral identity.  Regarding this, individual employees are not bound by any 
rules outside of the firm but have a personal sense of moral authority and 
responsibility. 
In the charismatic bureaucracy (firm N1), the charisma of the management team 
underpins an environment of shared, collectively embraced moral and social values. 
The charismatic leaders drive, influence and shape the culture, norms and 
perception of their employees towards values of mutual benevolence, generosity, 
kindness while the senior management’s faith and Christian values are followed in 
action by their behaving in kind and humane ways. Through visible modelling and 
direct association, morality is tacitly diffused from managers who are considered as 
heroes and their subordinates who regard their managers as inspiring and worthy of 
being emulated. This significantly enhances the individual and collective moral 
reflection and engagement of employees. Therefore, the effect of the charismatic 
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bureaucracy on employee morality is generally positive and this context provides a 
major exception amongst all the others.  
In the entrepreneurial bureaucracy (firm N2), success and drive to succeed (in 
performance terms) is the measure of morality. This potentially confuses questions 
of morality for questions of performance and efficiency which is in itself a sign of 
ethical weak organisational context in this case.  Employees are regulated in this 
case by fewer rules and have the support of their managers in advancing 
autonomous economic agency. Therefore, firm N2 is an environment that nurtures 
and values individual opportunistic behaviour brought together by the fabric of the 
organisation mainly channelled to serve the purpose of economic gains. Furthermore, 
opportunistic entrepreneurs are motivated by the need to achieve and to succeed (as 
measured in economic terms) (Walley and Taylor, 2002) and this increases the 
prevalence of conventional level reasoning amongst employees. In such a context, 
universal ethical values are almost non-existent and the need for critical moral 
inquiry is relegated by the excessive drive for economic gains. 
In all three case groups represented by the four hybrids above, the majority of 
participants had inflated moral identity, which disconfirms the theory of moral identity. 
The moral identity theory (Aquino and Reed, 2002) suggests that people have moral 
traits they deem as central to their self definition and that the ease of accessibility of 
these moral traits as triggered by contexts/situations determines the strength of their 
moral identity. As such, a person has a strong moral identity if situational cues easily 
trigger their moral traits, which then influences their decision-making. Conversely, 
individuals with weak moral identity do not readily have their moral traits prompted by 
situational cues and would less likely have their moral values influence their 
decision-making. It therefore seems that the moral identity theory assumes that 
contexts are ‘morally neutral’ platforms that have no effects on how employees 
perceive themselves morally.  
However, as discovered in previous chapters, bureaucracy seems to inflate moral 
identity altogether.  Contextual sensitivities tend to inflate employee perception about 
their own moral identity such that employees who show clear signs of moral identity 
weakness feel they have strong moral identities. This simply means that in certain 
cases and contexts, contextual variables are so strongly influencing the subjective 
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employee experience that they may well create an “inflated moral identity” general 
pattern. Also, there were no signs of any differences in how employees with weak 
moral identity and strong moral identity behave, as if bureaucracy also conflates or 
spills over MI. This is assumed to be so simply because so many people in 
conventional firms are of conventional moral reasoning (Jackall, 1988) 
This was largely driven by the rule compliance culture, for instance in the traditional 
bureaucracy whereby employees seem to be self-righteous identifying themselves 
as “moral” just by following the bureaucracies’ conventions. This also often creates a 
strong sense of professionalism and belief in the employees that they are working in 
an organisation that will not make them do the wrong things hence also creating a 
sense of moral competence. Thus, professional competence in this case is actually 
the ability of employees to imbibe set rules and deploy them effectively in executing 
their jobs. The more employees are able to comply with SOPs on their job, the more 
the system rewards them and the more competent they feel. Hence, any employee 
who feels competent on their job feels so because they are able to work according to 
set rules through which they also gain social acceptance among colleagues and 
superiors in working towards the overall goal of the bureaucracy. Also in this light is 
the feeling of moral competence employees seems to have within such rule based 
system. As earlier mentioned, the legitimacy of the strict rule based system is 
anchored on the quite corrupt Nigerian context (see Chapter 5) and the goals of 
firms to do business properly within the system. Thus, creating a rigid framework of 
rules within which employees must operate is considered an effective way of 
achieving this goal. Therefore, as employees obey the rules, they actually tend to 
believe that the ends of their actions will always be moral as long as they stay within 
the parameters of firm rules. Consequently, employees believe that the rules exist as 
safe and reliable moral guidelines. Moral competence in this instance is the feeling of 
‘safety’ (e.g. keeping one’s job or more likely to be seen and promoted) and 
‘uprightness’ that comes from following the rules, to the extent that employees are 
confident to defend their firms as ethical and safe places to work. This sense of 
competence legitimises the rule-based approach with employees, making them trust 
the system as one that brings out the best in them both professionally and morally. 
By placing their trust in the rules, they become uncritical of the rules, which in turn 
allow the values of the bureaucracy take over personal values such that employees 
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lose their own sense of individual valuing mechanism. By this, employees see things 
from the perspective of the firm, ‘I’ is often replaced by ‘we’ and also, this could 
easily distort definitions and meanings. Hence, employees believe that following the 
rules is tantamount to integrity and in the case of the firms; integrity is simply to not 
break the rules.  
Therefore, results of moral identity scores across all case groups returned a 
significantly skewed distribution of employees towards strong moral identities even in 
contexts where employees’ interview data showed strong signs of weak moral 
identity. This is because as noted above, insofar as everyone is compliant with the 
tenets of a bureaucracy each person is entitled to a sense of moral goodness. Whilst 
it is interesting that the moral identity results show a rather skewed distribution of 
employees towards those with strong moral identities, it must be noted that self-
reported measures such as the one used in this study are liable to participant bias 
and prone to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; Spector, 1994; 
Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). This may have also contributed to the skewed results 
obtained but also indicates that the bureaucracies tend to incite social desirability 
bias in individuals whereby none would not want to admit they are morally deficient 
in any way in order to maintain their reputation as good employees. This is in 
contrast to the CMR which in the case of this study was mapped out from the 
prevalent thought patterns of respondents based on their interview response thereby 
significantly reducing the effects of bias (see chapter 3).  
Also, this pattern’s discovery contributes to our understanding of the huge role of 
contexts; particularly bureaucracies in individual subjective moral identity perceptions. 
At least for the conventional moral reasoners it has been found that indeed 
bureaucratic context dimensions and dynamics (probably in interplay with cognitive 
dissonance factors) can bring self-perception of employees moral identity strengths 
“out of touch”, such that employees can be made to believe they are more morally 
motivated than they actually are just by complying with the conventions of their 
bureaucracy (like in the traditional and caste bureaucracies) or just by being driven 
to success and enterprise values (as in the case of the entrepreneurial bureaucracy). 
This implies that employees may have gradually developed personal defence 
mechanisms depending on how long they have worked in similar organisations, 
whereby their obedience to superiors and the bureaucratic rules automatically 
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signifies a sense of strong moral identities. Presumably, the longer they are 
employed, the more institutionalised they become. However, how this happens, how 
long it takes for such transformation to occur and whether there are any differences 
in moral identity vis-à-vis length of employment are interesting points for further 
study. This trend characterised three of the four bureaucracy hybrids found across 
the case groups explored in this study. The case of N1, the charismatic bureaucracy 
is the only case where data disconfirms this first theme.  
Within N1, organisational rules are more verbal and unwritten yet a binding and 
common understanding exists on what the firm stands for amongst all employees. 
This is owing to the influence of the leaders within the context, whose presence or 
absence of virtue is influencing how employees understand their work and how they 
experience and respond to the overall moral climate they experience. In the case of 
my dissertation N1 was a case of presence of virtuous leadership and it may be 
worth examining in future research the case of its absence. Through visible 
modelling and direct association, leaders hand down moral values to their 
employees who daily see their leaders live up to the values they claim to believe in. 
This reinforces a feeling of empowerment in employees by encouraging a moral 
system that all employees respect and trust because they esteem the faces of those 
values. Unlike the other bureaucracies in which employee conformity to rules is 
critical to ‘survival’ in the system, the context of N1 rather encourages moral 
awareness in employees and a sense of individuality that isn’t hinged on sheepish 
conformity. This may be contrary to expectations since a study by Howell and Avolio, 
(1992) suggests charismatic authority can make employees prone to uncritical 
conformity. Instead in N1, the sense of shared moral values encourages employees 
to be themselves, which is healthy for ethics as explained in the previous sections. 
Thus, the context of N1 contributes positively to moral identity strength rather than 
subjectively inflating it. Following from this, moral identity scores of employees in N1 
were confirmed through interview data as truly objective in nature. Employees within 
this context presented the highest number of post conventional thinkers across all 
case groups and this was confirmed through the strong signs of critical moral inquiry 
majority of employees demonstrated through interview data within this bureaucracy.  
Thus, the dominant trend amongst the bureaucracies studied in all case groups is 
the tendency for these contexts to escalate a subjective sense of strong moral 
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identity. This, as discussed above is largely encouraged through the substitution of 
moral identity with SOPs and management control, which instils a sense of 
conformity and compliance typical of conventional level thinkers. This may therefore 
imply that there is a strong link between reasoning at the conventional level and the 
ease with which bureaucracies entice a subjective inflated sense of employee moral 
identity strength. Thus, this first theme and the next theme to be discussed may have 
more symmetry that could prove useful for further studies. 
9.3 Discussion Theme 2 – The CMR is a better predictor of morality  
This discussion theme is linked to the second proposition explored in this study: 
Acting in alignment with a Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards 
conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders 
In all three cases, employee moral reasoning levels are a better predictor of morality. 
Thus, CMR was better at explaining employees’ moral conduct within the context of 
the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic context pushes people to do/act without thinking, as a 
way of thinking they are okay in moral terms, but for genuine moral inquiry personal 
contemplation is necessary. Post conventional level thinkers however showed clear 
signs of moral inquiry and usually assumed moral responsibility across the cases. I 
link also to Kohlberg that Jackall, (1988) in his study found that 80% of sampled 
managers were reasoning at the conventional level. But Kohlberg, (1973) did not 
take into account how organisational environments influence the development (or 
stagnation of) people reasoning patterns. Opposite is suggested by the descriptive 
ethics literature – readers may find a review of it in the earlier section of this 
dissertation on the mutual influencing between contextual and individual variable 
suggests, (see Chapter 3). This explains why most adults stay within the 
conventional moral reasoning. It is not because there is any genetic predisposition 
that adults cannot move beyond conventional level thinking but that business 
environments discourage this development. Only persons of a higher CMD level 
seem to have better ways to ethically respond to the contextual influences, but I 
found this also has limitations as higher CMD reasoners are not part of an in-group 
in the typical bureaucracy and they are pushed to operating in the margins of these 
organisations, for example sharing their moral concerns with persons they trust and 
developing other mechanisms for resilience.  But a longitudinal study may show how 
gradual and final effects unfold regarding all these groups and the organisation. It is 
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likely that there will be some turnover and it would be interesting to study how this 
relates to the topic of this theme, but it is outside the scope of this study. 
As it was discovered in the previous theme, there seems to be a rather uncritical 
acceptance of rules by most employees who claim to have strong moral identity. And 
that the moral identity strength employees claim to have could actually be as a result 
of their conformity to the set rules of the bureaucracy. Therefore, having a sense of 
strong moral identity may not necessarily translate into being able to make informed 
moral decisions. If anything, the first theme as discussed above indicates that 
employees with inflated sense of moral identity reason at Kohlberg’s conventional 
level of moral reasoning. As Trevino, (1986) explained, it is expected that managers’ 
reasoning on work related issues is primarily at the conventional level; therefore they 
look outside of themselves for cues about what is right or wrong. As also explained 
in chapter 6, Kohlberg’s (1969) theory suggests that conventional level thinkers are 
more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist behaviours to social 
norms. Also clearly Kohlberg’s conventional CMD levels (1969) are associated with 
instrumental orientation to maintaining relations based on individualist narrow self-
interest or/and more collectivist transactional clan self-interests. These general 
patterns are all indeed found in this case.  
The above finding also implies that employees reasoning at this (conventional) CMD 
level echo managers’ behavioural patterns both as they are encouraged to 
“habituate” themselves with the managerial norms of behaviour, and due to the 
attraction-selection effects overtime (Dreher, Ash and Bretz, 1988; Burkhardt, 1994; 
Boone et al, 2004). This means that conventional bureaucracies attract / retain 
conventional moral reasoners that do not question their morality. Critical moral 
inquiry is therefore more likely to operate around the rules and conventions in 
showing a convenient compliance with set rules, norms and standards without 
genuinely embracing moral inquiry at individual or community levels.  
Therefore, SOPs are more effective through conventional level thinkers because 
they are driven by the desire to conform to set standards and hence will not 
challenge the norms. They also find ways of rationalising the SOPs by believing they 
actually guide them into working the right way and doing things right in the firm. This 
is to the extent that the SOPs are regarded as ‘supreme’ over and above any other 
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sources of moral authorities outside of the bureaucratic structure. One implication of 
this is that employees become uncritical of rules and see through the lens of the 
bureaucracies only, such that definitions and meanings are altered in alignment with 
the bureaucracies’ conceptualisations. For instance, it would seem that certain moral 
concepts of worth like ‘trust’ and ‘integrity’ should have some concrete reference to 
universal norms that Kohlberg (1969) sees linked to a more universal (albeit of 
western ethics influenced) humanist ethic in his stage 6 amongst employees (a 
shared sense of justice and fairness, a sense of respect of human dignity, human 
and group rights and duties etc).  Instead, in this study across all case groups, most 
employees who claimed to have strong moral identities but were adjudged to reason 
at the conventional level simply used them strategically to succeed. This may not 
mean that people act unethically but it means that there is a socio-structural 
influence whereby what is moral becomes what the senior management and the 
superiors like, e.g. the consequentialist type of organisational morality I described 
earlier in chapter 3 is such an example. But in the worst case evidence shows that 
indeed this pattern can lead to legitimacy for and freedom to act in unethical ways, 
as long as these bring the desired outcomes and results (sales, reputation etc) for 
the organisation. As such, acts such as promising doctors a stipend for drug 
prescriptions, offering free clinical trials or sponsoring doctors on foreign trips were 
labelled ‘value added services’ and not acts of inducements. Employees (who claim 
to have strong moral identity but are reasoning at the conventional level) often 
explain the motive behind some of these value added services as one of the ‘potent 
strategies’ for earning the ‘trust’ of doctors and ‘penetrating’ hospitals.  
Likewise ‘trust’ in the language of three of the bureaucracies under study is 
understood to mean ‘securing as many doctors as possible to prescribe firms’ drugs’, 
which is a key driver of sales revenue and profit. Similarly, reference to the concept 
of ‘integrity’ in this context also showed a similar trend of a mere use devoid of the 
true moral meaning of the concept. Integrity is often one of the core values of the 
firms cited in this case group, yet every respondent interviewed seemed to always 
flippantly say they have integrity as part of their own personal values. Interestingly, 
the crux of the findings thus far shows that these employees are not ‘whole’ as real 
integrity implies but are fragmented into entirely different people courtesy of the strict 
compliance culture in which they work (Markus, 1971). One would expect that people 
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with genuine integrity are able to maintain an integrated sense of moral self in any 
system and within-outside the organisation without losing out and should perhaps 
even build protective mechanisms against any systemic practice that could erode 
that sense of moral worth. Or simply use them for performance and reputation aims 
without any real concern of how they are feeling about being instrumentalised – This 
is such that in a bureaucracy there may be a dangerous belief that the minority 
groups have to be sacrificed for the majority well-being, where the majority is mainly 
who holds power via the managerial office(s). However in this study, the use of 
integrity often appeared as a personal façade to help reduce potential self-reflection 
or guilt, devoid of any careful moral reflection and implied in all cases either being 
loyal to the system’s goal, which is profit/performance driven or simply as a cliché 
that is used to build a façade of morality that doesn’t exist. A senior manager in the 
traditional bureaucracy for instance in explaining his personal values was first upfront 
about his inclinations towards results but as an afterthought mentioned integrity. 
Another manager in the entrepreneurial bureaucracy explained that trust in the 
context of their firm implied being able to deliver agreed monetary targets when due 
without any excuses. Yet reference to integrity and trust in these scenarios seemed 
to be about ‘winning’. In this case as in the previous, the use of the term integrity is in 
line with the demands of the bureaucracy and not in moral terms as in maintaining 
one’s moral self or identity. Therefore in all these instances, actions are construed, 
as the bureaucracy would prescribe so that employees reasoning at the conventional 
level may not have the level of cognitive complexity to sense any moral conflicts in 
spite of claims by the same employees that they have strong moral identities. This 
implies that their behaviour within the context is better explained by Kohlberg’s CMR 
than they are by their moral identity which in most cases has already been 
significantly altered. 
In spite of these, in all instances where post conventional level thinkers were found, 
strong signs of critical moral inquiry regardless of contextual pressures have been 
shown. Through this it was discovered that post conventional level thinkers often 
defy conventions because they are able to see through the moral fog to the rules 
which the bureaucracies create and deliberately choose to act based on a higher 
moral principle. Such higher principles as found in this study were in most cases was 
rooted in a personal reverence for God or religious values such that this took pre-
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eminence over and above organisational rules. This ability is that of being able to 
respond to a system through proper inner dialoguing, a quality that is not necessarily 
encouraged by the rule-based system but is reflected in individuals who genuinely 
possess desire for true moral integrity. What theory seems to suggest is that those 
reasoning at the post-conventional level as well as those possessing strong moral 
identities would challenge the norms and status quo or at least feel uncomfortable by 
them. Across all case groups however, very few employees who claimed to have 
strong moral identity showed any signs of discomfort or moral inquiry in their 
relationship with the rules binding their daily activities. This is because moral 
identities are liable to contextual sensitivities and can therefore be significantly 
altered.  
However, CMR on the other hand is a more grounded and solid concept of the moral 
self that indeed pertains to the importance of individual factors in shaping workplace 
morality as distinct from the sociology and organisational design of contextual factors.  
This captures that the overall cognitive capacity of the role holders also define a 
propensity for more nuanced and more mature/developed moral reasoning and 
action patterns (Kohlberg, 1971), which unlike the moral identity theory (Aquino and 
Reed, 2002) did not show signs of being inflated but rather accurately demonstrated 
the level of moral reasoning in respondents as reflected in the ways they handled 
moral issues at work.  
Overall assumptions of the relevant theoretical (Kohlberg, 1969) and empirical 
literature (Jackall, 1988) are consistent with the overall data patterns found in this 
study in regards to proposition 2. Interestingly, the Charismatic Bureaucracy, one of 
the four hybrids of bureaucracies found in this study recorded an unusually higher 
number of post conventional thinkers compared to other bureaucracies. This is still 
consistent with the literature (Jackall, 1988) insofar it has been noted here that this is 
a quasi-bureaucracy, rather than a classical bureaucracy. This is probably because 
the environment of common values and integrity to one’s belief as espoused by the 
charisma of the leaders in this bureaucracy attracts more post conventional people.  
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9.4 Discussion Theme 3 – Bureaucracies encourage expertise over 
professionalism  
This discussion theme is linked to the third proposition explored in this study as 
follows: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value of 
organisational loyalty (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice 
and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and 
weak moral identity. 
 
Generally across all cases, bureaucracies were found to encourage expertise over 
professionalism. This can be linked to the fact that an overwhelming number of 
persons within bureaucracies become eager and socialised in displaying loyalty to 
their organisations rather than to their professions. On one hand, the CMR levels of 
employees as discussed in prior sections could largely contribute to this but on 
another hand, there are features of bureaucracies which encourage expertise and 
loyalty to organisations over loyalty to professions and their regulatory bodies. This 
creates a sense of transactional behaviour, which is strikingly different, to how 
professional behaviour norms are theorized.   As Fagermoen, (1997: pg. 434) 
explains, professional identity is ‘embedded values in meaningful practice’ and this 
Koehn, (2006) suggests is regulated by an external body independent of any firm. 
Therefore, Fagermoen’s (1997) study concluded that in nursing; human dignity and 
altruism were the most important values binding the identity of professional nurses. 
This, Koehn, (1994) would argue is linked with the welfare and well being of a ‘client’ 
(those who seek a public good of health, for instance). However, the bureaucracies 
in this study tend to have strong economic motives that overshadow the values of 
meaningful pharmaceutical practice and also demote the public good of health, 
which pharmacists have sworn to provide as secondary to economic gains. Through 
this, it was discovered that the bureaucracies are able to distract employees from 
their professional calling as pharmacists, making them function more as expert sales 
persons across all three case groups. Thus, the professional identity of being 
pharmacists, trained to save lives is lost within broader bureaucratic objectives such 
as profit maximisation and managerialism. This can also be challenged under 
broader and imposed bureaucratic rules and compliance oriented environment even 
within pharmaceutical organisations expected to preserve the professional ethos of 
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pharmacists. Therefore, who employees are supposed to be as pharmacists shifts 
from the conventional understanding of the profession to the sales persons the 
bureaucracies want them to be.  
Thus, in the case of the entrepreneurial bureaucracy for instance, each person freely 
acts as economic “agent” who applies rules and the freedom provided as to how key 
professional ethical values learnt (via education or earlier career), if available, apply. 
Since most employees in N2 (entrepreneurial bureaucracy) are pharmacists, they 
are expected to have their professional ethical values accessible to them on the field. 
But there is no reference to this and there is no evidence that the organizational 
context of N2 visibly supports its professionals remaining tied to the standards of 
professional ethics they learnt in earlier life and education. This is explained given 
that N2 main organisational characteristic was found to be opportunistic independent 
success and alliances on the basis of opportunistic self-interest. Hence employees 
choosing to engage their professional ethical values in making moral decisions could 
be affected by personal choice and more importantly by the effect of the unregulated 
bureaucracy on their professional identity in which case employees are more inclined 
to do the easier things on the field that gives them the recognition of being loyal 
employees to the bureaucracy’s objectives. 
Hence, a pharmacist in these bureaucracies is not the pharmacist defined by the 
PCN but one that is defined by the objectives of the bureaucracy. Consequently, in 
order to be liked and in order to ‘survive’, enjoy the benefits the system has to offer 
or to be seen as a ‘good pharmacist’, employees are faced with the dilemma of 
either adapting to the demands of their employer, particularly enforced by the salient 
characteristics of the bureaucracies, which would imply a reconstruction of their 
professional identities to fit in or a choice by participants to remain as ‘traditional 
pharmacists’. The latter may not fit into the system, or be subtly sanctioned by the 
non-offering of easy career and personal development paths. Since, employees may 
be morally incompetent by virtue of their CMD reasoning level, resultant conformist 
behaviours are prevalent in the system. A pharmacist therefore no longer sounds like 
one trained to save lives but like a sales person trained in a sales firm, out to make 
as much money as possible. The effect of the bureaucracies’ demands of the 
bureaucracies is responsible for this reconstruction of professional identity such that 
employees who have interacted with the system are prone to working only with those 
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values that make them survive within the system. In fact, many speak as if they are 
working at the highest levels of ethics because they are working in obedience to set 
standards of the bureaucracies. Such is the subtle but potent way bureaucracies 
reconstruct professional identities to the extent that a pharmacist would boldly 
declare himself/herself as a sales executive, not as a pharmacist and still feel he/she 
is working within the ethics of the profession when in fact his/her responses reveal 
they have clearly been submerged under the demands of how bureaucracies want 
them to operate.  
Also, bureaucracies through recruitment, socialisation and copious training programs 
are able to impact the ideologies of the bureaucracy into employees, who are 
expressly told how to behave in the system such that their professional identities are 
thereby reconstructed. Through recruitment, it was discovered across the cases that 
in most cases, bureaucracies also employ non-pharmacists to do the job of trained 
pharmacists. With these persons not having any professional training and identity 
with which they are affiliated, they are easily converted by the bureaucracies through 
trainings into the sales persons they are designed to function as. Besides, the notion 
of working in pharmaceutical organisations is lost in the nature of job roles and 
demands of the sales and marketing orientation of most bureaucracies akin to any 
other sales company. In other words, the ways the firms are structured and roles 
named seem to relinquish the pharmaceutical firms to merely sales and marketing 
organisations saddled with the responsibility of hawking drugs and making as much 
money as they can. The essential focus of saving lives is entirely lost in this kind of 
organisational milieu. 
Consequently, this is the ideal that bureaucracies promote that employees could be 
professional as a manager or a professional manager. However a critical observation 
here is that management is not a profession. Profession is an independent body 
(outside of any organisational interests) which advises people who undertake a 
particular strand of work and which provides some core ethical criteria and norms 
about the essential purpose of this profession for society independently of the 
context/employer where the professional exercises this (Hall, 1968, Freidson, 1973, 
Forrester, 1988). A profession is beyond and above an institution within which 
professionals work, while professional bodies are the guardians of very long lasting 
ethical traditions about practicing a particular profession (McCloskey and McCain, 
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1987). For instance different professional bodies regulate the activities of journalists. 
Such professional bodies advocate that good journalism involves abiding with 
standards considered to meet professional integrity – not broadcasting violence and 
atrocities regardless of its effect on viewership of the channel. This is in contrast with 
media that may only be interested in increasing viewership and ratings or supporting 
individuals or groups to influence public opinion and so on. Likewise in the 
pharmaceutical industry, professional bodies guide the ethos of being a pharmacist 
such that pharmacists for instance are forbidden to treat their clients as mere market 
segments (Koehn, 1994). Instead, there should be a sense of being a part of a 
profession, it is almost like a ritual being a part of the professional body but 
management is more nebulous.  
This is part of the critique of bureaucracies that they create a sense of requiring 
managers to justify their authority over the professions. Managers need to appear 
they act in the service of the interests of shareholders and that they demonstrate 
organisational loyalty as agents (Genfu, 2004; Laffont and Martimont, 2009). This 
study shows that often this loyalty is understood in a way that is mainly self-serving 
and mirroring managerial cognitive and moral capacity.  Managerial authority to 
substitute professional norms by their own ones serves them as a means for 
increasing managerial power.  
On the other hand managerial authority to override or recreate the 
professional norms in a given organisational context may just mirror and express 
their own cognitive moral capacity, based on their integrity and their meaning making 
quality as noted (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2011). Then because most of the 
management as found in this study and other studies reason at the conventional 
CMD level (Jackall, 1983), their way of showing they are good agents who ensure 
org interests is by setting their own “expert” standards of moral goodness and 
badness that overwrite and compete with professional ethical codes.  This may be or 
become a way of exercising power and ownership over employees’ moral identities 
and employees’ integrities because they consider them as “their” resources, in the 
sense of belonging to the organisation via their permanent employment contract. 
This may wrongly be misunderstood as a duty to submit their personal moral 
identities, their integrities to the agents-managers who legitimately are entrusted to 
take care of the firm’s good. As such, there is the tension between managerial 
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authority and professional authority and this is where the real problems lie. If one 
speaks to a proper professional in a bureaucracy, they should have a sense of ‘you 
do not owe me’ because who really owes me if anybody does is the profession. This 
sense was felt only in the charismatic bureaucracy where employees were proud to 
say they place their professions over the firm anytime and the leaders encourage 
them to do so. 
9.5 Theoretical Implications 
The implications of the findings examined above will now be critically discussed in 
two different sections. First, as seen from the previous section, bureaucracies can 
manifest in different forms often having varying impact on employee morality. This 
study has been able to uncover four different hybrids of bureaucracy and their effect 
on employee morality. Prior studies on bureaucratic morality by Jackal (1988) and 
Hummel (2007) did not account for such subtle differences in their conceptualisation 
of bureaucracy; hence an implication of this finding on the literature of bureaucracy 
will first be presented. Secondly this study advances our understanding of how 
bureaucracies actually have negative effect on employee morality through the 
different mechanisms they create. These were not explained in the studies of Jackal 
and Hummel and will be discussed in greater detail in the second implications 
section that discusses the findings above in the light of the bureaucratic morality 
literature. 
9.5.1 Implications for the literature on Bureaucracy 
In general, this study presents more explicit evidence that bureaucracy always 
influences morality and that bureaucracy has a subtle but rather negative impact on 
morality as shown in tables 9.2 and 9.3– except for charismatic authority. This is in 
alignment with earlier studies by Jackal, (1988) and Hummel (1998) whose findings 
suggest predominantly negative effects of bureaucracy on morality. They do this by 
creating a façade of morality that takes away the essential component of ethics - 
independent critical moral inquiry. This study establishes that by creating facades, 
bureaucracies are able to systematically discourage independent critical moral 
inquiry, which results in employees becoming increasingly insensitive to moral issues 
until they become unable to make independent moral choices on their jobs.  
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According to Cho et al, (2015), the concept of an organisational façade is originally 
theorised to serve one purpose – to create an organisational legitimacy in the eyes 
of stakeholders. As such Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008: pg. 437) define an 
organisational façade as “a symbolic front erected by organisational participants 
designed to re-assure their organisational stakeholders of the legitimacy of the 
organisation and its management” which aligns with the Lindblom, (1993) conception 
of Legitimacy theory. As will be further discussed below, it will be posited that 
bureaucracies through their internal mechanisms such as rules and managerial 
control are able to create a moral façade that legitimises them with their Board of 
Directors and shareholders. By this employees are made to believe that compliance 
to rules for instance means they are competent on their jobs and that this covers all 
aspects of moral decision making as well. Through this, rules replace independent 
moral inquiry as found in the case of the traditional bureaucracy for instance. 
However employees don’t simply relinquish their autonomy at once, they are 
systematically lured by the bureaucracy’s façade that pushes them to do or act 
without thinking as a way of thinking they are okay in moral terms. This, over time 
results in employees becoming converts of the bureaucracy’s ways of doing things, 
which is often devoid of genuine personal moral inquiry. This often results in a 
climate in which conformity is prevalent as will be explored in the second section.  
More recent theorising of organisational façade by Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008) 
suggests that an organisation’s façade is not unitary but could have several facets 
that serve different (and less ethically responsive) purposes. For example, 
Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008) cited examples of organisational facades two of 
which are relevant in this discussion of bureaucracy and its effect on morality as 
follows: rational façade and reputational façade.  
According to Cho et al, (2015: pg. 343), rational façade is ‘the key to market 
legitimacy’. It presents ‘rational norms’ which Meyer and Rowan, (1977: pg. 343) 
argue are not simply general values but that ‘they exist in much more specific and 
powerful ways in the rules, understandings and meanings attached to 
institutionalised social structures’. This was found to be particularly true in the all the 
traditional and caste bureaucracies, in which rational norms as displayed through 
rules and managerial control played powerful roles in the meanings employees 
attached to their social structures. For instance in some contexts, rules were the 
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‘holy grail’ of effectiveness, efficiency and doing the right things, whilst in some other 
contexts, rules were simply control tools to protect interests by restricting certain 
classes of persons from privileged positions. In the former, employees substitute 
compliance for critical moral inquiry whilst in the latter, employees use their 
subjective personal moral reasoning in making their moral decisions. But in all 
instances, ‘rational norms’ had great effects in influencing the perception of 
employees which ultimately also affected their moral dispositions within the 
bureaucracies. Also having rules that claim to restrict employees’ activities in certain 
ways in the wider corrupt context of the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry seems like 
the ‘right’ thing to have. In each of the case groups, there were mechanisms put in 
place to erect a moral front aimed at reassuring employees and other stakeholders 
of the legitimacy of the firm’s approach to the Nigerian market. This implies that 
organisations attempt to present an outlook that they are committed to doing things 
‘properly’ in a context where ‘anything goes’ and that they have sufficient 
mechanisms to regulate and control all firm activities. By this, stakeholders are made 
to believe in the firm’s commitment to ethical processes in order to protect their 
reputation hence the rational façade.  
A reputational façade aims at displaying rhetoric and symbols desired by critical 
stakeholders such as the press (Abrahamson and Baumard, 2008). These symbols 
often express “corporate values such as language, code of ethics or the attainment 
of an industry excellence award” (Cho et al: pg. 82) aimed at inflating corporation’s 
goals or masking unacceptable performance. Similarly, the websites of each of the 
firms studied in this dissertation all had sections for code of ethics, corporate values 
and the likes of such symbols that are on public display. Also, through this façade 
most employees actually believed that their bureaucracy is ethical and would deny 
that they do anything wrong. These all contribute towards creating a reputational 
façade. However in reality, these may be nothing but masks for the several 
unregulated activities of the firms and its employees on the field. For instance in the 
case of the Firm X scandal in Kano, the first references the firm made in response to 
accusations that it had violated due process were to its existing code of ethics of how 
things are expected to be done even though there were clear evidences that these 
were not necessarily followed in the build up to the scandal (Murray, 2007).  
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Therefore, bureaucracies create a façade of obedience and alignment to different 
rules norms and standards that are nothing but the bureaucracies own generated 
standards and not moral laws. This is like the convention theory (Daudigeos and 
Valiorgue, 2010; Wilkinson, 2011) in which different groups create their own rules 
through group systems but these are not moral laws even if these make an attempt 
at being morally inclined. That is, the rules within bureaucracies are often very 
different from a clear evidence of universal standards of ethics.  Thus, different 
ethical theories at some point refer to a minimum that bring a realisation that it is not 
about conventions that suit an organisation or a group but that there are universal 
standards of ethics such as justice, equality, fairness and so on. But as have been 
discovered, the hybrids of bureaucracy discussed above predominantly have rules 
that are not directly associated with such universal standards of ethics but rather 
protect some independent interests, most often economic gains. Such rules, with 
their focus on other objectives besides universal ethics are able to discourage 
independent critical inquiry. The essential component of ethics is not in people 
following the conventions but in following universal standards of ethics, for instance, 
Rawl’s (1971) theory of justice or that individuals show evidence of post-conventional 
reasoning though independent critical moral inquiry. Furthermore, with the notion of 
moral inquiry, individuals are encouraged to abide by universal ethics that underlie 
humanistic traditions (justice, human dignity etc) and engage in moral reflection and 
debate. But when employees are ‘limitless’ or when a system of governance makes 
employees feel they are self-righteous and limitless, for instance in the 
Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy, they do as they wish and that is exactly the absence of 
ethics. 
9.5.2 Implications for the literature on Bureaucratic Morality 
It follows from the previous section that even though bureaucracies may change, 
they all have a common pattern of effects that often interferes “as noise” for morality. 
That is, in each of the bureaucracies are elements and mechanisms that help create 
a façade/ climate that they may seem moral or that seems to encourage morality 
whereas their effects on employee morality is often negative as previously 
established. For instance, in the case of the traditional bureaucracy, enforcement of 
rule compliance through managerial control creates the impression that the 
bureaucracy supports strong morality whereas its effect on employee morality is 
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discovered to actually impede ethics.  In the caste bureaucracy, the adoption of strict 
rules under a utilitarian ethic façade and justified as being for the greater good using 
the previous history of fraud could create such ‘noise’ for morality. In the 
entrepreneurial bureaucracy the data of this study shows that there was a “wicked” 
phenomenon whereby success, drive and performance norms were conflated to be 
understood as relevant to ethical values, which may be misleading to orient 
employees and management towards losing their ethical compass as a good thing 
insofar as they keep being successful.   
The only exception was found in the case of a morally inclined ‘charismatic 
bureaucracy’ (N1). Although this finding was neither planned or expected, and 
despite the literature that also cautions as to the many ethical perils of charisma 
(Howell and Avolio, 1992; Graham, 1991), this exhibits the importance of moral 
character based on positive values of benevolence, trust, respect exhibited by the 
senior managers and via the managerial role models able to support a genuinely 
shared moral climate regarding the relations of managers and employees. This 
climate systematically values that facades are minimal and a genuine understanding 
of and appreciation of behaviour favouring benevolent collaboration is the norm.  The 
effect of the charismatic persons in the senior management on the bureaucracy that 
serve as moral role models can be seen through the lens of social cognitive theory. 
As explained by Wood and Bandura (1989: pg. 364), social cognitive theory explains 
that ‘in any causal structure, behaviour, cognitive and other personal factors and 
environmental events operate as interacting determinants that influence each other 
bi-directionally. This was the case within the charismatic bureaucracy whereby the 
effect of the charisma of the leaders created a system of bidirectional impact through 
mutual trust and social accountability that impacted significantly on how employees 
perceive the bureaucracy. 
In the leadership / ethics literatures there are works on the general impact of 
charismatic authority on employees, studies such as Morana, (1987); Shamir, House 
and Arthur, (1993); Conger and Kanungo, (1994); McNeese-Smith, (1995); 
McNeese-Smith, (1997); Chiok Foong Loke, (2001) have linked charismatic authority 
in organisations to job satisfaction, productivity, employee outcome, motivation, 
commitment and other similar employee related traits. Also, a study by Howell and 
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Avolio, (1992) highlighted some of the darker sides of charismatic authority such as 
‘charming’ employees into submission towards immoral ends. However, the opposite 
of this was found in the Charismatic Bureaucracy in which the managers’ behaviours 
encourage a greater sense of moral awareness whilst also allowing employees make 
their own choices thereby helping them retain their personal moral values. By this 
employees feel liberated to be themselves. Studies on employee moral development 
by Burns, (1978); House and Arthur, (1993); Dvir, Eden, Avolio and Shamir, (2002) 
based on Kohlberg’s (1973) theory suggested that for managers to be charismatic, 
they have to be ‘morally uplifting’ (Bass, 1998). This was found to be true within the 
context of the charismatic bureaucracy in which employees considered their leaders 
to inspire them morally and by this, they embrace these values which translates into 
a communal understanding of common values that binds the organisation together. 
The internalisation of company values by employees of N1 is not a function of rule 
compliance but a function of the charisma of the leaders who are faces of the values 
the firm stands for and whom employees willingly respect and embrace their values. 
It is also noteworthy that the context of the charismatic bureaucracy recorded the 
highest number of post conventional thinkers in any of the case groups, another 
indicator confirming the positive effect of charismatic authority on the morality of 
employees. 
Therefore all of the above imply that having an ethical protocol (Trevino, 1986; 
Ferrell and Skinner, 1988; Trevino, Butterfield and McCabe, 1998) codified is not 
enough but that morality has to be tacit. In the cases of the four hybrids of 
bureaucracies discovered in the cause of this study, two had clearly codified rules 
and these played out to have negative impact on employee morality. However with 
the two firms without clear rules, one had the effect of charismatic authority driving it 
whilst the other was driven by opportunistic entrepreneurship. The latter context also 
proved to have negative impact on employee morality however the only firm without 
rules but with some control underpinned by charismatic leadership seemed to work 
best for employee morality. As such, any codified attempt to define moral standards 
through websites and public relations, SOPS is often open to interpretation based on 
individuals’ stage of moral reasoning and also based on the overall purpose of the 
bureaucracy, which in most cases is efficiency. This was clearly the case in three of 
the hybrids of bureaucracy found in this study. Therefore as espoused in the 
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charismatic bureaucracy, ethics is best diffused by personalised, tacit means via role 
modelling, direct association and visual observation. As such in the case of the 
charismatic bureaucracy, it is the charisma of all the leaders that changed the picture 
of the bureaucracy. Thus, for morality to be effectively diffused within any system a 
strong consistency and coherence between context and individuals (individuals living 
out what they claim to believe) have to be a complimentary package for morality to 
work. This once again emphasizes the individual-situation interaction model of 
Trevino, (1986) in which it was posited that both individuals and contexts make 
ethics.  
9.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the main contribution of this study which is an empirical 
study of bureaucratic contexts on employee morality. From the four hybrids of 
bureaucracies found in the three case groups explored in this study, each had 
unique and varying in their impact on employee morality with three having a 
prevalently negative effect. Only the Charismatic Bureaucracy contributed positively 
to the moral development of employees within it. Across the case groups, it was also 
identified that there was a general inflated moral identity pattern caused by different 
factors within each context. Also, CMR was discussed to show more reliability in 
explaining employee moral behaviour given the fact that moral identity is prone to 
contextual sensitivities. Finally, discussions focused on how bureaucracies tend to 
support expertise over and above professionalism. Interestingly in all of these, the 
charismatic bureaucracy was found to disconfirm the findings of all propositions. 
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CHAPTER 10 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.0 Introduction 
This final chapter begins by highlighting the main limitations of this study. Then key 
practical implications of the main findings in this study are presented building on the 
discussions from chapter nine. On each of these practical implications, directions for 
future research are also proposed. From all these I draw my conclusions. 
10.1 Limitations 
In accurately capturing the two major theoretical measures employed in this study: 
moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and cognitive moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 
1961), a few limitations may be reported. First, in determining the moral identity 
strength of employees, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) moral identity measure was 
employed. The measure is widely documented to have consistently high validity; 
reliability and significant variations in large samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, 
McFerran and Laven, 2011). However the smaller sample size in this study could 
have affected the moral identity scores obtained, hence a limitation. Secondly, in 
measuring the cognitive moral development (Kohlberg 1973) of employees, the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) created by (Rest, 1989) is the main measurement tool 
that achieves scientific reliability and validity in the literature.  The nature of this 
study being a more qualitative exploration of effects of various bureaucratic contexts 
on employee morality was not based on this measure but rather a more subtle 
qualitative interview guide which has subsequently undergone qualitative analysis (of 
the manifested patterns of thought of the interviewees) to be matched against 
Kohlberg’s theoretical categories in his CMD theory (1961). This is clearly a limitation, 
which also entails some increased researcher subjectivity bias, which is however 
part of the general critiques for qualitative studies with interpretative research 
epistemology. However given the volume of the DIT questionnaire and the difficulty 
of getting participants to take part in this study, the DIT could not be used, nor was it 
compatible with a qualitative study as noted.  My chosen method of capturing the 
cognitive moral reasoning patterns of the interviewees could however be subject to 
researcher bias, which is thus another related limitation of this study.  
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Also, given the nature of ethics and the role contexts play in affecting moral thought 
and action, a cross-sectional study may not fully capture the full extent of the 
dynamics between organisational context variables (in this case, bureaucracy and 
related dimensions) and morality, i.e. the phenomenon investigated in this 
dissertation is very subtle, emerging and requires systematic observation across 
time. It is expected that longitudinal studies will more accurately reveal the full import 
of the role of contexts in shaping employee morality and this is something that the 
researcher may do in future studies. 
10.2 Practical Implications and Future research  
In this section, I present significant practical implications arising from the findings of 
this study. For each point raised, I also discuss directions for future research.  
Implications for Nationalised Bureaucratic Institutions in the organisational 
context of healthcare 
This study focused on bureaucracy in the private sector with multinationals in the 
corrupt context of Nigeria. The effects of the different bureaucracies within this 
context have been severally discussed earlier and it can be imagined that similar 
issues are true for national health care organisations like the National Health Service 
(NHS). The NHS is a large organisation with a complex structure and even within the 
structures, it contains both large and smaller units and all function differently. This 
research can also be applied in this instance to discuss the different arms of the 
NHS, the types of bureaucratic hybrids in each of these arms and their implication on 
the moral dispositions they might encourage. Also in the light of sweeping reforms 
taking place in the organisation of the public health service in England and Sweden 
for instance, (Fotaki and Boyd, 2005), it would be interesting to study across the 
different countries to further explore if for example the bureaucracies in their national 
health care systems are characterised by such or other hybrids of bureaucracy and 
their subsequent effects on morality and individual moral agency.  The nationalised 
bureaucratic healthcare context across EU and European countries may be a very 
interesting further context for continuing this empirical research. It is expected that 
this will help give interpretations to some of the moral and organisational behaviour 
challenges being experienced in those contexts for instance concerns of patient 
choice, governance hybrids and partnerships  (Fotaki, 2011).  
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Overall, this is expected to contribute to the growing research on how to make the 
NHS and other nationalised healthcare institutions in developed and developing 
countries work more effectively and more ethically.  
Headquarters and Subsidiaries Relationships 
The findings in this study also have implications for international business. In two of 
the three case groups studied in this research, the findings in this study bring to light 
the role the relationships between subsidiaries and their headquarters can play in 
shaping the type of bureaucracies operating within them as well as the type of 
morality they espouse. As such, the different subsidiaries of a firm could have 
entirely different bureaucracies in different contexts in which they operate, whilst the 
Headquarters presents a global façade of morality, while affiliate organisations in 
foreign contexts may be less encouraged to actively pursue organisational ethics 
beyond a surface level adherence to the operating procedures and codes of ethics of 
the Headquarters, as was found to be the case of A1 and A2 in this study. In such 
instances, subsidiaries are not necessarily fully regulated by the headquarters but 
such are left to function in contexts as desired. On the contrary, it could be the 
Headquarters that pressures subsidiaries into certain practices thereby stifling efforts 
being made at the subsidiary level to get things right. Generally however, it would be 
interesting to study the subsidiaries of the same firm in different contexts, particularly 
the developing nations vis-à-vis the developed nations to see the types of 
bureaucracy hybrids operating at these levels and the role of the headquarters in 
these different subsidiaries.  
Beyond Bureaucracy  
This study has highlighted the predominantly negative impact of bureaucracy on 
employee morality. This implies that bureaucracy is not an organisational form that 
necessarily encourages morality. From this study therefore, the bureaucracy 
literature benefits from the deeper understanding of how Weber’s ideal type is 
idealistic and that there are several manifestations of bureaucracy based on different 
factors such as national context, culture and firm’s objectives. However, within the 
literature of organisational studies and design, newer forms of organisations deemed 
to be ‘post-bureaucratic’ such as in the case of the Charismatic Bureaucracy and 
Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy have since emerged (Heckscher, Donnellon, 1994; 
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Kernaghan, 2000; Morris and Farrell, 2007) claiming to be radically different 
alternatives to the traditional bureaucracy. But, in discussing these newer forms of 
organisations, no matter the names given to them, there are always some elements 
of bureaucracy. As Heckscher, (1994:14) posited, in saying that post bureaucratic 
organisations ‘centre on teamwork, or lateral coordination, it turns out that some 
highly traditional bureaucratic organisations have a great deal of teamwork too’. 
Hence variations between these alleged new forms of organisations and traditional 
bureaucracies are hard to judge. Hence, wherever elements of bureaucracy such as 
rules (SOPs) or some form of managerial control are present, regardless of the type 
of organisation it is, flat or networked, these particular variables or dimensions will 
have both the positive effects (as found in the Charismatic Bureaucracy) and 
negative effects (present in the other three hybrids) found in this dissertation. 
Therefore, when newer forms of organisations are said to have been discovered yet 
have traces of rule compliance in some way or managerial control either via 
personalised means or other means, the negative effects of these on employee 
morality as found in this dissertation will have to be faced. In reality then, this calls to 
question the uniqueness of these newer forms of organisation if indeed they have 
some of the Weberian dimensions within them. Can they therefore be referred to as 
hybrids instead of radically new, different organisations? This question calls for 
future research studying these alleged newer forms of organisations to investigate 
their acclaimed uniqueness and to test whether some of the effects on employee 
morality found in this study are present in them as well.  
Hybrid bureaucracy and context 
In this study, four different hybrids of bureaucracy were found in the context of one 
industry. Each of these bureaucracies had different manifestations of rules and 
managerial control and also had different effects on the morality of individuals. All of 
these imply that there is no pure bureaucracy per se and that bureaucracy is 
idealistic. There is no one singular type of bureaucracy neither is there one singular 
way in which each of its dimensions manifest in any given context or setting. 
Bureaucracy is so nuanced that even within one industry, there are different shades. 
Hence, there could be as many different types of bureaucracies as there are 
organisations, with fundamental differences and superficial similarities. Therefore, it 
will be interesting to research across industries to find out whether the four hybrid 
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types found in this study are present in other industries or whether different 
industries tend to have their own types of bureaucracies peculiar to them.  
There is also a need for studies that might show contextual differences and resultant 
effects on different bureaucratic dimensions. Future research in bureaucracy can 
also look at other industry sectors and also consider other Weberian dimensions to 
be investigated in addition to the ones explored in this study. Longitudinal studies in 
each of the contexts can also be carried out to further appreciate the impact of the 
bureaucracy on employee morality. The current research design gives a snapshot of 
what is happening within each bureaucracy however, the continuous effect of the 
context on employee morality needs to be monitored over longer periods of time to 
test the stability of these effects. Also longitudinal studies are needed for instance to 
study the charismatic bureaucracy to see whether the charisma is sustained over a 
long period of time and whether its effects remain consistent over the duration of the 
longitudinal study.  
Promoting Ethical Organisations 
Although this research has been a qualitative study, in spite of its limitations earlier 
discussed, it has provided strong evidence that confirms Jackall, (1988) on how 
much conventional moral level of reasoning has been expanding in large 
organisations so as to become the norm of doing business, while in the morality and 
ethics literature conventional moral behaviour is understood as a rather inferior and 
immature way of individual being and active. This potentially means that 
organisational contexts of work may be gradually over time corrosive for both 
personal character and weakening of  the possibility for a virtuous economy for the 
common good  (Akrivou & Sison; 2016 forthcoming).  
The fact this research has been able to show that the persistence of 
conventional level morality in every day work contexts of large firms may be also an 
outcome due to the dynamics of bureaucratic organising in competitive global 
capitalist settings whereby the attraction, selection and the promotion of lower and 
mid level conventional moral reasoners / actors in key managerial and other 
positions of authority is a conscious act insofar as it supports a concern for short 
term efficiency that requires tolerance and promotion of conventional and 
transactional ways of professional relations within and outside firms. It is clear 
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anyway that bureaucratic rationality and conventional (lower-middle) level moral 
reasoning capacity are sine-qua non aspects of organisations.  
Therefore policy makers or anyone interested in promoting ethical organisations 
have to think of the implications of context on behaviour based on the findings of this 
dissertation. If the designs of organisations are not changed such that they promote 
other ethical forms of behaviour such as allowing for independent critical moral 
inquiry or such that they allow for universal ethics of justice and fairness (Kohlberg 
stage 6) to thrive, organisations may continually undermine employee morality. A 
good model as found in this study is in the case of the charismatic bureaucracy 
where a tacit exchange of morals from managers to subordinates through visible 
character and conduct resulted in the encouraging high number of post conventional 
level thinkers. All these support the notion in descriptive ethics literature (Trevino, 
1986; Weaver, 2006) that ethics is an interaction between context and behaviour 
hence, close attention must be paid to contexts and its impact on employees. 
Besides bureaucracy, the roles of other contextual elements or other organisational 
forms in affecting the morality of their employees may be considered in future studies. 
Also further studies could address how to break the habit of encouraging 
conventional level thinking within bureaucracies. Therefore subsequent studies could 
review how bureaucracies can best encourage morality in their employees whilst 
also helping the bureaucracy become a thriving ground for propagating individual 
critical moral inquiry.  
Tacit ethics 
As found in this study there is likely to be a higher level of moral reasoning in 
organisations where managerial control is more personal assuming that the 
management is more genuinely driven by ethical character and motivation and 
where SOPs are more tacit. The tacit nature is transmitted via the interactions 
between the managers and their subordinates. This was found in the Nigerian firms 
as an emergent finding but extremely interesting as contexts with more collectivistic 
culture have a more personalised culture rather than the individualistic culture, as in 
the west. If managers are explicitly trying to create organisational change, then one 
of the implications for organisational change is that moving towards a quasi 
collectivist culture would be more difficult even in a North American or Western 
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contexts, which are more individualist cultures. There could be more resistance 
because people want to see SOPs written down, risk registers etc in guiding their 
actions instead of trusting mutually shared norms as modelled by their leaders. More 
research is needed to test whether tacitly transferred ethics in different contexts have 
positive effects on the morality of employees. Through tacit conversations, there is a 
replication of norms, the mechanism that if I had longitudinal data; I could show why 
bureaucracy has longevity and is resistant to change. This would be interesting for 
future research to see how this continues over time. Also given all the negative 
contributions of the bureaucracy to morality and also given how resistant and long-
lived bureaucracies tend to get, more work is required to empirically see how 
organisations are able to introduce positive change to break the bureaucracy and 
create a healthy environment for ethics.  
Rules: Managerial and Employee Meaning Making 
In this study, the roles rules or SOPs play in the bureaucracy show that they can be 
used to drive compliance towards certain ends but that they can also be used to 
cover up managerial immorality.  Therefore, the SOPs themselves may not 
necessarily be the problem but the way managers use and interpret them, which as 
shown and noted also depends on the moral reasoning and character capacities of 
these but also on the normative elements of the bureaucracies that define a narrow 
role for management, mainly concerned with efficiency and the guarding of the upper 
echelon’s interests and goals. This may mean that more qualitative research is 
required to understand the way managers and individuals within the organisation 
understand, interpret or are allowed to interpret the moral context, rules, 
relationships and their own role and authority freedoms and limitations (Akrivou and 
Bradbury-Huang, 2011).  
In this same literature (Akrivou & Bradbury-Huang, 2011) it has been observed that 
while the role of leadership is the main catalyst of the type of context/morality norms 
that exists in each setting, it is also organisational relations between management 
and any non-management role holders that co-create the organisational behaviour 
dynamics. This study has shown that all these human dynamics are seriously limited 
in terms of their ethical flourishing possibilities within bureaucratic contexts. The 
American firms for instance do not give a leeway to interpretation so the importance 
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of research and practice is to help raise more management meaning making 
capacity because some of the adverse effects of rules found in this study could be 
competence issues.  Having the SOPs does not do the job; the responsibility is on 
individuals and managers to create the moral climate where the SOPs become 
something more (encouraging individual moral capacity) and not something less 
(limiting and stifling). The SOPs create an illusion that managers and employees 
must rely on the rules as they are but what I found in this case is that management 
as well as employee meaning making (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2011) is crucial 
since managers are the ones who have the power to sanction and reward, to elevate 
these SOPs into being useful for building moral capacities of their employees. Thus 
the responsibility of interpretation and implement is on individuals. 
Implications for management education and training 
This study has further confirmed the critical need to teach ethics in business schools 
in a way that prepares aspiring business managers for the realities they will face in 
the work place. This study has highlighted three of these realities including the 
likelihood of an inflated moral identity, conformity to norms and an excessive focus of 
results at the expense of professionalism. Therefore, the need arises in management 
education to emphasise the delicate role contexts can play in shaping and affecting 
the morality of those working in them. This study suggests the need for current and 
aspiring managers to be equipped with tools to engage in deliberate, critical, 
personal, independent moral inquiry, which could be a way to checkmate the 
negative effects contexts may have on their individual morality and choices. This 
also calls for emphasis to be made on the need for aspiring and current managers to 
assume a greater sense of responsibility in their moral choices, which can be 
enhanced by an objective self-reflection at work. At this level, organisations can also 
be encouraged to create enabling environments for their employees to engage in 
such acts of critical moral inquiry whilst training can be directed as deliberating on 
how the excesses of contexts can be curtained to create more morally healthy 
environment for employees. 
10.3 Conclusion  
This dissertation has been able to address a critical gap in our understanding of how 
contexts, in this case bureaucracies create mechanisms that are generally inhibitive 
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to employee morality. In so doing, it has been able to contribute to the literature of 
organisational design, moral identity, ethical decision-making and bureaucracy. 
Building on the initial suggestions of Trevino, (1986) and Weaver, (2006) that future 
research in descriptive ethics needs to consider the role of contexts in shaping 
employee morality and decision making capacity, this dissertation set out to 
investigate bureaucratic contexts. Earlier studies on bureaucratic contexts and their 
impact on employee morality (Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 2007) discovered that 
bureaucracies typically encouraged conventional level reasoning among employees. 
This implied that employees were unable to rise above the norms and status quo of 
bureaucracies in making ethical decisions at the post conventional level for instance. 
How bureaucracies achieve this however was not described. Also, the 
conceptualisation of bureaucracies was based on the assumption that there was only 
Weber’s ideal type, as it existed in traditional organisations. However, within the 
context of this study, four different hybrids of bureaucracy were found to have 
varying effects on employee morality, even though they were predominantly negative 
effects. This implies that studies on contexts need to carefully understand the nature 
of the contexts being investigated and their peculiarities as this will have huge 
ramifications on the effects discovered within them.  
In this study, clear mechanisms such as rule compliance, superficial belongingness, 
and success-oriented opportunism were found to be examples of ways different 
hybrids of bureaucracy stifled individual critical moral inquiry whilst also inflating a 
sense of strong moral identity. However charisma was found to play a positive role in 
tacitly building the moral awareness and capacity of employees. By these, it can be 
concluded that explicitly written rules as discovered in this study tend to have more 
negative effects on employee morality but that a more potent way of shaping the 
employee morality in a positive way is through tacit transfer and hence socialisation 
though the visible character and conduct of the managers.  
In conclusion, the literature on organisational design benefits from how to build 
ethical organisations that enhance the moral capacities of persons (employees and 
management) through recognition of the importance of a relational perspective 
alongside the structural and rule perspectives in positively shaping employee 
morality. The descriptive ethical literature benefits from yet another confirmation of 
the clear complimentary role in which both contexts and individuals play in shaping 
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ethical decision-making and also confirm this interplay as the direction for all future 
studies.   
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APPENDIX 1 KOHLBERG’S CMD STAGES & CMR PROFILES 
 
KOHLBERG’S CMD STAGES 
Pre-conventional Level 
The pre-conventional level comprises stages 1 and 2. At this level, individuals are 
concerned with concrete consequences (Trevino, 1986) often following from rules 
perceived as external and imposed. Thus, right and wrong are judged based on 
punishment and rewards involved as well as exchange of favour (Weber, 2009).  
Stage one indicates individuals are guided by obedience to rules usually 
administered by an authority, in order to avoid punishments. The question often 
asked at this stage for example is, ‘Will I get into trouble for doing or not doing this?’ 
At stage two, some form of exchange takes place hence the instrumental element of 
it. Nothing goes for free and adherence is based on fairness (Fraedrich, Thorne and 
Ferrell, 1994) or that reciprocity is a matter of 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch 
yours,' not of loyalty, gratitude or justice (Duska and Whelan, 1975). Individuals 
operating at the second stage tend to ask the question, “what’s in it for me?” with the 
ability to see beyond self a little bit more and focus on a fair exchange with another 
party. Thus, the social perspective at this level is characterised by egoism, in which 
actors are unable and unwilling to consider factors outside of self (Weber, 2009). 
Maesschalck and Vanoverbeke, (2005) added that the egoism criterion is focused on 
maximising ‘self-interest’, which is defined in a narrow, instrumental and economic 
sense of immediate interest. Both stage 1 and 2 seem to be in the flip side of the 
same coin in that punishment is avoided for rewards to be gained.  
Conventional Level 
Level two (the conventional level), comprises stages 3 and 4. At this level, the 
individual is expected to have internalised the norms of the society they belong to, 
for example in the family or at the work place and therefore, conformity to these 
norms is the golden rule for judging what is right (Kohlberg, 1967). As Kohlberg and 
Hersh, (1977) opined, ‘The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal 
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, 
and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it’ 
(p.55). In other words, fulfilment of responsibilities, behaving properly within set 
regulations, and living up to roles are all towards societal acceptance (Trevino, 1992). 
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There is an importance placed on interpersonal conformity and maintaining 
relationships (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). At stage 3, good behaviours are seen as 
those that please others or are approved by them. The question often asked is, 
“what will people think of me?” and it is towards group approval. Kohlberg and Hersh, 
(1977) called this stage the ‘good boy – nice girl’ orientation stage. Motives and 
intentions come to play here with the key aim of gaining societal trust or 
interpersonal trust. Approval is earned by being ‘nice’.  At the fourth stage, 
orientation is towards ‘law and order’ (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). Duties are 
important especially as laid down in social, legal and religious systems. Doing right 
consists of maintaining the social order for its own sake and respecting authority, 
designed to benefit all. 
Kohlberg, (1971) placed most American adults at this conventional level, specifically 
at the third stage. More recent studies on managers by Weber, (1990), Elms and 
Nichols, (1993) and Weber and Wasieleski, (2001) have also concluded that most 
research identifies managers as reasoning at this level in business organisations. In 
organisations, Colby and Kohlberg, (1987) described individuals operating at stage 3 
as more focused on adhering to the procedures and rules of a narrowly defined 
group. Individuals would consider rewards, punishments and consequences of their 
actions on their groups, which could for instance be a managers’ work group or 
departmental team in making any decisions. At stage 4, Colby and Kohlberg, (1987) 
explained that individuals focus on broader societal norms during decision making as 
well as the consequences to the members of the society affected by the decisions. 
This stage is all about conformity to a surface level ‘groupishness’ and preservation 
of the status quo, and the inability and lack of interest to engage in personally 
responsible action. 
Post-Conventional Level 
The level three (post-conventional) is the highest level of moral development. At this 
level, comprising stages 5 and 6, individuals go beyond being identified by others or 
following the provisions of the law for the sake of order via a universal rule of ethics 
of justice, which is a function of the law (Kohlberg, 1971). They look beyond society 
and begin to operate at a universal level (Rest, 1986) and while they look to the law 
for its universality of application they also begin to question the ethical force of 
prescribed laws which are also culturally and contextually defined (Weber & Gillespe, 
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1998). As Weber and Gillespie, (1998) explained, ‘the post conventional moral agent 
defines moral values and principles apart from the authority of groups, such as the 
organization or society’. Therefore, ‘laws are not always the most ethical directive of 
behaviour and, in fact, this individual would set aside a law in favour of a consistent 
adherence to an ethical standard’ (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). At stage five for 
example, there is an awareness of relativism in personal values and even though the 
law is still the defining societal contract, this stage of thought considers altering the 
law for socially useful purposes for example, when it is in the interest of humanity 
(Trevino, 1992). According to Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977), at this stage, ‘right action 
tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have 
been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society’ (p.55). It also comes 
with an awareness of and sensitivity towards the problem of moral relativism in the 
society. Hence, post conventional stage morality is motivated by the desire to reach 
a consensus and as such comes with changing law in terms of rational 
considerations for social utility as different from the stiff ‘law and order’ orientation at 
stage four (Kohlberg, 1971).  
At the sixth stage, the individual is guided more independently and is self-imposed 
not via external constraints and norms but freely committing oneself to self-chosen 
principles of ethical rights and justice. It is what Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977) called 
the universal ethical principle orientation, a stage at which ‘right is defined by the 
decision of the conscience according to self-chosen principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality and consistency’ (p.55). Such principles are often 
abstract universal ethical norms and not concrete rigid moral laws like the Ten 
Commandments for example (Kohlberg, 1967).  At their very core these abstract 
ethical principles are universal principles of justice, quality of human rights and of 
respect for the dignity and respect for fellow humans as individual persons (Kohlberg 
and Hersh, 1977). An example of such abstract ethical principle is Kant’s categorical 
imperative which proposed that actors should act in ways that their actions could 
become universal laws. Therefore, if an actor isn’t willing for the ethical rule they are 
following to be applied equally to everyone, including themselves, then the rule is not 
a valid moral rule (Crane and Matten, 2006). Also in this category is Rawl’s (1971) 
principle of justice in which he proposes humans take actions from behind ‘a veil of 
ignorance’ that blinds people to facts about themselves and thereby helps not to 
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tailor choices for self-advantage. Sandel’s (2010) opinion on justice is yet another 
perspective individuals operating at the post conventional CMD level can adopt. 
Sandel’s (2010) principle of justice inclines more toward Aristotelian ethics’ inspired 
‘communitarianist’ ethics perspective and it is also relative to post conventional view 
on freely chosen morality.  Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the 
interconnectedness of individuals and their community, for instance, family unit.  
However, Weber, (1990) as well as other studies (Trevino, 1992; Nichols, 1993; 
Greenberg, 2002) have found that very few managers operate at this post 
conventional level of moral reasoning and this has been validated more widely. For 
instance, Jackall, (1988) in a study of 100 managers found that all managers in 
studied organisations operated mainly in the early level conventional moral 
development stages. But, individuals found operating at this post conventional level 
often flow freely between stage 5, where emphasis is on rights and stage 6, where 
focus is on consistently applying universal ethical principles. Kohlberg argued that 
less than 20% of the American adults reach this level of principled thinking (Rest, 
1986; Trevino, 1992). Empirically, Kohlberg’s theory assumes that any individual 
found operating at this level within any organisation would transcend rules and 
conformity where necessary to operate at a higher level of moral reasoning to do the 
right things based on the principles that they choose to operate by. Therefore within 
a bureaucratic environment, such individuals weigh the rules of their immediate 
environments in the light of universal ethical principles and would stick to the latter 
whenever a conflict was observed. Thinking at this stage is expected to result in a 
string of unchanging, consistent moral behaviours based on outcomes of self-chosen 
principles, such Kantian ethics, Rawl’s or Sandel’s views of justice, for example.  
APPENDIX 1.1: CMR Profile of Participants in the American Case group 
Participant CMR level Quote 
A1g Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
 
“…Like these are online trainings, they give us 
Case studies of  situations and ask what we will 
do, we will give them the answer and they tell us 
either yes or no this is what you should do in 
such  situations  and then if you have such 
situations you report them so basically it is like 
trials, they tell you what to do more situations 
more often than not they are telling you this is 
how you shall handle this, they also tell you that 
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this is a consequence of this is how much they 
have had to pay for defaulters…” 
 
“…There is usually one training every month.  
(What are the kinds of things that they tell you?) 
Like these are online trainings, they give us Case 
studies of situations and ask what what we will 
do, we will give them the answer and they tell us 
either yes or no this is what you should do in 
such situations and then if you have such 
situations you report them so basically it is like 
trials, they tell you what to do more in situations 
more often than not they are telling you this is 
how you shall handle this, they also tell you that 
this is a consequence of this is how much they 
have had to pay for defaulters. So you are aware 
of this severe implications and the severity of 
such situations.” 
A1f 
 
Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
 
“… For example, let me come down to my level, 
you go to hospital, and you tell a doctor that you 
shall sponsor him for a particular program and 
that he would write your drugs more, what should 
he or she do? The answer of course is NO. You 
would tell him, of course it isn’t the proper thing to 
do, sponsoring the doctor would imply that you 
are influencing him and inducing him to prescribe 
your drugs which is not what we do, we are a 
company that stands for quality as in what you 
offer should sell for you and not trying to induce 
anybody.”  
 
A1a Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
 
“…Now, if you are talking to a government 
official, there are set guidelines. For a smart 
employees what you would do would be to come 
back to the office before meeting the person and 
have a scenario painting and say okay this is the 
best case, this is the worst case then you go, if 
you need any approval, you go with the worst 
case approved..” 
A1b Conventional 
Level, Stage 
3 
“That is not something I want to do even if the 
organisation allows me to do so. So whatever 
kind of business advantage we are trying to get 
or gain is secondary to your personal values. I 
would rather lose the business advantage than 
go against what the company set for me…” 
 
“And then also of course, the overall objectives is 
to ensure that everyone delivers on their 
numbers. It is a sales organisation whatever you 
are doing; your total overall picture is to impact 
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results. That also you want to ensure so these 
are very straight forward expectations. Nothing 
ambiguous or complex about that.” 
A1c Post 
Conventional 
Stage 5 
“the company keeps finding ways of saying okay 
bringing in training as much as possible, how 
best can we work in a complaint environment, 
looking at our nature. Nigeria, Africa where we 
operate is a column B country according to the 
global standard of corruption, so in country where 
corruption index is high, compliance is even 
taken seriously there. Something that can be 
overlooked in some countries will not be allowed 
in a place like the country where we are so these 
are some of the things that so A1 operating in a 
country with high corruption index makes it more 
complex to operate.” 
 
“For us (from self to we), integrity is very 
important [you hold that too as an individual?] I 
do top errm that's why for me I can work in A1. 
The company itself, the policy somehow dovetails 
into what I personally hold as what ought to be 
done. Where I may get a bit concerned is when I 
feel, oh this is too much, you can do this. It is 
not... Sometimes some issues are not because it 
is a compliance issues but because we cannot 
show proof, you need to show proof  that this 
organisation that you said you gave money, you 
didn’t give money to an individual which definitely 
you did not do but sometimes the person wants 
more evidence which you don’t have to show that 
you didn’t...that it's based on trust now.” 
A1d Conventional 
Stage 4 
“And everything is based strictly on compliance 
are you don't do things because you want to do it. 
You might be doing it and somehow to the 
applause of every other human it is okay and will 
evaluate it by looking at the laid down rules in 
terms of compliance were the rules followed? So 
you you might more than be penalised…” 
 
“Yes. Like I said before everything is based on 
approval. Because  if approval is not given you 
wait and it helps things more better  because 
once you do things without approval and issues 
emerge from such, the penalties are usually very 
high looking at a multinational company.” 
A1e Conventional 
Stage 3 
“The way we are being guided, so since you have  
a pre knowledge of what you expect to do, so 
would begin to know this is beyond me.” 
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“…Although our organisation (laughs) we are 
prone to change because every now and then we 
come up with new organisational structure that 
we need to align ourselves to…” 
A2a Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
 
“All in all basically I have a target and a budget I 
have to meet at the end of the year which is like 
the first KPI for me so I try as much as possible to 
organise myself and ensure that with all these 
activities I mentioned would help and assist to me 
in meeting my target” 
 
“I think most part of my life has been sales and 
sales  so I have come to enjoy sales and 
marketing which I think I will like to grow along 
that line so it's something that keeps driving me I 
actually want to see myself on top of the sales 
chart 1 day been like maybe the country manager 
or the managing director and all that so it's 
something that is driving me” 
A2b Post-
Conventional, 
Stage 6 
“My value system – God first and is centre for 
everything, there your relationship with people, 
being trustworthy like being reliable, owing up to 
what you can do and what you can't do you say it 
there. Everyone is a human being. As in you say 
your mind but assessing personality style and 
working with the person.” 
 
“Well, it was just discernment and intuition, what 
was just coming up and I use it to act and I was 
calm and I was just confident. I didn’t want to play 
like he was doing me a favour, I still will always 
talk about this patient the drug and all of that.” 
A2c Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
 
“We have people were really wanna take 
ownership of the business. We're very centered 
about the result and the same time where really 
really concerned about how we get the results. 
We about winning but wining the right way…” 
 
“We make sure that is an alignment between 
what you stand for and what the company 
believes in. If there is something about alignment, 
You are most likely going to be a perfect 
candidate, It starts that way…” 
A2d Conventional 
Level, Stage 
4 
We are a very compliant company… like just on 
Sunday, my boss sent us a corporate ethics and 
anti- bribery stuff again just to remind us of it. So 
the ever ready made rules internationally, their 
back rules, ethics and all of that so they pass it 
down.” 
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“…like I said, before you do something like that, 
always confirm with your boss, even though... 
Like I had a situation on Friday, I was talking with 
my boss. There was an consultant haematologist; 
he is the chairman of the Nigerian HIV AIDS task 
force, quite big. We sell ARVs and we are trying 
to get into the market. We have some generic 
competition so I was talking to my boss about it 
and he was telling me that we should come and 
make a presentation somewhere and talk to him. 
I asked my boss, what's in it for this man? before 
we go any farther, let's know where we say no 
and where we say.. and I said of course, because 
we are very ethical company what we can do is 
we can give him support educationally if he wants 
to go for a course or a training, 
Source: Fieldwork 
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APPENDIX 1.2: CMR Profile of Participants in the Indian Case group 
 
Participant CMR level Quote 
I1a Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
 
“Most times he (the director) tells you what to do, 
I work based on instructions that’s why I don't 
have the final say so whatever he says even if 
anyone comes around and needs something I 
only pass it on to my boss so whatever he says is 
final. So everything that comes up I have to follow 
up on the matter and give feedback...there is no 
freedom” 
I1c Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
 
'…the way the system is run…the way it is 
structured there is nothing you can do in the 
system that they don't know about, the way it is 
being done is like they monitor everything that 
goes on here, they monitor from the sales right to 
the distribution so there is no how you can come 
in and say you want to play pranks because that 
is why they place themselves everywhere, like in  
finance they are charge of the finance, then in 
charge of the stock, they are in charge of most of 
the things…’ 
 
“Well, like I said the environment wasn't that 
conducive, I just have to adapt, adapt  in the 
sense that whatsoever comes my way, as long as 
I'm in the system I just have to play along with 
it.I'm not happy but is nothing I can do about it 
and in Nigeria now the job opportunities are so 
slim so anyone that you have with you just have 
to get hold of it except you get a better one are 
you leave that's just what I'm doing.” 
 
 
I1d Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
“…What you do is... you don't break the rules but 
you bend it, that's one of the things you do as a 
sales man you have to work smart. You don't 
only work hard but you work smart. You must 
work smart, there are times when a hospital 
needs order, and the order is just 50,000, you 
can ask at the pharmacy to write another 50,000 
because you need it to meet up your target and 
you need the products so you can ask the 
pharmacist to add your own to it which are some 
of the unethical things that the office has forced 
you to do which ideally shouldn't be.” 
I1e Post- “I am one person will believes that it is very easy 
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Conventional 
level, Stage 6 
to maintain character than to retrieve it when it is 
lost, and this job is changing it is getting to me, 
and beginning to do certain things I'll think I'll 
never do so it's part of the reason I want to leave, 
is beginning to do certain things that I've always 
been against my own value system because to 
be honest if you're here long enough you would 
lose will you are a you become something else 
even if you did used to be the sort of person 
would believe in tips and bribes for doctors, that 
is one change the job is brilliant to me making me 
think at least I've had enough here.” 
 
I2b Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
“...the company at times they haven't paid you for 
like two months and it's the third month I have not 
been paid, sometimes you just wonder how 
you're going to eat. Goods pass through us to the 
final consumer, and the also go through us to 
them, so, what it does to me sometimes not all 
the time, if I am remitting money I'll have to use 
my head, like I don't have money and company 
also wants work done, there is no way that is 
easy. I don't have money to go for work today 
because I don’t have fuel in my car, sometimes I 
just take money from the money I am meant to 
remit, I don't score my manager for that so I just 
take it and with few things…” 
I2c Conventional 
level, Stage 3 
“… That is one thing also about Philips it is more 
or less like a family although I started with them 
as a meaning organisation when it wasn't as 
large as this so as a thing evolved we know. I 
said I grew with them so everybody still relates, if 
there's anything it is not personal maybe it's on-
the-job maybe you're not doing what you're 
supposed to do.” 
 
“We have standard of practice that we are giving 
to use. if you climb the ladder you have the SOP 
well, it is something that is given but is not as if 
we... we know that this is how we do things like if 
you want to do a meeting like a meeting with the 
doctors were called clinical meetings, this is how 
you go about it for it to be okay that's standard... 
But it is not something that is... we know it.” 
I2d Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
“…Every organisation has ways in which they 
achieve results. We all have core values what we 
believe in or principles, but all in the name of you 
want to achieve your targets you compromise 
some things. One of the things I can actually say 
is, going through the back door to get some 
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things done but naturally it is against my faith but 
because of my job what will I do?” 
 
“…Some of my colleagues sell other company 
products… you can't question this person 
because it is the person you have not been 
paying his expenses for months and you 
expecting them to cooperate he can't do magic… 
I will not, I will not. I will only query in areas where 
I feel that you know they are unfair enough to the 
company if the company is 80% to 90% fair to 
you, because these are issues that we also 
tender to management, please look into this and 
if management is not actually doing anything 
about it I don't know how you expect.... if you 
cannot get hundred per cent from all these guys, 
if with this poor response of the company they 
still give you 60% 70% or 80% of your target I 
think they are on track. So I put all these into 
consideration, so for reasons like that I don't 
report such things…” 
Source: Fieldwork 
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APPENDIX 1.3: CMR Profile of Participants in the Nigerian Case group 
 
Participant CMR level Quote 
N1a Conventional 
level, Stage 4 
 
“Haven worked in other organisations, here is 
quite different, they are unique in the way to do 
things, they make you to believe in yourself there 
are so many of is that you know cannot defend 
what do no but here I can tell you if you work 
here, if you know you will be able to defend it any 
time so here is a place that enables you to... they 
are very open, you feel challenged, you challenge 
yourself doing things. If you leave N1 you want 
half year working in any other organisation 
because they will groom you to. The culture here 
is such that you are close to the management, 
and directors you talk to them, you eat together 
so that fear is not there but at the same time be 
expected to do your job. Here they don't play with 
quality” 
N1b 
 
Post 
Conventional 
level, Stage 6 
 
 
“I think basically, the values I hold  in high esteem 
is a pure reflection of my religion and my religion 
tells me that my own motto, the motto I have, let 
me start from there –  do good to everyone and 
always be a better person in every situation” 
 
“I come from a family that holds up to very high 
morals so on my job, I would not lower the 
standards of what should be obtainable at my 
desk so I ensure that everything that emanates 
from my desk is  authentic, valid and I come back 
it up with documents and I think that speaks for 
every department in this organisation.” 
N1c Post 
Conventional 
Level 5 
for me, my values also relate somehow with 
where I'm working. like I said, I want to stand out, 
I want to be known, I also strive for excellence. 
many thing I lay my hands to do I don't mind if it 
takes me time, I wanted that when am giving it 
out, what is being signed is something of quality, 
it is something to reckon with. I do my job 
excellently well with little or  minimal fault you 
understand so that it can pass across and so I 
can say yes this is good work,  I look out for 
details because also I am an organised person 
when it comes to doing something in an 
organised way, I want to make sure that it is well 
done... 
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in anything my name is been mentioned, I want to 
make sure that my name is being measured for 
good not for something that's not good so I will 
not in any way mingle or interact with anything 
that I know will soil my name. also believe in the 
same that whatever you do today is subject to 
judgement in the future so we always see if lie 
today, you will need to all more lies to cover for 
the life that you have said, I try as much as 
possible to be plain in what I'm doing. when I say 
yes to something, that yes is yes, if I go out 
maybe I'm not here now, you are with somebody 
else and you put up the speakerphone, yes I said 
to you whilst we were together is still the same 
when I am not around for you to say this is the 
person that signed this, you will look at it as they 
are you sure so I look out and strive to have a 
very good integrity in the institution I find myself. 
N1d Conventional 
Level,  
Stage 4 
“They say we're product of the environment, what 
we see and what we hear but I came from a 
background where discipline is instilled. I must 
confess that, my father is a retired military officer 
who never joked with discipline, I told him  daddy 
thank you in 2008 for those disciplines because it 
is now back and actually see the  essence of 
those  discipline” 
 
“The MD said some words that he never knew 
we're going to play big on me, I picked them and 
actually applied them and I found out that their 
principles that you find in men were actually 
aspiring to be great and whilst in that  I 
mentioned some of those words and he was like 
wow and me I was only  doing my presentation to 
the whole management team of Fidson, I ended 
up being applauded like we have you been all 
this while and someone said I did fantastic and I 
thought I was only doing my stuff because they 
said they have always seen me as someone who 
is not serious or someone who is not up to to the 
game you know that's trying to erase shallow 
picking in what you do” 
N1e Conventional 
Level, Stage 
4 
When I am asked to lie that my boss in not 
around because he wants to avoid a particular 
person, it kills you. because you begin to have a 
disconnect with your personal values and What 
you are made to do your job and if you're a very 
emotional person by person that takes things 
seriously it can  actually begin to affect you. 
fortunately for me a gain I don't have to do that. 
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N1f Post 
Conventional, 
Stage 5 
Integrity something personal, you understand, I 
might have integrity... my level of integrity might 
be different it is relative so me as an auditor my 
own level of integrity might enter the higher than 
somebody in another department because is not 
really involved in the review aspect of things 
because I has an auditor have to review whatever 
any department or unit has done, I have two 
review and all of that so my own level of integrity I 
think should be a little higher than others, 
because they have to ensure that things are 
being done the right way. I think basically that is 
how I perceive it. 
 
they have values, but people's individual values 
might not agree with the company's core values. 
the company might it okay this is what you should 
do but at the individual level people may not 
actually comply with those things and you having 
a higher standard reasoning maybe because of 
the experience in that area, professional 
competence and all of that you find that it is 
difficult for you to make them understand why 
things should be done the way things should be 
done. that's my job. 
 
N1g Post-
Conventional, 
Stage 5 
Mention rotary club etc 
N1h Conventional 
Level,  
Stage 4 
“There is this free mindedness here… Firm N1 is 
an environment whereby you're not so scared of 
anybody even the bosses. I would also use an 
example of my director who grew me up to have 
confidence in myself no matter how critical or 
terrible you are you can stand up and just 
express this this and this. If you ask any about 
question my job, I will stand up and tell you this is 
how it is. I am not easily intimidated, one of my 
bosses the divisional director groomed me so 
here everybody's free, we are free with one 
another you know sometimes in some companies 
you could go up and say I want to see the MD 
and they say see the secretary... it is not like that 
here you walk up to him and say this is what I 
have, it is a friendly atmosphere, this freedom 
that is the best in my opinion, the freedom is 
there, expressing yourself in a well mannered 
way, not in an abusive way, you are free to 
express yourself…” 
N1i Conventional  
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Level,  
Stage 4 
N2a Post 
conventional,  
Stage 5 
It is not that I don't like money but I can't soil my 
hands because I want to get money. For me it is 
not worth it, I have a whole career ahead of me 
and I am building my own brand in the industry so 
because of... 
 
“…They won’t tell you that you can’t do things but 
if you did it to make money, nobody is going to 
harass you…You can do anything you feel like 
doing to a large extent… as long as you can 
justify it and of course you can always have a 
reason for it. It’s unlike the multinationals where 
you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they 
do the anti-corruption law every time…But whilst 
you are here there is really no code of ethics as 
long as you can justify it. 
N2b Pre-
Conventional 
Level 2 
“I enjoy selling and the figures are coming in. I 
calculate what I will make from transactions and I 
have had to give the money because there was a 
condition for that if you can do this we get this.  
So I don't have to start calling the office again. 
You know at times you need to get back to the 
office mostly because of the price issue but this 
particular incident there was already a provision 
because I've complained that we need to take out 
something because of the challenge we have and 
they actually keyed in…” 
N2c Pre-
Conventional 
Level 2 
“We build relationships, we also work on their 
emotions, and we discover opportunities. You 
might walk into a customer shop, there are 
opportunities there which nobody has filled up, 
not only giving the person the product but there 
are needs in his business that have not been 
identified or taken care of you know so 
discovering does opportunities and in helping the 
person to meet those needs will also increase his 
loyalty to your brand. In marketing they call it a 
war at the front you must do whatever, you use 
all the strategy that you can ever think of in order 
to make sure you win” 
 
“My own values, I know that I am a team player 
and I am also self-motivated even  things are not 
looking well i tend to encourage myself to be on 
top of my game and to do same for our 
colleagues also the values of the company, we 
tried to drive also the core values by maintaining 
good person relationship with your customers, 
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making sure that everything that is given to you 
doesn't diminish rather you grow them, values 
are there a lot of pains about it which I to bring in 
the best that we have from our hearts to put in 
our best to make sure that things are working as 
it is supposed to.” 
N2d Conventional 
(Stage 4) 
“In terms of all that I think at times most of those 
things are  just face values. They are things you 
just put in place any time you have meetings so 
one can ask you to recite the core values and all 
that but the truth is I feel to a very large extent 
these things are not being practised by me, by 
whoever, by the managing director, heads of 
departments and virtually everybody. so, I think 
people are not... it is more of Just lip service, 
people don't understand what it is what we see 
integrity. So easy for us to say  integrity, we begin 
to look at our customers they are not paying but 
we also giving what we promised, at times what 
we promised is not just in terms of product. If you 
tell me we have integrity then if I tell you okay I 
am going to pay you your incentive on 27 May, 
you should pay it but it doesn't happen so that 
means even as a company we have team work is 
one of our core values but they were almost 
beating themselves, in fact the level of internal 
conflicts to me is so high, I am try to do this at 
times you can seek advice from someone and 
that is what the person we use against you up 
there so, everybody is just...(interruption) so in 
terms of the core values I'm not sure we are 
doing  enough, and that's just a truth” 
N2e Conventional 
Level 
Stage 4 
“Basically I just think that bureaucracy kills 
everything here. The steps you have to go 
through to get anything done it slows everything 
down just makes it very very boring, it makes a 
drag so I think it is the bureaucracy that is the 
problem here. The presence is just to much.” 
 
“like I said, initially it  was if you meet 80% of your 
target, they would give you a certain percentage 
but that has never happened and at this point 
they still argument as to who should do the 
payment.  Basically what they are looking for his 
meeting your targets.” 
N2g Conventional 
Level 
Stage 4 
“Candour, results which is key, for me…at times 
no result is a result, you work at something you 
expect to get figures and the figures are not  
coming I feel that is a result, it is then left for you 
to look at that result that you have and ask 
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yourself why are we getting this result, is there 
anything in the process that we can work at....” 
 
“My own personal values are say things that it 
is... it is easy for people to build up expectations 
and find that it is not possible- it's all much more 
than that. Say it as it is let's know how it is and 
how we can tinker about it. don't try to impress 
yes of course if you work hard it will shall but then 
if you're playing to the gallery would doubt the 
works to back it up,  you're just wasting people's 
time and it can be annoying.” 
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APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
DECISION MAKING IN DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
Dear Respondent,  
 
Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. This study explores how different 
organisational environments enable decision-making. Below are some questions in this regard, 
kindly answer as truthfully as you can. Where necessary, kindly provide further explanations, as 
you deem necessary. This will help researchers understand your responses.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY: This is an academic work supervised by Drs K. Akrivou and E 
Fenton, in the University Of Reading, UK.  Anonymity and confidentiality have been part of this study’s 
ethical approval clauses in the UK. We treat all responses as STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  Note that you 
won’t be asked for your name. Any personally sensitive details you wish to share will be treated as 
anonymous information, with a random number assigned to this data.  All data will be aggregated to 
study general patterns. No individual data will be appearing in the end of this study.   
Adeyinka Adewale 
Researcher 
 
Job Designation: 
SECTION 1: ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Are there written rules guiding how you respond to issues/ standardised processes on 
how to do things on your job?  Yes [  ] No [  ] if  yes, kindly use the scale below to report how 
clear and complex the rules are, if no, kindly proceed to q uestion 2 
On this scale, 1 indicates rules are of low clarity/complexity and 7 indicates rules are of high 
clarity/complexity 
CLARITY OF RULES  
Scale 
Low  High 
The rules are clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
COMPLEXITY OF RULES     
The rules are complex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. Are you allowed freedom of judgement on issues you face while performing your work 
responsibilities?  Yes [  ] No [   ]    
Kindly explain what is expected of you and to what extent your freedom is encouraged or 
curtailed. Please give examples of each case (you may please continue overleaf)  
1. I have freedom to …………………………………………………………………………..………………………………  
2. I have freedom to……………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
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3. I have freedom to ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..  
4. I don’t have freedom to ………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
5. I don’t have freedom to……………………………………………………………………………………………………….  
6. I don’t have freedom to ………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
For each item identified below, circle the number to the right that best fits your judgement of its quality  
where 1 equals Strongly Disagree and 7 equals strongly Agree  
Use the rating scale to select the quality number. 
Environmental Features 
Scale 
 
Neither Agree/Disagree  
1. I am usually expected to do my work strictly following written rules or 
explicit procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am usually expected to always check with my manager before I take initiative  
in my work 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If a written rule does not cover some situation, I make up our own rules for 
doing things as I go along 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Management control help me do my job more effectively  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In my dealings with this company, even quite small matters have to be referred 
to someone higher up for a final answer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I can take very little action on my own until it is approved by my superior(s)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If my boss wants something dropped, I have to drop it  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There are strong penalties for violating company’s procedures of doing things  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rules and procedures make sense  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rules and procedures make work effective  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
On the whole, this company is more concerned with results  than how we get 
the job done 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Generally this company monitors all the time how I spend my work and effort  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel like I am closely monitored to ensure that I comply with company rules  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My manager inspects my work relations closely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My job allows me to do only the same things day to day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I see myself as a  specialist at my job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am not emotionally attached to my work  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am not emotionally  connected to other people in this organisation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I know the names of many other co-workers around here 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I relate well with many other employees in this organisation to them  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I trust the decisions of my managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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SECTION 2: ABOUT ME 
 Imagine you are the person described in the statements 1 -9 below how, kindly rate on the given scale the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement  
1 indicates Strongly Disagree and 7 equals strongly Agree 
 
Behavioural Preferences 
Scale 
 
Neither Agree/Disagree  
2. I love giving a lot to people and charitable causes  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I show compassion all the time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe in treating all equally in all my dealings  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People love hanging around me because I care for them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I dislike showing concern about the wellbeing of others  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am always of help to those who need my help around me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe in hard work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I tell people things as I feel, even if it will make them feel bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I could give my last naira note to another as long as it makes them feel better  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Haven considered statements 1-9 above, kindly rate how you feel about them 
I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I strongly desire to have these characteristics  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having these characteristics is not really important to me  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I often wear clothes that reflect my moral values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The type of things I do in my spare time clearly identify me as having these 
characteristics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The kind of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others I have these 
characteristics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SECTION 3: DEMOGRAPHICS 
Highest level of education achieved: 
Age: 18- 25 [   ] 26- 30 [  ] 31 – 35 [  ] 36 – 40 [  ] 41 – 45 [  ] 46 – 50 [  ] 51 – 55 [  ] 56 and above [  ] 
Gender: Male [   ]         Female [   ] 
State of Origin: 
Years of Working in this Organisation: 
Your rank in this  organisation Employee: [    ] Administrator [   ] Supervisor [    ] manager [    ]    
Senior Management [    ] 
 327 
Overall working experience (in years): 
Any experience of work or study abroad? Yes [   ]  No [  ] 
Marital Status:  
Spoken Languages 
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY 
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APPENDIX 3: RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
 
Research Procedure  
This section details a step-by-step guide to how data was collected and the research 
conducted. It also highlights some crucial challenges faced by the researcher in the 
cause of the project and how these were circumvented.  
 
School’s ethic committee approval 
The initial stages of this study required that appropriate clearance is received from 
the school’s ethics research committee. This is to verify that the research to be 
conducted will be within the permissive legal jurisdiction of research by the 
university’s standards. Checks were made to ensure participants are not vulnerable 
persons and that no live human specimens would be taken in the cause of the 
research. Also that any collected data would be by the consent of the parties after 
full disclosures have been made to them and that at the end of the research, such 
evidences will be destroyed. This study met with these and other criteria and was 
therefore approved.  
 
Selecting Potential Firms 
Next, a detailed list of all potential pharmaceutical firms in Lagos, Nigeria was 
collated using a recent United Nations (UNIDO, 2013) report on the industry. This list 
was used as a guide in uncovering key players in the industry, a detailed description 
of the firm’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT Analysis). 
From this, about 26 firms comprising 20 multinationals and 6 high profile indigenous 
firms were shortlisted for the research. Of these, the researcher planned to get 
access to about 6 firms, two each from three different case groups as planned from 
the research design. The risk of anonymising participating organisations was a 
critical issue at this stage of the research and as explained in the prior research 
design section, the researcher ensured that there was an ample number of firm 
population within each case group from which only two were studied. This ensured 
data would remain untraceable to any firm in particular thereby achieving the crucial 
ethic of anonymity. The next challenge was access into these firms. 
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Gaining access into the organisations  
Gaining access to the firms was an on-going process throughout the research.  From 
the initial contacts made to potential participating firms and the scheduled period of 
the fieldwork was 10 months. Inside these 10 months, only one firm had confirmed 
access. Access to others was obtained during the fieldwork. The process to gaining 
access began with the use of company email links provided in the aforementioned 
UN report. Emails were sent to about 26 potential firms about 10 months prior to the 
intended period of data collection. Of these, only one firm replied asking for more 
details on the research and contact of the researcher’s supervisors to perform 
appropriate checks. Afterwards, the management of the firm granted an approval for 
the research to proceed and promised full cooperation. This was the only firm that 
granted express approval in writing and also greatly cooperated with the researcher 
during the research. On another occasion with another firm, permission was denied 
after series of exchanges between the researcher and a designated HR staff of the 
organisation. The challenge of access to potential firms and low responses was 
therefore a major setback in the initial stages of the research. As at the time of 
heading into the field, only one firm had signalled support and no other save for an 
internal contact in one of the Indian firms. Upon getting to Nigeria, physical meetings 
with some of the established contacts had a major impact on access as the 
researcher was allowed into some firms with the help of these contacts. The 
researcher also then leveraged the professional networks of these leads to gain 
access into other firms with huge success. Thus, in five of six firms that took part in 
this study, no formal approval letter was obtained from the senior management as 
this had proven to be counterproductive when initially explored as the formal 
procedure to follow. However, all respondents that took part in this study did so 
voluntarily and were quite happy to lend their opinion to the research. 
 
Finding potential respondents  
The process of finding potential respondents for this study could only begin as soon 
as the respondent travelled to Lagos, the context of this research. Physically meeting 
with potential participants was more fruitful within the context than the use of virtual 
communication since access to some of the firms was through the help of internal 
leads. Upon gaining access into the firms, the network of internal leads was often the 
first target for interviews, after which the leads themselves would follow. The 
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snowball technique of finding participants for the interview proved very effective with 
each new participant often leading to one or two newer participants for the study. In 
other instances, the researcher simply approached some of the staff to whom the 
researcher had been previously informally introduced to, to give an introduction to 
the research and to request their participation. This yielded some result and a couple 
of new participants were recruited through this means. The former strategy however 
was the most potent for the study given that most of the organisations used are 
closed and often difficult for formal access.  
 
Arranging appointments for interview 
After making contact with potential participants, appointments were often fixed over 
the telephone and the researcher was flexible to the itinerary of the participant. It 
was for this reason interviews had to be conducted in different places. As a lot of 
participants were pharmaceutical sales representatives, the nature of their job 
required constant travel to different parts of Lagos. As such interview times and 
locations varied quite significantly and would average about two to three daily in 
most cases. Executing these two or three daily interviews would require hours of 
driving through notorious traffic and at times travelling very early in the mornings or 
late in the evenings. For ease in some instances, interviews were pre-arranged to 
take place in the participant’s various places of appointments outside their offices to 
save time and energy. In such cases, daily interview numbers would usually be on 
the average of three to four. Also, making room and adjustment for disappointments 
was an essential skill the researcher had to learn as there were seven different 
occasions interviews had to be rescheduled after the researcher had travelled to the 
agreed meeting point only for the participant to disappoint owing to unforeseen 
circumstances. This was prevalent early in the research and was subsequently 
controlled by sending reminder text messages to potential participants a day before 
the appointment and also telephoning them two hours before the agreed time to 
ensure the appointment was still holding. This method worked in almost all cases, 
and in cases where participants did not meet initial appointments, rescheduling for 
the same day was often negotiated but with the researcher having to wait around the 
agreed location for usually a maximum of 3-4 hours.  
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Introducing the research to potential participants 
Upon meeting up with the potential participant, the researcher introduced the 
research to the participant as clearly as possible so they could understand the aim of 
the research. Usually to avoid bias and guide answers the aim of the research 
project was modified slightly. To balance the need for research ethics but also 
ensure the avoidance of participant bias once the research content is fully 
communicated required, participants to read that this research’s aim is to understand 
organizational decision-making effectiveness in different firms in Lagos. Often when 
this was done, the participant felt less vulnerable and connected with the researcher 
for both the interviews and survey questionnaire. Also at this stage the ethics of the 
research and the consent form were read out to them for their signature and 
approval. A crucial part of the ethics included the protection of the identities of all 
firms and respondents that took part in the study. As such, a guarantee of anonymity 
accompanied the consent forms, which often made the interviewee feel a lot safer in 
asserting their views when questioned with boldness and openness. Since all 
identities were anonymised, the researcher instead generated and apportioned 
codes to all interviews and survey data to aid the ease of subsequent use of all 
gathered data. This standard was also applied to the only firm that granted express 
approval. The last part of introducing the research to participants included requesting 
their permission for interviews to be audio recorded, which was granted in all cases 
except on two occasions in which the researcher was allowed to take notes instead. 
After explaining these, participants were often asked if they were willing to go ahead 
with the interviews and questionnaires and in all cases, the response was 
affirmative. However, there were two cases in which after these explanations were 
made, the potential participants turned down their involvement in the research on the 
grounds that there were too busy to make time for the study since average time 
required was about two hours per participant.  
 
The interviews 
The interviews provided the most fascinating experiences during this whole research 
process. First was the fact that the researcher was meeting participants in almost all 
cases for the first time and from the first point of contact, a strong positive impression 
had to be made to win over the participants. This also made a steep learning curve 
for the researcher. Interview questions were semi-structured, they guided the 
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researcher’s questions initially and as interesting issues emerged from the 
interviewee’s responses, those were further probed. In situations where the interview 
setting was open and a bit tense, such as on two occasions in the Indian firms, the 
researcher had to devise sensitive ways of making the interviewee comfortable in 
order to draw information out of them. This included humour most of the times, nods 
of affirmation, intermittent sounds of agreement, and eye contact. In all cases, 
interviewees responded very positively to these such that even when the researcher 
was promised just 30 minutes of interview, the interviews often lasted for 90 minutes 
or more at times.  In all cases, the researcher always ended the interview on a very 
bright note especially in cases where very personal examples and incidents had 
been shared in the cause of the interview. Also, as the number of completed 
interviews increased, the researcher identified potent questions that often drew 
interviewees to open up on salient issues, which provided much needed insights for 
the study. These were retained and were strategically introduced at the peak of the 
interviews, once the interviewee got comfortable with the researcher (Hermanowicz, 
2002). Likewise, questions that were not clearly understood or unproductive were 
carefully taken out of the fold. As these refined sets of questions were deployed in 
subsequent interviews, quality discussions ensued. All interviews were captured 
using the iPhone recording application. It was chosen for its handiness and ease of 
use without making participants feel uncomfortable by any ‘professional’ looking 
device akin to making the researcher look like a real journalist. With each interview 
taking up to one hour and more in most cases, the recording device was always 
ready and effective in doing the good job. 
 
The questionnaire 
All participants in this study were also required to fill out the questionnaire (see 
Appendix 2) prepared to collect additional information on pertinent features of this 
study.  This was aimed at providing a source for data triangulation at the analysis 
stage. This survey instrument was three pages long and had three sections; one for 
the bureaucratic features of the organisation, the second for the moral identity of 
participants and the last section collected demographic information of participants. In 
most cases, questionnaires were filled only after the interview had taken place. Only 
on a few occasions were questionnaires filled in before the interviews were held. 
Also, due to time constraints, in many cases, the questionnaire had to be left behind 
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and picked up at a latter date since the interviews had taken a lot of participant’s 
time during working hours. There were slight challenges recovering some of these 
questionnaires but with persistence, they were all recovered.  
 
Organisation of collected data  
Codes were allocated to both audio data and survey questionnaires for ease of 
matching them together at the analysis stage. Appropriate back-ups were also made 
for all collected data in case of accidental data losses or failure of the electronic 
device. 
  
The following table shows the duration of each stage of this research process: 
 
Table 4.5 – Research process timeline 
Activity  Time line 
Ethics committee approval 2 weeks 
Selecting potential firms 10 months 
Gaining Access 12 months 
Finding potential participants 8 weeks 
Data collection (interviews and survey 
questionnaires) 
10 weeks 
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APPENDIX 4: PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
 
The Public Pledge as the ground for professional authority  
With the notion of expertise being the sole constituent of professionalism significantly 
faulted by Koehn, she goes further to argue that for professionals to have moral 
authority, they must be trustworthy. Trust in this case is the trustor’s expectation that 
the trusted will act to benefit the trustor. She puts forward seven conditions that must 
be met for professionals to be deemed trustworthy. In this case, the professional is 
the trusted and the client is the trustor. It follows that: 
1. The professional must act only in ways that aim at the client’s good to be 
worthy of the client’s trust. 
2. The professional must exhibit willingness to act. This is also necessary for 
trust in the professional –client relationship 
3. The willingness to help must be sustained and last for as long as the client 
needs for help to be rendered to them. 
4. Professionals must also be competent to be trustworthy 
5. Since it takes two to make help possible, the professional must be able to 
demand from the client the degree of accountability and discipline necessary 
for treatment to proceed or a legal case to be developed 
6. The professional must have the autonomy or freedom to serve the client’s 
good with discretion in such ways to ensure the best possible service is 
rendered to the clientele. 
7. The professional must have a high sense of responsibility. Since no one can 
watch over professionals all of the time so the professional must be bound to 
monitor her own behaviour. (Koehn, 1994:54) 
These are not exhaustive but grounding professional authority becomes a matter of 
showing either that the professional practice is already structured to meet the 
requirements above or that it can be altered to do so. Professionals are trust worthy 
as long as their actions conform to what it is to be a professional. The criteria of who 
qualifies to be a professional vary widely. Five frequently cited traits include: 
 
1. Professionals are licensed by the state to perform a certain act 
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2. They belong to an organisation of similarly franchised agents who promulgate 
standards and or ideal behaviour and who discipline one another for breach of 
these standards 
3. They possess esoteric knowledge or skills not shared by other members of 
the community 
4. Exercise autonomy over their work, work which is not well understood by the 
community 
5. Publicly pledge themselves to render assistance to those in need and as a 
consequence have special responsibilities or duties not incumbent upon 
others who have not made this pledge 
According to Koehn, the first four points are neither necessary nor sufficient but the 
fifth one is controversial yet defensible. A license does not confer professionalism 
just as much as having a driver’s license does not make one a professional driver. 
Nor is membership of an organised body a necessary condition for professionalism. 
Indeed doctors and lawyers belong to such bodies to regulate conduct and practices 
yet many others do not belong to any professional bodies perhaps because they do 
not entirely agree with the principles of such bodies. For instance in the case of 
doctors renouncing their professional membership of the American Medical 
Association for initiating policies that restrict health care access. Likewise, 
possessing esoteric skill does not create a moral obligation to help with those sets of 
skills as have already been argued in the case of experts. 
 
The persons who are universally recognised as professionals are those who do 
serve clients. Professionals must command the trust of clients who seek a public 
good. The concept of trust in this relationship is defined as the trustor’s expectation 
that the trustee will exhibit towards him. This is trust and not the perceived power of 
the professional to manipulate things or people, which bestows moral legitimacy. 
Therefore Koehn (1994) defines a professional as ‘an agent who freely makes a 
public promise to serve persons (e.g. the sick) who are distinguished by a specific 
desire for a particular good (e.g. health) and who have come into the presence of the 
professional with or on the expectation that the professional will promote that 
particular good’ (page 59).  
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Therefore, agents become professional by virtue of what they publicly profess or 
proclaim before persons lacking particular goods. Historically, the term profession 
implies the importance of the public statement of the professional to practice within 
the community. The word profess is from the Greek word prophaino meaning ‘to 
publicly declare’ and Latin word professio, a term applied to public statement made 
by persons who sought to occupy a position of trust. In all of these the profession or 
statement binds the speaker, but not the listener to act to help those needing a 
particular form of assistance. This is different from a contract, which is binding on 
two parties, which also must be accepted by both to be binding. In this case, once 
the utterance has been made, it becomes binding.  
 
Thus, professions use pledge to bind would be helpers to assist parties. These 
pledges are relatively unconditional and they bind the utterers to serve those who 
qualify as clients irrespective of clients’ ability to pay, their personal traits or the 
personal liking the professional may feel towards them. As such in the case of a 
lawyer, when a lawyer pledges to uphold the law as he becomes a practising 
member of the profession, he swears an oath to help and render his services to 
those who need it in the context of the law. Hence, the client cannot be reduced to 
the person upon whom a lawyer decides to bestow service. Rather the client is the 
person seeking legal justice who has come to the lawyer because of the lawyer’s 
public promise to promote legal justice, which is the good the client desires. This is 
the nature of professionalism as Koehn argues. It is based on an unwavering 
commitment based on public pledge to render a service to anyone in need of such 
service and it is on these grounds that professionals have moral legitimacy and can 
be trusted. 
